"Dieser Band vereinigt fünf Texte, die in einem inneren Zusammenhang stehen; sie zeigen die Entwicklung zentraler Motive von Benjamins Denken auf. Eingeleitet wird er durch eine sehr frühe Studie Über das Programm der kommenden Philosophie. Es folgen die Aufsätze Zur Kritik der Gewalt, wo Benjamins Schicksalsbegriff Gestalt gewinnt, und Schicksal und Charakter, eine Arbeit, die er selbst als ein Modell der ihm vorschwebenden philosophischen Theorie bezeichnet hat. In zwei Texten aus dem Nachlaß, den Geschichtsphilosophischen Thesen und dem Theologisch-politischen Fragment, kehren die Gedanken des frühen Benjamin wieder, auf einer anderen Stufe der Reflexion."
Walter Bendix Schönflies Benjamin was a German Jewish philosopher, cultural critic, media theorist, and essayist. An eclectic thinker who combined elements of German idealism, Romanticism, Western Marxism, Jewish mysticism, and neo-Kantianism, Benjamin made influential contributions to aesthetic theory, literary criticism, and historical materialism. He was associated with the Frankfurt School and also maintained formative friendships with thinkers such as playwright Bertolt Brecht and Kabbalah scholar Gershom Scholem. He was related to German political theorist and philosopher Hannah Arendt through her first marriage to Benjamin's cousin Günther Anders, though the friendship between Arendt and Benjamin outlasted her marriage to Anders. Both Arendt and Anders were students of Martin Heidegger, whom Benjamin considered a nemesis. Among Benjamin's best known works are the essays "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction" (1935) and "Theses on the Philosophy of History" (1940). His major work as a literary critic included essays on Charles Baudelaire, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Franz Kafka, Karl Kraus, Nikolai Leskov, Marcel Proust, Robert Walser, Trauerspiel and translation theory. He also made major translations into German of the Tableaux Parisiens section of Baudelaire's Les Fleurs du mal and parts of Proust's À la recherche du temps perdu. Of the hidden principle organizing Walter Benjamin's thought Scholem wrote unequivocally that "Benjamin was a philosopher", while his younger colleagues Arendt and Theodor W. Adorno contend that he was "not a philosopher". Scholem remarked "The peculiar aura of authority emanating from his work tended to incite contradiction". Benjamin himself considered his research to be theological, though he eschewed all recourse to traditionally metaphysical sources of transcendentally revealed authority. In 1940, at the age of 48, Benjamin died by suicide at Portbou on the French Spanish border while attempting to escape the advance of the Third Reich. Though popular acclaim eluded him during his life, the decades following his death won his work posthumous renown.
Ο Βάλτερ Μπένγιαμιν, όπως πάντα, μας στέλνει φιλάκια:
«Κάθε μορφή βίας ως μέσο είναι είτε βία που θεσπίζει, είτε βία που συντηρεί το δίκαιο. Όταν δεν αξιώνει τίποτα απ' αυτά τα δύο, παραιτείται από κάθε εγκυρότητα. Ως εκ τούτου προκύπτει ότι κάθε βία, ως μέσο, ακόμα και στην καλύτερη περίπτωση, αποτελεί μέρος της προβληματικής του δικαίου καθεαυτού. [...] Πάνω απ' όλα πρέπει να τονίσουμε ότι μια απολύτως μη βίαιη λύση διαφωνιών δεν καταλήγει ποτέ σε έννομο συμβόλαιο. Εκείνο είναι που τελικά οδηγεί, όσο ειρηνικά κι αν έχουν προσχωρήσει σ' αυτό οι συμβαλλόμενοι, σε ενδεχόμενη βία. Γιατί απονέμει σε κάθε μέρος το δικαίωμα να χρησιμοποιεί έναντι του άλλου βία με οποιονδήποτε τρόπο, σε περίπτωση παράβασης του συμβολαίου. Και όχι μόνο αυτό: όπως η κατάληξη, έτσι και η απαρχή κάθε συμβολαίου παραπέμπει στη βία. Ωστόσο, η άμεση παρουσία της ως βίας που θεσπίζει δίκαιο, δεν είναι αναγκαία εντός του συμβολαίου, εκπροσωπείται όμως σ' αυτό στο βαθμό που η εξουσία [Macht] η οποία κατοχυρώνει το έννομο συμβόλαιο κατάγεται με τη σειρά της από τη βία, ακόμα κι αν αυτή η βία δεν ορίζεται ρητά στο συμβόλαιο. Όσο μειώνεται η συνειδητοποίηση της λανθάνουσας παρουσίας της βίας εντός ενός νομικού θεσμού, τόσο αυτός παρακμάζει.Ένα τέτοιο παράδειγμα αποτελούν σήμερα τα κοινοβούλια. Παρουσιάζουν τους γνωστούς αξιολύπητους θεατρινισμούς γιατί δεν διατήρησαν τη συνείδηση των επαναστατικών δυνάμεων στις οποίες οφείλουν την ύπαρξη τους».
