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Empirismo y subjetividad
En la trayectoria filosófica de Gilles Deleuze se pueden distinguir dos la de antes y la de después del Anti Edipo (1972, escrito junto con Félix Guattari). La primera está marcada por una serie de investigaciones de historia de la filosofía en las que se percibe una búsqueda guiada por una clara Hume (1953), Nietzsche (1962), Proust (1964), Bergson (1966), Spinoza (1969). En cada uno de estos estudios, Deleuze trata de descubrir las grandes líneas de fuerza, poniendo el acento en las tensiones más que en las significaciones. Empirismo y subjetividad , dedicado a la filosofía de Hume, inaugura, así pues, esta serie.
Con su vuelta a Hume y el énfasis que este pone en la fuerza de la imaginación y del subjetivismo de todo conocimiento, Deleuze anticipa algo de lo que será su tarea en los años setenta. «¡La imaginación al poder!» era el lema de combate de Mayo del 68, año en que Deleuze escribe su Diferencia y repetición , creando con su empirismo trascendental poskantiano su propia filosofía. Más tarde Deleuze definiría esta como «el arte de formar, de inventar, de fabricar conceptos».
Empirismo y subjetividad desafía al estudioso a indagar en qué aspectos Hume inspiró el tan creativo y rebelde discurso filosófico francés de los años cincuenta y sesenta del siglo XX.
Con su vuelta a Hume y el énfasis que este pone en la fuerza de la imaginación y del subjetivismo de todo conocimiento, Deleuze anticipa algo de lo que será su tarea en los años setenta. «¡La imaginación al poder!» era el lema de combate de Mayo del 68, año en que Deleuze escribe su Diferencia y repetición , creando con su empirismo trascendental poskantiano su propia filosofía. Más tarde Deleuze definiría esta como «el arte de formar, de inventar, de fabricar conceptos».
Empirismo y subjetividad desafía al estudioso a indagar en qué aspectos Hume inspiró el tan creativo y rebelde discurso filosófico francés de los años cincuenta y sesenta del siglo XX.
240 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1953
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About the author
Gilles Deleuze
269 books2,667 followersDeleuze is a key figure in poststructuralist French philosophy. Considering himself an empiricist and a vitalist, his body of work, which rests upon concepts such as multiplicity, constructivism, difference and desire, stands at a substantial remove from the main traditions of 20th century Continental thought. His thought locates him as an influential figure in present-day considerations of society, creativity and subjectivity. Notably, within his metaphysics he favored a Spinozian concept of a plane of immanence with everything a mode of one substance, and thus on the same level of existence. He argued, then, that there is no good and evil, but rather only relationships which are beneficial or harmful to the particular individuals. This ethics influences his approach to society and politics, especially as he was so politically active in struggles for rights and freedoms. Later in his career he wrote some of the more infamous texts of the period, in particular, Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus. These texts are collaborative works with the radical psychoanalyst Félix Guattari, and they exhibit Deleuze’s social and political commitment.
Gilles Deleuze began his career with a number of idiosyncratic yet rigorous historical studies of figures outside of the Continental tradition in vogue at the time. His first book, Empirisism and Subjectivity, is a study of Hume, interpreted by Deleuze to be a radical subjectivist. Deleuze became known for writing about other philosophers with new insights and different readings, interested as he was in liberating philosophical history from the hegemony of one perspective. He wrote on Spinoza, Nietzche, Kant, Leibniz and others, including literary authors and works, cinema, and art. Deleuze claimed that he did not write “about” art, literature, or cinema, but, rather, undertook philosophical “encounters” that led him to new concepts. As a constructivist, he was adamant that philosophers are creators, and that each reading of philosophy, or each philosophical encounter, ought to inspire new concepts. Additionally, according to Deleuze and his concepts of difference, there is no identity, and in repetition, nothing is ever the same. Rather, there is only difference: copies are something new, everything is constantly changing, and reality is a becoming, not a being.
He often collaborated with philosophers and artists as Félix Guattari, Michel Foucault, Guy Hocquenghem, René Schérer, Carmelo Bene, François Châtelet, Olivier Revault d'Allonnes, Jean-François Lyotard, Georges Lapassade, Kateb Yacine and many others.
Gilles Deleuze began his career with a number of idiosyncratic yet rigorous historical studies of figures outside of the Continental tradition in vogue at the time. His first book, Empirisism and Subjectivity, is a study of Hume, interpreted by Deleuze to be a radical subjectivist. Deleuze became known for writing about other philosophers with new insights and different readings, interested as he was in liberating philosophical history from the hegemony of one perspective. He wrote on Spinoza, Nietzche, Kant, Leibniz and others, including literary authors and works, cinema, and art. Deleuze claimed that he did not write “about” art, literature, or cinema, but, rather, undertook philosophical “encounters” that led him to new concepts. As a constructivist, he was adamant that philosophers are creators, and that each reading of philosophy, or each philosophical encounter, ought to inspire new concepts. Additionally, according to Deleuze and his concepts of difference, there is no identity, and in repetition, nothing is ever the same. Rather, there is only difference: copies are something new, everything is constantly changing, and reality is a becoming, not a being.
He often collaborated with philosophers and artists as Félix Guattari, Michel Foucault, Guy Hocquenghem, René Schérer, Carmelo Bene, François Châtelet, Olivier Revault d'Allonnes, Jean-François Lyotard, Georges Lapassade, Kateb Yacine and many others.
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October 11, 2018
فصل اول رو تا الآن خوندم. خوب بوده. ولی خب زبان ثقیلی داره.
_________________
همهش رو نخواندم. به صورت مروری و آنجاهایی که به کارم میآمد را خواندم. خوب بود، نقد منصفانهای داشت. اما زبان فلسفیای داشت که برای تازهخوانها سخت بود. همینطور برای نخستین مواجهه با هیوم مناسب نیست.
_________________
قسمتی از متن کتاب:
"فهم خودِ ذهن است، اما ذهنی تحت تاثیر اصل تجربه ، زمان را در قالب گذشتهای تابع مشاهدهاش منعکس میکند؛ و تحت تاثیر اصل عادت، تخیل نیز ذهن است، اما ذهنی که زمان را در قالب آیندهای تعین یافته براساس انتظاراتش منعکس میکند. باور نسبتِ میان این دو بُعدِ برساخته است. هیوم به هنگام عرضهی صورتبندی باور مینویسد: این دو اصل((برای عمل روی تخیل با یکدیگر پیوند مییابند و مرا وامیدارند ایدههایی معین را به طریقی شدیدتر و سرزندهتر از ایدههای دیگری که همین مزایا را ندارند شکل دهم.))"
_________________
همهش رو نخواندم. به صورت مروری و آنجاهایی که به کارم میآمد را خواندم. خوب بود، نقد منصفانهای داشت. اما زبان فلسفیای داشت که برای تازهخوانها سخت بود. همینطور برای نخستین مواجهه با هیوم مناسب نیست.
_________________
قسمتی از متن کتاب:
"فهم خودِ ذهن است، اما ذهنی تحت تاثیر اصل تجربه ، زمان را در قالب گذشتهای تابع مشاهدهاش منعکس میکند؛ و تحت تاثیر اصل عادت، تخیل نیز ذهن است، اما ذهنی که زمان را در قالب آیندهای تعین یافته براساس انتظاراتش منعکس میکند. باور نسبتِ میان این دو بُعدِ برساخته است. هیوم به هنگام عرضهی صورتبندی باور مینویسد: این دو اصل((برای عمل روی تخیل با یکدیگر پیوند مییابند و مرا وامیدارند ایدههایی معین را به طریقی شدیدتر و سرزندهتر از ایدههای دیگری که همین مزایا را ندارند شکل دهم.))"
