سيد اللعبة: هنري كيسنجر وفن الدبلوماسية في الشرق الأوشط

by Martin S. Indyk

يستعرض هذا الكتاب تاريخًا مميزًا ومثيرًا للاهتمام لدبلوماسية هنري كيسنجر في الشرق الأوسط، إذ يكشف من خلاله الصعوبات والعقبات الخاصة التي واجهها كيسنجر وخلفاؤه في جهودهم لتحقيق عملية السلام بين إسرائيل وجيرانها العرب، وكيف أخفق ثلاثة رؤساء أمريكيين على مدار أكثر من عشرين عامًا منذ آخر مرة توسطت فيها الولايات المتحدة في اتفاقية سلام بين الإسرائيليين والفلسطينيين.

عانى مارتن إنديك سفير الولايات المتحدة السابق لدى إسرائيل والمبعوث الخاص للمفاوضات الإسرائيلية الفلسطينية في عام 2013 من هذه الإحباطات وخيبات
الأمل السياسية المتكررة.

Genres: History, Politics, Middle East, Biography, Nonfiction, Israel, International Relations

805 pages, Hardcover

First published October 19, 2021

Reviews

[Bill Manzi · Rating 5 out of 5]

Martin Indyk has written a fascinating book on the diplomatic efforts undertaken by Henry Kissinger in the Middle East after the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War. Indyk comes to this effort with huge credentials of his own, having served as U.S. Ambassador to Israel, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, and President Obama’s special envoy to the Israeli-Palestinian talks in 2013-2014. It is quite clear that Indyk has a huge amount of respect for Kissinger but in my view that respect did not prevent him from giving a balanced view of Kissinger’s work on the seemingly impossible problems presented by the outbreak of war between Israel and Egypt and Syria.

Of all the books I read in 2021, a good year for books, this might be the best. That opinion comes not only from the book giving us a great historical look at the monumental diplomatic effort undertaken by Kissinger, but by Indyk’s insights into Kissinger’s true diplomatic objectives, which were not always what they appeared to be. Kissinger’s goals were ambitious, and of course those goals were not always shared with his diplomatic partners. Indyk was afforded access to Kissinger for this book, along with historical documents, so he is in a great position to bring to us some of the less visible objectives of Kissinger.

Kissinger’s diplomacy is often referred to as coming from a “realist” perspective. Realpolitik and Kissinger are mentioned together often, but it is simply an incomplete idea of Kissinger’s underlying philosophy. No work on Kissinger can ignore the influence of Prince Clemens von Metternich, the architect of the Congress of Vienna and a model for Kissinger’s diplomatic ideology. We get a real look at that ideology courtesy of both Indyk and Kissinger:

“As we shall see , he would consistently shy away from aiming for peace treaties, instead seeking agreements that would give all sides a stake in preserving the existing order. As he told me decades later, ‘I never thought there could be a moment of universal reconciliation.’ Kissinger’s skepticism first found expression in the subtitle he chose for A World Restored. It was Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace. The fact that after years of deep research and contemplation he concluded that peace was problematic would have a formative influence on his approach to peacemaking in the Middle East. On the first page of the introduction to A World Restored, Kissinger explains why, ‘[T]he attainment of peace,’ he writes, ‘is not as easy as the desire for it.’ He asserts that eras like the period he had studied turned out, paradoxically, to be most peaceful because the statesmen involved were least in search of peace. In his analysis, peace was abstract and reversible. What mattered more was an absence of war, produced by the combination of ‘legitimacy’ and ‘equilibrium.’ Clemens Von Metternich, the foreign minister of the Austrian Emperor Francis I, was one of his role models in this respect. While Metternich’s Emperor believed that ‘peace, lasting peace is the most desirable goal of any decent man’ what he sought was stability, not the realization of theoretical ideals. And that is what Kissinger would seek too when he had the opportunity.”

Master of the Game Henry Kissinger and the Art of Middle East Diplomacy. Indyk, Martin p 31-32

Stability, preservation of order, and equilibrium. Those goals, as interpreted by Kissinger, would drive his diplomacy.

