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The Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust 1941-1945
In his landmark The Abandonment of the Jews, David S. Wyman argues that a substantial commitment to rescue European Jews on the part of the United States almost certainly could have saved several hundred thousand of the Nazis' victims. The definitive work on its subject, The Abandonment of the Jews is the winner of the National Jewish Book Award, the Anisfield-Wolf Award, the Present Tense Literary Award, the Stuart Bernath Prize from the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, and the Theodore Saloutos Award of the Immigration History Society. It was also nominated for the National Book Critics Circle Award.
458 pages, Paperback
First published April 1, 1984
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December 8, 2019
UPDATE Dec 2019 ... I re-read sections in order to help me frame the anger of my characters in the sequel to A FLOOD OF EVIL ... then I wrote this in my novel ...
When they were alone, Marissa showed an emotion to her father she had held back when they were with Berthold and Anna.
“I felt like I wanted to cry,” she said. “These two young people, putting themselves at mortal risk to fight Hitler and save Jews, and Churchill does nothing. FDR does nothing. American Jewish leaders do barely more than nothing.”
“Did the world know then what Hitler was doing?”
“Without question,” Marissa said. “FDR and Churchill received reports, some of which we now know came from Berthold and Anna. There were accounts in the press. AP and UP carried a headline screaming that the Nazis were turning Eastern Europe into ‘a vast slaughter house for Jews.’ The World Jewish Congress held a press conference in London at which they estimated one million Jews had already been killed. There was a rally attended by 20,000 people in Madison Square Garden.”
Marissa paused and wiped her eyes. “Yet,” she continued, “nobody proposed any measure to rescue the Jews still alive in Hitler's Europe. Churchill did not want Jewish refugees to flood into Palestine, Roosevelt did not want Jewish immigrants in America, and Jewish leaders were primarily concerned with establishing a Jewish state after the war was over. So they all let millions of Jews die.”
“Don’t you think it’s a little harsh to say they let Jews die?” Abraham asked.
“No I don’t,” Marissa answered. “It’s sickening to think of Anna and Berthold sending out reports that no one was willing to act on.”
****************** PRIOR COMMENTS ***************
I have so far read the sections describing the 1942 efforts to convince both Jewish leaders and the Allied governments that the Nazis had indeed embarked on a systematic program to murder all the Jews of Europe. This idea was simply so monstrous that many could not believe the evidence they were receiving. Others did not want to acknowledge what would have led to pressure to do something about it. Meanwhile, train after train carried Jews to death centers.
... Elie Wiesel's introduction ... in May 1944, a convoy of Jews from Hungary arrives at the railway station of a small Polish town … Auschwitz … this is the place they have come to die … they don't know this … Washington knows, and so does London. The Vatican knows … the Jews were abandoned ... they could no longer count on anybody ... Sad and revolting as it might sound, both the major Jewish organizations and the most powerful figures of the Jewish community could not or did not want to form a unified rescue commission
... the US State Department and British Foreign Office had no intention of rescuing large numbers of European Jews … such an initiative would have placed intense pressure on Britain to open Palestine and on the US to take in more Jewish refugees
... in Nov 1942, Rabbi Stephen Wise Wise called a press conference … through sources confirmed by the State Department … 2,000,000 Jews have been killed in an extermination campaign aimed at wiping out all the Jews in Nazi Europe
And still no one - not Churchill, not Roosevelt - acted to try to save those millions of Jews who were still alive.
When they were alone, Marissa showed an emotion to her father she had held back when they were with Berthold and Anna.
“I felt like I wanted to cry,” she said. “These two young people, putting themselves at mortal risk to fight Hitler and save Jews, and Churchill does nothing. FDR does nothing. American Jewish leaders do barely more than nothing.”
“Did the world know then what Hitler was doing?”
“Without question,” Marissa said. “FDR and Churchill received reports, some of which we now know came from Berthold and Anna. There were accounts in the press. AP and UP carried a headline screaming that the Nazis were turning Eastern Europe into ‘a vast slaughter house for Jews.’ The World Jewish Congress held a press conference in London at which they estimated one million Jews had already been killed. There was a rally attended by 20,000 people in Madison Square Garden.”
