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Bachelors of Science: Seventeenth Century Identity, Then and Now
Naomi Zack begins this extraordinary book with the premise that if one is to understand Western conceptions of racialized and gendered identity, one needs to go back to a period when such categories were not salient and examine how notions of identity in the seventeenth century were fundamentally different from subsequent constructions. The seventeenth century is the last time, for example, that Europeans had any contact with non-Europeans without racializing them. From the eighteenth century onward, race becomes a central category for Europeans in their transactions with a different world, and gender undergoes radical transformation. Zack takes the reader through a lucid tour of the lives, times, and writings of such key "bachelors of Science" as Bacon, Descartes, Newton, and Gassendi. The book situates these empiricist philosophers and their canonical reputations within the larger framework of the de facto "masculinization of science" and "scientizing of masculinity" in the seventeenth century, arguing for a more nuanced understanding of these key thinkers of the period. Other fascinating issues examined in this book include pre-racial conceptions of slavery, witchcraft trials and their connection to homosociality, and the highly sexualized nature of women's identity in the seventeenth century. Zack points out the link between elite bachelorhood, the profession of philosophy, and scientific pursuit as recreational activity. This book is a must for understanding the historical and philosophical precedents of modern scientific identity, race, and gender.
220 pages, Hardcover
First published May 10, 1996
About the author
Naomi Zack
34 books13 followersNaomi Zack is a professor of philosophy at the University of Oregon. She is a prolific author, having published seven books in addition to a large number of papers and contributed chapters in feminist ethics, particularly in areas having to deal with race or disaster.
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April 20, 2026
WAS BACHELORHOOD A BENEFIT TO SCIENTISTS AND PHILOSOPHERS?
Naomi Zack (b. 1944) is professor of Philosophy at Lehman College (CUNY); she formerly taught at the University of Albany, and the University or Oregon.
She wrote in the Preface to this 1996 book, “During my first year of graduate study at Columbia University in 1966… It was assumed that past philosophical thinking could be understood without understanding the culture in which it had first taken place… As a student, I did not know that ‘foreign’ concepts need to be understood on the basis of an understanding of other concepts, and events that were---or are, if the foreign writing is contemporary---present in the culture of original use. I did not learn this by the time I received my Ph.D. in 1970, or during the next two decades when intellectual critical theory became incorporated into academic scholarship across the curriculum. I was absent from academia, and philosophy as an academic subject, during that revolution. When I returned to both in 1990, I saw that a change was in place through a new self-consciousness of the relevance of culture to thought, on even the most abstract levels.
“When I began to teach full-time at the State University of New York at Albany in 1991, I had two lines of scholarly research. The first, racial theory, was partly a response to my own situation in academia. The second was a more mainstream study of John Locke’s political and social philosophy, specifically his concept of ownership. My work on race resulted in a book, ‘Race and Mixed Race’ [incidentally, Zack’s mother was Jewish, and her father Black and Native American] … in which I analyzed American racial categories of black and white. I understood the main problem with these categories to be the lack of scientific foundation for any concept of race, and I was left with the realization that modern concepts of race derive from the 18th and 19th century pseudoscience that rationalize European colonialism and chattel slavery. It therefore seemed important that there was a period in European history when the idea of race as we know it now did not exist, and that the 17th century was the last time that Europeans had contact with non-Europeans without racializing them.
“Given that, I wondered what else about 17th century identity was radically different from later modern constructions… My partial answers to questions about how human identity was different in the 17th century from earlier and later constructions make up this book.”
