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Project Azorian: The CIA and the Raising of the K-129
In early August 1974, despite incredible risks and after six years of secret preparations, the CIA attempted to salvage the sunken Soviet ballistic missile submarine K-129 from the depths of the North Pacific Ocean. The audacious effort was undertaken with the cover of an undersea mining operation sponsored by eccentric billionaire Howard Hughes.
"Azorian"--incorrectly identified as Project Jennifer by the press--was the most ambitious ocean engineering endeavor attempted by man. Following the accidental sinking of a Soviet missile submarine in March 1968, U.S. intelligence agencies were able to determine the precise location and to develop a means of raising the submarine from a depth of 16,400 feet. The remarkable salvage effort of the K-129, which contained nuclear-armed torpedoes and one nuclear tipped missile as well as crypto equipment, was conducted with Soviet naval ships a few hundred yards from the lift ship, the Hughes Glomar Explorer .
The book is based, in part, on the research for Michael White' documentary film Azorian: The Raising of the K-129 , released in late 2009. The research for the book and the documentary forced the CIA to issue a brief report on Project Azorian in early 2010, with one-third of the document redacted.
"Azorian"--incorrectly identified as Project Jennifer by the press--was the most ambitious ocean engineering endeavor attempted by man. Following the accidental sinking of a Soviet missile submarine in March 1968, U.S. intelligence agencies were able to determine the precise location and to develop a means of raising the submarine from a depth of 16,400 feet. The remarkable salvage effort of the K-129, which contained nuclear-armed torpedoes and one nuclear tipped missile as well as crypto equipment, was conducted with Soviet naval ships a few hundred yards from the lift ship, the Hughes Glomar Explorer .
The book is based, in part, on the research for Michael White' documentary film Azorian: The Raising of the K-129 , released in late 2009. The research for the book and the documentary forced the CIA to issue a brief report on Project Azorian in early 2010, with one-third of the document redacted.
264 pages, Paperback
First published November 15, 2010
38 people are currently reading
436 people want to read
About the author
Norman Polmar
75 books21 followersNorman Polmar is an author specializing in the naval, aviation, and intelligence areas.
He has led major projects for the United States Department of Defense and the United States Navy, and foreign governments. His professional expertise has served three Secretaries of the U.S. Navy and two Chiefs of Naval Operations. He is credited with 50 published books, including nine previous editions of Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet and four editions of Guide to the Soviet Navy. Polmar writes a column for Proceedings and was editor of the United States and several other sections of the annual publications of Janes Fighting Ships.
In 2019, the Naval Historical Foundation awarded Polmar the Commodore Dudley W. Knox Naval History Lifetime Achievement Award.
He has led major projects for the United States Department of Defense and the United States Navy, and foreign governments. His professional expertise has served three Secretaries of the U.S. Navy and two Chiefs of Naval Operations. He is credited with 50 published books, including nine previous editions of Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet and four editions of Guide to the Soviet Navy. Polmar writes a column for Proceedings and was editor of the United States and several other sections of the annual publications of Janes Fighting Ships.
In 2019, the Naval Historical Foundation awarded Polmar the Commodore Dudley W. Knox Naval History Lifetime Achievement Award.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 48 reviews
May 26, 2018
A detailed documentation of an historic CIA cover-up. However it's only for the reader with a high interest in CIA history, submarine technology or the Cold War. Otherwise a dry read, as it lacks the suspense and action of a Tom Clancy novel...
February 21, 2019
Heavy on details, short on answers to the main questions: Why specifically did the CIA invest so much money on such a dangerous (physically and politically) adventure, trying to raise the lost Soviet nuclear submarine K-129? A lot of guesses, not only from the author, who has obviously done a lot of legwork in chasing down information from unnamed well-placed sources, but also from those sources and officials from the various three-letter agencies (CIA, DIA, NSA, NRO, etc.), as well as White House staffers. There's a lot of declassified information seeing the light of day here for the first time, and one suspects that conversations with former spooks were conducted beyond the appropriate confines of pre-publication review. That means, yeah, I suspect there are things in here that those same three-letter agencies would have preferred to stay underwater, so to speak.