I heard someone say in a talk that Benjamin always seems like he’s talking about what he’s talking about but also something else entirely. Sort of like what he’s thinking is above his ability to make very clear in writing, but it makes it a lot more interesting that way. This was a pretty understandable and topical essay tho and I would recommend it
Muy bueno! Este sujeto es un crítico entero brígido, y en su forma de trabajar la crítica y la investigación se ve toda su metodología pues la crítica de la violencia no puede elaborarse en los fines sino en los medios - independiente de los fines (justos o injustos) o de los medios- Así, nos argumenta que desde la creación del derecho empieza inmediatamente la violencia con la instauración del poder, del trazado de límites y el reconocimiento de -tensos-derechos de "paz" frente a los vencedores. Para Benjamin desde el punto de vista de la violencia garantizada por el derecho NO EXISTE LA PAZ > en el mejor de los casos poderes igualmente grandes. La segunda función de la violencia es mantener el derecho, y en su crítica nos hace evidente cómo los organismos del Estado (el militarismo y la policía) pueden asemejarse, adaptarse y disfrazarse en cualquier función moderna de la sociedad pero que su fin jurídico es la sumisión del ciudadano a las leyes, la promulgación de decretos con fuerza de ley y la defensa de tales fines.
Jokes aside, this text really shows how much Benjamin didn't understand how social movements developed (probably he never went on a strike on his whole life).
"Legitimate" or "illegitimate" are not a scientific category to understand or analyse violence (as if in the real world violence cares about rights or "legitimate" procedures).
This edition really is phenomenal with lots of stuff included for the first time in English- hundreds of pages of Benjamin’s notes and fragments preceding his writing of the essay. Also multiple appendices of the works Benjamin read leading up to his writing of the essay. Also great essays from the translators! Highly recommended.
La violence est souvent questionnée en fonction de la légitimité de ses fins. A-t-on recouru à elle pour une raison juste ? Benjamin, lui, questionne la violence en tant que telle, comme moyen et s’intéresse à la violence du droit. Je vous préviens, cet essai est peu accessible. Ses phrases sont proustiennes, on ne sait pas toujours quel est le sujet et surtout, il utilise un vocabulaire philosophique qui peut être obscur si l’on n’est pas familier avec ce domaine.
J'ai donc concocté un lexique :
Droit positif = créé par les hommes, il peut varier d’une communauté à une autre. Peu importe les fins qui ont mené un homme à agir, il juge les moyens. Ces moyens seront légaux ou illégaux selon la loi en place à un moment M.
Droit naturel = universel, il questionne la légitimité d’un acte plutôt que la légalité. Agir illégalement mais dans un but juste est un droit naturel. Il critique les fins.
Violence fondatrice = fondation ou transformation du droit.
Violence conservatrice = sert à perpétuer la violence fondatrice du droit grâce à un instrument : la police.
Moyens purs = sont des moyens purs tous moyens non-violents pour régler un conflit (ex : dialogue). Ils sous-entendent un accord entre deux partis qui se font confiance. Comme il existe une possibilité de tromperie, on a fait entrer le droit.
--
Pour Benjamin, le droit est violent car il condamne les criminels, non pas parce que les moyens et/ou fins de leurs actions sont injustes comme il le proclame, mais pour se protéger d’un concurrent qui tente d’imposer un nouveau droit.