The Yom Kippur War caught both the State of Israel, and Henry Kissinger by surprise. That surprise led to initial military success for Egypt and Syria against Israel, and forced President Nixon and Kissinger to order a massive military resupply effort for Israel. The State of Israel turned the military tide, erasing the initial success of Egypt and Syria, going on the military offensive, and springing Kissinger into the shuttle diplomacy that Indyk chronicles so well in this book. We see some of the biggest historical figures in the Middle East, including Golda Meir, Anwar Sadat, Hafez al-Assad, Yitzhak Rabin, Ehud Barak, and so many others. Indyk, while highly respectful of Kissinger, pointed out Kissinger’s initial error in the run-up to the Yom Kippur War. Sadat, after taking over from Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, had given strong signals that the status quo ante was not satisfactory. Kissinger took these signals lightly:

“I thought [Sadat] was a clown… We all used to think sending the Russians out was a dumb thing; he got nothing for it. In the whole context, it was not such a bad strategy.”

Master of the Game Henry Kissinger and the Art of Middle East Diplomacy. Indyk, Martin p 77

Kissinger’s efforts centered not only around getting the combatants to stop their military operations, but negotiating agreements that got down to maps with very little acreage causing major disagreements with strong willed negotiating partners. As Kissinger began a three year process of shuttle diplomacy he was not only dealing with cease fire issues but using the crisis to marginalize the influence of the Soviet Union in the Middle East. He did this all the while “including” the Soviets in a nominal peace process that was an effective dead end. The real diplomatic activity was centered on Kissinger and what agreements he was able to put together.

Kissinger’s brilliance is often times, in my opinion, a problem for him. He came to have an understanding of minutiae involved in the government to government negotiations, including the mapping so critical to the disengagement negotiations. His construct of where he wanted all parties to end up diplomatically was solid, and based on outstanding understanding of all the issues involved. But in order to get to the desired spot all parties had to swallow some bitter medicine, which they were all reluctant to do. In those instances Kissinger deployed tactics that were tough, including some pretty rough treatment of the Israeli leadership. He brought the parties to where he wanted them to go, and maybe to where it was in their interests to be, but their trust in him was often times bruised by the necessities of diplomacy, including Kissinger’s subterfuges.

As mentioned above it was never Kissinger’s goal to achieve a “comprehensive” solution to the difficult problems of the Middle East. He sought to, and achieved, measures that set boundaries, political and military, that restored stability, equilibrium, and order, giving all parties involved a stake in continuing to avoid war, and to respect the established boundaries. Kissinger’s achievements here are not without fault, but on balance they were significant, and advanced the interests of the United States, and protected the State of Israel from potential disaster. It must be pointed out that Kissinger undertook the Middle Eastern diplomatic effort while serving a President, Richard Nixon, who was becoming engulfed in a political scandal that would consume his Presidency, and create a desire by Nixon to get political mileage out of Kissinger’s efforts, undercutting Kissinger at some key times. He was engaged in a political turf war with Nixon’s Secretary of State William Rodgers, with whom Kissinger had major disagreements with on the direction of U.S. policy in the Middle East. Kissinger carefully had to calibrate how tough he could be with the Israeli leadership, who were not afraid to turn up domestic political heat on Nixon and Kissinger when the going got especially difficult. He was dealing with the final negotiations on the Vietnam war, as well as a multitude of other serious crisis in the world. His success in the Middle East is a testament to not only his skills as a diplomat, but his unrivaled willingness to work around the clock.

Issuing praise of Kissinger, even today, can be a difficult thing. After many years he remains a figure reviled in many quarters. The review of this book in the New York Times by Jeremy Suri gives an indication of how hard praise is. Kissinger’s construction of a new Middle Eastern order out of the chaos of the Yom Kippur War is acknowledged, but Suri casts doubt on the positive benefits to the United States “in the long run.” Many of the breakdowns in the Middle East that occurred after Kissinger left are indirectly laid at his feet. That criticism, in my view, is nonsensical. It might be said that the Presidents that succeeded Nixon had less diplomatic success than Kissinger in the Middle East, but that cannot be laid at his feet. Like those that blame the Nixon/Kissinger opening to China for the rise of China as a major competitor to the United States that criticism seems based on misunderstanding the fundamental basis for both policies.

