On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason

by Arthur Schopenhauer, Mme Karl Hillebrand (Translator)

A disciple of Immanuel Kant, Arthur Schopenhauer took the Kantian concept that all knowledge derives from experience and broadened it to conclude that our experience of the world is necessarily subjective and influenced by our own intellect and biases, and that reality is but an extension of our own will. This is the basis of all of Schopenhauer's thinking, and here, he offers an essential foundation for understanding and appreciating all of his work. First produced as his doctoral dissertation in 1813, these two essays-"On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason" and "On the Will in Nature"-were revised and published by the author in 1847; this 1889 edition represents its first translation into the English language. Students of philosophy and of 19th-century culture will find this a demanding but satisfying read. The writings of German philosopher ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER (1788-1860) were a profound influence on art and aesthetics, music and literature in the 19th century. Among his many writings, The World as Will and Idea (1819) is considered his masterpiece.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, German Literature, Metaphysics, Germany, Classics, Psychology

412 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1813

About the author

Arthur Schopenhauer was born in the city of Danzig (then part of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth; present day Gdańsk, Poland) and was a German philosopher best known for his work The World as Will and Representation. Schopenhauer attempted to make his career as an academic by correcting and expanding Immanuel Kant's philosophy concerning the way in which we experience the world.

He was the son of author Johanna Schopenhauer and the older brother of Adele Schopenhauer.

Reviews

[Nick · Rating 5 out of 5]

Arthur told us to read this as the introduction to The World as Will and Representation, and boy was he right. Schopenhauer explains his treatment of Kant's philosophy so succinctly that WWR is really an exposition of what is written here. The strangest thing about Schopenhauer to me when i first approached him was his fixation on causality. You don't find a lot of thinkers so fascinated with the principle of sufficient reason. It is usually taken as a given. But it does form the basis of his whole system, which is why this is the proper introduction to his thought. 

Before reading this, it is necessary to have some familiarity with Plato and Kant, as Schopenhauer also told us in the introduction to WWR. The two things that one must approach this work which are found in Plato and Kant are 1) there is a difference between how the world appears to us and how it really is (Plato) & 2) we cannot go from this appearance to the thing in itself; the division of subject and object is fundamental (Kant). 

Given these two insights, the purpose of this work is to explore what Schopenhauer thinks is the general rule governing what we can know, which manifests itself in any attempt to understand "the world". It is also helpful to read Schopenhauer's criticism of Kant's philosophy to understand how Schopenhauer's treatment of the division of subject and object differs from that of Kant. The difference is that Arthur took the subjective idealism associated with George Berkeley seriously. That is, an object is known by a subject and cannot be considered as just "out there". Without the subject the world as object disappears. The "external" world is in some way known to us by experience, as we are to it. It goes both ways.

Most importantly, it is downright foolish and misleading to say that objects "cause" our representations independently. For causality is something that our knowing mind projects onto reality. Again without the knowing subject this world as object disappears, and so we cannot say these objects cause our sensations. Rather they are our representations. If we try attribute to them a cause, we must then explain how it is they are responsible for these effects ad infinitum, and so we discover that the principle of sufficient reason itself is fundamental to understanding and cannot be invoked to explain "the world" or "the thing in itself” independent of our understanding.

What the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason does is to ground sufficient reason as an explanation for various things we know, but not to invoke an explanation for it. That would require going to this noumenal world (which is dealt with in WWR). 

Sufficient reason is just that something is only explained with reference to something else, sufficient as in enough to explain its existence. Sufficient is not the same as necessary, although all causality as such is necessary, since a particular cause may have different effects and an effect may have different causes, it is the mutual relation between different things not in identity that defines causality. But is a relation that can only be for actually existing things. Nothing comes from nothing, something comes from something. This being based on the fundamental division of subject and object. Both have no meaning without the other. It is owing to this basic relation between different things that a reason is to be provided for something, which only is in relation to what else is. 

Aristotle attempted to separate different uses of sufficient reason into four as did Schopenhauer. These were material, final, formal, and efficient.

Material- what the cause is made of. "Wood."
Final- the end or purpose to which a cause occurs. "Write on"
Formal- what is the essence, nature, of the cause. "Rectangle."
Efficient- what brought the cause into existence. "Carpenter."

Together we get the causes of "table."

Schopenhauer differs from Aristotle by distinguishing valid uses for phenomena as opposed to objects (Kant). Aristotle in contrast to Kant was an transcendental realist: knowledge of objects is independent of experience and we can know their essence through experience.

Schopenhauer's four roots are:
Becoming (law of causality)- physical causes and effects
Knowing (reason)- abstract representation of causal relationships
Being (space & time)- relation of representations
Motives (action or will)- internal motivation of causal agent, subject

I think one can sort of map Schopenhauer's four roots to Aristotle's:
Becoming (material)
Knowing (final)
Being (formal)
Acting (efficient)

Schopenhauer's roots I also think can be thought to correspond to what are called the classical laws of thought. Schopenhauer acknowledges the four:

1) a subject is equal to the sum total of its predicates. Law of identity, a=a.

2) no predicate can be attributed and denied to a subject at the same time. Law of non-contradiction, a=-a=0. 

3) one of two opposite, contradictory predicates must belong to every subject. Law of the excluded middle. A is not A and B.

4) truth is the reference of a judgement to something outside of it, as its sufficient reason. 

The class of becoming corresponds to identity as like things can only be explained by like things, which shall always demand explanation. The effect is known by its cause and can contain only that. 

The class of knowing corresponds to non-contradiction. Among our representations, they may only follow from those of their type.

The class of being corresponds to excluded middle. Space and time which are a priori allow for multiplicity and coexistence (space) and succession (time), thus a relation between the two as well as a difference. 

The class of motives corresponds to sufficient reason. This is because it is through the immediate object of the inner sense (time) alone that we come to know the principle of causality at first through the law of causality and then its other groundings. 

(Notice how sequentially closer the four laws, roots, and Aristotle's classes come closer to Schopenhauer's will and away from phenomena...)

This connection of the four laws of thought with the four roots is largely mine, though Schopenhauer does list the four laws in this way, as what he calls metalogical truths, governing the second class (of reason). I hope this inference is accurate. If it is, then it is a splendidly easy way to understand this work. Together, the four laws of thought and the four roots explain everything. That i think Schopenhauer could assent to, even if I matched them incorrectly. 

The big point to all this is that the principle of sufficient reason and therefore all we can know is a result of the division of world into subject and object. It is that simple. Without this division, things wouldn't follow one after another, they would just be. But they could not "be" in a meaningful way without this division. 

The relevant part for his more popular ethical and aesthetic writings is the fourth class. This immediate motive power as will be shown in the World as Will and Representation is our direct access away from representation to the thing in itself.

