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Philosophical Writings
Although Leibniz's writing forms an enormous corpus, no single work stands as a canonical expression of his whole philosophy. In addition, the wide range of Leibniz's work--letters, published papers, and fragments on a variety of philosophical, religious, mathematical, and scientific questions over a fifty-year period--heightens the challenge of preparing an edition of his writings in English translation from the French and Latin.
270 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1716
About the author
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
1,384 books576 followersGerman philosopher and mathematician Baron Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz or Leibnitz invented differential and integral calculus independently of Isaac Newton and proposed an optimist metaphysical theory that included the notion that we live in "the best of all possible worlds."
Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, a polymath, occupies a prominent place in the history. Most scholars think that Leibniz developed and published ever widely used notation. Only in the 20th century, his law of continuity and transcendental homogeneity found implementation in means of nonstandard analysis. He of the most prolific in the field of mechanical calculators. He worked on adding automatic multiplication and division to calculator of Blaise Pascal, meanwhile first described a pinwheel in 1685, and used it in the first mass-produced mechanical arithmometer. He also refined the binary number system, the foundation of virtually all digital computers.
Leibniz most concluded that God ably created our universe in a restricted sense, Voltaire often lampooned the idea. Leibniz alongside the great René Descartes and Baruch Spinoza advocated 17th-century rationalism. Applying reason of first principles or prior definitions, rather than empirical evidence, produced conclusions in the scholastic tradition, and the work of Leibniz anticipated modern analytic logic.
Leibniz made major contributions to technology, and anticipated that which surfaced much later in probability, biology, medicine, geology, psychology, linguistics, and computer science. He wrote works on politics, law, ethics, theology, history, and philology. Various learned journals, tens of thousands of letters, and unpublished manuscripts scattered contributions of Leibniz to this vast array of subjects. He wrote in several languages but primarily Latin and French. No one completely gathered the writings of Leibniz.
Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, a polymath, occupies a prominent place in the history. Most scholars think that Leibniz developed and published ever widely used notation. Only in the 20th century, his law of continuity and transcendental homogeneity found implementation in means of nonstandard analysis. He of the most prolific in the field of mechanical calculators. He worked on adding automatic multiplication and division to calculator of Blaise Pascal, meanwhile first described a pinwheel in 1685, and used it in the first mass-produced mechanical arithmometer. He also refined the binary number system, the foundation of virtually all digital computers.
Leibniz most concluded that God ably created our universe in a restricted sense, Voltaire often lampooned the idea. Leibniz alongside the great René Descartes and Baruch Spinoza advocated 17th-century rationalism. Applying reason of first principles or prior definitions, rather than empirical evidence, produced conclusions in the scholastic tradition, and the work of Leibniz anticipated modern analytic logic.
Leibniz made major contributions to technology, and anticipated that which surfaced much later in probability, biology, medicine, geology, psychology, linguistics, and computer science. He wrote works on politics, law, ethics, theology, history, and philology. Various learned journals, tens of thousands of letters, and unpublished manuscripts scattered contributions of Leibniz to this vast array of subjects. He wrote in several languages but primarily Latin and French. No one completely gathered the writings of Leibniz.
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April 10, 2013- According to Leibniz's Principle of Sufficient Reason, everything happens for a cause or reason.
- Yes, but why?
- Yes, but why?
November 27, 2011
The most intelligent biped who ever lived was Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. His philosophy was impenetrable to me for years and years, but I stuck with it, considering that the guy knew no math and then, in a few short years in Paris, arrived at the calculus independent of Newton. Who else could get work done in Paris? Leibniz's philosophy of the monadology, the specimen dynamicum, the program for a metaphysical foundation for physics, the characteristica universalis, geometric algebra, the analysis situs, the Leibniz-Clarke controversy, all of these things were premonitions of the course science and philosophy actually took (and has still to take). The foresight is humbling and awe inspiring to me.
July 12, 2025
If there is only one book on philosophy to read, this is it. If there was one Genius in the world it was Leibniz.
No one ever had the imagination to explain the world like he did. To give just one example. Everyone knows that he said that this is the best of possible worlds. (And most people have trouble believing it). But it is not that he looked around and found everything pleasing but he had logical reasons to come to the conclusion. God could not have created a world without a sufficient reason. Therefore this must be the one that stands out. And he had to pick it! Amazing.
No one ever had the imagination to explain the world like he did. To give just one example. Everyone knows that he said that this is the best of possible worlds. (And most people have trouble believing it). But it is not that he looked around and found everything pleasing but he had logical reasons to come to the conclusion. God could not have created a world without a sufficient reason. Therefore this must be the one that stands out. And he had to pick it! Amazing.
November 28, 2021
This is a collection of the important shorter works of Leibniz's philosophical corpus, which are edited and translated by Garber and Ariew. Some of the more important works featured in this collection are the "Monadology," and "Discourse on Metaphysics," and "On Nature Itself". (So some of the works concern Leibniz's theoretical physics and theology, not just philosophy proper [whatever that is:]) Additionally included are some of Leibniz's correspondence letters, which serve to further buttress the arguments of certain essays. There is a short preface to each essay or letter in which the editor's provide relevant contextual information; moreover, the editors provide footnotes of relevent historical and philosophical, and terminological points that bring out various nuances that might otherwise have been missed entirely.
This work is intended to be a reference work--it's not meant to be read from page one to the end; rather, it is ideal for research, classroom instruction, or for on the go reading when you just need a quick Leibniz fix in a portable format. As an introduction to Leibniz' thought, it's hard to go wrong with this edition.
While using this book in a grad seminar, it was brought to my attention that there are some questionable aspects to the translation. Some of the works in this volume are translated from the Latin, others from the French. Either way, some of the word choices lend themselves to serious misinterpretation in the English. Having said that, while my Latin is better than my French, I don't think my understanding of Leibniz's complicated metaphysics was tainted anymore than it would have been had I been reading from the original languages.
Is I mentioned above, some of the inclusions concern theorectical aspects of various scientific problems, some of which are problems bequethed to Leibniz from previous thinkers, such as Descartes. But some of the selections have prefaces that do not fully bring out the way in which Leibniz' arguments are responses to certain historical problems.
For instance, in section 13 of On Nature Itself, Leibniz raises a number of objections to a view of motion that is compatible with Cartesian physics. The editors, however, do not make clear to which arguments Leibniz was responding. Here is one of these objections, as it relates to Descartes’ view of motion, in a more succinct form than as it occurs in section 13.
The Cartesian view of motion consists in geometrical bodies acting on each other within a plenum. Descartes’ definition of motion is as follows:
"The translation of a piece of matter from the neighborhood of bodies immediately touching it, these being regarded as being at rest, to the neighborhood of others. " Principle of Philosophy. Sec. II, P25.
It is only possible, furthermore, according to Descartes, for the movement of bodies to be circular. Principles II, p33.
Leibniz presents the following argument against this Cartesian view.
(P1) The criterion for distinguishing a uniform mass of matter is motion.
(P2) If motion is transference, then a change of state from one place to another must occur.
(P3) It is not the case that a uniform mass of matter can be distinguished by means of a change of state from one place to another.
(P4) If (P3), then it is not the case that the criterion for distinguishing a uniform mass of matter is motion.
(C1) It is not the case that the criterion for distinguishing a uniform mass of matter is motion.
Leibniz presumably intends this argument to be a reductio of Descartes's view since, if Descartes’s view of motion were true, then we would not be able to distinguish between individual objects; but we do distinguish between individual objects. Descartes’ view, therefore, must be false.
Leibniz gives an argument for (P3), which is reformulated as follows.
(P3a) One part of matter is distinguished from another by means of an extrinsic denomination. [Roughly speaking, an extrinsic denomination is a relational property that does not refer back to the subject:]
(P3b) It is not the case that at present there is a distinguishing criterion.
(P3c) If (P3b), then it is not the case that there is an extrinsic denomination.
(P3d) It is not the case that there is an extrinsic denomination.
(P3e) If (P3d), then it is not the case that one part of matter is distinguished from another.
(C2) It is not the case that one part of matter is distinguished from another.
Leibniz also argues against shape, instead of motion, being the criterion for distinguishing one piece of matter from another. According to Leibniz, a uniform mass of matter, which is infinite (i.e., Cartesian extension)has no boundary. Shape, however, entails a boundary. For that reason, the Cartesians cannot construe a uniform mass of matter as having shape; and hence, shape cannot be a means for distinguishing one piece of matter from another.
This work is intended to be a reference work--it's not meant to be read from page one to the end; rather, it is ideal for research, classroom instruction, or for on the go reading when you just need a quick Leibniz fix in a portable format. As an introduction to Leibniz' thought, it's hard to go wrong with this edition.