This was a pleasure to read.
This was a pleasure to read.
April 1, 2012
I knew the story from several books, but this is the definitive book-length treatment of it, which purports to correct errors in several earlier books. Shortly after midnight on February 25, 1968, the Soviet submarine K-129 left on a patrol from a submarine base on the Kamchatka peninsula, to be ready to attack Hawaii with missiles should the order come. On February 26, it sent a radio signal to the base saying it was all right; this was the last it was heard from. When K-129 failed to radio the base for some time, it was presumed lost; many Soviet naval vessels searched an area of the North Pacific equal to a quarter of the United States, to no avail, so on May 5 memorial services were held for the dead sailors. This search was so conspicuous that of course the Americans were aware of it, and the fact that it was done over a wide area showed to the Americans that the Soviets had no idea where the submarine was. The United States had a network of hydrophones all over the Pacific listening to nuclear tests. Five of these hydrophones showed two loud sounds within 6 minutes of each other around midnight on March 8; so did a hydrophone belonging to a US Navy cable laying ship. The origin of the two sounds was triangulated to a place near the 40th parallel and the 180th meridian. On July 15, 1968 the American special operations submarine USS Halibut sailed out to find the wreck. Once at the destination, it set up a grid of sonobuoys and started scanning the ocean bed by a remote-controlled submarine drone with a camera and strobe lights. At an unnamed date probably in August, 1968, the drone did find the sunken submarine! It was lying on the seafloor broken in two, and there was massive damage to the submarine's sail. Two of the submarine's three ballistic missiles were gone, but the third one was intact.
The CIA thought that it was a golden opportunity to recover the front half of the submarine and study Soviet missiles, fire control system and cryptographic equipment. This was patently illegal; by the law of the sea, a shipwreck belongs to the owner of the ship, in this case the Soviet Navy; yet illegality has never stopped the CIA. There has never been a recovery of an object so large from the depth of 16,000 feet, so new technology had to be invented. A special ship over 600 feet long, the Hughes Glomar Explorer, was built by Howard Hughes ostensibly for mining the seafloor for manganese. In the middle of the ship there was a pool with gates opening down. It held a giant claw weighing over 2,000 tons that was supposed to be lowered 3 miles down on a string of pipes, clasp the part of the submarine, and be raised. Because the claw was secret, it was transported to the pool under water by a specially built submersible barge, which was later used to transport Lockheed's stealth ship. On July 4, 1974, the ship arrived at the spot and started working. It found the submarine again, and on July 31, lowered the claw, and grasped the front half. On August 1, it started raising it. However, the seafloor proved harder than expected, and the steel in the claw more fragile in the frigid waters 6 miles below than expected, so when it was being raised, several of the claw's fingers broke off, and the pieces of the submarine they held dropped down, leaving only the front 38 feet of the submarine. What precisely it contained remains classified, but it did have bodies of six sailors, who were buried at sea with full military honors.
The Soviets, who were watching the Hughes Glomar Explorer all the time from a tug, got wind of the true purpose of the operation. In December, 1974, the Soviet naval attaché told a US Navy captain, "If you go back there it would mean war;" the captain told an admiral about it. Several American newspapers broke the story. Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin wrote a note of protest. So the plans to come back with a scoop instead of a claw never materialized. The whole project cost about $500 million. In contrast, at about the same time the Apollo program, with its six successful Moon landings and one aborted one, cost $24 billion. The answer to the question, whether this expense was justified, or would be if the entire front half of the K-129 were raised, is classified, but given the rapid progress in Soviet submarines and missiles at the time, the probable answer is, No. Nonetheless, it was an amazing feat of engineering!
