At the heart of ethics reside the concepts of good and bad; they are at work when we assess whether a person is virtuous or vicious, an act right or wrong, a decision defensible or indefensible, a goal desirable or undesirable. But there are many varieties of goodness and badness. At their core lie intrinsic goodness and badness, the sort of value that something has for its own sake. It is in virtue of intrinsic value that other types of value may be understood, and hence that we can begin to come to terms with questions of virtue and vice, right and wrong, and so on. This book investigates the nature of intrinsic just what it is for something to be valuable for its own sake, just what sort of thing can have such value, just how such a value is to be computed. In the final chapter, the fruits of this investigation are applied to a discussion of pleasure, pain, and displeasure and also of moral virtue and vice, in order to determine just what value lies within these phenomena.Author Michael J. Zimmerman is professor of philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro.
Announcing its intention to ‘deal only with certain issues that are highly general and abstract,’ the book delivers what it promises.
Engaging some of the principal philosophers of the last hundred years the book examines what is intrinsic value, and what sort of things have it. At the heart of the issues is a distinction between value ‘for’ and value in itself. Food is valued ‘for’ the health it gives. Someone who insisted that food was just valuable in an ultimate and unanalysable way would probably be thought of as a sick hoarder (or as propounding some weird philosophical theory?).
Yet philosophers, like the author, do want to say that some things seem to have an ‘intrinsic’ value which cannot be reduced to simply being valuable for some other end. Perhaps works of art fall into that category? Possibly some types of ethical actions too, like helping the sick?
This raises the question of ‘what’ it is that is valuable. Are things valuable, or ideas? Or is it the states of things, that are valuable, so there is a degree of relation involved in value?
These questions are asked, and explored, in excruciating detail. Readers who survive to the end of the book will have a theory of intrinsic value of states, which they can… er… value.
The book is written in a technical philosophical style for a readership of professional philosophers. In places, the argument is considering so many objections and variations that it is not always easy to remember what the actual thesis is that is being argued. The book would have benefited from a section at the end of each chapter, summarising what the chapter thinks it has shown.
Readers who do persevere to the end may find themselves thinking, so what? What is the implication, or relevance of what the book has shown? How does the author’s view make a difference to aesthetics or ethics, or any position within those fields? It is all very well to focus on this abstruse aspect of foundational thinking within those areas, but it is still helpful to readers to indicate why the author thinks it is worth engaging with the issues at all.