While using this book in a grad seminar, it was brought to my attention that there are some questionable aspects to the translation. Some of the works in this volume are translated from the Latin, others from the French. Either way, some of the word choices lend themselves to serious misinterpretation in the English. Having said that, while my Latin is better than my French, I don't think my understanding of Leibniz's complicated metaphysics was tainted anymore than it would have been had I been reading from the original languages.
Is I mentioned above, some of the inclusions concern theorectical aspects of various scientific problems, some of which are problems bequethed to Leibniz from previous thinkers, such as Descartes. But some of the selections have prefaces that do not fully bring out the way in which Leibniz' arguments are responses to certain historical problems.
For instance, in section 13 of On Nature Itself, Leibniz raises a number of objections to a view of motion that is compatible with Cartesian physics. The editors, however, do not make clear to which arguments Leibniz was responding. Here is one of these objections, as it relates to Descartes’ view of motion, in a more succinct form than as it occurs in section 13.
The Cartesian view of motion consists in geometrical bodies acting on each other within a plenum. Descartes’ definition of motion is as follows:
"The translation of a piece of matter from the neighborhood of bodies immediately touching it, these being regarded as being at rest, to the neighborhood of others. " Principle of Philosophy. Sec. II, P25.
It is only possible, furthermore, according to Descartes, for the movement of bodies to be circular. Principles II, p33.
Leibniz presents the following argument against this Cartesian view.
(P1) The criterion for distinguishing a uniform mass of matter is motion.
(P2) If motion is transference, then a change of state from one place to another must occur.
(P3) It is not the case that a uniform mass of matter can be distinguished by means of a change of state from one place to another.
(P4) If (P3), then it is not the case that the criterion for distinguishing a uniform mass of matter is motion.
(C1) It is not the case that the criterion for distinguishing a uniform mass of matter is motion.
Leibniz presumably intends this argument to be a reductio of Descartes's view since, if Descartes’s view of motion were true, then we would not be able to distinguish between individual objects; but we do distinguish between individual objects. Descartes’ view, therefore, must be false.
Leibniz gives an argument for (P3), which is reformulated as follows.
(P3a) One part of matter is distinguished from another by means of an extrinsic denomination. [Roughly speaking, an extrinsic denomination is a relational property that does not refer back to the subject:]
(P3b) It is not the case that at present there is a distinguishing criterion.
(P3c) If (P3b), then it is not the case that there is an extrinsic denomination.
(P3d) It is not the case that there is an extrinsic denomination.
(P3e) If (P3d), then it is not the case that one part of matter is distinguished from another.
(C2) It is not the case that one part of matter is distinguished from another.
Leibniz also argues against shape, instead of motion, being the criterion for distinguishing one piece of matter from another. According to Leibniz, a uniform mass of matter, which is infinite (i.e., Cartesian extension)has no boundary. Shape, however, entails a boundary. For that reason, the Cartesians cannot construe a uniform mass of matter as having shape; and hence, shape cannot be a means for distinguishing one piece of matter from another.
June 19, 2026
While modern philosophers clarify and improve Leibniz in various aspects, they also usually desacralise his doctrines. The collection is good but not perfect: there are too many correspondences, technical treatises (but if his logical and physical writings are included, why not also his papers in calculus?) and marginal commentaries of other philosophers that would be forgot had it not been written by Leibniz, but several of his more important writings are excluded (including his iconic 24 metaphysical theses and some theological writings). Besides, I do not think that this collection (or any other collection of Leibniz's shorter philosophical writings) can replace New Essays and Theodicy safely. I will pick up entries that I find interesting and comment on them.
Preface to a Universal Characteristic
Leibniz said that everything can be numbered and that the tool that he invented can predicate not only notions, but also sentences with numbers. I do not think that he is rigorous enough here. He only represented notions / sentences with numbers, not predicated them with numbers. So he developed a logical technique instead of a numerology. For theoretically Leibniz's technique can represent a notion with two different numbers without dysfunctions. So which number is predicated of the notion? If Leibniz replies that he predicated notions with structures, then he failed to predicated them with numbers anyway.
Samples of the Numerical Characteristic
These manuscripts might be too technical to belong here. I used to assume that Leibniz was a precursor to Boole, Schröder and Tarski in the algebraisation of logic, but Leibniz's actual technique might be better described as the arithmetisation of logic, closer to Gödel's numbering than to Boole, Schröder and Tarski's logical algebra. Both groups mathematised logic, but the mathematisation of logic is not a homogeneous process.
Meditations on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas
Lots of future themes in New Essays are developed more concisely here.
Primary Truths
This text is largely underestimated. Leibniz almost derived everything that he would be famous (philosophically) for from the law of identity. This text also might be the primary reason why Bertrand Russell asserted that Leibniz's philosophy was almost exclusively developed from his logic. Russell argued against Leibniz that Leibniz reduced relations to predicates of subjects. Russell might be technically correct, but he could not invalidate Leibniz's insights that one individual is fundamentally in relationship to everything else. Whether Leibniz or Russell respects relations more ontologically is quite a complicated question.
Modern physicalists might avoid Leibniz's critique of atomism by citing modern statistical physics: you see, if a fermion a is in the energy state x and another fermion b of the same fundamental type is in the energy state y, the case is essentially, statistically the same as the case that a is in the energy state y and b is in the energy state x. They are fundamentally indistinguishable! This might be a reason why physicalism becomes so prominent today, but even then physicalists can hardly answer Leibniz's stronger objections. It seems to me that from Galileo on whenever science advances significantly, there will be some cheerleaders of the "scientific philosophy" that reduce everything to new scientific discoveries, win huge popularity and then be forgot after one or two generations. I do not think that analytic naturalists today can avoid this fate.
Discourses on Metaphysics
Note that Leibniz used the Platonic participatory language when he discussed knowledge: human knowing is participating in God's omniscience. This shows that Leibniz was not a purely modern, Cartesian representationist, as he is stereotyped to be.
Leibniz's held that necessary truths follow analytically and contingent truths follow from God's choice from all possible worlds. Leibniz seemed to reduce all a priori truths to the law of non-contradiction. From a Kantian or a Husserlian point of view one might blame Leibniz for neglecting synthetic a priori judgements, as Husserl restricted analytic propositions to propositions that can be formalised and asserted the existence of "material a priori" truths, like that an extended thing must be coloured. Edith Stein therefore taught that human beings cannot exhaust all a priori truths for the limits of experiences even if they have an exhausted formal system (while, they cannot have). But one may realise that at one point Leibniz is better than Kant: for Leibniz analytic propositions follow from logical structures in themselves and might be opaque to the knower, for Kant, however, analytic propositions are reduced to the subject's self-knowledge and the subject's self-knowledge is mistaken as things known immediately.
As an enemy of ontological contingency I generally agree with Leibniz's rejection of arbitrary voluntarism. Leibniz's language of "God's choice" might still sound too voluntarist for me. I may say that since goodness is existence, a possible world that is better necessarily exist and one can only say that a possible world might not exist if one abstracts the world from teleological considerations (in the sense that one can say that the order of a subgroup of a finite group might not divide the order of the original group only if one abstracts the original group and the subgroup from their group structures and consider them only as a set and its subset, but that as long as the group structure is taken into account, the order of the subgroup divides that of the original group necessarily). That being said I may not reject modal metaphysics per se since abstractions are sometimes beneficial. I cannot see how this step can eliminate freedom if freedom is defined as the sensitivity to the telos. As to freedom as arbitrary choice I may follow Martin Luther to say that I would not want it to be given to me even if I could get it.
The last few chapters on ethics and theology are very good and might be read edifyingly or devotionally. But this collection fails to include more Leibniz's writings on the Trinity and mysticism.
Letters to Arnauld
I fell into sleep several times when I read this. It does not add substantially to Primary Truths and Discourses on Metaphysics and some of the statements are directly problematic. For instance, Leibniz said that species are abstracted from individuals and used mathematical abstractions as examples. Leibniz failed to distinguish species from properties. For one can say that a baboon is a primate but not that a baboon is a blackness even if the baboon is indeed black.
Are species simply abstracted? I doubt it. The question whether one is implicitly doing an abstraction when one talks about species is beyond my reach now but if one means that one can define a species as one defines a mathematical object, I will reject this thesis. I may say that as individuals are infinite for Leibniz, species are also infinite. For it is theoretically possible that, even if every property people used to use in identifying the species "baboon" fails since people have discovered baboons that do not satisfy that property, the species "baboon" remains identical because species is not a collection of properties but a indication of a common origin. To make an extreme example, one may identify that a certain style of poems so that whenever one encounters this style, one can tell that the poem is written by Konstantinos Kavafis. But even then one may take time to explain how one identifies this. Now "poems written by Kavafis" might be treated as a quasi-species, but its very origin, Konstantinos Kavafis, is a concrete individual.