There are several conspiracy theories about the sinking of the K-129, but the book claims that they are all false. The authors think that due to mistakes during an exercise, the launch sequences of two missiles were initiated; safeguards prevented an unauthorized launch, but the heat and noxious exhaust gases killed the crew of the submarine.
The CIA thought that it was a golden opportunity to recover the front half of the submarine and study Soviet missiles, fire control system and cryptographic equipment. This was patently illegal; by the law of the sea, a shipwreck belongs to the owner of the ship, in this case the Soviet Navy; yet illegality has never stopped the CIA. There has never been a recovery of an object so large from the depth of 16,000 feet, so new technology had to be invented. A special ship over 600 feet long, the Hughes Glomar Explorer, was built by Howard Hughes ostensibly for mining the seafloor for manganese. In the middle of the ship there was a pool with gates opening down. It held a giant claw weighing over 2,000 tons that was supposed to be lowered 3 miles down on a string of pipes, clasp the part of the submarine, and be raised. Because the claw was secret, it was transported to the pool under water by a specially built submersible barge, which was later used to transport Lockheed's stealth ship. On July 4, 1974, the ship arrived at the spot and started working. It found the submarine again, and on July 31, lowered the claw, and grasped the front half. On August 1, it started raising it. However, the seafloor proved harder than expected, and the steel in the claw more fragile in the frigid waters 6 miles below than expected, so when it was being raised, several of the claw's fingers broke off, and the pieces of the submarine they held dropped down, leaving only the front 38 feet of the submarine. What precisely it contained remains classified, but it did have bodies of six sailors, who were buried at sea with full military honors.
The Soviets, who were watching the Hughes Glomar Explorer all the time from a tug, got wind of the true purpose of the operation. In December, 1974, the Soviet naval attaché told a US Navy captain, "If you go back there it would mean war;" the captain told an admiral about it. Several American newspapers broke the story. Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin wrote a note of protest. So the plans to come back with a scoop instead of a claw never materialized. The whole project cost about $500 million. In contrast, at about the same time the Apollo program, with its six successful Moon landings and one aborted one, cost $24 billion. The answer to the question, whether this expense was justified, or would be if the entire front half of the K-129 were raised, is classified, but given the rapid progress in Soviet submarines and missiles at the time, the probable answer is, No. Nonetheless, it was an amazing feat of engineering!
There are several conspiracy theories about the sinking of the K-129, but the book claims that they are all false. The authors think that due to mistakes during an exercise, the launch sequences of two missiles were initiated; safeguards prevented an unauthorized launch, but the heat and noxious exhaust gases killed the crew of the submarine.
February 10, 2023
"The bubble burst on Friday morning, February 7, 1975, with a front page story in the Los Angeles Times revealing that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had salvaged a sunken Soviet missile submarine." So begins the fascinating account of the attempt to raise the K-129, a Russian submarine that had disappeared in 1968.
The Russian submarine K-219 left its home base and then disappeared somewhere near the Hawaiian Islands. In a spectacular feat of engineering and spy craft, the Navy working with Hughes Aircraft designed a special ship, in the guise of a deep sea mining project, to retrieve the sunken Russian sub that was lying on the bottom 16,000 feet below the surface. How they did it boggles the mind.
The K-129 was a Golf II diesel-electric sub carrying nuclear weapons. The CIA knew exactly where it sank thanks to the Halibut (https://www.goodreads.com/review/edit...) . The CIA was anxious to get it’s hands on one of those nuclear tipped missiles and any codebooks or other secret documents that might have been on the sub. Just one problem; it sank in 16,000 feet of water. In order to help hide what they were doing, the CIA contracted with Hughes, famed for concocting bizarre schemes, to design and build the Hughes Glomar Explorer ostensibly a deep sea mining ship. The plan was to use 16,000 feet of pipe connected to an enormous grappling hook to grab the forward part of the sub and raise it into a specially designed “moon pool”, as it was called, part of the ship open to the sea, to prevent anyone from seeing what they were up to. Josh Dean*** in his book on the project described it in these terms: "Imagine standing atop the Empire State Building with an 8-foot-wide grappling hook on a 1-inch-diameter steel rope. Your task is to lower the hook to the street below, snag a compact car full of gold, and lift the car back to the top of the building. On top of that, the job has to be done without anyone noticing.”