Indyk does offer criticism that to me seems to resonate. Kissinger’s fundamental misreading of the initial diplomatic thrust of Anwar Sadat before he launched the Yom Kippur War is detailed. A longer term impact criticism is Kissinger’s ignoring the potential for a Palestinian settlement with Israel that would have Palestinian aspirations met by a confederation with Jordan.

“Jordan and the PLO were relegated to minor roles in Kissinger’s design because their limited power denied them the ability to disrupt the new order. Therefore, by his calculation, their grievances did not need to be satisfied. Jordan was already in the American camp when Kissinger began to engage in Middle Eastern diplomacy, and King Hussein was effectively dependent for his regime’s survival on the United States and Israel. That was demonstrated in the 1970 Jordan crisis when they acted effectively together to pressure Syria to end its intervention there. Because of that assessment, Kissinger missed the role Jordan might have played in containing and eventually resolving the Palestinian problem in the framework of an existing, functioning state. “

Master of the Game Henry Kissinger and the Art of Middle East Diplomacy. Indyk, Martin p 554

Indyk has presented a fantastic book that recognizes the massive effort, and largely successful diplomatic effort of Henry Kissinger in the Middle East. Kissinger badly outplayed the Soviets in this effort, and that success provided a tangible, and immediate, victory for the interests of the United States (and Israel.) This book offers really great detail, and is sourced impeccably, and does bring a greater understanding of the intricacies of Middle Eastern diplomacy. Highly recommended.

[Alexander · Rating 4 out of 5]

An interesting book written by one of America's most experienced diplomats examining the actual art and practice of diplomacy. How does one convince other countries to follow your lead or work towards your objectives? How do you bridge the chasm between cultures to find a meeting of the minds. This is not a commentary of the objectives, but an analysis of the tools and practice of diplomacy.

[WM D. · Rating 4 out of 5]

The master of the game was a good book. I gave me a understanding of how Henry Kissinger conducted his shuttle foreign policy. A must read for anyone who likes non fiction

[Kaveh · Rating 4 out of 5]

Although I find Kissinger's methods at times to be bullish and improvisation rather than following a grand strategy, he's still one of the most effective diplomats of our time. He utilized the immense resources of a superpower to achieve his goals.
I was also very interested in reading a summary of the events of those years without having to read a dozen memoirs.
In that respect, this book is great as it gives an intimate and detailed view of the time and his interactions.
It is also a very good source to help understand Israeli and Arab relations and its current status, in my view.
Overall, I think this book is a worthy read even if one doesn't agree with the author's views.

[Ala Amro · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very detailed book. It gives evidence to the total and unconditional support of the U.S. to the existence and survival of the state of Israel. The intentional humiliation of the Arab nations and people and making sure they are defeated at each and every battle they fight, being military or diplomatic. The U.S. wanted to plant despair and surrender to the fact that the Jews who left Europe in the 20th century and confiscated Palestinian land cannot be defeated.
The U.S. will never be an impartial peace broker nor mediator.

[Moayad Hippo · Rating 4 out of 5]

ستتأكد حين تقرأ هذا الكتاب، إذا ما كنت قد تتبعت مسيرة كيسنجر من قبل، أنك أمام واحدة من أقذر صفحات السياسة في التاريخ، إن لم تكن أقذرها، فلم يكن كيسنجر بعيدا عن مخططات الكيان الصهيوني، والتماهي مع احتياجاته ورغباته، وإن حاول الكاتب أقناعك في بعض فصول هذا الكتاب بعكس ذلك.
ومما لا شك فيه انك أمام ثعلب سياسي، يجمع بين الذكاء، والمراوغة، وابتداع الحيل التي تخدم مصالحه. كما انك أمام شخص لم يستطع أن يتخلص من عقده، فحاك خيوطه التي خدمت الكيان، كما خدمت مسيرته كسياسي.