September 17, 2015
Gilles Deleuze continually amazes me. This incredibly tight and coherent book was written when he was only 28. it was his first book.
Here he utilizes Hume's radical critique on induction (which is actually a critique on causation and empiricism) in order to realign not only culture and society but also subjectivity.
From here, Deleuze no longer speaks of subjectivity in his other works (for the most part). He immediately grasps the relation of subjectivity with time, as past coherences are also given in the present through a formal repetition of content deployment.
This is connection of Bergson and Freud; that process is knowledge, and the imprint of a particular process as being the "main line" highlights not only what is significant in an encounter but also significant for future encounters.
When we understand that relations are "outside themselves" as external connections that are imposed, we can grasp that subjectivities as self referential are also "relations outside themselves". It is the process of this superimposition that creates mind, being and so on as synthetic relations of what we do. Knowledge is given to a material process. In later works, Deleuze shows the mixture of material sheets of consistency from which agency is expressed forms the partial objects of agential realism as the formation of new agencies as new material consistencies.
"Philosophy must constitute itself as the theory of what we are doing, not as a theory of what is".
This is the jump as a young Deleuze pushes us beyond existentialism of a resoluteness of being into the functionalism of the 21st century.
Here he utilizes Hume's radical critique on induction (which is actually a critique on causation and empiricism) in order to realign not only culture and society but also subjectivity.
From here, Deleuze no longer speaks of subjectivity in his other works (for the most part). He immediately grasps the relation of subjectivity with time, as past coherences are also given in the present through a formal repetition of content deployment.
This is connection of Bergson and Freud; that process is knowledge, and the imprint of a particular process as being the "main line" highlights not only what is significant in an encounter but also significant for future encounters.
When we understand that relations are "outside themselves" as external connections that are imposed, we can grasp that subjectivities as self referential are also "relations outside themselves". It is the process of this superimposition that creates mind, being and so on as synthetic relations of what we do. Knowledge is given to a material process. In later works, Deleuze shows the mixture of material sheets of consistency from which agency is expressed forms the partial objects of agential realism as the formation of new agencies as new material consistencies.
"Philosophy must constitute itself as the theory of what we are doing, not as a theory of what is".
This is the jump as a young Deleuze pushes us beyond existentialism of a resoluteness of being into the functionalism of the 21st century.
April 17, 2017
If I'm ever a professor, I will use Chapter 2 (Cultural World) as an essay to read in an intro social and political or ethics course, it is that readable. AND, it's by Deleuze. How often can we put "readable" and "Deleuze" together?
Plus, this is a fresh take on Hume: I remember thinking that he was only about bundles. Reading this book made me realize what a shame it was to have been introduced to Hume in such a limited way.
This book is an analytical and creative take on Hume and his system, and as someone who is approaching more Deleuzian philosophy, also really helpful for understanding the foundation of some of Deleuze's most challenging ideas (esp. immanence, difference & repetition)
Plus, this is a fresh take on Hume: I remember thinking that he was only about bundles. Reading this book made me realize what a shame it was to have been introduced to Hume in such a limited way.
This book is an analytical and creative take on Hume and his system, and as someone who is approaching more Deleuzian philosophy, also really helpful for understanding the foundation of some of Deleuze's most challenging ideas (esp. immanence, difference & repetition)
June 4, 2019
ترجمهی بسیار خوبی داره کتاب.
«ما را خطا تهدید نمیکند؛ بسی بدتر از آن، در هذیان غرقهایم.»
«ما را خطا تهدید نمیکند؛ بسی بدتر از آن، در هذیان غرقهایم.»
April 8, 2020
This is a surprisingly compelling work of epistemology. In his first published monograph, Deleuze ingeniously reinvents Hume's system of philosophy not only to repudiate Kantian critical/transcendental philosophy but to rehabilitate empiricism as well on transcendental grounds.
What follows is an attempt to summarize the monograph's argument.
For most philosophers, the question is discovering the stable given of human nature, and the nature of the mind itself. Hume reverses this question by asking "How does the mind become human nature? How is the subject constituted in the given?"
For DH (Deleuze's Hume) the mind does not exist in itself. Rather, the mind is a collection of ideas that we refer to as the imagination. The imagination operates without constancy or uniformity, and it is a faculty guided the principles of association (the famous threesome of contiguity, resemblance, and causality). The principles of association provide a uniformity for the imagination, a system for the ideas so that they can acquire their own relations and thus become knowledge. It is in this process, the subject is born. And through the imaginative workings of the subject's fancy, the mind can travel beyond legitimate knowledge and acquire beliefs that are then regulated and corrected by various rules and principles. The subject is always that which is constituted within the given, but it is simultaneously that which transcends and moves beyond the given through the imagination.
There exists two axises that run through the subject. On the one hand you have the axis of ideas-association-transcendence-knowledge, but on the other hand you have the corollary axis of passions/affectations-belief-sympathy-morality whose principles and process are parallel to but incompletely independent of the generation of the subject.
What many philosophers have failed to grasp is that associations and affectations have no representative content. They cannot be thought in themselves but are merely activity. They go beyond the purview of reason. Deleuze underscores how reason is a limited faculty which only deals with parts, while feeling and sentiment deal with wholes. Reason cannot influence practice in the way that passion can.
What is perhaps most central is that DH argues that experience and habit are the two most powerful regulators of association and understanding. Experience always exists in the present as the reconstitution of the past (DH takes up temporality as duration here). Habit subsists through the difference of repetition, the aggregation of similar cases which allows the understanding to reason about experience. Because of this habit presupposes (and in some way is) experience. But at the same time their unity is not given.
Furthermore, DH repudiates Kant's rebuttal of Hume. Kant argues that Hume's empiricist philosophy makes the case that knowledge begins with and is derived from experience. And DH answers: Who wouldn't argue that we get knowledge from experience? Kant does not recognize that Hume has a completely different understanding of the nature of knowledge and experience.
Hume holds up the atomism of ideas and the associationism of ideas as completely independent phenomena with disparate generative principles. Hume does not believe genesis is absolutely determinative, he merely draws out their functional capacity to create the subject and the understanding. Empiricism is inherently based on the dualism between terms/atoms/ideas and associations/relations/human nature. The fundamental question of empiricism once again is "How is the subject constituted inside the given?" Kant is wrong to collapse the subject and the given to some presupposed unity or harmony. DH would contend that the given and the subject are not regulated by the same principles. Kant assumes this is the case. And this is primarily why his transcendental deduction fails.
Deleuze closes with the following lines:
"Here again, the fact is that the given never joins together its separate elements into a whole. In short, as we believe and invent, we turn the given into a nature. At this point Hume's philosophy reaches its ultimate point: Nature conforms to being. Human nature conforms to nature--but in what sense? Inside the given, we establish relations and form totalities. But the latter do not depend on the given, but rather on the principles we know; they are purely functional. And the functions agree with the hidden powers on which the given depends, although we do not know these powers. [...] Philosophy must constitute itself as the theory of we are doing, not as a theory of what there is. What we do has its principles; and being can only be grasped as the object of a synthetic relation with the very principles of what we do."
What follows is an attempt to summarize the monograph's argument.