In a review of Polmar’s book by the Naval Historical Foundation, Captain James Bryant write that Polmar told him it was a very difficult book to write because 90% of what he knew was incorrect. “Bruce Rule** was the leading acoustic analyst for the Office of Naval Intelligence for 42 years. In May 1968, the Navy took the acoustic data and compartmentalized it so that not even the Navy’s experts could review it. Consequently, it was not until 2009 – forty-one years after the event – that Bruce’s analysis of the data from open sources determined that the K-129 was lost when two ballistic missiles’ rocket motors fired, melted the launch tubes and filled the boat with burning exhaust. This book gives details of the probable causes.”*
Of course, the sinking gave rise to all sorts of conspiracy theories. John Craven who had been very involved with the Halibut —among others like Kenneth Sewell—came to believe that the K-129 was in the process of launching a nuclear-tipped missile against Hawaii at the time of the submarine’s “explosion” and sinking. Palomar deals with this view in Chapter 11.
*https://www.navyhistory.org/2011/09/b...
** Regarding Bruce Rule’s role, Mr. Role wrote a comment on the review by Capt. Bryant. I quote in full:
In his excellent review of “Project AZORIAN, the CIA and the Raising of the K-129,” CAPT Jim Bryant discusses this writer’s analysis of acoustic detections of the loss of the K-129 first completed in 2009 because the Navy compartmentalized the acoustic data so that not even their own experts at the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) could analyze it.
I thank CAPT Bryant for his acknowledgment of my analysis; however, the basic conclusion (two R-21 missiles fired within the K-129 for 96-seconds each with ignition separated by 361-seconds) was so straight-forward (obvious) that it took less than an hour to come to that conclusion.
There were at least six acoustic analysts at ONI in 1968 who could have derived that assessment with the same facility. Such was the dark side of the Navy’s obsessive compartmentalization which prevented those involved in the approval of the AZORIAN recovery effort from knowing that the area within the K-129 from which they hoped to recovery crypto-equipment and associated documents had been exposed to 5000-degree (F) missile exhaust plumes for more than three-minutes.
Bruce Rule
Louisville, KY
14 September 2011
Those interested in irony will find it in https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reb.... Note the similarity between 129 and 219. See also In feindlichen Gewässern. Das Ende von K-219 by Peter Hutchhausen.
***https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/3...
The Russian submarine K-219 left its home base and then disappeared somewhere near the Hawaiian Islands. In a spectacular feat of engineering and spy craft, the Navy working with Hughes Aircraft designed a special ship, in the guise of a deep sea mining project, to retrieve the sunken Russian sub that was lying on the bottom 16,000 feet below the surface. How they did it boggles the mind.
The K-129 was a Golf II diesel-electric sub carrying nuclear weapons. The CIA knew exactly where it sank thanks to the Halibut (https://www.goodreads.com/review/edit...) . The CIA was anxious to get it’s hands on one of those nuclear tipped missiles and any codebooks or other secret documents that might have been on the sub. Just one problem; it sank in 16,000 feet of water. In order to help hide what they were doing, the CIA contracted with Hughes, famed for concocting bizarre schemes, to design and build the Hughes Glomar Explorer ostensibly a deep sea mining ship. The plan was to use 16,000 feet of pipe connected to an enormous grappling hook to grab the forward part of the sub and raise it into a specially designed “moon pool”, as it was called, part of the ship open to the sea, to prevent anyone from seeing what they were up to. Josh Dean*** in his book on the project described it in these terms: "Imagine standing atop the Empire State Building with an 8-foot-wide grappling hook on a 1-inch-diameter steel rope. Your task is to lower the hook to the street below, snag a compact car full of gold, and lift the car back to the top of the building. On top of that, the job has to be done without anyone noticing.”