If Schopenhauer is right about the principle of sufficient reason being "sufficient" to explain the different classes of knowing, then Kant's Procrustean table of judgements is reduced from twelve categories to one: causality. The end result of this is that it is possible to have intuitions without concepts (which Kant claimed would be blind). And thereby have access to the mysterious thing-in-itself through direct experience. The route to this is the inner sense of time, as opposed to the outer sense of space. Space gives us multiplicity via coexistence whereas time presents unity through duration. With time we experience an endless chain of causation where one thing becomes another, and an individual thing means nothing outside of its relation to other things. Just as the future makes no sense without a present or a past.

We can perhaps escape our own individuated existence and learn the true nature of things, which is not be god which is a transcendental idea and argued for inappropriately from the principle of sufficient reason. The underlying nature of our world, noumena, is knowable to us and all living things but unconsciously, not as individuated objects in the forms of space-time-causality which belong only to the knowing subject. It is not rational or at least to us not known rationally. Yet it is intimately connected to our conscious life. Not as a cause, but as one in the same as the world as it appears to us as idea.

[Hamid Elikahi · Rating 4 out of 5]

به گمانم بيشتر خوانندگان اين كتاب مسير مشابهي را پيموده اند كه از مقدمه ي "جهان همچون اراده و تصور" مي گذرد، جايي كه شوپنهاور مطالعه ي "ريشه..." را پيش نياز ضروري آغاز اثر عظيم مي داند. همان جا پيش نياز ديگر آشنايي با فلسفه ي كانت بيان مي شود كه بدون شك پيش نياز كمابيش ضروري اثر حاضر نيز هست؛ دستكم بايد تعريف لغتنامه اي بعضي اصطلاحات او مانند پيشيني و پسيني يا گزاره هاي تحليلي و تركيبي را دانست تا بعضي قسمت ها بيش از اندازه نامفهوم نباشند.
همان طور كه مترجم فارسي در مقدمه ي كوتاهش اشاره مي كند خواندن كتاب آسان نيست. تيزي نكته هاي ظريفي اين و آنجا بر مغز آدم فرو مي رود، اما دنبال كردن رشته ي اصلي كتاب گاهي بسيار دشوار است. به نظرم سخت ترين بخش كتاب تكه هايي از فصل اول و تكه هايي از بخش هفتم است آنجا كه مفهوم اراده را معرفي مي كند.
ترجمه روان است و كم پيش مي آيد از خودت بپرسي اين جمله را چطور بايد بخوانم كه دستكم از نظر دستوري درست به نظر بيايد. تمركزي كه آقاي ولي ياري جوان روي شوپنهاور داشته اند خاطر آدم را نسبت به كارشان جمع مي كند. من قبل از شروع ترجمه ي فارسي چيزي حدود ١٠٠ صفحه از ترجمه ي انگليسي كتاب را خوانده بودم كه درمجموع همان دستم آمده بود كه از ترجمه ي فارسي.
اين جناب شوپنهاور آدم بداخلاق و بامزه اي تشريف داشته اند. بسياري از تكه هاي كتاب با بدوبيراه گويي به فيلسوفان به نظر ايشان به دنبال ناني مثل هگل و رفقايش پايان مي گيرند كه احمق و بي شعورند. اين طور ليچارگويي، درست بعد از سطرهايي كه مبحث سنگيني را به بحث كشيده، ناگهان فشار را از روي فكر آدم برمي دارد و به خنده اش مي اندازد.

[Malakh · Rating 5 out of 5]

Al publicar la segunda edición de su magna obra El mundo como voluntad y representación – nada menos que un cuarto de siglo después de su primera publicación – Schopenhauer optó por dejar inmaculada su exposición y añadir un segundo volumen, con cuatro nuevos tomos y bajo el título de Complementos. La distancia temporal que separaba este nuevo planteamiento de sus reflexiones de juventud ocasionó esta decisión, a través de la cual pretendía guardarse «de deteriorar el trabajo de mis años mozos mediante la rebuscada crítica de la vejez». Es posible que hablar de un deterioro de sus anteriores escritos resulte una exageración; no obstante, esa misma revisión y reedición que allí desaprobaba la había realizado pocos años antes con su tesis doctoral, Sobre la cuádruple raíz del principio de razón suficiente, compuesta en 1813 y galardonada in absentia por la Universidad de Jena. Por esta razón, este escrito incluye fragmentos indiferenciados de juventud y vejez, aunque prontamente detectables cuando se refiere a sus obras posteriores o cuando critica abierta y furibundamente a los filósofos contemporáneos, actitud que, por razones evidentes, no mostró en la mucho más cautelosa versión que elaboró en su etapa juvenil.

Ahora bien, desde la misma introducción a la obra advierte Pilar López de Santa María que en ella descubrimos «al Schopenhauer – valga la expresión – menos schopenhaueriano: el que no habla de la voluntad, de las ideas o los dolores de la existencia». Ciertamente esta obra no incluye – o incorpora tan sólo de forma embrionaria – los grandes temas por los que el autor ha sido conocido posteriormente, aunque nada menos que su fundamental teoría del conocimiento se encuentra expuesta aquí casi en su totalidad. No en vano, escribirá posteriormente que «sin familiarizarse con esta introducción y propedéutica no es posible comprender cabalmente el presente escrito [El mundo como voluntad y representación], y el contenido de aquel tratado será presupuesto aquí por doquier como si estuviera en este libro; además, si ese tratado no hubiera precedido hace ya varios años a este libro, más que anteponerlo como introducción, lo habría incorporado al primer libro, el cual ahora, al faltarle lo dicho en aquel tratado, muestra cierta imperfección por esa laguna que ha de ser suplida mediante la invocación de dicho tratado». Por consiguiente, no puede disminuirse la importancia de esta obra, que asentó una serie de cimientos sobre los que Schopenhauer construyó fatigosamente durante el resto de su vida.

El problema que buscaba resolver con este ensayo proviene de la confusa exposición que a su parecer habían realizado los filósofos precedentes del principio de razón suficiente, «el gran principio del porqué» (Leibniz) o el «principio de toda explicación» (Schopenhauer), que seguía la fórmula wolffiana de que Nihil est sine ratione cur potius sit, quam non sit (Nada es sin una razón por la que sea). Este principio sirve de enlace entre todas nuestras representaciones, sean de la clase que sean, de modo que fundamenta el carácter sistemático de la ciencia y la distingue del simple agregado de conocimientos. Habiendo sido formulado universalmente desde los antiguos, se había «descuidado la adecuada separación de sus muy diversas aplicaciones, en cada una de las cuales obtiene un diferente significado y que, por lo tanto, delatan que su origen se encuentra en distintas potencias cognoscitivas». Por esta razón, al interpretar que existen cuatro clases posibles de objetos de nuestra facultad representativa, Schopenhauer estipula que deben existir cuatro formas – o raíces – del principio de razón suficiente que corresponden a nuestra forma de conocer estas clases de objetos.