For most philosophers, the question is discovering the stable given of human nature, and the nature of the mind itself. Hume reverses this question by asking "How does the mind become human nature? How is the subject constituted in the given?"
For DH (Deleuze's Hume) the mind does not exist in itself. Rather, the mind is a collection of ideas that we refer to as the imagination. The imagination operates without constancy or uniformity, and it is a faculty guided the principles of association (the famous threesome of contiguity, resemblance, and causality). The principles of association provide a uniformity for the imagination, a system for the ideas so that they can acquire their own relations and thus become knowledge. It is in this process, the subject is born. And through the imaginative workings of the subject's fancy, the mind can travel beyond legitimate knowledge and acquire beliefs that are then regulated and corrected by various rules and principles. The subject is always that which is constituted within the given, but it is simultaneously that which transcends and moves beyond the given through the imagination.
There exists two axises that run through the subject. On the one hand you have the axis of ideas-association-transcendence-knowledge, but on the other hand you have the corollary axis of passions/affectations-belief-sympathy-morality whose principles and process are parallel to but incompletely independent of the generation of the subject.
What many philosophers have failed to grasp is that associations and affectations have no representative content. They cannot be thought in themselves but are merely activity. They go beyond the purview of reason. Deleuze underscores how reason is a limited faculty which only deals with parts, while feeling and sentiment deal with wholes. Reason cannot influence practice in the way that passion can.
What is perhaps most central is that DH argues that experience and habit are the two most powerful regulators of association and understanding. Experience always exists in the present as the reconstitution of the past (DH takes up temporality as duration here). Habit subsists through the difference of repetition, the aggregation of similar cases which allows the understanding to reason about experience. Because of this habit presupposes (and in some way is) experience. But at the same time their unity is not given.
Furthermore, DH repudiates Kant's rebuttal of Hume. Kant argues that Hume's empiricist philosophy makes the case that knowledge begins with and is derived from experience. And DH answers: Who wouldn't argue that we get knowledge from experience? Kant does not recognize that Hume has a completely different understanding of the nature of knowledge and experience.
Hume holds up the atomism of ideas and the associationism of ideas as completely independent phenomena with disparate generative principles. Hume does not believe genesis is absolutely determinative, he merely draws out their functional capacity to create the subject and the understanding. Empiricism is inherently based on the dualism between terms/atoms/ideas and associations/relations/human nature. The fundamental question of empiricism once again is "How is the subject constituted inside the given?" Kant is wrong to collapse the subject and the given to some presupposed unity or harmony. DH would contend that the given and the subject are not regulated by the same principles. Kant assumes this is the case. And this is primarily why his transcendental deduction fails.
Deleuze closes with the following lines:
"Here again, the fact is that the given never joins together its separate elements into a whole. In short, as we believe and invent, we turn the given into a nature. At this point Hume's philosophy reaches its ultimate point: Nature conforms to being. Human nature conforms to nature--but in what sense? Inside the given, we establish relations and form totalities. But the latter do not depend on the given, but rather on the principles we know; they are purely functional. And the functions agree with the hidden powers on which the given depends, although we do not know these powers. [...] Philosophy must constitute itself as the theory of we are doing, not as a theory of what there is. What we do has its principles; and being can only be grasped as the object of a synthetic relation with the very principles of what we do."
April 25, 2020
كتاب مهم، محاولة لإعادة قراءة هيوم بعيدا عن نقد كانط التعسفي له في بعض النقاط، لكن للأسف الترجمة سيئة جدا جدا، من أسوء الترجمات التي قرأتها.
April 14, 2013
An utterly brilliant reading/refining of Hume and a great transition into Deleuze's own philosophy. It doesn't get much better than this.
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October 25, 2025کتاب تحسینبرانگیزِ «گفتوگوهایی در باب دین طبیعی» که پس از مرگ هیوم منتشر شد (1799)، واضحترین و پیچیدهترین را دوباره درهم میآمیزد. شاید این کتاب یگانه گفتوگوی حقیقی در تاریخ فلسفه باشد: زیرا در گفتوگوهای این کتاب، نه دو، بلکه سه شخصیت وجود دارد که نقشهای تکمعنا (ثابت) ندارند، و ائتلافهای موقتی برقرار میکنند، آنها را میگسلند و از نو آشتی میکنند... دمهآ مدافع دین وحیانی، کلئانت نمایندهی دین طبیعی و فیلون شکاک است. طنزِ هیوم-فیلون صرفاً راهی برای به توافق رساندنِ همگان، به نام شکاکیتی که «درجات» را بازتوزیع میکند نیست، بلکه طریقیست برای گسست، حتی از جریانهای مسلط قرن هیجدهم، برای بشارتدادن اندیشهی آینده.
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August 18, 2023Deleuze manages to make Hume seem interesting, an impressive feat if there ever was one.
Empiricism doesn't convince me unfortunately, but Deleuze redefines it, or shores up a definition often overlooked, that is somewhat more palatable to me:
More succinctly, it seems Hume wishes to re-present empiricism as being concerned with the subject as being within "the given", the impressions which the subject meets with, and forming experience not merely from the given, but by the principles which shape the given as ideas. And this experience has the further attribute of being practically oriented.
All of this is very attractive in some respects, but my issue with Hume, and with Deleuze here, is that they invoke the social and never really expand enough on it. That custom (repetition) is, in part, at the very forefront of what the subject is considered to be is an important bit of thought, and yet custom, in its social dimension, never gets its due I feel. It remains oddly particular and individual. I don't know, I'm a dirty fence sitter on this for the moment. I will have to think and probably reread after having gone through the Treatise properly.
18/08/2023
Second Reading: Still have a very high opinion of this, though less sympathetic to the philosophy of Hume in general, and yet with a higher opinion. I still think Kant's copernican turn was generally correct.
Some interesting considerations perhaps with Deleuzes characterisation of "the Given" that could go to criticise the rather simplistic rendering in Marcuse's Reason and Revolution. Also perhaps some kind of latent pragmatism? Interesting to re-read, perhaps due a re-re-read.
Empiricism doesn't convince me unfortunately, but Deleuze redefines it, or shores up a definition often overlooked, that is somewhat more palatable to me:
The classical definition of empiricism proposed by the Kantian tradition is this: empiricism is the theory according to which knowledge not only begins with experience but is derived from it. But why would the empiricist say that? and as the result of which question? (...) The fact is, though, that the definition is in no way satisfactory: first of all, because knowledge is not the most important thing for empiricism, but only the means to some practical activity. Next, because experience for the empiricist, and for Hume in particular, does not have this univocal and constitutive aspect that we give it. (...) In short, it seems impossible to define empiricism as a theory according to which knowledge derives from experience. (106-108)
More succinctly, it seems Hume wishes to re-present empiricism as being concerned with the subject as being within "the given", the impressions which the subject meets with, and forming experience not merely from the given, but by the principles which shape the given as ideas. And this experience has the further attribute of being practically oriented.
All of this is very attractive in some respects, but my issue with Hume, and with Deleuze here, is that they invoke the social and never really expand enough on it. That custom (repetition) is, in part, at the very forefront of what the subject is considered to be is an important bit of thought, and yet custom, in its social dimension, never gets its due I feel. It remains oddly particular and individual. I don't know, I'm a dirty fence sitter on this for the moment. I will have to think and probably reread after having gone through the Treatise properly.
18/08/2023
Second Reading: Still have a very high opinion of this, though less sympathetic to the philosophy of Hume in general, and yet with a higher opinion. I still think Kant's copernican turn was generally correct.