In a review of Polmar’s book by the Naval Historical Foundation, Captain James Bryant write that Polmar told him it was a very difficult book to write because 90% of what he knew was incorrect. “Bruce Rule** was the leading acoustic analyst for the Office of Naval Intelligence for 42 years. In May 1968, the Navy took the acoustic data and compartmentalized it so that not even the Navy’s experts could review it. Consequently, it was not until 2009 – forty-one years after the event – that Bruce’s analysis of the data from open sources determined that the K-129 was lost when two ballistic missiles’ rocket motors fired, melted the launch tubes and filled the boat with burning exhaust. This book gives details of the probable causes.”*
Of course, the sinking gave rise to all sorts of conspiracy theories. John Craven who had been very involved with the Halibut —among others like Kenneth Sewell—came to believe that the K-129 was in the process of launching a nuclear-tipped missile against Hawaii at the time of the submarine’s “explosion” and sinking. Palomar deals with this view in Chapter 11.
*https://www.navyhistory.org/2011/09/b...
** Regarding Bruce Rule’s role, Mr. Role wrote a comment on the review by Capt. Bryant. I quote in full:
In his excellent review of “Project AZORIAN, the CIA and the Raising of the K-129,” CAPT Jim Bryant discusses this writer’s analysis of acoustic detections of the loss of the K-129 first completed in 2009 because the Navy compartmentalized the acoustic data so that not even their own experts at the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) could analyze it.
I thank CAPT Bryant for his acknowledgment of my analysis; however, the basic conclusion (two R-21 missiles fired within the K-129 for 96-seconds each with ignition separated by 361-seconds) was so straight-forward (obvious) that it took less than an hour to come to that conclusion.
There were at least six acoustic analysts at ONI in 1968 who could have derived that assessment with the same facility. Such was the dark side of the Navy’s obsessive compartmentalization which prevented those involved in the approval of the AZORIAN recovery effort from knowing that the area within the K-129 from which they hoped to recovery crypto-equipment and associated documents had been exposed to 5000-degree (F) missile exhaust plumes for more than three-minutes.
Bruce Rule
Louisville, KY
14 September 2011
Those interested in irony will find it in https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reb.... Note the similarity between 129 and 219. See also In feindlichen Gewässern. Das Ende von K-219 by Peter Hutchhausen.
***https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/3...
January 9, 2019
I found this quite interesting although I knew the basic details of the project from other readings. I think this is about as an authoritative book as we'll ever see on Project Azorian. I can't think of anyone who could do this more thoroughly than Norman Polmer, which is why I bought the book. I like how he debunks some of the wilder accounts of the project found in other books.
May 10, 2024
This is an amazing Cold War story that I enjoyed learning more about. It appears to be definitive account of what is known, including addressing some conspiracy theories and other published accounts. However, it is very dry technical reading, and Polmar made little effort to make a compelling narrative, very much "just the facts." Recommended only for patient and serious naval/history buffs.
February 19, 2025
Very fact-focused - lots of dates and time-stamped play-by-play, as well as details about things like the engineering and the corporate entities that were involved. I thought that was great, but probably not everyone's cup of tea. If you're looking for something more narrative, check out Blind Man's Bluff.
September 26, 2017
Highly credible; Norman Polmar is among the most authorities authors on submarine technology.
March 1, 2018
Well written, readable yet meticulously detailed.
September 13, 2018
Terrific book - wonderful complement to any reading/research about the entire operation.
May 10, 2019
Very technical in places, but a great read. Polmar offers an insight into the lives of the crew of K-129, a very nice touch.
February 6, 2020
Fantastic level of detail of the whole operation. Geeky pleasure.
June 16, 2020
Very factual. Audiobook was a little dry, but the story is still great!
March 29, 2021
An excellently sourced and incredibly thorough telling of one of the most amazing engineering accomplishments and intelligence operations in American history.