De esta forma, el filósofo de Danzig analiza las principales visiones del principio a lo largo de la historia, criticando la habitual confusión entre causa y razón de conocimiento para posteriormente exponer su perspectiva sobre el particular. Cada uno de los capítulos de la obra corresponde a un pormenorizado examen de las cuatro clases de representaciones u objetos y el principio que responde al conocimiento de sus relaciones. Con la magnífica capacidad literaria que caracteriza todos sus textos, a lo largo del tratado expone sus acuerdos y discrepancias con la filosofía kantiana – maestro al que aspiraba a superar – e incorpora iracundas acometidas contra los argumentos ontológico y cosmológico; aunque sin duda aquello que otorga un carácter encantador a la obra son sus continuas diatribas a la filosofía alemana de su tiempo, en la que Hegel y Fichte se llevan la peor parte. Como es habitualmente señalado, es recomendable poseer cierto conocimiento, aunque sea superficial, de la filosofía moderna, sus conceptos y sus problemas – especialmente en lo referido a Kant y Hume – a la hora de acercarse a los textos de Schopenhauer. No obstante, más allá de estos saberes preliminares, leer a este autor es, como el mismo afirmaba que debía expresarse el buen filósofo, similar a asomarse a «un lago suizo que, debido a su calma, aun siendo muy profundo tiene una gran claridad, que es precisamente la que hace visible la profundidad».

[Awrixa · Rating 4 out of 5]

همانطور که خود نویسنده گفته ، این کتاب مقدمه کتاب «جهان همچون اراده و تصور»، کتاب اصلی نویسنده، هست. ترجمه آقای ولی‌یاری واقعا عالی هست و سختی خوندن رو کاهش داده ولی باز باید تمرکز کافی رو هنگام خوندن داشت.

[Erick · Rating 3 out of 5]

Schopenhauer epitomizes the philosophical blowhard. Having an ego is not rare among philosophers. Indeed, it’s quite common, but Schopenhauer takes it to the next level. Hegel was egotistical, but his egotism was largely due to his over appreciation. Schopenhauer’s ego was due to his perceived under appreciation. He hardly misses an opportunity to blast other philosophers while lamenting his own perceived obscurity. Hell hath no fury like a philosopher scorned.


This isn’t a bad work. It didn’t strike me as particularly novel or consistent though. His philosophy regarding the will strikes me as being novel to a degree, but the theme of this work, which deals primarily with the segmentation of mind and its approach to perception, isn’t. Many philosophers prior to Schopenhauer recognized the role that the understanding plays in perception. Apparently, Schopenhauer saw his contribution being in his segmentation of the mind. Ultimately, Schopenhauer sees reason (vernunft) and understanding (verstand) as the principle parts of mind. The understanding uses intuitive perception to decode the external world and the reason makes concepts out of that. At least, this is what I get out of what Schopenhauer presents here. Schopenhauer is far from concise, and, quite honestly, he has a tendency to ramble. His rabbit trails often veer into reproaches of other philosophers and into other areas that the relevancy of is not always readily apparent.


Schopenhauer apparently faults earlier philosophies that investigated the process of cause and effect because they didn’t call attention to the importance of the state or condition that surrounds any particular example of cause and effect (pg. 55). In other words, cause and effect only exists within the context of the conditional. Under the wrong conditions, a cause is rendered null. He also thinks that cause and effect is endlessly regressive and progressive. For whatever reason, Schopenhauer thought it was important to point this out. Even though I don’t deny the truth of what he is claiming, I have a tendency to wonder what the utility of such a criticism is. If a cop is investigating a stabbing, he doesn’t need to know that the knife was made in China – even though that may be a part of this particular chain of events and directly factored into the condition. Likewise, earlier philosophers investigating cause and effect might’ve seen more utility in limiting their investigations to relevant proximities. Conditions, although indeed relevant to effectivity overall, can be nigh on infinite and incalculable if one tries to factor all of them in. Limiting oneself to relevant factors when investigating cause and effect might simply be a practical necessity. Schopenhauer’s criticism seems to not have a lot of merit if we apply Occam’s razor to such topics. Cause and effect can be properly limited to the immediate cause (as being the active component) and immediate effect in most cases. Conditions are passive components and often impractical to account for in total. Schopenhauer breaks down all movement as cause, stimulus and motive (pg. 111). This seems to be a reasonable approach to take regarding cause and effect. It can at least render it calculable.


Schopenhauer sees intuitive perception as being empirical (pg. 118). He goes on to state that matter and substance are the same and are pure action/cause (pg. 119). He reaches this conclusion by removing quality and form from matter. He sees substance as being objective and abstract, while the form and quality are concrete and, apparently, subjective. This is certainly idealist language and hardly consistent with any kind of empiricism. Schopenhauer calls this transcendental idealism to differentiate it from the idealism of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. It’s his modified Kantian idealism. I hardly find his approach consistent though. Schopenhauer sees all change as being infinitely divisible (p. 136). He rightly recognizes that this cannot be perceived, so we can no longer be dealing with an intuitive perception that is empirical. It is certainly far from clear to me that an infinite divisibility is even reasonable. Schopenhauer cites Aristotle as his authority for accepting such an extrapolation from sensory data. I would cite Zeno as my authority as to why it is far from a reasonable extrapolation. Aristotle was attempting to refute Zeno but was certainly far from successful. Infinite divisibility of anything requires practical absurdities. The famous one being if one leaves one’s current place in space to any other place, one must pass the halfway mark between the two places, but there is a halfway mark even between these that one must pass, and a halfway mark between that...etc... ad infinitum. Infinite divisibility ultimately means one must move through infinite space to reach any point, which is obviously counter to any empirical understanding of perceivable space. Aristotle may think that we move in infinite ways to compensate for this distance, but this is to simply add further complications when the obvious and simpler explanation is that space and time are not infinitely divisible. This must also go for change as well. Even if one were to accept Schopenhauer’s and Aristotle’s perspective, it doesn’t help Schopenhauer because these infinite degrees of change aren’t empirical and could have little to do with what intuitive perception supplies the understanding with and ultimately what the reason works with (Pg. 170-171). The above does point to problems with Schopenhauer’s segmentation of mind if nothing else. Schopenhauer’s desire to retain abstract idealistic philosophy, while at the same time, retaining the empiricism of the English philosophers is ultimately the main issue.


Schopenhauer created a philosophy that was a bizarre mixture of Kantian and Humean philosophies. Hume was hardly consistent. I don’t think Schopenhauer is either. Schopenhauer uses his segmentation of mind as a means of attacking other philosophers and philosophies. He is able to switch places of attack when countering certain philosophies by positioning himself onto one of these segments of mind. He can attack proofs for God’s existence by positioning himself on reason but can accept physical phenomena at face value (Pg. 69) by presumably positioning himself on the understanding. This kind of ambivalence is a tiresome philosophical escapade. It isn’t that I’ve ever been taken with philosophies attempting to validate God’s existence, it really is that I don’t find Schopenhauer consistent. I feel like he was involved in some kind of ruse in which he not only duped himself, but was attempting to dupe others. I do plan on continuing my study of him, but I am not too terribly impressed so far. I give the book around 3 stars. This work does have some compelling moments, but not too many. I could have added more to this review, but I am already tired of typing.