[Zach · Rating 4 out of 5]

B+

[John Parker · Rating 3 out of 5]

Master of the Game is an exceptionally detailed account of Henry Kissinger’s Middle East diplomacy after the 1973 Yom Kippur War—so detailed, in fact, at times it feels like an hour-by-hour logbook. It’s a slice of history told with authority and access, and Indyk’s own diplomatic experience gives the analysis real weight and context. The prose is lean and deliberate, and Indyk points out where Kissinger was less than perfect. The audiobook narration carries it well.

Where Indyk shines is when he steps back from the shuttle flights and phone transcripts to compare U.S. administrations. His contrasts between Nixon and Clinton—both managing foreign policy under domestic scandal—are particularly insightful. The progression he traces through successive administrations helps place today’s Middle East (Israel versus non-state actors such as Hamas) in context, showing the evolution of Israel from its pre-1967 vulnerability, surrounded by adversarial state actors, to its current security and diplomatic posture. Make sure you stick around for the Epilogue.

Master of the Game sheds light on how people act under pressure, not just what policies they make, and reframes peace as Kissinger saw it—something earned in increments, less a moment of harmony than a structure sturdy enough to endure tension. Recommended if you like deep dives into policy, power, and process more than personality.

[Natalie · Rating 3 out of 5]

The rating has nothing to do with the quality of the book—I just wasn’t the target audience. It was SO much more detail than I needed as a lay person with only a vague concept of who Kissinger is or anything that happened in the Middle East in the 20th century. It was a pleasant enough read, but whew.

[Kemp · Rating 3 out of 5]

A book about Henry Kissinger. Sounds dull. It wasn’t, but it was way too detailed.

A solid book to understand the dynamics between Israel, its Middle East neighbors, and the greater Muslim community. It goes behind the scenes leverages the Kissinger’s memoirs, and those of Israeli leaders, and that of Sadat.

3.5 Goodread stars.

[Ietrio · Rating 1 out of 5]

Right. Now there is peace in Israel. And there is a Palestine. The Iraq has a free zone with Iran. And since Kissinger there hasn't been a gunshot wound in the Middle East.

Or back to reality: the deification of a moronic bureaucrat.

[Michael · Rating 5 out of 5]

This detailed, day by day account of Henry Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy to bring about stability in the Middle East after the 1973 Yom Kippur War would have been fabulous even if it had not been authored by Martin Indyk, who was an ambassador to Israel and an advisor to Presidents Clinton and Obama. But Indyk's intimate knowledge of the issues and the players and his relation of Kissinger's diplomacy to later events adds an important historical perspective to the discussion outlined in the book. While some may find the exhaustive discussion of issues, meetings, outside influences, pressures and proposals to get a bit tedious at times, this treatment allows the reader to gain a good understanding of all of the moving parts that have to be considered in such a negotiation.

There is also a generous helping of Kissinger's philosophies regarding foreign policy issues, such as his preference for stability and order over idealistic dreams of "peace," and his view that war is sometimes necessary to place parties in a position where they are willing to enter into agreements restoring stability. He always placed the interests of great powers on a high plane, with little regard for the fate of individuals, particularly those forced to wage the wars for their rulers. In this respect, the author suggests that Kissinger's passive approach to peacemaking prior to October 1973 helped to trigger the war, perhaps in his view a necessary step toward placing the adversaries in a position where they were willing to make the compromises necessary for the restoration of stability. But tell that to those killed in the war.

The author is generally complimentary toward Kissinger's efforts, though not afraid to point out missed opportunities and blind spots, particularly with regard to issues involving the Palestinians. (Kissinger was never very good at considering the interests of non-state actors). I thought that perhaps more credit should have been given to Anwar Sadat, whose statesmanship and determination to make peace with Israel were of tremendous help in assisting Kissinger in bringing about a cessation of hostilities that has endured for nearly fifty years. One wonders, as the author does, whether more would have been possible had Kissinger been a bit more open-minded about his approach.

My reading of this masterful account occurred during Russia's invasion of Ukraine and while the Senate was considering the nomination of Ketanji Brown Jackson to the Supreme Court. The Russian atrocities clearly illustrated the importance of experience, wisdom and good judgment in conducting foreign affairs and the Senate hearings on the Supreme Court nomination, full of demagoguery and clownish acts of jackassery, showed that many of our country's leaders are not up to the task. So we should be grateful for hard-working, knowledgeable professionals, like Indyk and Kissinger, who perform the heavy lifting of foreign relations, whether we agree with them or not.