April 9, 2021
As Col. Klink (from "Hogan's Heroes") would say; "very interesting!".
September 27, 2023
The 4 stars is more about the story than the writing. Great research, cool story. Writing wasn't bad but nothing spectacular
June 19, 2024
A fascinating history of a truly audacious project
July 31, 2024
Interesting read, in places a bit too complicated which makes it hard to picture what you're reading.
April 24, 2025
Good read if you're into U.S. naval history and conspiracy.
July 25, 2023
Detailed discussion on the fate of the Russian Submarine K-129 and the effort by the USA to raise it.
April 6, 2012
During the Cold War, the United States Navy and Central Intelligence Agency partnered on intelligence collection deep beneath the waves. Operations including silently trailing Soviet submarines and tapping into underwater telephone cables as described by Sherry Sontag and Christopher Drew in their book, Blind Man's Bluff: The Untold Story of American Submarine Espionage. They introduced the most technologically challenging operation of the Cold War, the raising of the downed Soviet submarine, K-129. Norman Polmar and Michael White discuss this operation in greater detail in a book and companion documentary that focuses on the subject entitled Project Azorian: The CIA and the Raising of the K-129.
The whole project includes three major steps. First, find K-129 and determine if its condition was such that it could be salvaged in order to obtain intelligence in the form of details about Soviet submarine design, construction of nuclear weapons, and codebooks or other cryptological material. USS Halibut, an intelligence asset employed underwater cameras to pinpoint K-129s location three miles below the ocean surface. The photos revealed that the sub was salvageable. Next, a ship needed to be constructed that could raise the submarine. The bulk of Project Azorian describes in interesting detail the planning and construction of the Hughes Glomar Explorer, complete with lifting cables, a capture vehicle, and a “moon pool” to house the submarine once retrieved. Howard Hughes allowed one of his corporations to act as a front for the U.S. government to at least reduce Soviet suspicion of the ship’s actual mission. Publicly, Glomar Explorer was trying to mine the ocean floor for manganese. Finally, the submarine and its contents were analyzed to derive as much intelligence value as possible.
By highlighting this whole effort, Project Azorian serves as an important book on Cold War history. It is recommended for intelligence analysts and sailors alike as well as any fan of engineering marvels.
The whole project includes three major steps. First, find K-129 and determine if its condition was such that it could be salvaged in order to obtain intelligence in the form of details about Soviet submarine design, construction of nuclear weapons, and codebooks or other cryptological material. USS Halibut, an intelligence asset employed underwater cameras to pinpoint K-129s location three miles below the ocean surface. The photos revealed that the sub was salvageable. Next, a ship needed to be constructed that could raise the submarine. The bulk of Project Azorian describes in interesting detail the planning and construction of the Hughes Glomar Explorer, complete with lifting cables, a capture vehicle, and a “moon pool” to house the submarine once retrieved. Howard Hughes allowed one of his corporations to act as a front for the U.S. government to at least reduce Soviet suspicion of the ship’s actual mission. Publicly, Glomar Explorer was trying to mine the ocean floor for manganese. Finally, the submarine and its contents were analyzed to derive as much intelligence value as possible.
By highlighting this whole effort, Project Azorian serves as an important book on Cold War history. It is recommended for intelligence analysts and sailors alike as well as any fan of engineering marvels.
October 19, 2012
This is one of the more famous episodes of Cold War technical espionage: what does the US government do when a Soviet missile submarine sinks to the bottom of the ocean? Raise it, of course!
This book is fairly straightforward history, with some effort put into debunking and evaluating various conflicting accounts. There's far more attention to narrative order and detail than there was put into suspense or popularization, making it a fairly dry read for anybody without a pre-existing interest in intelligence history. That said, the underlying story is pretty amazing - that they managed to build something this big, and keep it secret until almost the very end, complete with getting Howard Hughes to supply the cover story, that they were building a prospecting ship for undersea mining.