She points out, “The bachelorhood of the 17th century philosophers of science seems to result more from their particular career histories and general professional commitments than from social factors external to their work… The bachelorhood of the 17th century philosophers intersected with their work to give them a status that was seriously recognized and respected by the most powerful figures in their society…. Politics offered another way to succeed that was independent of marital status… Locke was politically active and successful throughout his career, and he was always single. Love and sex were not primary motives for middle- and upper-class marriage in the 17th century, but money and status were. These men probably did not marry because they knew they could do better in the world by remaining single and concentrating their financial resources and social efforts on activities associated with their work. Another reason to marry, of course, was procreation. However, without great property to bequeath or wisely accepted beliefs in the intrinsic value of children, there is no reason to think parentage would have been an important goal.” (Pg. 62-63)
She continues, “This discussion would not be complete without a broader look at the relationship between bachelorhood and the profession of philosophy. During the early modern period, bachelorhood was required of all university or college fellows at Oxford and Cambridge. Out of the group considered here, Locke and Newton held such positions until middle age, but there is no evidence in either case that this requirement was the cause of their lifelong bachelorhood: Locke could have married when he lost his university post and Newton after he joined the Mint. The required bachelorhood of priests on the continent and academic fellows in England could strengthen the argument for the general association of bachelorhood with philosophy in the early modern period. It could be argued that the prescription of bachelorhood was internalized by philosophers with results that made them different psychologically from men in other occupations. However, I have been making the wider cultural case that... early modern marriage did not have the personal value it acquired later.” (Pg. 65-66)
She observes, “I have already suggested that science was an enjoyable recreation for the bachelors of science. Through its earliest associations with ‘the betterment of mankind' in Bacon’s optimism about technology, science in England seemed to need no external justification. It became self-ruling… The 17th century separation of science from other strife-torn spheres of thought came to provide the model for intellectual and academic freedom generally. And under that model, the 17th century bachelors of science liberated themselves.” (Pg. 111-112)
She asserts, “The question … ‘What kind of man is God?’ now changes to ‘What kind of God is man?’ In a paradigmatic and competitive universe of knowledge, a successful scientist is an intransigent and jealous god, concerned neither with justice nor mercy, but only with having things work in the ways of his own devising. The role for lesser knowers is to help execute his program with due respect for his power and recognized authority, that is, for his dominion … The result was that in science, as in political theory in 17th century Protestant England, God acquired human attributes and men became divine.” (Pg. 127-138)
She summarizes, “I have been considering the identities of 17th century bachelors of science in terms of their interests in science and their positions in society. They were a new group who directed their energies toward self-invention as members of that group, at the same time as they ‘masculinized science.’ The direct subjects of contemporary feminist, emancipatory, and ecological critiques were not members of this new group, nor would they have comparable status in society. Also, the modern identities of children, women, non-Europeans, and natural beings had not yet been constructed in the 17th century… Therefore, as excluded and not yet conceptualized in their own rights---these subjects were unidentified.” (Pg. 141)
She asks, “What transcultural conclusions can be drawn about the early modern monosexual foundations of gender and the de facto exclusions of women from intellectual work? How can such conclusions avoid the anachronism of applying later constructions of female gender onto 17th century culture?… Although some women ruled and even wrote, it was generally assumed that they did these things not as women, but because of their male characteristics. And there are no cases in which female rulers or writers were recognized to be the equals or superiors of men of the same class who were engaged in similar activities. It may be that the lack of sexual foundationism for female difference was enabling to some 17th century women. Contemporary feminist criticism of later modern sexual dimorphism would seem to support that interpretation. But it may also be that the close association of social status with gender in the early modern period was more damaging to female achievement than later association of female gender with biological sexual difference was to be. At any rate… it seems fairly clear that women, as a conceptualized group, lacked a positive identity, in its own right, during the 17th century.” (Pg. 166-167)
She summarizes, “If there is a lesson from history here it is that racial concepts and racism are unlikely to be the root causes of the oppression, enslavement, and genocide of racialized human beings. This suggests that the elimination of race and racism, essential as it is, can do no more than expose the crimes which it has been used to obfuscate. Once racial concepts and racism have been eliminated, the monumental task of enforcing ethical behavior toward all human beings can be assessed. If one looks beyond the safety of economic, social, and boundaries, it is doubtful that globally there has been much moral progress since the 17th century.” (Pg. 181)
This book may interest a wide variety of readers.
Naomi Zack (b. 1944) is professor of Philosophy at Lehman College (CUNY); she formerly taught at the University of Albany, and the University or Oregon.
She wrote in the Preface to this 1996 book, “During my first year of graduate study at Columbia University in 1966… It was assumed that past philosophical thinking could be understood without understanding the culture in which it had first taken place… As a student, I did not know that ‘foreign’ concepts need to be understood on the basis of an understanding of other concepts, and events that were---or are, if the foreign writing is contemporary---present in the culture of original use. I did not learn this by the time I received my Ph.D. in 1970, or during the next two decades when intellectual critical theory became incorporated into academic scholarship across the curriculum. I was absent from academia, and philosophy as an academic subject, during that revolution. When I returned to both in 1990, I saw that a change was in place through a new self-consciousness of the relevance of culture to thought, on even the most abstract levels.
“When I began to teach full-time at the State University of New York at Albany in 1991, I had two lines of scholarly research. The first, racial theory, was partly a response to my own situation in academia. The second was a more mainstream study of John Locke’s political and social philosophy, specifically his concept of ownership. My work on race resulted in a book, ‘Race and Mixed Race’ [incidentally, Zack’s mother was Jewish, and her father Black and Native American] … in which I analyzed American racial categories of black and white. I understood the main problem with these categories to be the lack of scientific foundation for any concept of race, and I was left with the realization that modern concepts of race derive from the 18th and 19th century pseudoscience that rationalize European colonialism and chattel slavery. It therefore seemed important that there was a period in European history when the idea of race as we know it now did not exist, and that the 17th century was the last time that Europeans had contact with non-Europeans without racializing them.