[محمدعلی کرمی · Rating 5 out of 5]

من هم مثل اکثرِ دوستان به‌منظور مطالعه اثر اصلی شوپنهاور، یعنی «جهان همچون اراده و تصور» از این کتاب عبور کردم. اگر علاقه‌مند به معرفت‌شناسی نباشید، می‌تونه کمی خسته‌کننده باشه، که البته به‌نظر من عمده بخش‌های کتاب سرگرم کننده و جذاب بودن. مطالعه‌ی کتاب نیاز به آشناییِ نسبی با فلسفه یونان باستان و کانت داره. کاری که ریشه چهارگان اصل دلیل کافی انجام می‌ده اینه که دلیل کافی رو به عنوان توضیحی برای چیزهای مختلفی که می‌دونیم، اما برای توضیحی براشون نداریم، ارائه میده. همونطور که از نام اثر پیداست، کتاب در باب توضیح زمینه‌ایه که خودش رو از چهار منظر ارائه می‌کنه. این چهار منظر عبارتند از صیرورت و یا همون شدن، شناسایی، وجود و فعالیت که به ترتیب به شکل 1. قانون علیت، 2. قانون حکم ظاهری، 3. قانون موقعیت در مکان و توالی در زمان و 4. قانون انگیزش و تحریک، ظاهر می‌شود.
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دلیل کافی به این معنیه که که چیزی فقط با ارجاع به چیزی دیگه تبیین میشه، منظور از کافی اینه که وجود چیزی رو توضیح بده. کافی همون ضروری نیست، اگرچه علیت به این صورت ضروریه، یک علت خاص ممکنه آثار متفاوتی داشته باشد و یک معلول ممکنه علل متفاوتی داشته باشد، این رابطه متقابل بین چیزهای مختلفیه که در عینیت نیستند که علیت را تعریف کنند. اما رابطه‌ایه که فقط می‌تونه برای چیزهای واقعی وجود داشته باشه. هیچ چیز از هیچ به وجود نمیاد، چیزها از چیزهای دیگه ایجاد میشن. این مبتنی بر تقسیم اساسی موضوع و مفعول است. هر دو بدون دیگری معنایی ندارند. به دلیل همین رابطه اساسی بین چیزهای مختلف است که باید برای چیزی دلیلی ارائه کرد که فقط در رابطه به چیز دیگری است. شوپنهاور بر این باوره که حداکثر درک‌پذیری ممکن پیش نیاز مطلقا ضروری برای فلسفه، با تعریف دقیق همه‌ی عبارات به‌دست میاد. برای مقابله با اشتباه سهوی و عمدی و اینکه شناخت به دست آمده در قلمرو فلسفه را ایمن‌تر کنیم که با کشف بعدی سوء فهم یا ابهام دوباره به وجود نیاد، به این درک‌پذیر بودن نیاز داریم. خلاصه اینکه فیلسوف واقعی به دنبال وضوح و تمایزه. از دید شوپنهاور، اصل دلیل کافی بنیان هرگونه علمه. معنای کلی اصل دلیل کافی اینه که هرچیزی همواره و همه‌جا به‌واسطه چیز دیگری به وجود میاد؛ هیچ چیز بدون زمینه یا دلیلی برای این که از چه رو موجوده، وجود نداره. این کتاب شرحِ خیلی خوبی بر ایدئالیسمِ استعلاییه، البته من آشنایی عمیقی با کانت ندارم که بخوام نظر خاصی در این باب داشته باشم. شوپنهاور تصحیحات و رفع عیب‌هایی بر فلسفه کانت اعمال میکنه و نقد شدیدی هم به بسیاری از فلاسفه دیگه مانند دکارت و اسپینوزا وارد می‌کنه و فصول ابتدایی که در باب برهان‌های وجود خدا بحث میکنه بسیار جذابن.
پ.ن: شاید بعدا تغییراتی هم تو این متن بدم.

[Paradoxe · Rating 5 out of 5]

Πάνω από 4.5 αστέρια, κάτω από 5.

Κριτική οσονούπω

20/03:
Παρέλειψα και θα παραλείψω για λίγο ακόμα ν' ανεβάσω μία κριτική ή μάλλον περισσότερο μία σύνοψη γι' αυτό το βιβλίο,. ωστόσο θέλω να σημειώσω ότι δεν έχω σταματήσει να "τσιμπολογώ" απ' αυτό. Νομίζω πως δε μπορώ να το ξεπεράσω κι είναι το δεύτερο βιβλίο του συγγραφέα που μου προκαλεί αυτή την αντίδραση. Δεν είναι πως το ξαναδιαβάζω, περισσότερο θωπεύω σελίδες. Αλλά σήμερα ειδικά διαβάζοντας πάλι για την αφή και την όραση συνειδητοποιώ για μία ακόμη φορά πόσο ευγνώμων νιώθω απέναντι στο συγγραφέα που απ το πρώτο βιβλίο του οδηγήθηκα στο Περί Ψυχής του Αριστοτέλη και στη γνωριμία με το Σενέκα. Ειδικά το Περί Ψυχής μέσω της Τετραπλής ρίζας αποκτά ακόμη μεγαλύτερη δύναμη μέσα μου. Το αόρατο χέρι του Σοπενάουερ διαρκώς με οδηγεί κάπου, εύχομαι στο διηνεκές.

[Jake Yaniak · Rating 5 out of 5]

There is probably no better explanation of Transcendental Idealism than Schopenhauer's On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Schopenhauer was an incredibly skilled philosopher, with a cutting wit as sharp as his intellect. He comes across a bit petty when he criticizes Hegel. But if you've ever tried to study Hegel you'll find his frustration with the other philosopher quite understandable.

[Miguel Rodríguez · Rating 5 out of 5]

En el prólogo de El mundo como voluntad y representación, Schopenhauer nos indica varios requisitos para leerlo: Haber leído su tesis (este libro), tres libros de Kant (uno de ellos Prolegómenos), y varias cosas más. Me tomé en serio (parte de) su recomendación, y me alegro mucho de haberlo hecho.

Este libro fue su tesis doctoral, escrita en 1813 y revisada y completada en 1847. Recoge casi en su totalidad la teoría del conocimiento de El mundo y sus escritos posteriores, y es un trabajo sobresaliente y exhaustivo que arroja luz sobre cuestiones como la subjetividad, la causalidad, la verdad y el conocimiento humano.