Je voulais aborder avec vous deux points : la violence étatique qui s’approprie une violence légitime (coucou Darmanin) et les grèves qui ne sont jugées (encore aujourd’hui) que pour leurs effets et pas comme moyen. Je n’ai pas la place ici. Un second poste où j’irai dans le détail vous intéresserait ?
Je vous laisse avec cette satire d’Anatole France sur les droits “égaux”: “Les lois défendent pareillement aux riches et aux pauvres de dormir sous les ponts.” Comme le dit Georges Sorel, “le droit est à l’origine un privilège des rois ou des nobles, en un mot : des puissants."
In hindsight, I should have simply read Benjamin's essay and not bothered with the 'critical addenda' included, since they didn't accentuate Benjamin's work in the slightest, and, in fact, I was wondering in many places why these specific writings were included at all. Sure, Benjamin mentions each of them in his TtCoV - and refers, however obliquely to their writings - but none of them had a direct correlation to Benjamin's essay. In the larger scheme of academics and scholarship they are connected but so are plenty of other persons and works that could have better played off of Benjamin's TtCoV. I found Benjamin's essay to be fascinating and complex. He was quite obviously extremely well read, and this essay is excruciatingly detailed and almost too wide-ranging. It was meant to be part of a larger work, never completed and never discovered either, so it is likely there was much more to this analysis than the broad strokes he lays down here. Still, it is interesting, especially in the present times, though it demands a focused reading and somewhat deep understanding of multiple ideas and theories. Not for the faint of brain, for sure.
Ce mi-am zis, eseu scurt, il dau gata rapid. Hmmm...ritmul a fost de 2 pagini pe zi si nu stiu ce am inteles. BW face o prezentare a conceptului de violenta in diferitele lui forme. sa vedem:
Dpdv teleologic, violenta poate fi considerata un mijloc de atingere al unui obiectiv final. Si deja apar 2 intrebari: - In anumite situatii, este violenta un mijloc justificabil de atingere al unor obiective? - Sunt indreptatite acele obiective obtinute prin violenta?
Din cate inteleg eu, obiectivele sunt incluse in urmatoarele situatii - cele date de legea pozitiva: obiective / legi noi create de om pentru om - cele date de legea naturala: obiective care cuprind drepturile inerente ale omului (date de Forta Suprema, natura, judecata).
In cadrul legii naturale, un obiectiv intemeiat / neintemeiat caracterizeaza si tipul de violenta necesitat pentru obtinerea lui (legitima vs nelegitima)
In cadrul legii pozitive avem obiectivele legale, produse de om, confirmate istoric. Violenta ca mijloc duce la stabilirea unor astfel de obiective care la randul lor: 1. sunt produse pentru a preveni violenta 2.sunt mentinute prin violenta.
Legea pozitiva se intersecteaza cu cea naturala atunci cand pentru obtinerea obiectivelor naturale este necesara o cantitate excesiva de violenta. Obiectivele devin legale si violenta este limitata (BW da de exemplu educatia). Tendinta legislatiei moderne este de a priva individul, cel putin dpdv legal, de orice forma de violenta, chiar daca ea vizeaza obiective naturale.
Violenta TREBUIE sa ramana in mana LEGILOR. In caz contrar, nu scopurile mijlocite sunt problema, ci tocmai faptul ca violenta nu este cuprinsa in cadrul legii. STATUL este o institutie in care violenta este (trebuie sa fie si sa ramana) LEGALA.
Manifestarile violente in cadrul statului pot fi: - active : revolutia - pasive : santajul prin greva (Greva insa este o actiune non-violenta)
Forma de violenta: 1. MILITARA. Ea este de doua tipuri: - violenta producatoare de legi - violenta care conserva legile 2. POLITIENEASCA - prezinta aceleasi doua forme. Politia are simultan si autoritatea de a decide asupra scopurilor legale pe care le apara => ariile de actiune pot fi din cele mai vulnerabile (ex.dat de BW - ganditorii). Statul nu este protejat prin diverse legi de obiectivele mintii ganditorilor.