From a historical standpoint, it is interesting that in the 1970s we knew sufficiently little about Soviet capabilities that the investment was considered worthwhile - the Glomar Explorer cost about as much to build as the USS Enterprise. This, despite the fact that the project was briefed to the senior leadership as having about a 30% chance of success, and, true to advertising, the project was not really a success. Oh, they built an amazing ship and managed to pull something off the ocean floor, but they lost the nuclear warheads and the cryptographic material, which were the targets of the project.
Afterwords, the ship wasn't good for much intelligence-wise, and was sold off to an offshore oil drilling company - in fact, the company that became Transocean.
This book is fairly straightforward history, with some effort put into debunking and evaluating various conflicting accounts. There's far more attention to narrative order and detail than there was put into suspense or popularization, making it a fairly dry read for anybody without a pre-existing interest in intelligence history. That said, the underlying story is pretty amazing - that they managed to build something this big, and keep it secret until almost the very end, complete with getting Howard Hughes to supply the cover story, that they were building a prospecting ship for undersea mining.
From a historical standpoint, it is interesting that in the 1970s we knew sufficiently little about Soviet capabilities that the investment was considered worthwhile - the Glomar Explorer cost about as much to build as the USS Enterprise. This, despite the fact that the project was briefed to the senior leadership as having about a 30% chance of success, and, true to advertising, the project was not really a success. Oh, they built an amazing ship and managed to pull something off the ocean floor, but they lost the nuclear warheads and the cryptographic material, which were the targets of the project.
Afterwords, the ship wasn't good for much intelligence-wise, and was sold off to an offshore oil drilling company - in fact, the company that became Transocean.
September 11, 2015
3.5 stars
There have been a lot of books written about this topic since we admitted it to the Russians in the 90s. For the sake of sales, I presume, they have contained conspiracy theories, intrigue, ineptitude, all the stuff that makes for a good read. This is a book that sticks to facts and first-person interviews with those involved on the US and Russian side. The author actually points out other books and authors and where they screwed up, and why, and backs it up with science and documentation.
As such, it is not a Tom Clancy novel. I won't give stuff away, but suffice it to say that it is probably the greatest maritime engineering feat of the modern era, and I knew nothing about it. The scope of the counter-intelligence efforts, combined with just the sheer engineering of it, is great. The photos that illustrate the story really help (like one of a massive floating barge the size of several city blocks and as tall as a 5 story building, basically a floating Bass Pro Shop) the reader to envision what is taking place.
If you are a fan of maritime history, US/Russia relations or (like me) someone who loves a good engineering story, then pick it up.
There have been a lot of books written about this topic since we admitted it to the Russians in the 90s. For the sake of sales, I presume, they have contained conspiracy theories, intrigue, ineptitude, all the stuff that makes for a good read. This is a book that sticks to facts and first-person interviews with those involved on the US and Russian side. The author actually points out other books and authors and where they screwed up, and why, and backs it up with science and documentation.
As such, it is not a Tom Clancy novel. I won't give stuff away, but suffice it to say that it is probably the greatest maritime engineering feat of the modern era, and I knew nothing about it. The scope of the counter-intelligence efforts, combined with just the sheer engineering of it, is great. The photos that illustrate the story really help (like one of a massive floating barge the size of several city blocks and as tall as a 5 story building, basically a floating Bass Pro Shop) the reader to envision what is taking place.
If you are a fan of maritime history, US/Russia relations or (like me) someone who loves a good engineering story, then pick it up.
August 4, 2012
First question: Why was all the text in my Kindle edition centered instead of left justified?
I would rate this book as "okay". There were a few points I lost interest because it diverged on a tangent in to Naval nerd discussions on types of Soviet ships. I was hoping for something more like Manhunt: The Ten-Year Search for Bin Laden--from 9/11 to Abbottabad or The Triple Agent: The al-Qaeda Mole who Infiltrated the CIA in terms of depth and scope, as well as attachment to characters. Unfortunately, this book took more of a synoptic approach. Perhaps that is a fault of the writer, or perhaps it is due to the cloak of secrecy still around Azorian.