Eugen Dühring made an interesting commentary that universals are both abstracted from individuals and are the real force behind the diversification of species and development of individuals. Dühring was insightful here but also displayed some confusions when one talks about universals or argues about whether universals is prior to individuals or not. But I may say that there are at least three different things one may talk about when one talks about "universals":
1. Ideals like Truth, Goodness and Beauty. They are (perhaps one should say "He is" instead), in Dühring's sense, the real forces behind the diversification of species and development of individuals. They are individuals themselves and prior to sensible individuals.
2. Genus and species. They are as real as sensible individuals and species and sensible individuals cannot be separated from each other.
3. Properties. They are in Dühring's sense, abstractions from individuals and species. I may say that they are concepts that are posterior to individuals without saying that they are mere names.
On Freedom
Leibniz said that individuality implies infinity and that necessary truths and contingent truths differ from each other as finite numbers differ from the infinity. I may say that the analogy is not so good because according to Leibniz himself, even the necessary properties of individuals are infinite in number.
A Specimen of Dynamics
This might also be too technical for this collection. Some of Leibniz's ideas might sound surprisingly modern, though. Leibniz understood the mass by forces, and that might be similar to the vision of modern particle physics while mass is given by various interactions (especially interactions with Higgs bosons).
New System of Nature
This is the place where Leibniz's won the title as the author of the doctrine of "pre-established harmony". Leibniz's theory is beautiful, but he did not explain in detail how to explain things teleologically. He set the project but did not finish it himself. German idealists did a lot in this respect.
On the Ultimate Origination of Things
Leibniz here defined essence as the strive for existence. That is very radical and reminds me even of Goethe's visions:
Stumm war alles, still und öde,
Einsam Gott zum ersten Mal!
Da erschuf er Morgenröte,
Die erbarmte sich der Qual;
Sie entwickelte dem Trüben
Ein erklingend Farbenspiel,
Und nun konnte wieder lieben,
Was erst auseinanderfiel.
Und mit eiligem Bestreben
Sucht sich, was sich angehört;
Und zu ungemeßnem Leben
Ist Gefühl und Blick gekehrt.
Sei’s Ergreifen, sei es Raffen,
Wenn es nur sich faßt und hält!
Allah braucht nicht mehr zu schaffen,
Wir erschaffen seine Welt.
But Leibniz did not deprive God of the claim to creatures' creations like Goethe did since he did not treat that as a zero-sum game.
On Nature Itself
Leibniz was pretty Augustinian here. He defined the primary matter as the pure, invisible passive force and the secondary matter as primary matter modified by the intelligible forces of monads. Visible bodies are, for Leibniz, secondary matters.
Letters to Johann Bernoulli
It is good that Leibniz rejected the idea that whatever cannot be perceived clearly and distinctly does not exist.
To Queen Sophie Charlotte of Prussia
Surprisingly good among his philosophical letters. Leibniz developed something like Kant's transcendental deduction here.
Letters to Des Bosses
Not very good-written, but indispensable for Leibniz's doctrine of substantial chains.
Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason
I actually like it better than I like The Monadology. Leibniz distinguished perception from apperception (the reflection on perceptions themselves). For Leibniz only human beings have apperception but all monads have perception. Therefore Descartes was wrong to reduce everything without apperception to machines.
Leibniz's aesthetics: beauty lies in order and when one enjoys beauty when one implicitly calculates the order. The question is, whether one can voluntarily reject beauty, that is, rejecting harmony. (One might think of Jonathan Edwards' eschatology where during the judgement, both the blessed and the dammed will perceive God as Truth and Goodness, but only the blessed will perceive God also as Beauty.) Like Leibniz Kant also affirmed that beauty lies in a harmony (the harmony between the sensible and the intelligible world) and that enjoyment of beauty is an unconscious realisation of the harmony. But Kant put more emphasis on pleasure and displeasure and if one indulges oneself in utilitarian concerns, one will not be pleased by beauty. That is, utilitarian people disjoint themselves with the harmony. One may relate that to Edwards' theory of the failure to love being-in-general, Kant's radical evil and Schelling's theory of evil as the radical self-will drawing to the periphery here.
To some extent, however, Leibniz also participated in (or was a victim of) the modern vulgarisation of nature. For Leibniz nature is just the mechanical world and grace is just the moral world. Ancient philosophers and theologians like Maximus the Confessor certainly did not use these two words in this way.
The Monadology
Perhaps too iconic for me to comment on. If you have read previous treatises it is a good review and systematisation, though.
Letters to Wolff
Leibniz defined perfection as the higher degree of reality and imperfection as exceptions to general rules. Perhaps one should go deeper to say that perfection lies in the subsuming many individuals into one without defying each individual's individuality.
Christian Wolff is now known only as a dull and dogmatic systematiser of Leibniz. But he actually revised Leibniz's philosophy substantially: for Leibniz the law of non-contradiction governs only necessary truths, but for Wolff everything is governed by the law of non-contradiction. That might be the reason why Schelling polemicised against Hegel as a negative philosopher and a polished version of Wolff. As I remarked previously I did find Leibniz's explanations insufficient and Wolff might be right to subsume the two principles of Leibniz into one principle. But Wolff was wrong in giving the law of non-contradiction that level of prominence and assuming that the first principle can be exhausted by propositions. For God must affirm Himself and only God's self-affirmation can render anything contradictory to God intelligible. One can say that God is not self-contradictory, but one cannot say that God is defined as "He that is not self-contradictory". Otherwise one might treat contradictions as the engine leading to the Absolute, that is, some version of Hegelian historicism.
On God and the Soul
Leibniz accused Descartes of repeating the mistakes of Stoics because although Descartes granted the soul of immortality, he did not grant the soul of hope. Then the soul can only endure the misfortunes like a Stoic sage but cannot enjoy.
On Body and Force
The content is similar to that of New System of Nature. I actually like it better.
Two Sects of Naturalists
Leibniz compared Hobbes to Epicureans and Spinoza to Stoics and accused both of them of naturalism. He might be a little bit unfair to Spinoza to lump him with Hobbes, though. Both Hobbes and Spinoza were wrong in rejecting teleology, but Spinoza's problem was more "abstraction from teleology" and was more redeemable than Hobbes'. Spinoza ended in love, Hobbes ended in fear and control. Hobbes might even commit the original crime of mistaking things not bad enough as goodness, in Spinoza's system.
That being said this treatise is a good reminder that Stoic necessity is not an antidote to Epicurean chaos. Plato actually identified blind necessity as a chaotic force against reason.
Letters to Clarke
Here Leibniz argued that space and time are nothing but orders of things using his principle of the sufficient reason. Leibniz sounded dangerously close to a Machaen positivist here. Indeed one may say that Leibniz asked everything for a reason, and Mach also rejects everything without reason. So what are their differences? Leibniz did not, as Mach did, reduce what is reasonable to what is given in sensible phenomena. Leibniz was contemplative, Mach was pragmatist.
Conclusion
While Leibniz did not write a philosophical magnum opus, it is not an excuse to expand the Leibnizian canon indefinitely. Some of the letters and marginal comments collected here are genuinely inferior in philosophical quality.
Leibniz is unfashionable today although lots of his critiques of voluntarists are still valid. Now voluntarists today play the new game accusing intellectualists as "neglecting the existential depth". So let us play their game and see who are the cowards and conformists here. In an age where beauty is "uncool" and reconciliation is derided as "immaturity" and "naiveness", one needs even a desperate courage to defend intelligibility and harmony.
Preface to a Universal Characteristic
Leibniz said that everything can be numbered and that the tool that he invented can predicate not only notions, but also sentences with numbers. I do not think that he is rigorous enough here. He only represented notions / sentences with numbers, not predicated them with numbers. So he developed a logical technique instead of a numerology. For theoretically Leibniz's technique can represent a notion with two different numbers without dysfunctions. So which number is predicated of the notion? If Leibniz replies that he predicated notions with structures, then he failed to predicated them with numbers anyway.
Samples of the Numerical Characteristic
These manuscripts might be too technical to belong here. I used to assume that Leibniz was a precursor to Boole, Schröder and Tarski in the algebraisation of logic, but Leibniz's actual technique might be better described as the arithmetisation of logic, closer to Gödel's numbering than to Boole, Schröder and Tarski's logical algebra. Both groups mathematised logic, but the mathematisation of logic is not a homogeneous process.
Meditations on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas
Lots of future themes in New Essays are developed more concisely here.
Primary Truths
This text is largely underestimated. Leibniz almost derived everything that he would be famous (philosophically) for from the law of identity. This text also might be the primary reason why Bertrand Russell asserted that Leibniz's philosophy was almost exclusively developed from his logic. Russell argued against Leibniz that Leibniz reduced relations to predicates of subjects. Russell might be technically correct, but he could not invalidate Leibniz's insights that one individual is fundamentally in relationship to everything else. Whether Leibniz or Russell respects relations more ontologically is quite a complicated question.