Some interesting considerations perhaps with Deleuzes characterisation of "the Given" that could go to criticise the rather simplistic rendering in Marcuse's Reason and Revolution. Also perhaps some kind of latent pragmatism? Interesting to re-read, perhaps due a re-re-read.
September 13, 2025
Unfair the extent this monograph seems made for me. I've had Quine's phrase "the Humean condition is the human condition" rattling around my brain for some time, but, as Deleuze argues here, there has been insufficient attention drawn to what is meant by human nature in the Humean sense. There are shared emphases between Quine and Deleuze, but Deleuze here makes the sharp departure from a purely epistemic reading of Hume, and a shift towards a wholly radical reinterpretation of Empiricism as an account of how subjectivity issues forth from the given. Even if we take Locke as a base, there is the assumption of Tabula Rasa; we begin from nothing and are gradually formed from what the senses take in. What Deleuze sees in Hume is a strong program of how a confluence of our impressions and actions pull together a subject as a whole as an emergent feature; that from largely physical and functional processes and biases such thing as a human nature can emerge; not just what we know, but rather a functional emergent sort of being. Thus Deleuze engages practical reason and means-ends views of ethics, pragmatist action-oriented matters of knowing, and physicalist-functionalist philosophy of mind, all of which are firmly in my personal eclectic wheelhouse, delivered as a reading of the philosopher who got me into Philosophy. This text has the added benefit of being written as a straightforward academic monograph rather than whatever the hell is going on in the later Deleuze everyone loves and loathes; and even then there is a tremendous secondary Gilles Deleuze's Empiricism and Subjectivity: A Critical Introduction and Guide written by Jon Roffe worth reading if only because of how well written it is. Really, the only negative response I have to this book is the realization I may possibly be a Deleuze guy.
September 5, 2024
hume mola👍
February 7, 2017
I can and must someday concoct an epic play on Deleuze. Till then there is the indispensable mammoth psychlinguistic cannon to break through. We need to start throwing windows out of windows but first obtain the complete unabridged works of Hume, including the History and the Letters.
July 11, 2025
Je n'ai pas le courage intellectuel de critiquer un ouvrage philosophique yet , en revanche je peux partager des extraits que je trouve très pertinents. En l'occurence, ces extrait sont primordiaux pour les étudiants qui comme moi s'adonnent régulièrement à ce magnifique exercice du commentaire de texte philosophique.
" (...) une théorie philosophique est une question développée, et rien d'autre: par elle-même, en elle même, elle consiste non pas à résoudre un problème, mais à développer jusqu'au bout les implications nécessaires d'une question formulée. Elle nous montre ce que les choses sont, ce qu'il faut bien que les choses soient, à supposer que la question soit bonne et rigoureuse."
"En philosophie, la question et la critique de la question ne font qu'un; ou si l'on préfère, il n'y a pas de critique des solutions, mais seulement une critique des problèmes.(...) En ce sens, on voit combien sont nulles la plupart des objections faites aux grands philosphes. On leur dit: les choses ne sont pas ainsi. Mais, en fait, il ne s'agit pas de savoir si les choses sont ainsi ou non, il s'agit, de savoir si est bonne ou non, rigoureuse ou non, la question qui les rend ainsi"
" (...) une théorie philosophique est une question développée, et rien d'autre: par elle-même, en elle même, elle consiste non pas à résoudre un problème, mais à développer jusqu'au bout les implications nécessaires d'une question formulée. Elle nous montre ce que les choses sont, ce qu'il faut bien que les choses soient, à supposer que la question soit bonne et rigoureuse."
"En philosophie, la question et la critique de la question ne font qu'un; ou si l'on préfère, il n'y a pas de critique des solutions, mais seulement une critique des problèmes.(...) En ce sens, on voit combien sont nulles la plupart des objections faites aux grands philosphes. On leur dit: les choses ne sont pas ainsi. Mais, en fait, il ne s'agit pas de savoir si les choses sont ainsi ou non, il s'agit, de savoir si est bonne ou non, rigoureuse ou non, la question qui les rend ainsi"
July 30, 2025
I debated rating this less, because I had quite a miserable and tolling experience reading this (particularly due to my unfamiliarity with Hume). However this really truly shook me, and profoundly changed how I view myself, existence, and really everything. I am nothing but a synthesis of the various functions and processes constituting my subjectivity. And what there IS, is a question neither answerable nor worth answering.
"We are habits, nothing but habits – the habit of saying ‘I’"
"Philosophy must constitute itself as a theory of what we are doing, not as a theory of what there is"
"We are habits, nothing but habits – the habit of saying ‘I’"
"Philosophy must constitute itself as a theory of what we are doing, not as a theory of what there is"
November 8, 2022
No sé que viene antes el huevo o la gallina
May 14, 2019
Surprisingly straightforwardly written in a relatively lucid style--working mainly around the concept of subjectivity in Hume and how it arises from the mind via the principles of human nature (association and the passions). I'm not an expert on Hume (the only real book I read from being the Inquiry) but Deleuze explains it with an immense clarity, but it's also clear that being his first book it's pretty different from the Deleuze that everyone knows.
One part that intrigued me more is Deleuze (or Hume)'s admission that the hypothesis of a continuous existence of the world is a 'necessary principle of fancy'. He's almost admitting that substance metaphysics is a necessary illusion! The very philosophy he would go on to later criticise rather ruthlessly. Also some possible connections to Whitehead's notion of the super-ject, the subject participating in the process of the development of their own subjectivity.
One part that intrigued me more is Deleuze (or Hume)'s admission that the hypothesis of a continuous existence of the world is a 'necessary principle of fancy'. He's almost admitting that substance metaphysics is a necessary illusion! The very philosophy he would go on to later criticise rather ruthlessly. Also some possible connections to Whitehead's notion of the super-ject, the subject participating in the process of the development of their own subjectivity.
March 12, 2023
الذات هي تجاوز المعطى الأولي، أو هي [تجميعة] تجاوز المعطى بغزارته الفائقة. أنا أفكر، أنا أفعل، وأنا أترك، وأنا الذي نظر الأعمى إلى أدبي، في كل ذلك تحدث نقلة [فاعلة] أو يحدث التركيب الموجب للذات على قاعدة التركيب السالب، أو التركيب الفاعل [المتوهم] على خلفية التركيب المنفعل [المتخيّل]. تتكون الذاتيّة على قاعدة أولى أو على نقلة أولى هي: أن نثبت أكثر مما نعلم. شروق الشمس اليومي اعتياديًا يجيز لنا أن نثبت أنها ستطلع من جديد بعد ليل آخر، يجعلنا نلزمها بلزوم منطقي وعقلي. لكن الذاتية لا تتوقف على ذلك، أي أنّ نثبت أو نلزم الأشياء بلزومات وإثباتات، التي لم يبلغ تكرارها معشار تكرار شروق وغروب الشمس. هذه أطروحة هيوم الأساسيّة: التكرار لا يغير شيئًا في الشيء نفسه، وإنّما يغير شيئًا في العقل أو في الذات. وهذا التغير هو اعتياد أو عادة تنتج على التكرار لدفق الإدراكات المتواصل لمعطيات هي عند هيوم تعالقات لا جواهر ولا مواضيع. في هذا ينفس هيوم الذات والموضوع كمعطيات قبليّة، فأنطولوجياه هي أنطولوجيا أولية العلاقات والقوى على الجواهر والأشياء. العقل هو تجميع وتركيب نهر الإدراكات الأوليّة والأصغرية لتعالقات تصادفية وعرضية تولد اعتيادات بالتجاور والتشابه والتتالي، وقعر العقل هو هذيان الأحاسيس في فوضى الصدفة واللاتعالق.