Para leerlo, es recomendable tener una buena idea de qué es el idealismo trascendental y las formas de la intuición, el entendimiento y la razón kantianas (y su jerga farragosa), y también conocer algo la epistemología de Hume. Partiendo de esto, el libro es de una claridad abrumadora. Busca ser cristalino en cada definición y desarrollo. Recorre la historia filosófica del principio de la razón, a la par que construye su teoría del conocimiento, señalando y corrigiendo errores fundamentales del sistema kantiano. Simplemente por su concisión merece la pena leerlo, pero la crítica kantiana, su tratamiento de la causalidad y la percepción, la crítica del concepto de sujeto, de la teología y su concepto de voluntad lo convierten en un texto valiosísimo que, desgraciadamente, es constantemente olvidado.

También hay que reconocer varios defectos que tiene, y el mayor es remitir continuamente a otras obras suyas para poder leer el desarrollo completo de "x" concepto. Otro es el escaso desarrollo del concepto de voluntad (y su ambigüedad). Por otra parte, sus insultos a Hegel, a Alemania y a la filosofía académica en general me han parecido divertidísimos.

4.5/5

[Rondo Kazakian · Rating 5 out of 5]

I have very rarely read a book that I could feel changing my internal architecture page by page. Many other people have said this, but with Schopenhauer, I feel like I'm seeing my own thoughts and most deeply held convictions elucidated with an order and precision I could never achieve myself. I haven't even cracked "Will and Idea" yet, and already, Schope's notions of perception, thought, eternity, universal personhood, etc. etc. have changed the way I see the world.

Schopenhauer walks such a fine line. He doesn't buy into the human exceptionalism of religious and nationalistic thought, but he never gets close to nihilism. He's an atheist, but he creates a more meaningful foundation for human experience and soulfulness than I've seen in any religion. He's crusty and sarcastic, but also deeply passionate. His thoughts are so deep and specific, but his writing is light and beautiful and savory.

I know I'm going to spend a great deal of time with all of Schopenhauer's works, and honestly, I'm thrilled to death that I found them.

[Alex Lee · Rating 3 out of 5]

Schopenhauer finds it necessary to rescue noumena causa from Kant by calibrating our human experience to these four grounds of causation. These four grounds for Schopenhauer arise naturally due to different cuts in reasoning's consistency. Admittedly these grounds are somewhat arbitrary, but he is unable to find much connection between these grounds except for their ability to highlight concepts. In this Schopenhauer is very much a follower of Kant.

I, too, do sometimes find Kant to be too airy. But that conceptual distant is necessary to highlight principle "noumenonal" connection between disparate phenomenon. Schopenhauer can be thought of as being a half step so as to try and bring Kant back. In the process Schopenhauer seems to find the most objectional point being Kant's misuse of the term "ground". Ground here is another way of denoting various cuts, "levels" of rationality for Schopenhauer, so by no means is four the only way to arrange these levels, as we can provide a multitude of differing reasons, each of which Kant would most likely state as being chimeral and undecidable in isolation.

What is of interest though, is that like Kant, Schopenhauer calibrates human action to will (desire). Unlike Kant, Schopenhauer seems to find that will is more radically aligned to create objects as well, not just through the platitudes of a noumenon as a morality but also existentially. Schopenhauer seems to find that the actual physical world is created through repetition of various consistencies like a wheelbarrow traveling the same ground in the same way as to make a rut... this dissolving of the phenomenal eliminates the thing-in-itself from view as an independence of human will. As a result, Schopenhauer requires another ground (having eliminated Kant's ground) thus, Schopenhauer finds everything as emerging from reason as a geometry of which causation is but a mode of extension.

In some ways, Schopenhauer is like Descartes in seeing everything as a consistency constituted through a rational mentality. This is an interesting move which eventually finds its full expression with Husserl (perhaps independently of Schopenhauer) but the move to remap all in terms of rationality is perhaps too much, and allows Schopenhauer far too much freedom to disregard the world as excessive chimera, when in fact it becomes more likely that Schopenhauer falls prey to chimera himself. How else can he claim that his fourfold root is the actual calibration of that is an optimization of understanding?

He can't. He can only show us how this view is possible, not that it is all encompassing above all other views, in part because he can't really evaluate other views except through a neutral term, which he then goes forth and questions, as there can be no real ground as any one thing requires another thing.

In this Schopenhauer is correct, all is connected through conception and rationalization -- but rather than end up with a Liebnizian monad or a Deleuzian rhizome, he reverts to a loose Kantian model of mid-modernism reasoning that cannot recognize that radical groundlessness that Schopenhauer is courting except to insist on it in terms of zero (void) or infinity (all).

What would help Schopenhauer in this, to find a quantized view of all through all else, is for him to give up the very instrument he cannot give up; to grasp that unlike Kant's insistence on a faculty of pure reason there are in fact an indeterminate number of reason(ing)s... that reason may be sufficient but it is not the only One.

[Griffin Wilson · Rating 4 out of 5]

I would exhort any potential reader to first familiarize themselves with Kant's First Critique (or perhaps the Prolegomena) up to at least a superficial level, although ideally a thorough one.

After all, Schopenhauer did -- in another work -- say:
"Whosoever has not read and understood Kant is but a child."

The "Principle of Sufficient Reason" was perhaps best described by Leibniz when he wrote "nihil est sin ratione" (nothing is without reason); everything occurs for a reason, and Schopenhauer sets out to propose the "root" of this fact.

The Fourfold Root is as follows
The Reason of Being: or the a priority of time as a pure intuition of both inner and outer sense.
The Reason of Being in Space: or the a priority of space as the pure intuition that, along with time and the a priori concept of the understanding (causality), renders sensibility and perception possible. Schopenhauer takes what was Kant's table of categories and shaves off everything but causality.
The Law of Motives: or what is, more or less, the "Will," a very complicated concept which I will not explain here.
The Reason of Knowing: or that a judgment may only be considered knowledge if it is true. Thus, a judgement may be considered knowledge by way of logical truth, empirical truth, transcendental truth, or metalogical truth. The other sections on the "root" I understand well enough, but this I found most difficult. I am not yet done with Kant's Critique of Judgement, so perhaps the fog will begin to clear as I work my way through that.

Schopenhauer does not restrain himself in lambasting Hegel, Fichte, Jacobi, and other "professors" for their (in his opinion) inability to accept the limits that Kant's transcendental philosophy placed around them

[Gerrit G.]

I have read it as a supplement to Kant's first critique. It is not an easy work to understand, there are some random rants against ppl such as Hegel which overdoes it and makes you think deeper about *what* the content of the critique really is.

[Cameron · Rating 5 out of 5]

The principle of sufficient reason is one of the great metaphysical controversies that has engaged philosophers from Aristotle to Spinoza. Simply put, the principle states that for everything that exists, there is a sufficient reason for why it exists and not otherwise. Schopenhauer's critical interpretation of the principle identifies the basic condition for both the applications of the principle and knowledge of the phenomenal world in general: the presence of a subject apprehending an object. He outlays four fundamental classes of objects and corresponding intellectual constructs for which sufficient reason can be obtained by the subject. For Schopenhauer, the phenomenal world and the subject are inextricably linked or "inseparable correlates," a subjective condition paving the way for the centerpiece of his philosophical system: the thing-in-itself, or the Will. A powerful work of Kantian metaphysics by one of philosophy's most lucid minds.