Modern physicalists might avoid Leibniz's critique of atomism by citing modern statistical physics: you see, if a fermion a is in the energy state x and another fermion b of the same fundamental type is in the energy state y, the case is essentially, statistically the same as the case that a is in the energy state y and b is in the energy state x. They are fundamentally indistinguishable! This might be a reason why physicalism becomes so prominent today, but even then physicalists can hardly answer Leibniz's stronger objections. It seems to me that from Galileo on whenever science advances significantly, there will be some cheerleaders of the "scientific philosophy" that reduce everything to new scientific discoveries, win huge popularity and then be forgot after one or two generations. I do not think that analytic naturalists today can avoid this fate.
Discourses on Metaphysics
Note that Leibniz used the Platonic participatory language when he discussed knowledge: human knowing is participating in God's omniscience. This shows that Leibniz was not a purely modern, Cartesian representationist, as he is stereotyped to be.
Leibniz's held that necessary truths follow analytically and contingent truths follow from God's choice from all possible worlds. Leibniz seemed to reduce all a priori truths to the law of non-contradiction. From a Kantian or a Husserlian point of view one might blame Leibniz for neglecting synthetic a priori judgements, as Husserl restricted analytic propositions to propositions that can be formalised and asserted the existence of "material a priori" truths, like that an extended thing must be coloured. Edith Stein therefore taught that human beings cannot exhaust all a priori truths for the limits of experiences even if they have an exhausted formal system (while, they cannot have). But one may realise that at one point Leibniz is better than Kant: for Leibniz analytic propositions follow from logical structures in themselves and might be opaque to the knower, for Kant, however, analytic propositions are reduced to the subject's self-knowledge and the subject's self-knowledge is mistaken as things known immediately.
As an enemy of ontological contingency I generally agree with Leibniz's rejection of arbitrary voluntarism. Leibniz's language of "God's choice" might still sound too voluntarist for me. I may say that since goodness is existence, a possible world that is better necessarily exist and one can only say that a possible world might not exist if one abstracts the world from teleological considerations (in the sense that one can say that the order of a subgroup of a finite group might not divide the order of the original group only if one abstracts the original group and the subgroup from their group structures and consider them only as a set and its subset, but that as long as the group structure is taken into account, the order of the subgroup divides that of the original group necessarily). That being said I may not reject modal metaphysics per se since abstractions are sometimes beneficial. I cannot see how this step can eliminate freedom if freedom is defined as the sensitivity to the telos. As to freedom as arbitrary choice I may follow Martin Luther to say that I would not want it to be given to me even if I could get it.
The last few chapters on ethics and theology are very good and might be read edifyingly or devotionally. But this collection fails to include more Leibniz's writings on the Trinity and mysticism.
Letters to Arnauld
I fell into sleep several times when I read this. It does not add substantially to Primary Truths and Discourses on Metaphysics and some of the statements are directly problematic. For instance, Leibniz said that species are abstracted from individuals and used mathematical abstractions as examples. Leibniz failed to distinguish species from properties. For one can say that a baboon is a primate but not that a baboon is a blackness even if the baboon is indeed black.
Are species simply abstracted? I doubt it. The question whether one is implicitly doing an abstraction when one talks about species is beyond my reach now but if one means that one can define a species as one defines a mathematical object, I will reject this thesis. I may say that as individuals are infinite for Leibniz, species are also infinite. For it is theoretically possible that, even if every property people used to use in identifying the species "baboon" fails since people have discovered baboons that do not satisfy that property, the species "baboon" remains identical because species is not a collection of properties but a indication of a common origin. To make an extreme example, one may identify that a certain style of poems so that whenever one encounters this style, one can tell that the poem is written by Konstantinos Kavafis. But even then one may take time to explain how one identifies this. Now "poems written by Kavafis" might be treated as a quasi-species, but its very origin, Konstantinos Kavafis, is a concrete individual.
Eugen Dühring made an interesting commentary that universals are both abstracted from individuals and are the real force behind the diversification of species and development of individuals. Dühring was insightful here but also displayed some confusions when one talks about universals or argues about whether universals is prior to individuals or not. But I may say that there are at least three different things one may talk about when one talks about "universals":
1. Ideals like Truth, Goodness and Beauty. They are (perhaps one should say "He is" instead), in Dühring's sense, the real forces behind the diversification of species and development of individuals. They are individuals themselves and prior to sensible individuals.
2. Genus and species. They are as real as sensible individuals and species and sensible individuals cannot be separated from each other.
3. Properties. They are in Dühring's sense, abstractions from individuals and species. I may say that they are concepts that are posterior to individuals without saying that they are mere names.
On Freedom
Leibniz said that individuality implies infinity and that necessary truths and contingent truths differ from each other as finite numbers differ from the infinity. I may say that the analogy is not so good because according to Leibniz himself, even the necessary properties of individuals are infinite in number.
A Specimen of Dynamics
This might also be too technical for this collection. Some of Leibniz's ideas might sound surprisingly modern, though. Leibniz understood the mass by forces, and that might be similar to the vision of modern particle physics while mass is given by various interactions (especially interactions with Higgs bosons).
New System of Nature
This is the place where Leibniz's won the title as the author of the doctrine of "pre-established harmony". Leibniz's theory is beautiful, but he did not explain in detail how to explain things teleologically. He set the project but did not finish it himself. German idealists did a lot in this respect.
On the Ultimate Origination of Things
Leibniz here defined essence as the strive for existence. That is very radical and reminds me even of Goethe's visions:
Stumm war alles, still und öde,
Einsam Gott zum ersten Mal!
Da erschuf er Morgenröte,
Die erbarmte sich der Qual;
Sie entwickelte dem Trüben
Ein erklingend Farbenspiel,
Und nun konnte wieder lieben,
Was erst auseinanderfiel.
Und mit eiligem Bestreben
Sucht sich, was sich angehört;
Und zu ungemeßnem Leben
Ist Gefühl und Blick gekehrt.
Sei’s Ergreifen, sei es Raffen,
Wenn es nur sich faßt und hält!
Allah braucht nicht mehr zu schaffen,
Wir erschaffen seine Welt.
But Leibniz did not deprive God of the claim to creatures' creations like Goethe did since he did not treat that as a zero-sum game.
On Nature Itself
Leibniz was pretty Augustinian here. He defined the primary matter as the pure, invisible passive force and the secondary matter as primary matter modified by the intelligible forces of monads. Visible bodies are, for Leibniz, secondary matters.
Letters to Johann Bernoulli
It is good that Leibniz rejected the idea that whatever cannot be perceived clearly and distinctly does not exist.
To Queen Sophie Charlotte of Prussia
Surprisingly good among his philosophical letters. Leibniz developed something like Kant's transcendental deduction here.
Letters to Des Bosses
Not very good-written, but indispensable for Leibniz's doctrine of substantial chains.
Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason
I actually like it better than I like The Monadology. Leibniz distinguished perception from apperception (the reflection on perceptions themselves). For Leibniz only human beings have apperception but all monads have perception. Therefore Descartes was wrong to reduce everything without apperception to machines.
Leibniz's aesthetics: beauty lies in order and when one enjoys beauty when one implicitly calculates the order. The question is, whether one can voluntarily reject beauty, that is, rejecting harmony. (One might think of Jonathan Edwards' eschatology where during the judgement, both the blessed and the dammed will perceive God as Truth and Goodness, but only the blessed will perceive God also as Beauty.) Like Leibniz Kant also affirmed that beauty lies in a harmony (the harmony between the sensible and the intelligible world) and that enjoyment of beauty is an unconscious realisation of the harmony. But Kant put more emphasis on pleasure and displeasure and if one indulges oneself in utilitarian concerns, one will not be pleased by beauty. That is, utilitarian people disjoint themselves with the harmony. One may relate that to Edwards' theory of the failure to love being-in-general, Kant's radical evil and Schelling's theory of evil as the radical self-will drawing to the periphery here.
To some extent, however, Leibniz also participated in (or was a victim of) the modern vulgarisation of nature. For Leibniz nature is just the mechanical world and grace is just the moral world. Ancient philosophers and theologians like Maximus the Confessor certainly did not use these two words in this way.
The Monadology
Perhaps too iconic for me to comment on. If you have read previous treatises it is a good review and systematisation, though.
Letters to Wolff
Leibniz defined perfection as the higher degree of reality and imperfection as exceptions to general rules. Perhaps one should go deeper to say that perfection lies in the subsuming many individuals into one without defying each individual's individuality.
