Louisbourg, France's impressive fortress on Cape Breton Island's foggy Atlantic coast, dominated access to the St. Lawrence and colonial New France for forty years in the mid-eighteenth century. In 1755, Great Britain and France stumbled into the French and Indian War, part of what (to Europe) became the Seven Years' War—only for British forces to suffer successive defeats. In 1758, Britain and France, as well as Indian nations caught in the rivalry, fought for high the future of colonial America.Hugh Boscawen describes how Britain's war minister William Pitt launched four fleets in a coordinated campaign to prevent France from reinforcing Louisbourg. As the author shows, the Royal Navy outfought its opponents before General Jeffery Amherst and Brigadier James Wolfe successfully led 14,000 British regulars, including American-born redcoats, rangers, and carpenters, in a hard-fought assault landing. Together they besieged the fortress, which surrendered after forty-nine days. The victory marked a turning point in British fortunes and precipitated the end of French rule in North America.Boscawen, an experienced soldier and sailor, and a direct descendant of Admiral the Hon. Edward Boscawen, who commanded the Royal Navy fleet at Louisbourg, examines the pivotal 1758 Louisbourg campaign from both the British and French perspectives. Drawing on myriad primary sources, including previously unpublished correspondence, Boscawen also answers the question "What did the soldiers and sailors who fought there do all day?" The result is the most comprehensive history of this strategically important campaign ever written.
A traditional military history of the campaign for Louisbourg, with a well-written narrative and thorough research. Boscawen (a descendant of the admiral but still a balanced historian) focuses on the British siege and the amphibious operation, and puts in into the context of the wider war. He also studies the impact and quality of leadership on both sides.
Boscawen thoroughly covers questions of policy and strategy. He does a fine job providing the strategic background of the war as a whole, the British campaign planning, Britain’s successful effort to interdict French supply and troop convoys, and the training and campaigning of the British expeditionary force, consisting of both British regulars and North American colonial soldiers.Boscawen’s coverage of tactics and terrain is clear and vivid. Prior to 1758, Boscawen notes, the British navy was “lackluster” and suffered from a flimsy command structure that did little to curb naval officers’ general indifference (Boscawen suggests that the execution of Admiral Byng may have produced this effect).
At one point Boscawen describes the training of Amherst’s men at Halifax, which he calls an “important phase,” but then explains how Pepperell's New England troops were “ill-trained”---some clarification here would have helped. It also seems like Boscawen somewhat over-exaggerates the impact of the victory at Louisbourg at times.