إنّ التداخل التاريخي لهيوم في تاريخ الفلسفة هو التحول الباراديغمي من سيكولوجيا العقل إلى سيكولوجيا تأثرات وانفعالات العقل، من هنا أخلاقية وسيسولوجية وتاريخيّة هيوم، أو البعد الأخلاقي والاجتماعي والتاريخي للتجريبة والذاتية عنده، فقبل أن تكون عالم نفس أو لتكون عالم نفس عليك أن تكون فيلسوفا للأخلاق والمجتمع والتاريخ. إنّ الفكر هو قوة للخارج، وإنّ الذات هي تركيب بالإضافة لهذه القوى وليس تركيبا بالإدماج، إنّ الذات هي تجميع أو ملتقى معطيات مع قدرة إضافية على [إثبات أكثر مما تعلم] أو قدرة على التركيب الفاعل والتركيب المنفعل. والمعطيات هي تعالقات تؤثر في الحواس لتوليد انطباعات أو انفعالات أو أفكارا، تختلف عن بعضها في [شدة التأثر]. إن الوقوف عند التركيب الفاعل هو وهم السببية هو علّة العقلانية والتجريبية الكلاسيكية، والتجاوز الهيومي هو إعادة الاعتبار للتركيب المنفعل، أي للقوة التركيبية في المخيلة، والفرق الهيومي هو: إنّه لا شيء يحدث عبر المخيلة، بل كل شيء يحدث في المخيلة. في دقات الساعة على سبيل المثال، تتالي للثواني وتوليد للديومة والزمان، وبالتالي تقسيم افتراضي للزمان لماضي وحاضر ومستقبل. لا يمكن لآلية الساعة القيام بهذا [التركيب السالب] لأن الساعة تفتقد لل[اللاوعي] قبل افتقادها للوعي، أو للمخيلة قبل الفاهمة. بالنسبة للساعة كل دقة لعقرب الثواني هو شيء مستقل في ذاته، الساعة لا تشعر بالزمن لأنّها لا تقوم بتأليف خيالي أو فانتازي للزمن. ومن هنا للمقارنة كل شروق للشمس هو شيء مستقل بذاته، هو تعالق ما يؤثر في مستقبلات حسيّة ويولد إدراكات جزئية، ويتم في المخلية بشكل راجع تأليفي إجراء التركيب السالب الأول في الذاتية على مستوى اللاوعي، قبل إحداث التركيب الفاعل على مستوى الوعي.
هذا الإدغام أو هذا التقلص على مستى اللاوعي الذي يجري في المخيلة هو التركيب السالب للذاتية وهو موضوع التجريبية الهيومية أو التجريبية المتعالية. فالتجريبية عند دولوز عن هيوم، هي ليس الوقوف الوضعي الساذج عند واقع التجربة وبناء المعرفة على نتائج التجارب، وليست هي الفكرة المبسّطة والمختزلة عن العقل كلوح أبيض لكتابة الحواس. فالتجريبية بهذا المعنى ليست إلا اسمًا آخرًا للمثالية، طالما إنها تفترض مسبقًا الوجود القبلي المستوي للذوات والموضوعات، مع أسبقية كليّة أو جزئية لأحدهما على الآخر. تجريبية دولوز عن هيوم، هي النظر في ممكن التجربة الترانسنتدالي لا في واقعها الموضوعي. وبهذا المعنى لا تكون التجربة شيئًا مضادًا للمفاهيم والتجريدات، بل كما يصرح دولوز تصبح الاتجاه الأكثر ابتداعًا للمفاهيم. وهذا هو المكانة المميزة لهيوم دولوز الذي جاء في فترة انغمست الفلسفة الفرنسية فيها حتى أذنيها في الهيغلية، تلك التي تنفي إمكانية معرفة الأشياء والموجودات في ذاتها، وتعلي من شأن التجريدات والمفاهيم، وتنظر للموجودات بوصفها تحققات للتاريخ لا تجاورات في المكان، وهي بالتالي بحسب دولوز تضع الروح مقابل العالم أو لا ترى في الوجود إلا ما يفترضه العقل فيه أو ما يستحسن أن يكون فيه. هذه نزعة لا تفتح الفكر على الحياة أو لا تفكر في الحياة مع الحياة، إن نزعة نا��ية للحياة تفوح منها رائحة السكون والشلل، مقابل الحركة والرقص التي هي صفة الفلاسفة المحبين للحياة، أو صفة الفلاسفة المفضلين دولوزيا على الأقل.
إنّ سيكولوجيا تأثرات العقل بالضد من سيكولوجيا العقل الممتنعة تجعلنا نفهم مع هيوم واسبينوزا قوّة الحقيقة في الانفعال والتأثر، أي نعيد للانفعال والتأثر في تكون الذاتية والموضوعيّة الاعتبار الذي سلبه منهما تاريخ الفلسفة، حين أحدق في قرص الشمس وتظهر لي الشمس قاب قوسين أو أدنى هذه حقيقة مساوية في أثرها التاريخي والاجتماعي، بل والمعرفي، حقيقة أن الشمس تبعد حسابيًا كذا وكذا من الكيلومترات. من هنا يرى هيوم على سبي المثال إنّه لا يمكن دحض الدين عقليًا، لأنّ الانفعال الديني بمفهوم هيوم يحوز على [عقلانية] و[حقيقة] اجتماعية وتاريخية وقبل ذلك ذاتية وموضوعية لا تقل عن فكرة عقلية مجردة أو عن حقيقة موضوعية. ف"العقل عينه ما هو إلا تحديد عام وهادئ للانفعالات، يقوم على الرؤية من بعيد أو على الانعكاس". بهذا، على هذا المستوى من الراديكالي، يمكن فهم الوجوه العقلانية للدين أو للأفكار والانفعالات الدينية.
وإنّ سيكولوجيا تأثرات العقل بالضد من سيكولوجيا العقل، في نظرية هيوم عن الذاتية والفكر بوصفهما حركة وصيرورات وقوى للخارج هو مدخل هيوم أو تطبيق هيوم لكفرته عن الأخلاق والاجتماع. هيوم يرى إن الطبيعة البشرية متحيّزة أكثر مما هي أنانية. إنّه من السهولة والسذاجة هو تذاكي فلسفة الحالة الطبيعية والعقد الاجتماعي التي تقوم على الأنانية والمنفعة الشخصية. نقد هيوم ينطلق من تجريبيته وذاتيته. فلو كانت الأنانية الصرفة مستحكمة في الطبيعة البشرية لما ظهر المشكل الاجتماعي من أساسيّة، لأننا سنضع حدودًا. المشكلة الاجتماعية والسياسية للطبيعة البشرية هي في التحيّزات والتعاطفات التي تولدها التأثرات والانفعالات العقلية، بما إنّ العقل والفكر هو نتاج قوى الخارج. بهذا فإنّ الطبيعة البشرية تعاطفية وتواشجية، لو كنا أنانيين لكنا منعزلين أو انعزاليين في ذاتية سيكولوجية انعكاسية، المشكل الاجتماعي والسياسي يأتي من التعاطفية والتحيز الذي يصم الذاتية، نحن لا ندخل حروبًا لأننا منفعيين أو أنانيين، بل لأن التعاطفات والتحيزات، أو التحيزات التعاطفية متضاربة. العائلة والعشيرة والقبيلة والامة هي قبل أن تكون تشكلات انثروبولوجية أو إثنية وعرقية أو اجتماعية، هي تحيزات حسية وإدراكية وفكرية. الانفعالات والمشاعر والعواطف والأفكار هي الأمم والشعوب والقبائل والعائلة.