In diverse situatii, statul nu poate garanta prin sistemul legislativ in vigoare scopurile empirice pe care doreste sa le atinga => politia intervine din MOTIVE DE SECURITATE. Politia este elementul omniprezent al statelor civilizate. Violenta politiei este mult mai mare in democratii fata de monarhii (unde este subordonata monarhului).
BW zice ulterior ca orice contract legal este caracterizat de o putere care are o origine violenta. Disparitia constiintei latente violente din cadrul unei institutii legale duce la desuetitudine (ex. - parlamentul). Aceste institutii legale desuete cultiva un compromis ca forma nonviolenta de a interactiona cu problemele politice. Ele insa apar in urma unor miscari violente (gen revolutie). Asta mi-a placut in mod deosebit: sentimentul din spatele oricarui compromis este ca varianta cealalta este de fapt mai buna .
Solutii non-violente de rezolvare a conflictelor? Da, relatiile private, conferintele.
Apoi BW face o afirmatie care in ziua de azi este desueta: el zice ca exista o zona non-violenta a intelegerii umane datorita faptului ca este complet inaccesibila violentei - si aici este terenul limbii, al intelegerii prin limbaj (insa eu ma gandesc la "shitstormurile" actuale care pot fi foarte dure).
Violenta are un dublu rol in cadrul statului: obtinerea prin violenta a capacitatii de a emite legi, care insasi aceste legi sunt legate de violenta intr-un mod necedsar si intim caci capacitatea de emite legi inseamna PUTERE. Iar PUTEREA presupune VIOLENTA.
Intr-un final BW mai face o ultima impartire a violentei: - violenta mitica (la origine violenta zeilor) - este violenta moderna producatoare de legi, de granite. Este violenta care ameninta si care este caracterizata de sange. Este violenta executiva (producatoare de legi) si administrativa (mentinatoare a legilor). Ciclul: producere de legi / mentinere de legi - violenta mentinatoare a legilor suprima contraviolenta ostila si indirect slabeste violenta creatoare a legilor. Acest ciclu dureaza pana apar forte noi care prin violenta noua produc noi legi. - violenta divina - este violenta care distruge legile, care pur si simplu loveste si anihileaza, insa fara sange si cu caracter ispasitor. Este violenta "suverana". Daca violenta mitica cere sacrifiu, cea divina il accepta (aici a trebuit sa ma gandesc la Fear and Trembling - Søren Kierkegaard).
THOU SHALT NOT KILL - din aceasta porunca divina nu deriva nici un fel de judecata legala (mitica) a faptei. Ea este doar un ghid de conduita morala umana, al societatii umane. Este o doctrina a sanctitatii vietii.
Uffffff - mi-ar facea placere o discutie pe tema violentei (mai ales ca sunt multe aspecte pe care nu le-am inteles). Poate dupa ce il citesc pe Foucault o sa ma luminez nitel mai mult. M-ar bucura si alte recomandari cu privire la violenta.
There is a political movement taking place from the streets of today's world to the world agenda. As this political movement is not organized, it has a rather scattered and spontaneous structure in terms of its formation. However, it has such an effective and powerful identity that today's thinkers and theorists have started to think about it and have described our century as a period in which these political movements that emerged throughout the world will be experienced. Likewise, the year has been 2020, we will almost finish the first quarter and the determination of the thinkers seems to be quite right.
The Italian theoretician Toscano also wrote this short but concise book that sheds light on the present day by bringing together various seminars and texts to characterize these revolts centered on the crises of capitalism. It has been evaluated on the basis of mnun's theories.
And all thinkers have described the age we live in as the "Age of Revolts", and this is a very accurate point of view, with the Istanbul Gezi Park Resistance, the Sao Paulo protests, the workers' union actions in Seoul, the anti-racist riots in America, the great justice march in Turkey, and France. This determination has been reinforced by many popular uprisings that I can't think of, such as the Yellow Vests resistance in Turkey, the uprisings of anarchist movements in Greece, the economic crisis protests in Spain (2013 if I'm not mistaken), and feminist thought-oriented rights-seeking actions. Likewise, such great upheavals have never been experienced in any time period, and this situation has gained an identity specific to the century we are in.