[Koszta Robert · Rating 5 out of 5]

Schopenhauer - numele ca sunet si portretul ca imagine a ceea ce sunetul numește ascundeau de mult timp pentru mine o aparență, o intuită greutate. Acum mult timp cineva a pronunțat acest nume.. și mi-a rămas în minte. Dar muzicalitatea și colorația lui ce s-au alipit de mine în anii adolescenței le-am descifrat în sfârșit sub reprezentarea minții acestuia pe care am început să o cunosc. Care este, după mine, unul dintre cele mai înalte vârfuri de munte. Iar Schopenhauer te ia cu el și îți arată drumul spre acesta, de unde se pot vedea atât de clar atât de multe lucruri.
Spre exemplu, aveam o enigmă de când eram copil, o intrebare: "de ce mă văd cu capul în jos atunci când mă privesc într-o lingură..?". Și, deși răspunsul poate părea stupid de intuitiv, nu îmi explic de ce nu am căutat mai mult să îl găsesc. Și m-a găsit el pe mine, arătându-se de unde nu credeam că pot să mă aștept. De la Schopenhauer, ce explică foarte simplu și grafic, de ce imaginea se creează cu capul în jos pe retină. Reamintindu-mi că e datorată desigur caracterului rectiliniu al luminii:

"Primul lucru pe care-l face intelectul este acela că restabileşte impresia produsă de obiect, impresie ce ajunge răsturnată pe retină, cu josul în sus. După cum se ştie, răsturnarea inițială apare datorită faptului că, deoarece fiecare punct al obiectului vizibil emite raze rectilinii în toate părțile, razele care provin de la extremitatea superioară a acestuia se intersectează în deschiderea îngustă a pupilei cu cele ce provin de la extremitatea inferioară, ceea ce face ca acestea din urmă să ajungă sus, iar celelalte jos; tot așa cele care vin din partea dreaptă ajung în stânga. Aparatul ocular de refracție, situat îndărăt, deci humor aqueus, lens et corpus vitreum [umoarea apoasă, cristalinul și corpul vitros], are doar rolul de a concentra razele de lumină ce provin de la obiect, astfel încât ele să-și găsească loc în spațiul restrâns al retinei."

Sigur că aceasta este doar o potecă ce duce totul spre ideea unui "procedeu prin care intelectul prelucrează senzația într-o intuiție", cireașa de pe tortul acestui raționament. Însă explicația a legat cumva totul la întrebarea pe care mi-o ridicasem în copilărie și a dat un răspuns. Suprafața încovoiată a lingurii ricoșeaza fiecare punct al imaginii mele înapoi spre ochiul meu așa cum este imaginea mea de fapt. Incovoierea părții inferioare a lingurii îmi reflectă lumina ce provine de la fruntea mea tot în partea de sus, în timp ce o oglindă normală ar reflecta lumina frunții mele spre partea de jos a suprafeței retinei din ochiul meu. Deci natura ochiului, a luminii și a intelectului, obișnuit să descifreze totul invers, nu reușește să "vadă corect" când totul vine acum "așa cum este" și doar rațiunea scoate la iveală cauza în acest caz.

Nu știu de ce pesimismul care i se atribuie pare pentru mine doar un pur realism. Afirmația anterioară simt că e prematură, având în vedere că mai am foarte mult de parcurs din filosofia acestuia, dar totuși o las ca primă impresie urmând să mă contrazic dacă este cazul. Realitatea nu este distractivă dacă vrei să o privești în mod cât mai obiectiv. Poate e un întuneric datorat înălțimii muntelui de unde poți să vezi clar și aproape precum dintr-un observator calea lactee, stelele, esența. Să vezi datorită lipsei de poluare luminoasă a "idealului" de sub vârf.
Sigur, pentru o viață suportabilă e nevoie de ideal și fantezie. Dar să fie o coborâre "voită" de pe munte.. 

Poate am fost sedus de filosofia acestuia. Sau poate este cea mai apropiată plimbare a minții mele alături de o așa luciditate spre încercarea de a găsi adevărul ce se vrea să tindă spre lucrul în sine. Las totul proaspăt, sigur incomplet pentru lucrarea în sine și poate cu aer inocent ce bate prin prisma primilor pași personali prin filosofie. (da, 6 p intenționați)

[Truls Ljungström · Rating 1 out of 5]

Detta är i princip en lång beskrivning som påstår att vi inte kan hitta ett logiskt skäl att lita på empiriska data. Om jag förstår Schopenhauer rätt, och det är jag verkligen inte säker på, menar han att logiska demonstrationer visserligen är sanna, men att allt som fyller dem bara är empiri, dvs osäkerheter, vars sanning bara vilar på tidigare osäkerheter. Detta är iofs sant, men förnekar själva grundpoängen med kunskap, och det är kanske S:s poäng. Om vi kopplar detta till idén om viljan till liv, så blir tilliten till världen en radikal förtroendeakt, och ett bejakande, i Nietzsches mening (Och Nietzsche idoliserade Schopenhauer). Problemet är att det är inkrökt skitsnack, som övervärderar det medvetna i förhållande till livet som sådant. Schopenhauers argument postulerar att viljan till liv är ett val, snarare än en drift, och det är orimligt. Livsvilja finns i låga intelligensformer. När nu Schopenhauer citerar antik filosof efter antik filosof, kanske det är rimligt att komma ihåg att hela traditionen från Herakleitos och Anaximander ser livsvilja som det som skiljer det levande från allt annat. Jag är inte imponerad. Sedan är det möjligt att jag har missförstått något eller allt, och eftersom texten är så tät, skulle det innebära att samtliga påståenden i denna text är potentiellt felaktiga.

[Josh Anderson]

I'm not going to give this a rating until I familiarize myself more with Leibniz and Kant's philosophies, and what exactly is Schopenhauer's polemic against Kant's Critique. Some chapters come alive with wild imagery, with no reference points needed. The only reason I read this is because I started to read The World as W&R, and he tells the reader to stop reading unless they're familiar with "On the Principle," so I went and found it online and read it a lot faster than I thought I would, but a lot of really defining what is being laid out here would take diagramming these Aristotelian principles and tracing their definition throughout modern philosophy. It is evident that Schopenhauer's body of work is more circular than linear, and I wouldn't mind coming back to this essay after reading W as W&R. I'd recommend this to anyone that enjoys Aristotle, which is probably not that many people, and certainly anyone who has enjoyed Nietzsche - as N. uses Schopenhauer as a starting point for a great many ideas in his philosophy. It really starts to get interesting in this essay when Schopenhauer starts referencing "idée occulte" from such thinkers as Pico de Mirandola and Giordano Bruno. The next essay, "On The Will of Nature" may be my next read instead of going straight to his core work. I have to admit that chapters with titles like "Animal Magnetism and Magic" right behind "Sinology" (the study of Chinese language, customs, etc.) have me very curious.