Christian Wolff is now known only as a dull and dogmatic systematiser of Leibniz. But he actually revised Leibniz's philosophy substantially: for Leibniz the law of non-contradiction governs only necessary truths, but for Wolff everything is governed by the law of non-contradiction. That might be the reason why Schelling polemicised against Hegel as a negative philosopher and a polished version of Wolff. As I remarked previously I did find Leibniz's explanations insufficient and Wolff might be right to subsume the two principles of Leibniz into one principle. But Wolff was wrong in giving the law of non-contradiction that level of prominence and assuming that the first principle can be exhausted by propositions. For God must affirm Himself and only God's self-affirmation can render anything contradictory to God intelligible. One can say that God is not self-contradictory, but one cannot say that God is defined as "He that is not self-contradictory". Otherwise one might treat contradictions as the engine leading to the Absolute, that is, some version of Hegelian historicism.
On God and the Soul
Leibniz accused Descartes of repeating the mistakes of Stoics because although Descartes granted the soul of immortality, he did not grant the soul of hope. Then the soul can only endure the misfortunes like a Stoic sage but cannot enjoy.
On Body and Force
The content is similar to that of New System of Nature. I actually like it better.
Two Sects of Naturalists
Leibniz compared Hobbes to Epicureans and Spinoza to Stoics and accused both of them of naturalism. He might be a little bit unfair to Spinoza to lump him with Hobbes, though. Both Hobbes and Spinoza were wrong in rejecting teleology, but Spinoza's problem was more "abstraction from teleology" and was more redeemable than Hobbes'. Spinoza ended in love, Hobbes ended in fear and control. Hobbes might even commit the original crime of mistaking things not bad enough as goodness, in Spinoza's system.
That being said this treatise is a good reminder that Stoic necessity is not an antidote to Epicurean chaos. Plato actually identified blind necessity as a chaotic force against reason.
Letters to Clarke
Here Leibniz argued that space and time are nothing but orders of things using his principle of the sufficient reason. Leibniz sounded dangerously close to a Machaen positivist here. Indeed one may say that Leibniz asked everything for a reason, and Mach also rejects everything without reason. So what are their differences? Leibniz did not, as Mach did, reduce what is reasonable to what is given in sensible phenomena. Leibniz was contemplative, Mach was pragmatist.
Conclusion
While Leibniz did not write a philosophical magnum opus, it is not an excuse to expand the Leibnizian canon indefinitely. Some of the letters and marginal comments collected here are genuinely inferior in philosophical quality.
Leibniz is unfashionable today although lots of his critiques of voluntarists are still valid. Now voluntarists today play the new game accusing intellectualists as "neglecting the existential depth". So let us play their game and see who are the cowards and conformists here. In an age where beauty is "uncool" and reconciliation is derided as "immaturity" and "naiveness", one needs even a desperate courage to defend intelligibility and harmony.
December 30, 2024
Faced with the laws of Newton and the strength of his religious perspective, Leibniz's philosophical writings, taken collectively, constitute a comprehensive attempt to interpret reality in a systematic, consistent and credible way. There's an underlying harmony to the world. Man and animal are pre-formed, individualized units (monads) of this overall perfection, filled with its energy and expressing its purpose.
Both animal and man have soul but only man has a rational soul and is able to understand, appreciate and reflect the world's underlying perfection. Man's happiness lies in his progress toward degrees of perfection, though Leibniz spins a bit regarding his argument that, in a pre-established, harmonious world consisting of self-contained ("windowless") monads (beings with energy/soul), individuals have free will.
Like Hegel's Absolute Freedom, Leibniz has a capstone to his system and this is God. God is the pervasive presence throughout the world and is the pervasive presence in Leibniz's philosophy. God is the final cause that draws the whole world onto Himself so that everything fits together and has a place, even evil (leads to a higher good).
It is quite a system that Leibniz has constructed and, reflective of his time, it perhaps seemed reasonable enough. Pull God from the capstone position, however, and Leibniz's thought is philosophical and scientific theology. Substitute Schopehauer's Will (Energy) or Darwin's evolution for Leibniz's God, and much of Leibniz's harmonious worldview would rest on a firmer foundation except that, rather than a pre-established harmony, such perfection would be (and is) continuously created through (godless) force and counter force acting on and reacting to each other, providing ever changing states of equilibrium from states of disequilibrium.
Both animal and man have soul but only man has a rational soul and is able to understand, appreciate and reflect the world's underlying perfection. Man's happiness lies in his progress toward degrees of perfection, though Leibniz spins a bit regarding his argument that, in a pre-established, harmonious world consisting of self-contained ("windowless") monads (beings with energy/soul), individuals have free will.
Like Hegel's Absolute Freedom, Leibniz has a capstone to his system and this is God. God is the pervasive presence throughout the world and is the pervasive presence in Leibniz's philosophy. God is the final cause that draws the whole world onto Himself so that everything fits together and has a place, even evil (leads to a higher good).
It is quite a system that Leibniz has constructed and, reflective of his time, it perhaps seemed reasonable enough. Pull God from the capstone position, however, and Leibniz's thought is philosophical and scientific theology. Substitute Schopehauer's Will (Energy) or Darwin's evolution for Leibniz's God, and much of Leibniz's harmonious worldview would rest on a firmer foundation except that, rather than a pre-established harmony, such perfection would be (and is) continuously created through (godless) force and counter force acting on and reacting to each other, providing ever changing states of equilibrium from states of disequilibrium.
April 22, 2012
It is a lot of fun reading Leibniz. He defines his terms well, and is very clear when he speak. His humility and desire to seek truth are evident in the way he writes. This book is well worth the time it takes to not just read it, but examine it and work to understand his philosophy.
January 29, 2022
Leibniz was - and is still - widely considered a mathematical genius (known for independently inventing calculus). This is a collection of his philosophical writings (he didn’t write a main philosophical book... rather, his philosophy is scattered among relatively short published and unpublished essays, notes and correspondence with other thinkers of his time). In it, one can see how his thinking evolved over time, how his prior convictions (one of which being that god exists and he must be benevolent) influenced the course of his thought, and what conclusions he eventually arrived at. It is intriguing to see how, while his conclusions seem very unorthodox, his thinking was highly logical.
One of his interesting conclusions (considering he was a contemporary or Newton, living at the turn of the 18th century) was that matter (i.e. something dimensional and solid/impenetrable) cannot be the primary/fundamental stuff the world/universe is made of. While he accepted that the world needs to be made by small indivisible particles, he reasoned his way into rejecting the atomic theory dominant in his time (the atomic theory, at the time, posited that atoms are tiny bits of matter, each with a particular size and shape). Instead, the primary/fundamental stuff needs to be some form of energy. He eventually coined the term “monad” to describe these smallest/shapeless particles.
Furthermore, in his attempt to find an explanation for the interaction/relation between the consciousness we experience and the material world we observe (our mind and our body), he reached the conclusion that this energy monads consist of need to have some type of perception/awareness/appetite (some kind of soul, so to speak) even if it doesn’t have memory (he considered memory necessary for consciousness to arise: when we are unconscious our sensory organs still work and we may have some type of perception/awareness, but since we can form no memories we have no conscious awareness). The agreement between body and mind (when I stub my toe I subjectively experience pain, and when I decide to I can make the matter in my arm move) cannot be attributed to direct interaction (since there is no way to explain consciousness acting on matter or visa versa): rather, matter and soul must both exist and be harmonized since the universe came to be (or since all eternity, if the universe is eternal).
His monadology is a form of panpsychism, where each monad is connected and experiences the entire universe from its own unique point of view:
“This interconnection our accommodation of all created things to each other, and each to all the others, brings it about that each simple substance has relations that express all the others, and consequently, that each simple substance is a perpetual. Living mirror of the universe.”
“Thus each organizer body of a living being is a kind of divine machine or natural automaton, which infinitely surpasses all artificial automata. For a machine constructed by man’s art is not a machine in each of its parts. For example, the tooth of a brass wheel has parts or fragments which, for us, are no longer artificial things, and no longer have any marks to indicate the machine for whose use the wheel was intended. But natural machines, that is, living bodies, are still machines in their least parts, to infinity. This is the difference between nature and art, that is between divine art and our art.”
“From this we see that there is a world of creatures, of living beings, of animals, of entelechies, of spikes in the least part of matter. Each portion of matter can be conceived as a garden full of plants, and as a pond full of fish. But act branch of a plant, each limb of an animal, each drop of its humors, is still another such garden or pond.”
Beyond drawing the distinction between perception/soul and consciousness (which requires memory), he furthermore drew another distinction on whether a conscious being is able to engage in abstract thought/true reasoning. It is this abstract reasoning that enables humans to self-reflect, and be moral agents.