If I need to make a more personal comment at this point, I interpret these movements as democracy of rebellion rather than the age of rebellion. Because the capitalist system, in every crisis period, the antidemocratic practices of the capitalist state for "security" have taken the issue out of ballot box democracy, causing the people to take to the streets and seek rights, law and justice through physical indicators. The concept of high security, which has developed with technology, has reached a point where it determines the demands, welfare and lifestyles of societies. Of course, it is obvious that every suppression will respond by breaking out. Therefore, peoples have started to demonstrate their democratic demands through violence in the squares. Toscano and other theorists see a revolutionary process in this, but I don't think they have any purpose other than demand and the abolition of oppression. Because, when we evaluate the riots that have happened so far, the endings were realized by getting what they wanted. Therefore, I can say that the ground of democracy has shifted to the squares.
Toscano has produced a highly qualified book with this work.
Es un texto profundamente anti-finalista; ya desde el comienzo lo destaca Benjamin al basar su planteamiento de la "violencia como medio" en el concepto de causa eficiente aristotélica, mientras evita por completo tratar la discusión del uso de la violencia como causa final, orientada a "fines justos e injustos", sean naturales o legales.
Es algo muy propio de Benjamin esa reversión a lo irracional, es decir, que la violencia no se ejerce para la defensa de fines legales, sino para defender al derecho en sí mismo. Y esta sutil distinción es la que Benjamin cabalga siempre: No hay que presumir esa racionalidad absoluta en cada actuación de la jurisdicción y el aparato represivo. El despliegue de la violencia estatal no está perfectamente medido y pensando, sino que responde al mero impulso de mantener unas instituciones heredades, no por justicia, sino por la conservación de un derecho que se oscurece tras su consolidación.
Hasta aquí todo bien, el problema es el apartado final con la "solución" que plantea Benjamin (la misma que en textos posteriories); la redención de toda esta violencia que al parecer tiene un 'origen mítico' pasa inevitablemente por el sacrificio del sometimiento hacia una violencia de "origen divino"; una violencia que redime del derecho mismo, no atiende a concepto de culpa, es incruenta y redentora. Por lo que no hay voluntad humana ni fuerza mortal que subsane toda esta barbarie, solo divina. ¿Y qué se puede decir frente a esto? Aquí cada uno que crea lo que quiera
“If the consciousness of the latent presence of violence in a legal institution disappears, the institution falls into decay. In current times, parliaments constitute an example of this: they offer a well-known, woeful spectacle because they have not remained conscious of the revolutionary forces to which they owe their existence.” (49)
“…at its beginnings all law was the privilege of kings or grandees—in short, of the powerful. So it will remain, mutatis mutandis, as long as law continues to exist. For, from the viewpoint of violence, which alone can guarantee law, there is no equality, only at best equally sized magnitudes of violence.” (56)
I could go on and on with incredible quotes but it’s all an evasion of saying anything, since surely it would be trite. A work I will undoubtedly be referencing and has already become a central reference for me politically, especially for situating any critique of liberalism/constitutional republics/etc. I’ll be sitting with this one.
As for the edition itself, it's a great collection of all of the relevant fragments, the essay, and some of Benjamin's sources, all of which are awesome. had higher hopes for the secondary lit. while often helpful a littttttle too weedy for what i needed as a reader
Μια σύντομη αλλά εκρηκτική μελέτη που ξεγυμνώνει τη νομική και κρατική βία από την υποτιθέμενη ουδετερότητά της. Ο Μπένγιαμιν δεν ενδιαφέρεται για την ηθική της βίας, αλλά για το πώς λειτουργεί – ως ιδρυτική ή διατηρητική δύναμη. Η σκέψη του μοιάζει να ξετυλίγεται σαν φιλοσοφικό αστυνομικό μυστήριο, με ερωτήματα που παραμένουν ανοιχτά. Δεν είναι ένα κείμενο για «εύκολες λύσεις», αλλά για όσους θέλουν να διαταράξουν τις βεβαιότητες γύρω από το δίκαιο και την εξουσία. Αφαίρεσα ένα αστέρι, γιατί η γλώσσα του είναι ερμητική, ίσως σκόπιμα – αλλά κάποιες φορές ο στοχασμός πνίγεται στο ίδιο του το ύφος. Παρ’ όλα αυτά, πρόκειται για μια μελέτη που πυροδοτεί τη σκέψη και ανατρέπει όσα θεωρούσαμε αυτονόητα.