Marissa paused and wiped her eyes. “Yet,” she continued, “nobody proposed any measure to rescue the Jews still alive in Hitler's Europe. Churchill did not want Jewish refugees to flood into Palestine, Roosevelt did not want Jewish immigrants in America, and Jewish leaders were primarily concerned with establishing a Jewish state after the war was over. So they all let millions of Jews die.”
“Don’t you think it’s a little harsh to say they let Jews die?” Abraham asked.
“No I don’t,” Marissa answered. “It’s sickening to think of Anna and Berthold sending out reports that no one was willing to act on.”
****************** PRIOR COMMENTS ***************
I have so far read the sections describing the 1942 efforts to convince both Jewish leaders and the Allied governments that the Nazis had indeed embarked on a systematic program to murder all the Jews of Europe. This idea was simply so monstrous that many could not believe the evidence they were receiving. Others did not want to acknowledge what would have led to pressure to do something about it. Meanwhile, train after train carried Jews to death centers.
... Elie Wiesel's introduction ... in May 1944, a convoy of Jews from Hungary arrives at the railway station of a small Polish town … Auschwitz … this is the place they have come to die … they don't know this … Washington knows, and so does London. The Vatican knows … the Jews were abandoned ... they could no longer count on anybody ... Sad and revolting as it might sound, both the major Jewish organizations and the most powerful figures of the Jewish community could not or did not want to form a unified rescue commission
... the US State Department and British Foreign Office had no intention of rescuing large numbers of European Jews … such an initiative would have placed intense pressure on Britain to open Palestine and on the US to take in more Jewish refugees
... in Nov 1942, Rabbi Stephen Wise Wise called a press conference … through sources confirmed by the State Department … 2,000,000 Jews have been killed in an extermination campaign aimed at wiping out all the Jews in Nazi Europe
And still no one - not Churchill, not Roosevelt - acted to try to save those millions of Jews who were still alive.
February 5, 2009
The ongoing debate among descendants of immigrants on how best to keep new immigrants and illegal aliens out of the country is nothing new. Anti-immigration laws and sentiment were all the rage during the late thirties and especially during WWII. Guided by the Daughters of the American Revolution and the American Coalition of Patriotic Societies, Senators and Congressmen watched diligently for any hint that those funny little furriners might sneak in.
Senator Rufus Holman (Rep., OR) in 1942 once blocked a bill in the Senate because it aroused his suspicion that "it relaxes the immigration laws," though he openly admitted, "I know nothing about this bill." Representative William Elmer (Rep., MO)--no doubt a descendant of the famous American patriot, Elmer Fudd, --was equally distrustful. He apprised the House of "a determined and well financed movement...to admit all the oppressed, Hitler-persecuted people of Germany and other European countries into our country."
Senator Rufus Holman (Rep., OR) in 1942 once blocked a bill in the Senate because it aroused his suspicion that "it relaxes the immigration laws," though he openly admitted, "I know nothing about this bill." Representative William Elmer (Rep., MO)--no doubt a descendant of the famous American patriot, Elmer Fudd, --was equally distrustful. He apprised the House of "a determined and well financed movement...to admit all the oppressed, Hitler-persecuted people of Germany and other European countries into our country."
May 26, 2008
I wrote a paper in middle school on American knowledge of the Holocaust and how we did not use all our resources to try to stop the killings in the death camps. This book was my key source as it brings together an incredible amount of information on what Roosevelt and others in power knew, and incriminating statements they made that showed they consciously chose not to bomb railroads or do anything else to slow down the Nazi death machinery.
As a side note, in retrospect I read way too much on the Holocaust as a kid...
As a side note, in retrospect I read way too much on the Holocaust as a kid...
July 5, 2021
This disturbing book lays out in well-researched detail how the FDR administration, the State Department, Congress, other governmental entities, and the American people failed to come to the rescue of the Jews of Europe during the Holocaust. Some people stalled and obfuscated intentionally and others just didn't comprehend the depth of the tragedy until the war was over. The media did not do a good job of telling the story to the American people, although everyone who was following the news at all probably should have had some clue. The anti-immigration, anti-Semitic, and nationalist views prevalent in the United States and England undermined the possibility of rescue, as did the inability of the Jewish organizations in the United States to work together.