[Alonzo Caudillo · Rating 5 out of 5]

Este libro es la gran introducción al pensamiento de Schopenhauer. Su claridad, su rigor, sus críticas a los idealistas alemanes (Fichte, Schelling y Hegel), a Kant y a los prekantianos Wolff y Leibniz, son maravillosas y se agradecen por proponer un principio limpio de vaguedades y de sed de absoluto que de vuelven intrincados. El tono apasionado de Schopi es resonante y novedoso en la historia de la filosofía europea pero también llega a ser insoportable por convertirse en amargo berrinche contra Hegel. En definitiva, quiero seguir dialogando con él y entender por qué un personaje como ése no se decantó por el "neospinozismo" de los idealistas.

[María · Rating 4 out of 5]

Debo leerlo de nuevo.🤯

[Miguel Angel Lozano · Rating 4 out of 5]

De Schopenhauer no sabía lo suficiente y creí hacerlo. La reducción del mundo a autofagia era el único concepto que tenía en mente antes de empezar a leer a este filósofo. Pero Schopenhauer fue un filósofo extraordinario. Su tesis doctoral es la piedra angular del origen de su sistema (para mi sorpresa es muy sistemático), la cuádruple raíz del principio de razón suficiente da una clasificación de los cuatro tipos de objeto, según los cuales el sujeto experimenta toda realidad posible como representación. Para Schopenhauer, el sujeto cognoscente y el objeto de conocimiento subsumen la porción del mundo llamada “representación”.

Lo que yo llamo fenómeno el lo llama objeto, lo que yo llamo percepción el lo llama objeto, lo que yo llamo perceptor el lo llama sujeto, y la combinación de ambas es ineludible pues se implican una a la otra, esto sería la representación. La explicación sobre la división del mundo constituye el centro de interés en la filosofía de Schopenhauer, cuya tesis está expuesta en su obra mayor “el mundo como voluntad y representación” (que actualmente estoy leyendo).

Schopenhauer pone como requisito a la obra el aventarse primero su tesis, luego la obra de Kant y luego su obra magna; puesto que su obra tiene un pie puesto sobre cada una de ellas. Lo esencial de su tesis es que hay cuatro clases de objetos y se corresponden a un modo particular del principio de razón suficiente, esto es: de porque algo es de una forma y no de otra. Los objetos según Schop.: intuidos, puros, conceptuales y de voluntad (autoconocimiento).

Cada uno a punta a una forma distinta del principio de razón. La primera a la ley de la causalidad, la segunda a la razón de ser, la tercera a la razón de conocimiento y la cuarta a la motivación de la acción. En conclusión, aunque no esté totalmente inclinado al idealismo y me cueste bastante trabajo aprehender mi cuerpo como una representación más, me parece que es un trabajo muy claro, producto de mucha reflexión y de una voluntad férrea por alcanzar lo verdadero.

[VII]

Very boring to read for someone who is not interested in epistemology. I got baited into reading it from the intro of his will and representation and he managed to dissuade me from reading that too. There are just too many things that we take for granted now (even if we can't articulate them properly) that were exciting at that age.

[Miguel Angel Lozano · Rating 5 out of 5]

Schopenhauer escribió Sobre la cuádruple raíz del principio de razón suficiente como tesis doctoral en el año 1813; cuando corrían tan solo sus 26 años, aunque cualquiera podría pensar que es el trabajo de un filósofo consumado.

Su objeto con este trabajo fue explicar la existencia individual tal como se presenta de manera inmanente en cada una de las conciencias. La relación de ésta capacidad cognoscitiva con el significado del mundo vendría después -en su obra magna "El mundo como voluntad y representación" así como en "La voluntad en la naturaleza". No obstante, en este trabajo de juventud, y a pesar de no constituir el fin de la filosofía de Schopenhauer, ya nos obsequia una teoría acerca de la manera en que experimentamos y conocemos, y por ello ya juega, en su sistema posterior, un rol fundamental: tanto así que él le asigna la función de ser la base o el cimiento a lo que llegaría después. Así pues la tesis soportaría las obras de madurez. Esto se debe a que en los textos de Schopenhauer todo es un mismo (y enorme) pensamiento; todo se halla íntimamente conectado, y por su abordaje originario hace que la apreciación de las cosas más cotidianas cambie según el todo y estas adquieren el peso correspondiente según al nuevo sitio y función en esta explicación particular del misterio de existir.

Esta tesis aborda el principio de razón suficiente, una forma de decir la facultad específica del intelecto: en tanto que toda forma de conocer requiere la constatación de una razón. Pero tales (razones) pueden ser divididas según sus propiedades. Y según Schopenhauer cada una se corresponde con un tipo específico de objeto, que no obstante (como los demás) también ha de seguir la forma general de todo conocer que se presenta bajo la formula sujeto-objeto. La primera forma y los primeros objetos que visitamos son los más fáciles de identificar pues llenan nuestro presente de la forma más viva. Son la materia y la forma que mediante la sensación y su subsecuente transformación por el intelecto hacen del mundo objetivo un mapa de las causas de las sensaciones echándolas hacía un exterior sentido como tal. Pero cuya existencia depende en realidad de aquello en donde es percibido. El segundo tipo de objetos consiste en aquellos enunciados que pueden ser verificados de acuerdo a una verdad formal. Aquí revisitamos el aparato lógico y la capacidad de conceptualizar: ideas tan antiguas como universales a lo largo de la historia de la filosofía y el pensamiento, o al menos desde que vieron la luz en la Grecia clásica. La tercera forma aplica a aquellos objetos en cuya razón hemos de buscar NO un juicio sino una intuición de acuerdo a su manera de ser; aquí entrarían los objetos de la matemática. Por último los objetos del sentido interno: nosotros mismos, y con ello la profunda revelación de la composición de la existencia.

Este pequeño resumen está a distancias astronómicas de poder hacer justicia a tan excelente trabajo. De verdad que no dejo de sorprenderme de la calidad y sobre todo de la capacidad de análisis, y la consecuente penetración, en los temas más difíciles sobre los cuales pocas veces se tienen las nociones presentes y en mucho menos casos los conceptos claros. Es posible, en verdad lo creo, que en estos libros, olvidados de la gran parte, se halle algo, si no exacto, si cercano a la verdad.

[Jón Absalonsen · Rating 4 out of 5]

Schopenhauer is perhaps best known as a 19th century black-pilled edge-lord, and although this book has its share of snarky passages about his nemesis and contemporary Hegel (which are very entertaining btw), the book's main focus is about one central question, the question "why?" and its various flavours. Schopenhauer explains that a lot of blind alleys in the history of Philosophy boil down to a confusion relating to asking "why?" and not being specific about what one expects as an answer. Answering the question "why?" is equivalent to giving a reason for something (Hence the word "reason" in the title).