Benjamin apunta aquí una discusión importante que rechaza absolutamente las discusiones liberales sobre la justificación de la violencia como medio a través de unos fines "justos" y mira de frente la pregunta sobre la posibilidad de establecer un mundo nuevo sin hacer uso de la misma. Pero no justifica el uso de la violencia sin más. Se pregunta acerca de su origen y posibilidad y del carácter histórico de la misma.
Tendrían que ser muchas más páginas, pero me quedo con esto: "¿es posible resolver los conflictos sin violencia alguna? Sin duda que sí: las relaciones privadas entre personas están llenas de ejemplos de esto. El acuerdo carente de violencia se encuentra donde la cultura del corazón ha puesto a disposición de los hombres medios puros de acuerdo."
La más elegantísima defensa de la legitimidad de la violencia que usted jamás podrá leer. Qué manera de contener en tan corto ensayo a tantos autores posteriores (Foucault, Habermas, Agamben...), a no ser, claro, que cada uno agarrase un pedacito. De cualquier forma, un sencillo pero contundente texto cuya actualidad (y cierta oscuridad) es muy reivindicable.
Señor jesucristo por qué te lo tuviste que llevar tan joven...
P.d: nadie me había dicho que en Benjamin había un pequeño anarquista escondido.
It can create a discourse, sure. I am tremendously weary of leaning on Benjamin to help me (or anyone not European really) understand my own relationship to power and violence. He’s not wrong all the time, but he tends be to be idealistic when it matters.
won't bother commenting too much on the actual essay since it comprises only ~15 pages of this 300+ page book (but obviously it's worth reading, you could also just definitely find a free pdf online rather than buying this critical edition). What this is good for is delineating how the theological dimension of Benjamin's argument is aligned with the overall political project at work here (including the Hermann Cohen excerpt is helpful).
stray thought 1 — i can't remember if Paul Virlio actually cites this essay in his extended essay Speed and Politics but upon reflection there is probably an underdeveloped point of synthesis here and with his argument there that the root of bourgeois power is always found in military dominance and that the economic dominance is simply representative of (to borrow some Benjaminian phrasing) legal state violence.
stray thought 2 — representative liberal democracy: a teleological system with no final purpose? no wonder Habermas was an early critique of Benjamin
stray thought 3 — For Benjamin there seems to be a certain kind of violence as more fundamental than any law. there's then a shift in the relative significance of gewalt (general violence) and recht (law) so that it is no longer law which forms the rational basis of politics, but rather a legal violence.
anyway not going to write a whole essay on here just going to say this edition is great but also probably only for the real Benjamin heads
Me encantó cuando trataba Benjamin el tema de la falsa dicotomía entre derecho natural y derecho positivo, pero cuando trató el tema de la violencia divina, el efecto de atracción de la obra se diluyo. Realmente, salvo que tengas un concepto de Dios bastante particular, no se entenderá la diferencia entre la violencia humana y la divina. Al final el libro deja más dudas de las que cree resolver. Sin embargo, por ser un esfuerzo de pensamiento grandioso ha recibido una buena calificación.
Honestly, folks think I'm so sweet peace-loving kiddo who will critique violence much, and that my brain must have been altered somehow, I mean, come on, they cane even put fake things in folks wombs while making it act like an embryo so you would be tensed all month about bleedin'. And the worst part, your semi-evil sister tells you about it in villain tone through her book! Next time it happens, I'll bleed the hardest and you'll wonder where all those blood came from.
