'The Courage to Be' is Paul Tillich's most famous book and was, according to the introduction by Harvey Cox, quite popular even among laypeople. But this doesn't mean that this is an easy read. Tillich is a philosopher after all, and even though the concepts he deals with, such as anxiety, death, guilt, meaning, faith and others are important and his language is quite concise, the nature of the subjects require quite abstract thinking at times.
The first chapter is quick tour through the history of philosophy concerning the meaning of courage. Here he looks at Plato, Aquinas, Seneca, Spinoza and Nietzsche. His own definition of the 'courage to be', which lends the book its title, is probably closest to Nietzsche's 'will to power' and Spinoza's 'conatus '. Tillich is talking about something beyond the subject-object divide. It is not something psychological in our minds, it is in ourselves, in our whole being. Affirming life is putting your consciousness in line with your being which is already pulsating with that reality of the courage to be.
In the second chapter he explains this in more detail saying that "courage is self-affirmation 'in spite of,' that is in spite of that which tends to prevent the self from affirming itself". In an existentialist fashion, he thus defines being against the backdrop of nonbeing. This also leads him to a discussion of anxiety, which is "the state in which a being is aware of its possible nonbeing".
This discussion of anxiety was one of my favorite parts of the book. According to Tillich anxiety is an existential condition and not just something certain people experience. He describes three forms in which anxiety manifests itself in our lives:
There is ontic anxiety, which is related to fate and death, moral anxiety, which has to do with guilt and condemnation, and finally there is spiritual anxiety, which regards emptiness and, in its absolute form, meaninglessness.
These three main forms of anxiety are often intertwined but still Tillich traces each of them back to a period in history when they were predominant. The ontic anxiety was prevalent in the ancient world, which conceived of the human life as in the hand of the gods and subject to fate.
"... the individual's feeling of being in the hands of powers, natural as well as political, which are completely beyond his control and calculation - all this produced a tremendous anxiety and the quest for courage to meet the threat of fate and death."
In the medieval period the ontic anxiety was partly overcome by the christian beliefs promoted by the church, in a life after death and in God's providence. But in this period the moral anxiety grew stronger. This anxiety was related to guilt and the possibility of condemnation if one fails to live up to the standards of the divine.
"The anxiety of condemnation symbolized as the 'wrath of God' and intensified by the imagery of hell and purgatory drove people of the late Middle Ages to try various means of assuaging their anxiety..."
The reformation helped to engage this anxiety and partially relieved people of moral anxiety. But it was not until the age of Enlightenment that the third type of anxiety, spiritual anxiety, became dominant:
"The breakdown of absolutism, the development of liberalism and democracy, the rise of a technical civilization with its victory over all enemies and its own beginning disintegration - these are the sociological presuppositions for the third main period of anxiety."
The third chapter is a discussion about pathological anxiety and its relation to the existential anxiety Tillich is talking about. Here he also points out the differences in the roles of the priest and the therapist in helping people address these two different types of anxiety.
What comes next is a look at different approaches of overcoming anxiety through participation. Here Tillich describes and gives historical examples of primitive collectivism, semi-collectivism and neo-collectivism. Neo-collectivism is probably the most interesting one of these. It arises in a historical period of extreme individualization as a response to the anxiety of the own finitude, guilt and meaninglessness. The nazism, communism and fascism of the 20th century are examples for this. They try to repress individualism in a totalitarian way:
"In this way the anxiety of individual nonbeing is transformed into anxiety about the collective, and anxiety about the collective is conquered by the courage to affirm oneself through participation in the collective."
In the fifth chapter Tillich takes a closer look at Existentialism. Existentialism, just as depth psychology, affirms that the individual is not just a part of the whole, but that there is something unique about every person and her subjectivity. Furthermore, as Sartre points out, man is condemned to a radical freedom: the freedom to decide who to be and what do with one's life. This is the central claim of Existentialism: existence precedes essence. There is no essence, no idea of what we as humans ought to be that we receive from a divine authority and there is no meaning arising out of nature. There is only the meaning we create by living in a meaningful way. This of course is also a huge responsibility that one is tempted to renounce. In Tillich's analysis, this is what happened in the 20th century with a massive return to collectivism (nazism, communism, fascism). Here the individual's freedom is given up, but even the giving up of the freedom in this way is a decision freely taken and one for which one is ultimately radically responsible for.
The last chapter gets really theological. Here Tillich explains his concepts of the 'God above God' and 'absolute faith'.
The God which is transcended through the 'God above God' is the cosmological God, which is the understanding of God as some kind of super-being. Tillich finds the idea of God as being unacceptable and argues for the notion of God as the ground of being. In another essay by Tillich called 'Two Types of Philosophy of Religion (1946)', which I strongly recommend, he calls this an ontological notion of God.
Following his critique of theism is this excerpt in which he defines 'absolute faith':
"Theism in all its forms is transcended in the experience we have called absolute faith. It is the accepting of the acceptance without somebody or something that accepts. It is the power of being-itself that accepts and gives the courage to be."
And:
"The content of absolute faith is the 'God above God'. Absolute faith and its consequence, the courage that takes the radical doubt, the doubt about God, into itself, transcends the theistic idea of God."
The contents of this book will stay with me a long while. Especially the last chapter is something that I will have to chew on a bit more. But I can already recognize that what Tillich gave the world through this book and other books is something precious. As Robert Neeley Bellah said: "I was one of those many whom Paul Tillich showed that Christian faith did not have to be 'belief in the unbelievable'." At least he helped me to see one possible way in which the words 'faith' and 'God' can still have meaning and power even after the 'death of God' experienced in radical doubting.