مع هذين التطبيقين أترك لكم الكتاب لتستبدوا فيه.
إنّ التداخل التاريخي لهيوم في تاريخ الفلسفة هو التحول الباراديغمي من سيكولوجيا العقل إلى سيكولوجيا تأثرات وانفعالات العقل، من هنا أخلاقية وسيسولوجية وتاريخيّة هيوم، أو البعد الأخلاقي والاجتماعي والتاريخي للتجريبة والذاتية عنده، فقبل أن تكون عالم نفس أو لتكون عالم نفس عليك أن تكون فيلسوفا للأخلاق والمجتمع والتاريخ. إنّ الفكر هو قوة للخارج، وإنّ الذات هي تركيب بالإضافة لهذه القوى وليس تركيبا بالإدماج، إنّ الذات هي تجميع أو ملتقى معطيات مع قدرة إضافية على [إثبات أكثر مما تعلم] أو قدرة على التركيب الفاعل والتركيب المنفعل. والمعطيات هي تعالقات تؤثر في الحواس لتوليد انطباعات أو انفعالات أو أفكارا، تختلف عن بعضها في [شدة التأثر]. إن الوقوف عند التركيب الفاعل هو وهم السببية هو علّة العقلانية والتجريبية الكلاسيكية، والتجاوز الهيومي هو إعادة الاعتبار للتركيب المنفعل، أي للقوة التركيبية في المخيلة، والفرق الهيومي هو: إنّه لا شيء يحدث عبر المخيلة، بل كل شيء يحدث في المخيلة. في دقات الساعة على سبيل المثال، تتالي للثواني وتوليد للديومة والزمان، وبالتالي تقسيم افتراضي للزمان لماضي وحاضر ومستقبل. لا يمكن لآلية الساعة القيام بهذا [التركيب السالب] لأن الساعة تفتقد لل[اللاوعي] قبل افتقادها للوعي، أو للمخيلة قبل الفاهمة. بالنسبة للساعة كل دقة لعقرب الثواني هو شيء مستقل في ذاته، الساعة لا تشعر بالزمن لأنّها لا تقوم بتأليف خيالي أو فانتازي للزمن. ومن هنا للمقارنة كل شروق للشمس هو شيء مستقل بذاته، هو تعالق ما يؤثر في مستقبلات حسيّة ويولد إدراكات جزئية، ويتم في المخلية بشكل راجع تأليفي إجراء التركيب السالب الأول في الذاتية على مستوى اللاوعي، قبل إحداث التركيب الفاعل على مستوى الوعي.
هذا الإدغام أو هذا التقلص على مستى اللاوعي الذي يجري في المخيلة هو التركيب السالب للذاتية وهو موضوع التجريبية الهيومية أو التجريبية المتعالية. فالتجريبية عند دولوز عن هيوم، هي ليس الوقوف الوضعي الساذج عند واقع التجربة وبناء المعرفة على نتائج التجارب، وليست هي الفكرة المبسّطة والمختزلة عن العقل كلوح أبيض لكتابة الحواس. فالتجريبية بهذا المعنى ليست إلا اسمًا آخرًا للمثالية، طالما إنها تفترض مسبقًا الوجود القبلي المستوي للذوات والموضوعات، مع أسبقية كليّة أو جزئية لأحدهما على الآخر. تجريبية دولوز عن هيوم، هي النظر في ممكن التجربة الترانسنتدالي لا في واقعها الموضوعي. وبهذا المعنى لا تكون التجربة شيئًا مضادًا للمفاهيم والتجريدات، بل كما يصرح دولوز تصبح الاتجاه الأكثر ابتداعًا للمفاهيم. وهذا هو المكانة المميزة لهيوم دولوز الذي جاء في فترة انغمست الفلسفة الفرنسية فيها حتى أذنيها في الهيغلية، تلك التي تنفي إمكانية معرفة الأشياء والموجودات في ذاتها، وتعلي من شأن التجريدات والمفاهيم، وتنظر للموجودات بوصفها تحققات للتاريخ لا تجاورات في المكان، وهي بالتالي بحسب دولوز تضع الروح مقابل العالم أو لا ترى في الوجود إلا ما يفترضه العقل فيه أو ما يستحسن أن يكون فيه. هذه نزعة لا تفتح الفكر على الحياة أو لا تفكر في الحياة مع الحياة، إن نزعة نا��ية للحياة تفوح منها رائحة السكون والشلل، مقابل الحركة والرقص التي هي صفة الفلاسفة المحبين للحياة، أو صفة الفلاسفة المفضلين دولوزيا على الأقل.
إنّ سيكولوجيا تأثرات العقل بالضد من سيكولوجيا العقل الممتنعة تجعلنا نفهم مع هيوم واسبينوزا قوّة الحقيقة في الانفعال والتأثر، أي نعيد للانفعال والتأثر في تكون الذاتية والموضوعيّة الاعتبار الذي سلبه منهما تاريخ الفلسفة، حين أحدق في قرص الشمس وتظهر لي الشمس قاب قوسين أو أدنى هذه حقيقة مساوية في أثرها التاريخي والاجتماعي، بل والمعرفي، حقيقة أن الشمس تبعد حسابيًا كذا وكذا من الكيلومترات. من هنا يرى هيوم على سبي المثال إنّه لا يمكن دحض الدين عقليًا، لأنّ الانفعال الديني بمفهوم هيوم يحوز على [عقلانية] و[حقيقة] اجتماعية وتاريخية وقبل ذلك ذاتية وموضوعية لا تقل عن فكرة عقلية مجردة أو عن حقيقة موضوعية. ف"العقل عينه ما هو إلا تحديد عام وهادئ للانفعالات، يقوم على الرؤية من بعيد أو على الانعكاس". بهذا، على هذا المستوى من الراديكالي، يمكن فهم الوجوه العقلانية للدين أو للأفكار والانفعالات الدينية.
وإنّ سيكولوجيا تأثرات العقل بالضد من سيكولوجيا العقل، في نظرية هيوم عن الذاتية والفكر بوصفهما حركة وصيرورات وقوى للخارج هو مدخل هيوم أو تطبيق هيوم لكفرته عن الأخلاق والاجتماع. هيوم يرى إن الطبيعة البشرية متحيّزة أكثر مما هي أنانية. إنّه من السهولة والسذاجة هو تذاكي فلسفة الحالة الطبيعية والعقد الاجتماعي التي تقوم على الأنانية والمنفعة الشخصية. نقد هيوم ينطلق من تجريبيته وذاتيته. فلو كانت الأنانية الصرفة مستحكمة في الطبيعة البشرية لما ظهر المشكل الاجتماعي من أساسيّة، لأننا سنضع حدودًا. المشكلة الاجتماعية والسياسية للطبيعة البشرية هي في التحيّزات والتعاطفات التي تولدها التأثرات والانفعالات العقلية، بما إنّ العقل والفكر هو نتاج قوى الخارج. بهذا فإنّ الطبيعة البشرية تعاطفية وتواشجية، لو كنا أنانيين لكنا منعزلين أو انعزاليين في ذاتية سيكولوجية انعكاسية، المشكل الاجتماعي والسياسي يأتي من التعاطفية والتحيز الذي يصم الذاتية، نحن لا ندخل حروبًا لأننا منفعيين أو أنانيين، بل لأن التعاطفات والتحيزات، أو التحيزات التعاطفية متضاربة. العائلة والعشيرة والقبيلة والامة هي قبل أن تكون تشكلات انثروبولوجية أو إثنية وعرقية أو اجتماعية، هي تحيزات حسية وإدراكية وفكرية. الانفعالات والمشاعر والعواطف والأفكار هي الأمم والشعوب والقبائل والعائلة.