LO MÍTICO VS LO DIVINO. Entre la pléyade de escritos y grandes debates sobre la violencia, se encuentra también este libro de Benjamin cuya edición tiene un texto introductorio de Eduardo Maura Zorita. La introducción me pareció algo cansina, si bien aporta cierta claridad a algunas cuestiones planteadas por Benjamin, más que introducir, extiende lo que el autor quizo decir, tan es así que esta "introducción" triplica la extensión de la obra. Es curioso que al ser introductorio, nunca se menciona que la huelga a la que alude Benjamin, es la del "golpe de Kapp", que realmente sí ayuda a entender mejor sus planteamientos. En el texto ya propiamente de Benjamin, se habla de diferenciar entre una violencia jurídica y natural. La primera está regulada por el estado quien detenta el monopolio de la violencia, la usa para establecer o conservar el poder y los derechos, y es la única que decide cuáles casos quedan emancipados de la aplicación de la ley. Se identifica también con la violencia mítica (o de destino) en la cual, y que entre fines y medios, decanta sobre estos. Incluso, asevera que esta violencia ni siquiera es un medio, sino una manifestación. Detrás de la instauración de derechos, está la instauración del poder, todo derecho es privilegio de los poderosos. La violencia natural se juzga por la crítica de sus fines, es la violencia divina, que trasciende el estado mítico, que ya no inculpa y expía como en este, sino que redime. Es una violencia que se ejerce por medios no violentos (centrada en el fin), y se trata, sobre todo, de dejar fuera al Estado, del establecimiento de una relación privada entre las partes en la esfera del entendimiento, es decir, a través del lenguaje. En todas las relaciones siempre hay poder y siempre hay violencia. Lo que sí hace Benjamin en su texto es sugerir medios no violentos, lo cuales están al margen del Estado (y lo que flota acá es el anarquismo, para romper el círculo del poder). Lo que no hace es definir la violencia en sí, para luego diferenciar los tipos de violencia, entonces, cuando habla de una violencia divina y natural, parece una invitación a la conducta violenta cuando no se lee de qué trata y como se desarrolla esta. Es un texto que da para pensar los fenómenos de violencia que acontecen en diversos contextos.
Violence seems to fundamentally draw counter to thought in a way that I think can make it really tricky to theorize and write about in the abstract. But it felt necessary to understand more thoroughly after reading Wretched of the Earth earlier this year. Specifically I wanted to understand the productive nature of violence, what kinds of identities does it create? What does it do to language? And in what situations, if any, is it necessary?
I appreciated the honesty in calling these writings "Towards the Critique of Violence" — Benjamin makes grasping motions in a direction but doesn't quite grab onto solid ground. There's also the fact that the work itself was never finished due to fascist violence. Yet the types of motion that Benjamin explores seem to illuminate something profound to me, and certainly seem fundamental to developing a more radical analysis of the economy of violence that produces fascism and liberalism.
For example, Benjamin's understanding of violence as law-positing violence and law-preserving violence leads into a very good analysis of the police as both positing their own law via the authority of the law to enforce vague regulations upon various aspects of life, as well as preserving the law by arresting people and subjecting them to the law-preserving violence of the state apparatus. These motions could be said to correspond to fascism and liberalism. The supposed erection of 'boundaries' with "Build a wall" vs. the preservation and humanization of such boundaries via progressive investments in modernizing the carceral and border apparatus proves to be a false contradiction as these movements are mutually constitutive.
Benjamin illustrates a mysterious divine violence which functions as a pure means (and thus seeks to abolishes the juridical economy of violence as myth). Some examples are the earth swallowing up the sons of Korah, the general strike, and I would like to add the popular revolt and prison break as well.
There's also a short part on lying as a path of non-violence that was pretty thought-provoking.
Benjamin's masterclass intervention in the legal debates colouring Weimar society in the aftermath of the first world war and the civil violence of the German Revolution. Reversing Clausewitz's dictum that war is the continuation of policy by other means, Benjamin critiques both Schmitt's conception of political theology and Kelsen's theory of positive law, arguing in a dense, esoteric text that politics is the continuation of war by other means. Unpacking the concept of violence, Benjamin juxtaposes justice against law, arguing that the law presupposes the force of violence as its security that makes the attainment of justice impossible. Such violence, according to Benjamin, is already possessed of a law-making power, one that threatens in all acts and movements of violence to constitute a new legal order. For Benjamin, the possibility of justice is that act of a violence that dissolves itself, the "divine violence" of a destituent power against law itself. This is a highly esoteric text, but the critical edition comes with a phenomenal scholarly apparatus, and fantastic introduction that will ensure that even a reader unfamiliar with Benjamin's wider writings will be given ample context and resources for its understanding.