Schopenhauer divides the world into 4 types of objects and the corresponding principles of reason relating to them:

(1) Cause and effect
(2) Knowledge or concepts
(3) Objects in time and space
(4) The subject or self

I can't claim to fully grasp all the intricacies of this book, but I think it is safe to say that it goes as deep as any Philosophy text. It's not an easy read, and some paragraphs were lost on me. As is the case for many other philosophy texts, each sentence needs to be chewed on for a bit longer than those from an average non-fiction book.

My main takeaways are:

> The importance of knowing what one means by "reason". For example, why is the grass green? There are (at least) two kinds of reasons: (1) the pigments in grass filter out all wavelengths of light except green (causal explanation) and (2) We know that the grass is green since looking at grass gives the sensation of greenness (reason for knowing).

> The outline of the Kantian notion of subjectivity and objectivity, where the former is raw sensation and the latter is simply the former organised in time and space, and (crucially) both exist in the mind.

> The division of causility into three categories: (1) simple cause and effect, (2) impulse-response and (3) motives. The latter two can be broken down and reduced to the first one. This struck me as similar to Dennett's notion of the three stances: (1) physical (2) design and (3) intentional, which are modes of explanation at three different levels of abstraction. This particular point interests me, since I find that we humans have a bias towards explaining things in terms of motives or intentionality instead of plain physical or biological terms, even if motives/intentionality are the rarest type of cause.

[Grant · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very weird book. If it was a parody of an academic work, like a Thomas Bernhard book about a philosopher who can't get over his hatred of Hegel and his rejection by academic society, then this would be a 5/5. It has a ludicrous amount of vitriol, to the point that it becomes tedious. Luckily, by the end his anger switches to other topics like Judaism(by which he means Christianity), or becomes funnier, like writing a short story about doing the movie Pretty Woman for the cosmological argument for the existence of God.

In terms of the philosophical content, much of it is cleaning up Kant's arguments, especially in the A-Edition Transcendental Deduction, or biting the bullet of empiricism in explaining Kant's picture of cognition (which is way more convincing than Kant's neurotically-ataraxic openness to the potential that aliens and angels wouldn't have human eyeballs, and therefore we shouldn't connect the idea of sensibility with the human sense organs, or the understanding with the brain). The PSR specific stuff was the least interesting bit of the book until the concluding chapter where he presents everything in a new arrangement connected with the "schema of time." He also says some things which interestingly prefigure Nietzsche, and there's even a passage on the emptiness of the highest concepts which is nearly verbatim what Nietzsche says in Twilight of the Idols about "the wisps at the edge of reality."

I recommend this book to get a better idea or how the Kantian picture of perception works in reality (the stuff about eyeballs is so great), and for his presentation of Kant generally, which is very clean, and mostly faithful. It's pretty clear that at this point he had only read the B-edition of the Critique, or else he would have presented his own contributions as clarification instead of refutation. All said, he does make good arguments against Kant, which is very useful to anyone who wants to see where Nietzsche is picking up from. He is clearly the bridge between the two.

[Zo · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a wonderful work of philosophy. I am not familiar enough with current accounts of causation or objections to Schopenhauer's account to know why he's "wrong" (which I'm sure he is in parts), but this came off to me as a penetrating and perhaps even still relevant account of the different forms of causation. Schopenhauer's brand of idealism elucidated here, and how that idealism relates to the PSR, seems wholly in keeping with the developments of predictive processing theories and contemporary idealism. His discussion of the transcendental aspects of idealism were the first time I've felt like the "transcendental idealism" concept really made sense to me, and even seems highly relevant to contemporary debates about what it means to represent and the frame problem in AI? I am likely giving him too much credit but I was blown away. Truly felt like a work of metaphysics written in mid-19th century that actually bears on contemporary AI, causation, and phil of mind debates. His thoughts on the nature of mathematics and different sciences were also fascinating, and I wonder how they would be evaluated in a contemporary phil of sci/math framework? Of course all of this insight is garbed in Schopenhauer's brilliant writing, full of biting humor and the most delightful analogies. Reminded me of how much I enjoyed reading him last time and that I need to read Part 2 of World as Will sometime soon.

[Dan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Schopenhauer originally wrote this as his doctoral dissertation, and much later rewrote it in the present form. What probably was missing and appears in abundance here are the following: his grumpiness, hate of Hegel, hate against any version of the ontological argument, the conviction that his philosophy is the only correct one, the conviction that posterity will vindicate him, and even more hate directed at his fellow/German philosophers and countrymen. The only philosopher he partially admires is Kant. Schopenhauer accepts the main framework developed by Kant; however he rejects a few minor ones and proposes his own: the thing-in-itself is knowable from inside the subject as will, practical reason along with the moral imperative is nonsense, categories are unnecessary, causality is a prior and the only category necessary, and so on. Basically, Schopenhauer divides all beings into 4 categories and argues that there are 4 corresponding ways to reason in each case: becoming/changes, knowing, being or space/time, and willing/action.

[Neutrino3 · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book is about Space and Time. To read it as such, you only need sections §18 and §21 to understand. Read here: https://bit.ly/3qmJSg0

Time allows sequences, but not faces. Space allows objects juxtaposition in extreme beauty (to western mind), but no time evolving.

Time gives us Death of objects which are non-moving in themselves. Space gives us longevity.

Only in their concussion is juice of life possible.

Mind is called the inner-space, because it lives only in Time, that is, having one idea at the time in succession.

This book thought me something as a physicist, which released me from uneasiness I felt about difference of space and time that couldn't describe - for that reason I give it 5 stars.

[Nicholas Moran · Rating 4 out of 5]

On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason: 4.5/5

As per instruction by Schopenhauer himself in the introduction to his magnum opus, this first essay is one of the pre-requisites suggested to any reader before proceeding with WWV, and rightfully so. Great introduction to his view on metaphysics and his philosophy overall, well worth the read.

On the Will in Nature: pending

[Alina · Rating 4 out of 5]

Schopenhauer has some neat elaborations on Kant and corrects him on his negligence on the fact of our embodiment. However, this text wasn't the most gripping piece of canon work that I've read, and I've found that reading secondary literature on Schopenhauer is sufficient. Kant has made the primary contributions, and Schopenhauer adds a tiny bit, which can be learned through summaries.

[Ömer Talha · Rating 4 out of 5]

Schopenhauer, kaleme aldığı bu ilk kitabında, her bir şeyin varlığını ispata dair dört ilkenin olduğunu ifade ediyor. Zaman, mekan ve töz bağlamında, içinde bulunduğumuz dünyadaki her şeyin a priori seviyesine indirgenene değin "niçin" sorusunu sormamızı öğütlerken bu kelimeyi bilimlerin anası addediyor.