While it is evident that he didn’t arrive at theism through reason (from his very early writings, he was always a convinced theist), the argument he articulated for the belief in a benevolent God is interesting and has some power:
“This sufficient reason for the existence of the universe cannot be found in the series of continent things [i.e. in the chain of physical causation]. [...] Thus this sufficient reason, which needs no other reason, must be outside this series of contingent things, and must be found in a substance which is its cause, and which is a necessary being, carrying the reason for its existence with itself. Otherwise, we would not yet have a sufficient reason where one could end the series. And this ultimate reason for things is called God.”
“Since this substance is a sufficient reason for all this diversity, which is utterly interconnected, there is only one God, and this God is sufficient.”
“We can also judge that this supreme substance which is unique, universal, and necessary must be incapable of limits and must contain as much reality as is possible, insofar as there is nothing outside it which is independent of it, and insofar as it is a simple consequence of its possible existence.”
“Thus although reason cannot teach us the details of the great future, which are reserved for revelation, reason itself assures us that things are made in a way that surpasses our wishes. Since God is the most perfect and happiest, and consequently, the substance most worthy of love, and since genuinely pure love consists in the state that allows one to take pleasure in the perfections and felicity of the beloved, this love must give us the greatest pleasure of which we are capable whenever God is its object.”
There are issues with Leibniz’s philosophical system, but it is interesting to see how those were explored/improved/solved over the years. Ultimately, the system is incomplete, but it would’ve been interesting to see what he might do with it given more time. It would also have been interesting to see what he could do given our current scientific data (for instance, his view of biology - which was a necessary/integral part of his system - would definitely have to be radically different than it was). Finally, it would’ve been interesting to see where he would end up if he could start from a truly agnostic point of view (possibly closer to Spinoza’s deism - probably a more logically accessible/coherent picture of it, too).
One of his interesting conclusions (considering he was a contemporary or Newton, living at the turn of the 18th century) was that matter (i.e. something dimensional and solid/impenetrable) cannot be the primary/fundamental stuff the world/universe is made of. While he accepted that the world needs to be made by small indivisible particles, he reasoned his way into rejecting the atomic theory dominant in his time (the atomic theory, at the time, posited that atoms are tiny bits of matter, each with a particular size and shape). Instead, the primary/fundamental stuff needs to be some form of energy. He eventually coined the term “monad” to describe these smallest/shapeless particles.
Furthermore, in his attempt to find an explanation for the interaction/relation between the consciousness we experience and the material world we observe (our mind and our body), he reached the conclusion that this energy monads consist of need to have some type of perception/awareness/appetite (some kind of soul, so to speak) even if it doesn’t have memory (he considered memory necessary for consciousness to arise: when we are unconscious our sensory organs still work and we may have some type of perception/awareness, but since we can form no memories we have no conscious awareness). The agreement between body and mind (when I stub my toe I subjectively experience pain, and when I decide to I can make the matter in my arm move) cannot be attributed to direct interaction (since there is no way to explain consciousness acting on matter or visa versa): rather, matter and soul must both exist and be harmonized since the universe came to be (or since all eternity, if the universe is eternal).
His monadology is a form of panpsychism, where each monad is connected and experiences the entire universe from its own unique point of view:
“This interconnection our accommodation of all created things to each other, and each to all the others, brings it about that each simple substance has relations that express all the others, and consequently, that each simple substance is a perpetual. Living mirror of the universe.”
“Thus each organizer body of a living being is a kind of divine machine or natural automaton, which infinitely surpasses all artificial automata. For a machine constructed by man’s art is not a machine in each of its parts. For example, the tooth of a brass wheel has parts or fragments which, for us, are no longer artificial things, and no longer have any marks to indicate the machine for whose use the wheel was intended. But natural machines, that is, living bodies, are still machines in their least parts, to infinity. This is the difference between nature and art, that is between divine art and our art.”
“From this we see that there is a world of creatures, of living beings, of animals, of entelechies, of spikes in the least part of matter. Each portion of matter can be conceived as a garden full of plants, and as a pond full of fish. But act branch of a plant, each limb of an animal, each drop of its humors, is still another such garden or pond.”
Beyond drawing the distinction between perception/soul and consciousness (which requires memory), he furthermore drew another distinction on whether a conscious being is able to engage in abstract thought/true reasoning. It is this abstract reasoning that enables humans to self-reflect, and be moral agents.
While it is evident that he didn’t arrive at theism through reason (from his very early writings, he was always a convinced theist), the argument he articulated for the belief in a benevolent God is interesting and has some power:
“This sufficient reason for the existence of the universe cannot be found in the series of continent things [i.e. in the chain of physical causation]. [...] Thus this sufficient reason, which needs no other reason, must be outside this series of contingent things, and must be found in a substance which is its cause, and which is a necessary being, carrying the reason for its existence with itself. Otherwise, we would not yet have a sufficient reason where one could end the series. And this ultimate reason for things is called God.”
“Since this substance is a sufficient reason for all this diversity, which is utterly interconnected, there is only one God, and this God is sufficient.”
“We can also judge that this supreme substance which is unique, universal, and necessary must be incapable of limits and must contain as much reality as is possible, insofar as there is nothing outside it which is independent of it, and insofar as it is a simple consequence of its possible existence.”
“Thus although reason cannot teach us the details of the great future, which are reserved for revelation, reason itself assures us that things are made in a way that surpasses our wishes. Since God is the most perfect and happiest, and consequently, the substance most worthy of love, and since genuinely pure love consists in the state that allows one to take pleasure in the perfections and felicity of the beloved, this love must give us the greatest pleasure of which we are capable whenever God is its object.”
There are issues with Leibniz’s philosophical system, but it is interesting to see how those were explored/improved/solved over the years. Ultimately, the system is incomplete, but it would’ve been interesting to see what he might do with it given more time. It would also have been interesting to see what he could do given our current scientific data (for instance, his view of biology - which was a necessary/integral part of his system - would definitely have to be radically different than it was). Finally, it would’ve been interesting to see where he would end up if he could start from a truly agnostic point of view (possibly closer to Spinoza’s deism - probably a more logically accessible/coherent picture of it, too).
April 1, 2016
famous for the bizarre 'windowless monad' argument, contained herein. author is otherwise brilliant, independently deriving the calculus. monads are still demerits, though.
July 7, 2025
A great and illuminating selection of Leibniz writings spanning his whole career during which, despite his enormous influence on the coming generations, comprised surprisingly few finished or extensive works.
Leibniz was a man of his time in that the scope of his investigative interests was very large. Aside from his works on theology and metaphysics (from which we may remember the notorious diagnosis that we live in the "best of all possible worlds"), he had a great passion for mathematics and physics – not without results, since his investigations pertaining to binary numbers and differentiation have paved the way for key inventions of modern technology. He was also involved in practical matters: he for instance offered his input on the possible unification of the Protestant and Catholic churches, and drafted a plan of organising a spectacular fair for all kinds of inventions, which in its scope ressembled that of the later World Fairs. His interest was additionally piqued by other cultures and languages and traditions – so an impish observer might call him, all things considered, a veritable anti-Cartesian.
While math and physics are definitely not my forte, I enjoyed a fair bit of these writings, especially the ones that had to do with theodicy (a word most likely coined by Leibniz), logic and metaphysics. Leibniz is adamant about a few principles, for instance that of non-contradiction and sufficient reason, that singular substances or monads are not material, that nothing in nature happens in leaps but rather forms a steady continuum and that God is perfect and especially just and truly worth our worship.
The last one mentioned may seem like yet another result of a boring Christian attribute raffle, but Leibniz treats the matter very consistently. Naturally, his solutions for theodicy don't work at all (the allure of the problem is in how strong minds want to crack an impossible problem without giving up), but he constantly keeps reminds us that since God is perfect, he must have chosen the best of all possible worlds among his preliminary sketches (this was not just a moral stance but also a philosophical one: God must have used the minimal number of building blocks and processes to get a maximum amount of goodness out of it). Since he is just, his current plan cannot be meant for our injustice (emphasising the importance of correction and contrasts). Since he is truly worth our worship, he must have given us free will and made us a world whose structure is nothing but impeccable, for otherwise he would be a despot or simply a bad clockmaker (neither particularly admirable).
In his metaphysical discussions about substances, the nature of space, whether God is natural or supernatural etc. he comes across like a real medieval, being capable of impressive hair-splitting yet at the same time being somewhat bogged down by the distinctions. This comes to a head in his famous correspondence with Samuel Clarke, and it's no wonder that Leibniz – otherwise such a good-natured chap on a genuine quest for truth – begins to lose his cool over Clarke's both perspicacious rebuttals and his prevarication, and finally decides to let out some steam in his last letter:
"I shall at this time reply more amply to clear the difficulties and to test whether the author is willing to listen to reason and to show that he is a lover of truth, or whether he will only quibble without clearing anything."