مع هذين التطبيقين أترك لكم الكتاب لتستبدوا فيه.
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April 6, 2008This book is about David Hume. I was going to read everything Deleuze ever wrote, and this is the first of his books. I read Hume's book on Human Nature one summer and it just about killed me. I knew for sure that I was not going to be a life long reader of philosophy.
December 5, 2017
As usual with Deleuze, compelling ideas matched with some very unfortunate writing.
February 9, 2026
Since inescapable doubt can foreshadow past works to how we write such studies now without a critical insight as the apprentice meets the professional eye.. effectively, how did a text come to be when it was written, and as this monograph between Humean parodied & paratactical series vs the (a)subjective surrealist notion of Leibniz/Borges series protects the former (Hume) from being probated, perhaps we have to be skeptical of independent studies a-vis their attitude and similar gatherings of work compared to this par exemplar notion of collegium and actualized groundwork (since it is Deleuze's first work, and not his last say on the word of philosophy.)
A better prerogative of this book is between realist and naturalist intention, which is bound to a Hellpit when Kant and Nietzsche attempt so, but perhaps even irrealis when Deleuze is engaged to dismantle the cusp of Hume as Time is irreversible to its Other like witnessing a passing mood or finding the beauty of say, a-sexuality selection... which is why this book is convenient to read for an epistemologist or a many philosophers.
This explanation of a monad is explaining the a-subjective quality of space, and how points err to disfigure'd space:
As for the second part of the thesis, we can see that it is determined by the first. The smallest impression is neither a mathematical
nor a physical point, but rather a sensible one.33 A physical point is
already extended and divisible; a mathematical point is nothing.
Between the two there is a midpoint which is the only real one.
Between real extension and nonexistence there is real existence
whose extension will be precisely formed. A sensible point or atom
is visible and tangible, colored and solid. By itself, it has no extension,
and yet it exists. It exists and we have seen why. In the possibility
of its existence and in the reason for its distinct existence, empiricism
discovers a principle. It is not extended, since no extension is itself
and atom , a corpuscle, a minimum idea, or a simple impression. "Five
notes play’d on a flute give us the impression and idea of time; tho’
time be not a sixth impression, which presents itself to the hearing
or any other o f the senses.’^ 4 Similarly, the idea of space is merely
the idea of visible or tangible points distributed in a certain order^5
Space is discovered in the arrangement o f visible or tangible objects,
just as time is discovered in the perceptible succession of changing
objects.
When Deleuze separates the understanding vs the imagination, it is only to distinguish the faculties which stir something that is not primordial of past nature, it is to the stir the future's memories of its death of recurrence, and its potential moderacy to in habituate nature as pure affirmation of difference.. It reminds me of the Godard movie when the woman protagonist mentions the affirmation of all sums is more Nietzschean and beastial since the primordial has to see its own death before it did see at all, and empiricism is precisely about this certitude to remain pragmatic, rationale of life over death once death sees its insignificance. It's one reason vitals and physicalism continue to re-appear throughout our duration of living, and how much of it goes against this birth of subjective intentions. (how to affirm differences of nature that rule over us vs the other ways.)
Some other thoughts, Deleuze seems to indicate the n=1, or the root radical is co-dependent on One-ness. (read: different than the nomos of n=0, the breaking away of stratification to separate a socius as democratic and rational instead of Ancient Greek recalling time) to begin One in his ouevre and co-terminus with its readership, in other words, he is entirely flat and constructible to conquer new things Deleuzian inspired or lifestyle related as he is playing chess on his own.
A better prerogative of this book is between realist and naturalist intention, which is bound to a Hellpit when Kant and Nietzsche attempt so, but perhaps even irrealis when Deleuze is engaged to dismantle the cusp of Hume as Time is irreversible to its Other like witnessing a passing mood or finding the beauty of say, a-sexuality selection... which is why this book is convenient to read for an epistemologist or a many philosophers.
This explanation of a monad is explaining the a-subjective quality of space, and how points err to disfigure'd space:
As for the second part of the thesis, we can see that it is determined by the first. The smallest impression is neither a mathematical
nor a physical point, but rather a sensible one.33 A physical point is
already extended and divisible; a mathematical point is nothing.
Between the two there is a midpoint which is the only real one.
Between real extension and nonexistence there is real existence
whose extension will be precisely formed. A sensible point or atom
is visible and tangible, colored and solid. By itself, it has no extension,
and yet it exists. It exists and we have seen why. In the possibility
of its existence and in the reason for its distinct existence, empiricism
discovers a principle. It is not extended, since no extension is itself
and atom , a corpuscle, a minimum idea, or a simple impression. "Five
notes play’d on a flute give us the impression and idea of time; tho’
time be not a sixth impression, which presents itself to the hearing
or any other o f the senses.’^ 4 Similarly, the idea of space is merely
the idea of visible or tangible points distributed in a certain order^5
Space is discovered in the arrangement o f visible or tangible objects,
just as time is discovered in the perceptible succession of changing
objects.
When Deleuze separates the understanding vs the imagination, it is only to distinguish the faculties which stir something that is not primordial of past nature, it is to the stir the future's memories of its death of recurrence, and its potential moderacy to in habituate nature as pure affirmation of difference.. It reminds me of the Godard movie when the woman protagonist mentions the affirmation of all sums is more Nietzschean and beastial since the primordial has to see its own death before it did see at all, and empiricism is precisely about this certitude to remain pragmatic, rationale of life over death once death sees its insignificance. It's one reason vitals and physicalism continue to re-appear throughout our duration of living, and how much of it goes against this birth of subjective intentions. (how to affirm differences of nature that rule over us vs the other ways.)
Some other thoughts, Deleuze seems to indicate the n=1, or the root radical is co-dependent on One-ness. (read: different than the nomos of n=0, the breaking away of stratification to separate a socius as democratic and rational instead of Ancient Greek recalling time) to begin One in his ouevre and co-terminus with its readership, in other words, he is entirely flat and constructible to conquer new things Deleuzian inspired or lifestyle related as he is playing chess on his own.
February 9, 2023
Gilles Deleuze's essays and books on other thinkers are always interesting. If nothing else, you'll always learn something new about the thinker that's up for dissection, because Deleuze always manage to to conclusions that no other critic has managed.
And damn it if Deleuze doesn't argue his conclusions well.
Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature is in almost every sense the beginning of Deleuze's own philosophical project. In this essay, Deleuze argues for an empiricism that no only describes how humans relate to the empirical world, but also how Hume's empiricism forms the best possible framework from which we can understand subjectivity. And knowing later Deleuze, this essay is also a stand response to the transcendental methodology that has permeated Continental philosophy since Immanuel Kant.