“Given that, I wondered what else about 17th century identity was radically different from later modern constructions… My partial answers to questions about how human identity was different in the 17th century from earlier and later constructions make up this book.”
She points out, “The bachelorhood of the 17th century philosophers of science seems to result more from their particular career histories and general professional commitments than from social factors external to their work… The bachelorhood of the 17th century philosophers intersected with their work to give them a status that was seriously recognized and respected by the most powerful figures in their society…. Politics offered another way to succeed that was independent of marital status… Locke was politically active and successful throughout his career, and he was always single. Love and sex were not primary motives for middle- and upper-class marriage in the 17th century, but money and status were. These men probably did not marry because they knew they could do better in the world by remaining single and concentrating their financial resources and social efforts on activities associated with their work. Another reason to marry, of course, was procreation. However, without great property to bequeath or wisely accepted beliefs in the intrinsic value of children, there is no reason to think parentage would have been an important goal.” (Pg. 62-63)
She continues, “This discussion would not be complete without a broader look at the relationship between bachelorhood and the profession of philosophy. During the early modern period, bachelorhood was required of all university or college fellows at Oxford and Cambridge. Out of the group considered here, Locke and Newton held such positions until middle age, but there is no evidence in either case that this requirement was the cause of their lifelong bachelorhood: Locke could have married when he lost his university post and Newton after he joined the Mint. The required bachelorhood of priests on the continent and academic fellows in England could strengthen the argument for the general association of bachelorhood with philosophy in the early modern period. It could be argued that the prescription of bachelorhood was internalized by philosophers with results that made them different psychologically from men in other occupations. However, I have been making the wider cultural case that... early modern marriage did not have the personal value it acquired later.” (Pg. 65-66)
She observes, “I have already suggested that science was an enjoyable recreation for the bachelors of science. Through its earliest associations with ‘the betterment of mankind' in Bacon’s optimism about technology, science in England seemed to need no external justification. It became self-ruling… The 17th century separation of science from other strife-torn spheres of thought came to provide the model for intellectual and academic freedom generally. And under that model, the 17th century bachelors of science liberated themselves.” (Pg. 111-112)
She asserts, “The question … ‘What kind of man is God?’ now changes to ‘What kind of God is man?’ In a paradigmatic and competitive universe of knowledge, a successful scientist is an intransigent and jealous god, concerned neither with justice nor mercy, but only with having things work in the ways of his own devising. The role for lesser knowers is to help execute his program with due respect for his power and recognized authority, that is, for his dominion … The result was that in science, as in political theory in 17th century Protestant England, God acquired human attributes and men became divine.” (Pg. 127-138)
She summarizes, “I have been considering the identities of 17th century bachelors of science in terms of their interests in science and their positions in society. They were a new group who directed their energies toward self-invention as members of that group, at the same time as they ‘masculinized science.’ The direct subjects of contemporary feminist, emancipatory, and ecological critiques were not members of this new group, nor would they have comparable status in society. Also, the modern identities of children, women, non-Europeans, and natural beings had not yet been constructed in the 17th century… Therefore, as excluded and not yet conceptualized in their own rights---these subjects were unidentified.” (Pg. 141)
She asks, “What transcultural conclusions can be drawn about the early modern monosexual foundations of gender and the de facto exclusions of women from intellectual work? How can such conclusions avoid the anachronism of applying later constructions of female gender onto 17th century culture?… Although some women ruled and even wrote, it was generally assumed that they did these things not as women, but because of their male characteristics. And there are no cases in which female rulers or writers were recognized to be the equals or superiors of men of the same class who were engaged in similar activities. It may be that the lack of sexual foundationism for female difference was enabling to some 17th century women. Contemporary feminist criticism of later modern sexual dimorphism would seem to support that interpretation. But it may also be that the close association of social status with gender in the early modern period was more damaging to female achievement than later association of female gender with biological sexual difference was to be. At any rate… it seems fairly clear that women, as a conceptualized group, lacked a positive identity, in its own right, during the 17th century.” (Pg. 166-167)
She summarizes, “If there is a lesson from history here it is that racial concepts and racism are unlikely to be the root causes of the oppression, enslavement, and genocide of racialized human beings. This suggests that the elimination of race and racism, essential as it is, can do no more than expose the crimes which it has been used to obfuscate. Once racial concepts and racism have been eliminated, the monumental task of enforcing ethical behavior toward all human beings can be assessed. If one looks beyond the safety of economic, social, and boundaries, it is doubtful that globally there has been much moral progress since the 17th century.” (Pg. 181)
This book may interest a wide variety of readers.
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