(This kind of saltiness reminds me of the wonderful "correspondence" between Descartes and Hobbes, where the former virtually dismisses the latter as a contrarian materialist whose counterarguments were not worth the ink.)
There is plenty of interest herein, and the character and genius of Leibniz does definitely come across. My rating reflects primarily my own enjoyment and what I got out of this book. My rewards were mostly in terms of philosophical history and not necessarily personal, and thus I need to withhold a higher score that a more objective view on the nature of this collection would have indubitably granted.
Leibniz was a man of his time in that the scope of his investigative interests was very large. Aside from his works on theology and metaphysics (from which we may remember the notorious diagnosis that we live in the "best of all possible worlds"), he had a great passion for mathematics and physics – not without results, since his investigations pertaining to binary numbers and differentiation have paved the way for key inventions of modern technology. He was also involved in practical matters: he for instance offered his input on the possible unification of the Protestant and Catholic churches, and drafted a plan of organising a spectacular fair for all kinds of inventions, which in its scope ressembled that of the later World Fairs. His interest was additionally piqued by other cultures and languages and traditions – so an impish observer might call him, all things considered, a veritable anti-Cartesian.
While math and physics are definitely not my forte, I enjoyed a fair bit of these writings, especially the ones that had to do with theodicy (a word most likely coined by Leibniz), logic and metaphysics. Leibniz is adamant about a few principles, for instance that of non-contradiction and sufficient reason, that singular substances or monads are not material, that nothing in nature happens in leaps but rather forms a steady continuum and that God is perfect and especially just and truly worth our worship.
The last one mentioned may seem like yet another result of a boring Christian attribute raffle, but Leibniz treats the matter very consistently. Naturally, his solutions for theodicy don't work at all (the allure of the problem is in how strong minds want to crack an impossible problem without giving up), but he constantly keeps reminds us that since God is perfect, he must have chosen the best of all possible worlds among his preliminary sketches (this was not just a moral stance but also a philosophical one: God must have used the minimal number of building blocks and processes to get a maximum amount of goodness out of it). Since he is just, his current plan cannot be meant for our injustice (emphasising the importance of correction and contrasts). Since he is truly worth our worship, he must have given us free will and made us a world whose structure is nothing but impeccable, for otherwise he would be a despot or simply a bad clockmaker (neither particularly admirable).
In his metaphysical discussions about substances, the nature of space, whether God is natural or supernatural etc. he comes across like a real medieval, being capable of impressive hair-splitting yet at the same time being somewhat bogged down by the distinctions. This comes to a head in his famous correspondence with Samuel Clarke, and it's no wonder that Leibniz – otherwise such a good-natured chap on a genuine quest for truth – begins to lose his cool over Clarke's both perspicacious rebuttals and his prevarication, and finally decides to let out some steam in his last letter:
"I shall at this time reply more amply to clear the difficulties and to test whether the author is willing to listen to reason and to show that he is a lover of truth, or whether he will only quibble without clearing anything."
(This kind of saltiness reminds me of the wonderful "correspondence" between Descartes and Hobbes, where the former virtually dismisses the latter as a contrarian materialist whose counterarguments were not worth the ink.)
There is plenty of interest herein, and the character and genius of Leibniz does definitely come across. My rating reflects primarily my own enjoyment and what I got out of this book. My rewards were mostly in terms of philosophical history and not necessarily personal, and thus I need to withhold a higher score that a more objective view on the nature of this collection would have indubitably granted.
August 30, 2020
Leibniz is an uneven reading experience for me. His principle of sufficient reason, effusive piety, and faith in compossibility are unfashionable at the least. His long digressions into subtle epistemological distinctions are completely uninteresting to me. BUT, Leibniz's exposition of the nature of monads is absolutely fascinating. Getting a view of this beautiful, multi-faceted concept was totally worth skipping around all the other stuff I found to be chaff.
April 6, 2018
important shorter works of Leibniz's philosophical corpus, which are edited and translated by Garber and Ariew. Some of the more important works featured in this collection are the "Monadology," and "Discourse on Metaphysics," and "On Nature Itself".
March 7, 2012
My rating is based more on the fact that I think Leibniz's theory of monadism is fascinating than anything else. It seems so simple - and so crazy - on the surface, yet some of the complexities of it make me wonder a little. I still don't subscribe to it, even after several weeks of discussion (really, professor?) on it in my modern philosophy course, but it provokes some interesting thought experiments.
March 17, 2019
What an interesting read! Because of our modern day knowledge of atoms and because nothing works perfectly, I don't think his concept of monads would work but it was interesting to think about that perhaps these perfect monads worked before the Fall and atoms are part of a new broken world. Also, I found his discussion on the connection between mind and body interesting since it was quite different from Socrates' teachings.
July 10, 2007
All hail the monad!
June 8, 2026
Leibniz was part of the philosophical tradition struggling under the impact of Descartes. Descartes intended to restart philosophical thinking by reevaulating the starting point. He used his methodical doubt to strip away any uncertain or unclearly grounded knowledge and worked his way back up to the existence of the world and of God. Along the way, he posited a distinction between the material and the spiritual with an attempt to reunite the two principles that most agree was not successful. Subsequent philosophers tried to sort out the problem of what's really real--the material or the spiritual, or some way to combine both. Leibniz's solution was monads.
For Leibniz, reality is made up of simple substances and compound substances. Each compound substance is an aggregate of simple substances. The simple substances (monads) are indivisible parts of reality that are therefore unchangeable (they have no parts to move around or rearrange) and eternal (they cannot be destroyed). They are not just particles of matter, they have a force or power in them. They can be the forms or souls in things, the principle that makes the compounds what they are (so they are like Aristotle's forms). They also contain the potential for everything, since the whole history of the monad and what it will be a part of is already in it. In modern parlance, the macrocosm is contained in the microcosm. Leibniz works out a lot of consequences from this system about the nature of the world and of God.
While he crafts an interesting philosophical system, it's hard to see that it represents reality accurately. The monads are simple and indivisible but they are distinct from each other and also have at least the potential of being any other thing. Nothing every really dies, the monad that was the soul of the person or animal continues on and may re-aggregate again. God exists outside this system but He created it and sustains it in existence. Since God is good and intelligent, the world is the best one possible and is coherent and comprehensible. The idea does not present the real world as most people know it. I found his system interesting but ultimately unhelpful.
Mildly recommended--this is more for people interested in the history of philosophy.
For Leibniz, reality is made up of simple substances and compound substances. Each compound substance is an aggregate of simple substances. The simple substances (monads) are indivisible parts of reality that are therefore unchangeable (they have no parts to move around or rearrange) and eternal (they cannot be destroyed). They are not just particles of matter, they have a force or power in them. They can be the forms or souls in things, the principle that makes the compounds what they are (so they are like Aristotle's forms). They also contain the potential for everything, since the whole history of the monad and what it will be a part of is already in it. In modern parlance, the macrocosm is contained in the microcosm. Leibniz works out a lot of consequences from this system about the nature of the world and of God.
While he crafts an interesting philosophical system, it's hard to see that it represents reality accurately. The monads are simple and indivisible but they are distinct from each other and also have at least the potential of being any other thing. Nothing every really dies, the monad that was the soul of the person or animal continues on and may re-aggregate again. God exists outside this system but He created it and sustains it in existence. Since God is good and intelligent, the world is the best one possible and is coherent and comprehensible. The idea does not present the real world as most people know it. I found his system interesting but ultimately unhelpful.
Mildly recommended--this is more for people interested in the history of philosophy.
December 16, 2018
Going to read his responses to Locke and Berkeley after I read them, but read pretty much all the other sections other than skimming some of the more purely physics parts. Leibniz's integration of physics/metaphysics and belief in the necessity of both is compelling, but I'm not sure his fundamental metaphysical theories of monads, forces, etc seems like a persuasive vision compatible with modern science (unless I'm misunderstanding, which is certainly possible because it is fairly difficult to follow). I enjoy seeing the way he brings mathematical rigor to his philosophy, and some of the more linguistic/semiotic musings are brilliant. I found his thoughts on free will hard to parse but they seemed possibly more sophisticated and compelling than pretty much anyone else I've encountered. My biggest problem was anthropomorphized his God was, and I tend to side with Spinoza/Descartes on the notion of final causes (that they don't exist). His critique of Descartes' mind/body dualism seemed pretty spot on, and his concept of "synchronization" is well articulated and fits within modern science. Also some interesting reflections on the origins of creation which I thought were interesting even if not apparently applicable. His breadth and rigor of thought is amazing, but I enjoyed him less than others because he is a bit denser (more purely mathematical), didn't have as fun a moral vision as Spinoza (or as sensible a metaphysics in my opinion), and while I agree with many of his critiques of Descartes I enjoyed Descartes' writing about philosophy more and could more easily see its historical significance. Interested to read more about contentions with his thought / what is generally considered to be most significant.