The book is a brilliant accomplishment. I'm happy that I had the chance to read it.

[Joey · Rating 4 out of 5]

“Master of the Game”’s fault is its density. The book drags for about the middle third, wherein Indyk bogs us down the the minute detail of negotiations leading up to the initial Sinai agreement. I am trying to think what sort of reader would genuinely want the level of detail into which Indyk descends, and all I can come up with are: 1) PhD students writing dissertations on the mechanics of negotiations; 2) members of actual, high-level negotiation teams who somehow have a couple dozen spare hours to plow through and annotate a volume like this.

Inasmuch as my rating is 4-stars though, I clearly think highly of “Master of the Game.” This is because Indyk fortunately does far more than simply chronicle Henry Kissinger’s meetings and other communications with Golda Meir, Anwar Sadat, Yitzhak Rabin, Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and numerous other characters in an ensemble cast of players in the various theaters of 1970s Middle East peacemaking. Indyk sprinkles his recounting of Kissinger’s adventures with short anecdotes of Indyk’s own negotiating experiences and, more importantly, clear and thoughtful analysis of the successes and failures of Middle East shuttle diplomacy in the mid-70s.

Indyk clearly admires Henry Kissinger, but he doesn’t hold back on criticism of the former secretary’s flaws and missteps. In the final analysis, Indyk recommends Kissinger’s gradualist, step-by-step approach in the Middle East to contemporary statesmen and women. And indeed, those who see in Israel/Palestine only the prospect of stalemate and violence simply lack the creativity to imagine incremental, Kissingerian steps toward peace, wherein both sides exchange negotiating chips for time to slowly build — or rebuilt — political trust in one another. As Kissinger’s experience demonstrates, this gradual approach is far from a slam dunk. But it has fared better historically than each of America’s grand grasps for comprehensive peace. In sum, Kissinger’s preference for stability over peace is probably more relevant today than it was even during Kissinger’s tenure at the State Department. Perhaps the United States will soon be ready for a return, at least in some form, to the realist approach to foreign policy that Kissinger championed.

[Kristaps · Rating 5 out of 5]

Sometimes going too much in the mundane tit-for tat, displaying each exchange to the slightest minutiae (however important in diplomacy), this book gave overall a very interesting perspective on what happens behind the scenes of international diplomacy. Certainly a rather flattering portrayal of Kissinger at times, but I must admit there is no denial that he was a very intriguing person indeed.

For me it gave me an understanding of what needs to take place to make peace- especially taking into account the perspectives of current war in Ukraine. We really do not live in a world where idealistic policymaking would be best for maintaining peace, but if realpolitik has to be pursued, it has to be very, very shrewd. In a way it raises some doubt that current global policymakers have the general vision and underlying understanding of bigger picture of history that Kissinger (and also Sadat) had.

There are quite a few moments in the book that display how very easily whatever was achieved in pursuing the cessation of hostilities between e.g. Egypt and Israel could have fallen apart. Diplomacy indeed is a fine art.

I was expecting it to be a dry, academic read, but there are quite a few personal intermissions, attempts at verbally painting the scenes, interesting descriptions of personalities involved that make this book much more enjoyable. It surprised me in a positive way, however there was a negative effect from this book - it was generating an obsessive interest in me on Israel's 20th century history, so I spent too much time in wikipedia hole afterwards :)

[Hussain · Rating 5 out of 5]