I would rate this book as "okay". There were a few points I lost interest because it diverged on a tangent in to Naval nerd discussions on types of Soviet ships. I was hoping for something more like Manhunt: The Ten-Year Search for Bin Laden--from 9/11 to Abbottabad or The Triple Agent: The al-Qaeda Mole who Infiltrated the CIA in terms of depth and scope, as well as attachment to characters. Unfortunately, this book took more of a synoptic approach. Perhaps that is a fault of the writer, or perhaps it is due to the cloak of secrecy still around Azorian.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
November 23, 2021
"Project Azorian" will be of interest to a fairly select group of people: readers with an in-depth interest in deep ocean science/technology, CIA history, and/or the Cold War. Otherwise, this is going to be quite dry reading. Having said that, however, I'm glad authors Norman Polmar and Michael White found this obscure but massive CIA project worth their time and effort to thoroughly document. Their writing was good considering the unemotional, technical nature of the story. Project Azorian is a case study in how bureaucratic inertia and self-aggrandizement can lead to massive waste. Especially true when you can couch things in national security goals and keep everything secret and out of the public's eye. Things like this need to become lessons in history. Sadly, Project Azorian won't.
April 9, 2013
Although the book is short, it is packed with information not previously accessible to the public. As a fan of Cold War history I had read much about Azorian or "Project Jennifer" as it was known prior to 2010. Never in my dreams had I thought that my kids would eventualy see pictures of K-129's wreckage, much less myself. Norman Polmar, whose books are the best you can read on submarine history is an amazing author and does not dissapoint in this book (or in any of his others). The narrative of the people who actualy developed the Glomar and the Barge also makes for anamazing insight of the project. All in all a great read on an amazing chapter of Cold War history and one of my favorite books.
August 23, 2012
This book details how the CIA in partnership with other American corporations found a missing Soviet submarine in the early 70's and built a specialized ship to raise it up for intelligence materials. The authors did a great job of research, although I could have done with a little less of their descriptions of how other authors got the details wrong. It also seemed to me that the build up was too long and the chapter of the actual event was too short. Still, I liked the book overall for talking about a Cold War event that I hadn't learned about before. And, of course, if you are a Tom Clancy fan, this will be an interesting read. :-)
October 29, 2014
This is a very mediocre "history" of the K-129/Hughes Glomar Explorer events. There is very obvious "dual author syndrome." That is, all too often, the authors seem to be in disagreement on the facts. They each write opening or closing sentences for the same paragraph, and no editor challenged them to choose one or the other. I wasn't clear whether they were trying to write propaganda for Dark Programs in general, whether successful or not, or whether one of them was and the other wasn't in tune with those sentiments. Someday, when the CIA releases enough information (though that may be utterly unlikely), there may be a definitive book about all of this. It ain't this one.
May 11, 2015
Some days I miss the Cold War. Gone are the days when the government would fund every harebrained idea someone deep in the bowels of the CIA or DoD would dream up. This is the true story of the Project Azorian, the attempt to raise a sunken Soviet nuclear ballistic missile submarine from 3 miles beneath the Pacific. The story itself is fantastic, incorporating some amazing marine engineering, intelligence gathering and suspense on the high seas. The only complaint is that the writing is a bit dry but overall it is a great read. An added bonus is a good amount of material from the Soviet side which gives insights into what they were thinking and doing during the operation. Recommended!
June 15, 2016
Being an engineer I very much enjoy this kind of books which tells about engineering feats. I was aware of Project Azorian long before I read this book and wanted to know more about it and this book has some unique insights. I did not like the same author's book on the sinking of USS Thresher because albeit he seems to be very much qualified to write on technical matters, he is not the best of narrators. I could not find fault about that in this book, maybe because I expected it to be much more technical or because he had a co-writer on this one. The volume of technical information, drawings and photos in this book is amazing and makes it a very good read for anyone interested.
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