June 12, 2025
If one could summarize Leibniz's philosophy, it would likely be a counterpose to Nietzsche's:
"God is alive."
Somewhat off the beaten path, I more read this for my personal edification of German philosophy rather than for my more Marxist studies (though of course Leibniz is still an important figure in the Kant-Hegel-Marx chain). Although I very much related to Leibniz and parts of his philosophy, the second part (where he talks about his contemporaries) will only be relevant for people who are philosophy majors who want to trace the full canon of western philosophical thought. Otherwise, much of it has to do with outdated physics and philosophy that Kant later crushed (along with many other metaphysical schools of thought he rendered obsolete or redundant).
The book has Leibniz's Monadology in it, which is probably his crowning achievement in philosophy. Interestingly enough, his Monadology seems to be very similar to Schopenhauer's will, though of course their outlooks on life in general as being pure Christian optimism and pure pantheistic pessimism are completely different, with a small wrinkle, while everything in Schopenhauer's system possesses one and the same will, Leibniz's monads exist in everything and are completely distinct. The value of the essays before in my opinion is how Leibniz traces his thoughts towards the Monadology, and I will also be reading a more extensive analysis on it that should be more enjoyable for a casual reader.
One can also see Leibniz's influence on Kant, with his "thing in itself" somewhat taking the place of monads while Kant making use of Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason in explaining his own metaphysics.
"God is alive."
Somewhat off the beaten path, I more read this for my personal edification of German philosophy rather than for my more Marxist studies (though of course Leibniz is still an important figure in the Kant-Hegel-Marx chain). Although I very much related to Leibniz and parts of his philosophy, the second part (where he talks about his contemporaries) will only be relevant for people who are philosophy majors who want to trace the full canon of western philosophical thought. Otherwise, much of it has to do with outdated physics and philosophy that Kant later crushed (along with many other metaphysical schools of thought he rendered obsolete or redundant).
The book has Leibniz's Monadology in it, which is probably his crowning achievement in philosophy. Interestingly enough, his Monadology seems to be very similar to Schopenhauer's will, though of course their outlooks on life in general as being pure Christian optimism and pure pantheistic pessimism are completely different, with a small wrinkle, while everything in Schopenhauer's system possesses one and the same will, Leibniz's monads exist in everything and are completely distinct. The value of the essays before in my opinion is how Leibniz traces his thoughts towards the Monadology, and I will also be reading a more extensive analysis on it that should be more enjoyable for a casual reader.
One can also see Leibniz's influence on Kant, with his "thing in itself" somewhat taking the place of monads while Kant making use of Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason in explaining his own metaphysics.
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November 22, 2024Leibniz has the most beautiful writing out of the rationalists. I seriously recommend reading the Monadology—a very strange yet creative work that, I think, kicks off idealism in Germany and is worthy of being among the classics of Western philosophy. Also, the Discourse of Metaphysics is wonderful. Reading any biography of Leibniz will surely lay the unbearable weight of his genius onto the reader. Despite being the most challenging and probably my least favourite of the big three (Descartes and Spinoza), he's worth reading and will hold a soft spot for me.
Here's a great quote from the Monadology:
“Each portion of matter may be conceived as a garden full of plants, and as a pond full of fish. But each branch of a plant, each limb of an animal, each drop of its humours, is also such a garden or such a pond.
And although the earth and the air interspersed between the plants in the garden, or the water interspersed between the fish in the pond, are not themselves plant or fish, yet they still contain them, though more often than not of a subtlety imperceptible to us.
Thus there is nothing uncultivated, nothing sterile, nothing dead in the universe, no chaos, no confusions, except in appearance. This is somewhat like what is apparent with a pond viewed from a distance, in which we see a confused motion and swarming of the pond’s fish without making out the fish themselves.”
Here's a great quote from the Monadology:
“Each portion of matter may be conceived as a garden full of plants, and as a pond full of fish. But each branch of a plant, each limb of an animal, each drop of its humours, is also such a garden or such a pond.
And although the earth and the air interspersed between the plants in the garden, or the water interspersed between the fish in the pond, are not themselves plant or fish, yet they still contain them, though more often than not of a subtlety imperceptible to us.
Thus there is nothing uncultivated, nothing sterile, nothing dead in the universe, no chaos, no confusions, except in appearance. This is somewhat like what is apparent with a pond viewed from a distance, in which we see a confused motion and swarming of the pond’s fish without making out the fish themselves.”
May 16, 2020
I have started reading this about a week ago in order to prepare myself for Kant. It's an interesting read if you are into metaphysics and a new definition for how to-day human percieves concept of God. I also loved his essay on Monads. However, the only caveat are the letters. If you want to have a full experience, read them by all means, but they are merely commentary on his main phisolophical points and dont contain any additional value considering they comprise about half of the book.
January 21, 2025
musze sie tutaj zgodzic z Kantem, nic dziwniejszego nie czytałam. monady snia mi sie po nocach do dzisiaj. dlaczego oceniam to na 2 gwiazdki, a nie na jedna otoz uwazam to za pewne osiagniecie napisanie takiego bullshitu. gdybym byla kantem tez za punkt honoru postawilabym sobie obalenie go. lepiej przeczytac arystotelesa. naprawde ciezko o druga taka pozycje, jedyne co bym mogla do tego przyrownac to hegla
June 19, 2025
This man is one of the most intelligent philosophers in the catalogue. He attempts to systematize reality with God as the ultimate being, as was the day, and harmonize it with scientific and mathematic grounding. Overall, I am much too ignorant to judge such a work. I cannot say I enjoyed the read, but I will attempt to grasp some of the concepts again perhaps. Would recommend to those interested in the genre.
June 5, 2018
It was alright back in college. It never gelled with me due to his abundant optimism and faith in the unknown reaches of the world's "design." What's the point in philosophizing if all is as it should be?
Perhaps reading Voltaire's "Candide" prior has skewed my view...no, it's Leibniz that is silly. If only he'd met Nietzsche.
Perhaps reading Voltaire's "Candide" prior has skewed my view...no, it's Leibniz that is silly. If only he'd met Nietzsche.
January 2, 2020
I first read most of this volume while in a graduate school class on the Rationalists a quarter century ago. This time I re-read the Discourse on Metaphysics, the Monadology, and a some other essays. I wasn't quite as intrigued by Leibniz this time around as last time. The Monadology is far more interesting than the Discourse.
October 30, 2020
3/5
There's not much to say about Leibniz, other than that I hardly understood him. There's just something about Rationalist thinkers that I can't resonate with, excluding Descartes' Discourse and Meditations. I can read Leibniz, and this applies to Spinoza as well, but I can never grasp it. In class, we would go over specific sections of his argument, literally a single sentence. We would finally understand it but lose it when moving to the next. I really can't wait for how Philosophers after Leibniz interpret and criticize his work because maybe that might help me finally get what he's doing.
There's not much to say about Leibniz, other than that I hardly understood him. There's just something about Rationalist thinkers that I can't resonate with, excluding Descartes' Discourse and Meditations. I can read Leibniz, and this applies to Spinoza as well, but I can never grasp it. In class, we would go over specific sections of his argument, literally a single sentence. We would finally understand it but lose it when moving to the next. I really can't wait for how Philosophers after Leibniz interpret and criticize his work because maybe that might help me finally get what he's doing.
February 3, 2022
Leibniz is for me, a learned mathematical imagination, in each of his texts you can find the perfect logical argumentation coupled with a wonderful imagination that expresses some metaphorical images, even poetic. This book is a wonderful example, as it compiles the most suggestive and powerful themes of the Hanoverian philosopher, from charateristica universalis to the principles of nature and grace, read this book only if you want to understand the universe.
March 21, 2023
Leibniz is unfortunately not that important in the grand scheme of things as he was never able to publish a full book. However, this is a fun read especially when comparing with other more influential philosophers and their thought. The monadology stands out as probably the best text to read to understand his thought.
September 28, 2023
Leibniz was too Christian to consider some philosophical problems. It seems that it made a bad excuse to avoid wrestling with philosophical difficulties. So literally it is a kind of deus ex machina! I think if he were in an age that Christian influence have become weak as ours, he would do more important works. That is unfortunate.
February 7, 2026
"Så ingår i den verkande orsaken till denna skrift en otalig mängd av rörelser och kroppsställningar från förfluten och närvarande tid, och likaledes ingår i ändamålsorsaken eller avsikten med min skrift en oändlig mängd av små böjelser och dispositioner i min själ ur det förflutna och det närvarande"
October 28, 2021
A pretty interesting book overall. The arguments, partly because of how old they are, can be easy to misinterpret, and I can imagine some people dismissing them out of hand simply because he talks about God, but they’re worth considering
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