الكتاب شرحة وبطريقة سلسة كيف تشكل الشرق الاوسط من خلال الاحداث التي تحكم فيها هنري كيسنجر الذي صمم استراتيجية ان لا ينتصر العرب على اسرائيل وبالتالي يتم يكون السلاح السوفياتي قد انتصر على السلاح الامريكى
لقد كانت هناك احداث فارقة في الاحداث ادت الى تشكيل الشرق الاوسط لمدة اربعة عقود اهمها
١- حرب السادس من اكتوبر التي من دونها لم تكن اسرائيل ان تسمح لامريكا بالتدخل لصياغة الشرق الاوسط الحالي
٢- تدخل امريكا بثقلها لمنع هزيمة اسرائيل من خلال تسيير خط جوي لشحن إحتياجات إسرائيل من السلاح
٣- إسرائيل كانت تترك في المفاوضات بخطة تلمودية صارمة لعدم التنازل عن الارض الا في اضيق الحدود ويتم تعويضها بعشرة اضعاف ما تنازلت عليه رغم انها ارض محتلة عن طريق اتفاقيات ودعم بالمال والسلاح
٤-تسرع السادات وتدخله في سير المعارك ادى لمحاصرة الجيش المصري الثالث وبالتالي فقد انتصاره في الحرب لصالح إسرائيل التي قوت من موقفها بدعم امريكي سخي
٤- تم استبعاد السوريين من اللعبة لان سوريا لا تمثل ثقل في الاستراتيجية الامريكية وعدم رغبة النظام العربي السني التعامل مع حكام من الطائفة العلوية مما دفع السوريين للتحالف مع النظام الايراني بعد الثورة وتبني دعم المليشيات حتى يكون لها قيمة في السياسة الدولية
٥-لم يستفد المصريين والسوريين من الدعم العربي الذي قاده الملك فيصل والجزائر بتعليق تصدير النفط الى امريكا بسبب تسرع السادات في تقديم تنازلات كبيرة مقابل السلام مع إسرائيل واستعادة خط بعرض ٣٠% كم من سينا
٦- نجح كسينجر في تطبيق مبداء الارض مقابل الوقت حتى يمل العرب من القضية الفلسطينة والقبول بوجود إسرائيل وهو ماحصل بعد اربعة عقود

[David · Rating 5 out of 5]

Superb.

Details the exhausting process and reaching agreements in the Middle East. Covers some ideas on what America's role has been and should be moving forward. Sheds an fascinating light on the peace negotiations and how each nation and their statesmen had to walk a tight rope across this sea of landmines attempting to work out a settlement that was good for their nation but also acceptable to their own people.

The backdrop is doing this during two of the biggest crises the United States has faced in Watergate and Vietnam.

Big takeaways:
Those who have gone in aggressively pursuing peace have been unsuccessful. Those attempting to find and maintain order and a balance have been more successful.
The settlement must come with a sense of justice that ALL sides can live with. Meaning, right now, there will inevitably be more conflict.
So long as Palestinians do not have their own state to operate as they wish, there cannot be peace as it is not going to be seen as just by them.

This is not to say that one side is right or wrong but that the conflict continues until the actors can live with the arrangement. A curious thing is can China live with Taiwan not being part of their nation despite developing and growing in a different system for 70+ years and indeed, in opposition to the PRC. Of course, they say no which means, there must be conflict of some kind down the road.

[Patrick Conlon · Rating 5 out of 5]

A history Sec. Kissinger’s role in creating and facilitating the “Middle East peace process” following the 1973 Yom Kippur war. The author, who clearly admires Kissinger, goes into granular detail about the negotiating process and how America used its leverage and military aid disbursements to reduce the USSR’s influence in the region, and to reduce Egypt, Syria, and Jordan’s will and ability to make war on Israel.

Though the author ignores or excuses some of Kissinger’s blind spots and errors—namely the exclusion of the Palestinians from the peace process and the notion that the absence of war is equivalent to peace—he explains how Kissinger used the process to prioritize American interests and how America came to be the key mediator for peace and conflict in the region. A brilliant, character driven history that will expand your understanding of how the present middle eastern order came to be.

[Chad Manske · Rating 4 out of 5]

Former US Ambassador to Israel takes a new look from recently released files as well as interviewing Kissinger himself to better understand the ‘master’ of Middle East peace negotiations. It’s been 22 years since a peace accord has been struck between Israel and its Arab neighbors and it appears we couldn’t be further from one today. Thus, Indyk wanted to peel back the history and context for both Kissinger’s successes, and failures, to see what worked and what didn’t. Kissinger’s savvy step-by-step process seemed a plausible formula whereas today’s talks seem to grasp for more than either side will allow. Giants like Meir, Sadat, Rabin, Hussein, Al Assad and others play prominently in a contest to curry a western-brokered solution vs a Soviet one. Fascinating reading that punctuates the tittle conveying that Kissinger was truly, the Master of the Game!