What Deleuze argues is that empiricism, contrary to transcendental rationalism, is able to form a non-apriori concept of the subjective, forming the subject out of the mind's experiences of the empirical and social world. Deleuze as such lays out that the "I" is not formed by a soul, rationalism or anything else inherent to the human, but rather is build from the ground up on a blank slate.
And damn it if Deleuze doesn't argue his conclusions well.
Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature is in almost every sense the beginning of Deleuze's own philosophical project. In this essay, Deleuze argues for an empiricism that no only describes how humans relate to the empirical world, but also how Hume's empiricism forms the best possible framework from which we can understand subjectivity. And knowing later Deleuze, this essay is also a stand response to the transcendental methodology that has permeated Continental philosophy since Immanuel Kant.
What Deleuze argues is that empiricism, contrary to transcendental rationalism, is able to form a non-apriori concept of the subjective, forming the subject out of the mind's experiences of the empirical and social world. Deleuze as such lays out that the "I" is not formed by a soul, rationalism or anything else inherent to the human, but rather is build from the ground up on a blank slate.
April 1, 2025
Hume poses a question: what is the science of human nature like? That is just to ask: how does the mind become a subject?
Answer that, and you will have what the science of human nature seeks—something constant, something universal: human nature itself.
And the answer, it turns out, is twofold principles.
1 / There is *the principle of association*, which leads us to believe in what we do not presently know. And
2 / there is *the principle of passion*, which leads us to care for those whom we are not naturally disposed to care for.
The structure of the mind unfolds accordingly. First, the idea: the indivisible minimum of realities—call this atomism. Second, the relation: the consequence that the principle imposes on the idea—this is just the principle of association at work.
Answer that, and you will have what the science of human nature seeks—something constant, something universal: human nature itself.
And the answer, it turns out, is twofold principles.
1 / There is *the principle of association*, which leads us to believe in what we do not presently know. And
2 / there is *the principle of passion*, which leads us to care for those whom we are not naturally disposed to care for.
The structure of the mind unfolds accordingly. First, the idea: the indivisible minimum of realities—call this atomism. Second, the relation: the consequence that the principle imposes on the idea—this is just the principle of association at work.
April 18, 2025
No lo he disfrutado tanto como las otras 2 monografías, creo que es una lectura muy densa sobretodo porque maneja varios conceptos a la vez con los que si no se ha estado muy familiarizadx previamente es facil perder el hilo entre clasificaciones y el orden lógico que construye sus principales argumentos. Sin embargo, el libro remonta completamente a partir del penúltimo capitulo y remata con una conclusión excelente que hace que hacen que haber pasado por tantas idas y vueltas argumentales hagan sentido. Es más, podría recomendar que se lea primero la conclusión para darse una mejor idea de por donde van los tiros. Deleuze siempre tan creativo, brillante y enrevesado, hace una excelente revisión de la obra de Hume.
May 23, 2019
Artık çevirisinden midir, ya da başka bşr nedenden midir bilemiyorum ama okurken zorlandığım bir metindi.
Anladığım kadarıyla, Deleuze'ün ele aldığı temel soru: "insan nasıl özne haline gelir?"
Arzular ve anlama kabiliyeti, insanın zihninin ne şekilde çalıştığını belirlemekte, bu kapasiteye bağlı olarak her şey imgelemin içerisinde gerçekleşmektedir. Öznesiz bir imgelem fantezidir. Kendi başına, dört başı mamur bir kurgusu, varlığı vardır. Burdan yola çıkarak insanın ürettiği tüm yapaylıklara, kurgusallıklara ilişkin bir kavrayış çerçevesi sunmaktadır. Mülkiyet, ahlak, adalet, din belli başlı ilişkilerle zihinde imgeleme, zihnin etkinliği ise bu imgelemin ötesine dönüştürmektedir.
Anladığım kadarıyla, Deleuze'ün ele aldığı temel soru: "insan nasıl özne haline gelir?"
Arzular ve anlama kabiliyeti, insanın zihninin ne şekilde çalıştığını belirlemekte, bu kapasiteye bağlı olarak her şey imgelemin içerisinde gerçekleşmektedir. Öznesiz bir imgelem fantezidir. Kendi başına, dört başı mamur bir kurgusu, varlığı vardır. Burdan yola çıkarak insanın ürettiği tüm yapaylıklara, kurgusallıklara ilişkin bir kavrayış çerçevesi sunmaktadır. Mülkiyet, ahlak, adalet, din belli başlı ilişkilerle zihinde imgeleme, zihnin etkinliği ise bu imgelemin ötesine dönüştürmektedir.
April 5, 2026
Establecemos relaciones y formamos totalidades; éstas no dependen de lo dado, sino de principios que conocemos, que son puramente funcionales, y estos concuerdan con los poderes ocultos de los que depende lo dado y a los que no conocemos. Llamamos finalidad al acuerdo de la finalidad intencional con la naturaleza, algo que puede ser pensado, es decir implícito y que rige tácitamente al hombre. La filosofía debe constituirse como la teoría de lo que hacemos, no como la teoría de lo que es. Lo que hacemos tiene principios, y al Ser nunca se lo puede captar sino como el objeto de una relación sintética con los principios mismos de lo que hacemos.
October 19, 2022
As someone who has been entrenched in Deleuze’s later work (from Difference & Repetition to his collaborations with Félix Guattari), I realised that I had neglected many of his earlier philosophical monographs — which informed my decision to begin with Empiricism and Subjectivity.
As always, Deleuze doesn’t disappoint. His creative, thorough and careful reading of Hume draws new light to empiricism, countering the tendency to oversimplify Hume’s empiricism as a ‘bundle-theory’ and leaving it there.
These monographs should not be slept on.
As always, Deleuze doesn’t disappoint. His creative, thorough and careful reading of Hume draws new light to empiricism, countering the tendency to oversimplify Hume’s empiricism as a ‘bundle-theory’ and leaving it there.
These monographs should not be slept on.
Read
June 29, 2022great. I feel like I would be less into Hume if I were actually reading Hume, but reading Deleuze on Hume is both profoundly rigorous thinking and also very much anticipates the kind of affirmative psychedelic journey that 60's Deleuze onward always seems to have, no matter how strict and historical the subject-matter. there is beauty here.
also like.. was Bergson pretty much just doing Hume? + memory cone? time and free will is pretty much covered here.
also like.. was Bergson pretty much just doing Hume? + memory cone? time and free will is pretty much covered here.
December 4, 2023
Sendo o primeiro livro de Deleuze, ele ainda não pareceu encontrar o estilo, a cadência e a forma com que escreveu suas demais obras (como A Dobra, que é muito mais compreensível, apesar de tratar de abstrações tão ou mais complexas que este livro). No entanto, ele é de um brilhantismo sem igual, que com certeza me fez enxergar detalhes do pensamento de Hume que não só tinham me passado batidos, como não me tinham sido tão "bem-vindos". Planejo voltar no futuro e reler.
June 4, 2021
Bu kitabın 1953 yılında yazılmış olduğuna inanmakta zorlanıyorum. Henüz zihin konusunda yeterli bilimsel çalışmalar ortada yokken sanki O günlerden bu günleri görmüş ve kendi kavramlarını Hume'un zihin bakışına bir nakış gibi işlenmiş bir filozofun ilk kitabında onun düşüncesini ören öğeleri izleme fırsatı buldum.
November 3, 2023
At first, I didn't get where it was going at all but the second half made the pieces of the puzzle fit in the right place and everything clicked, a beautiful interpretation and a deep insight of Hume's philosophy.
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