[Jean Bonilla · Rating 4 out of 5]

A great book. By that I mean weighty, revealing, and occasionally even witty. A masterful description of a pivotal set of negotiations in the Middle East. All our subsequent agreements with countries in the region are founded on the successes and failures of Kissinger in crafting this accord. Now I finally know where that UN Peacekeeping element came from, something that has been part of FSO assignments since I joined.

I’m doubly glad that Martin Indyk wrote the book. He brought both credibility and great additional perspective from his own service in the region and his work in subsequent negotiations. We’ll worth the time it took to read.

[Martin L. Collin · Rating 4 out of 5]

This, Martin Indyk's latest publication, opens a door not only to political military, and cultural history of the Levant region, but also with personality

and militarily activity, but also includes a plethora of intimate insights into the personal thoughts and concerns of the actors involved in the diplomatic and militarily activity over the final decade's of the 20th century in the Middle East.

The book is a lengthy, scholarly work, and delves into a great deal of detail.

[Nick · Rating 4 out of 5]

A fine account of Kissinger’s diplomacy during and after the Yom Kippur War. This book shines in its ability to relate military minutiae to the overall, strategic-level policy debates at the time. Sadat’s magnanimity, Israel’s deep-seated fears and diplomatic inflexibility, and Kissinger’s deft diplomacy also shine in this book. At times, however, Indyk’s analysis comes across as overly admiring of Kissinger. Some of his historical jumps across decades are illuminating; others are jarring or tangential. Overall, a riveting book on an under-examined period.

[Andrea Engle · Rating 5 out of 5]

Elegantly nuanced and elaborately detailed, this volume by Martin Indyk, former U. S. ambassador to Israel, sets forth Henry Kissinger’s creation of “shuttle diplomacy” during his orchestration of the Middle East peace process … it demonstrates the unexpected longevity of tracks laid in the 1970’s … wide-ranging in its intricacy …

[Abdulrahman Fakhroo · Rating 3 out of 5]

Sad to see how Kissinger, when dealing with Israel, has to atone for his sins to the PM, Knesset, Israeli court of public opinion, AIPAC, and American Jews. When he’s dealing with an Arab dictator, all he cares to convince is the dictator. Shows the sad state of affairs we find ourselves in. A very deep dive into 1973 war. Quite a laborious read.

[Sheila Eddings · Rating 2 out of 5]

Oh my goodness, 50 pages in and I’m bored out of my mind. I thought this would be interesting but this is more of a scholarly tome with no desire to entertain:). Written as a daily blow-by-blow log almost, I give up! Not for me.

[Richard FitzGerald · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very detailed

So much back channeling

It's basically just the Yan Kippur war

Doesn't give insights to how the Middle East countries negotiate

[Ell, Ess Jaeva · Rating 5 out of 5]

GOT styled "diplomacy" that helps frame the complexity surrounding Israel's Palestinian genocide. lots of minutia, boring horse trading plus posturing... tempted to take a star due to zero dragons

[Elizabeth · Rating 5 out of 5]

Fascinating with extreme enlightening facts of a period. Great guidance on today's time, grateful.

[Izak Miklavčič · Rating 4 out of 5]

master of being the most annoying person in every room - decent book tho

[Glenn · Rating 5 out of 5]

Martin S. Indyk brought to the project of chronicling Henry Kissinger's diplomacy in the Middle East a unique perspective. Indyk was the United States Ambassador to Israel, twice. He served on the National Security Council in President Clinton's first term, and as Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs in Clinton's second term. As he describes, in immense detail, the work Henry Kissinger did to secure disengagement of the hostile forces after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, he comments on the success, or failure, of later administrations in similar circumstances.

A very interesting and informative book. If I may say so, a wise book, and a good resource for anyone wanting to understand how, and when, diplomacy works.