It is heartbreaking that many Jews could have been rescued--the author lays that out with no doubts. One of the saddest things is that the U.S. State Department and the British Foreign Office were secretly opposed to saving Jews, because then they might have had to accommodate the rescued in the United States or in Palestine. The author debunks the excuses given to delay and inhibit rescue operations. He also does not have any support for the idea that people who were responsible for failing to rescue Jews when they could have should be judged by the standards of their time and not ours--rescuing those in peril of death and torture has never been acceptable in any time. Truly the United States abandoned the Jews to their terrible fate during the Holocaust when we could have done much, much more to save tens if not hundreds of thousands in ways that would not have interfered with the war effort.
It is heartbreaking that many Jews could have been rescued--the author lays that out with no doubts. One of the saddest things is that the U.S. State Department and the British Foreign Office were secretly opposed to saving Jews, because then they might have had to accommodate the rescued in the United States or in Palestine. The author debunks the excuses given to delay and inhibit rescue operations. He also does not have any support for the idea that people who were responsible for failing to rescue Jews when they could have should be judged by the standards of their time and not ours--rescuing those in peril of death and torture has never been acceptable in any time. Truly the United States abandoned the Jews to their terrible fate during the Holocaust when we could have done much, much more to save tens if not hundreds of thousands in ways that would not have interfered with the war effort.
December 15, 2022
When I first began reading The Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust 1941-1945, historian David S. Wyman's seminal academic work, it felt a lot fresher than when I finished it. Since I began reading the book, several newer histories of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in general and of Roosevelt's reaction to the Shoah have come out, and, more directly, documentarian Ken Burns released what will likely be the seminal work on the United States' response to the Holocaust for many, many years. And both of those sets of works, at least by my estimation, have provided a more nuanced, thorough investigation of this country's atrocious "abandonment of the Jews".
Mark my words: Wyman is in fact quite thorough, The Abandonment of the Jews' including more than 100 pages of endnotes. And his scholarship is in fact mostly impeccable; Wyman's sources, both primary and secondary, speak for themselves, and are truly damning of the response of the American government at all levels, and of the American public themselves. It's just that Wyman's work here seems dated, of all things. Since Wyman retired, never mind wrote The Abandonment of the Jews, it's been more than thirty years, and since then we've learned so much more nuanced a picture, that Wyman's work is incomplete at best. For example, it's become abundantly evident that Pres. Roosevelt actually had much, much more wherewithal to actively take part in the rescue of European Jewry—but was largely hamstrung, both by the ostensibly more pressing need to bring the U.S. out of the Great Depression and especially by the vicious and virulently antisemitic and xenophobic and isolationist opposition in the United States Congress, as well as the State Department. And it's become abundantly evident that the seeds for the antisemitism in this country, wherein at least a third of the American public didn't want the Jews this country already had, much less refugees from Hitler's Europe, were laid at least a few decades before the Nazis even rose to power. As such, while Wyman's analysis and presentation does indeed make much information clear, the effect of the research he had available to him being itself incomplete mutes the overall reaction to the book, since with the benefit of hindsight we've gathered a much more nuanced view of FDR and the Shoah than Wyman arguably could possibly have gathered himself.
However, where I found The Abandonment of the Jews most problematic is probably not really Wyman's fault. One of the recurring themes of Wyman's book is that Wyman would have opted for an approach more akin to the Bergson Group's reaction to the Holocaust, the Bergson Group having been much more militant and activist about the rescue of European Jewry than the more conservative and subdued reactions of the overwhelming majority of the American Jewish establishment. (See Shake Heaven and Earth: Peter Bergson and the Struggle to Rescue the Jews of Europe, by Louis Rapoport for a more thorough review of the Bergson Group's efforts.) But there are two difficulties with Bergson's approach, and more importantly, Wyman's reaction thereto: First, as Ken Burns has made abundantly and heartbreakingly clear in his excellent documentary miniseries "The U.S. and the Holocaust", the degree of virulence of the antisemitism of the American public makes it not at all a given that a more aggressive approach to the rescue of the Jews of Europe would have been in any way successful. When arguably the most famous celebrity of the era was an open Nazi, when one of the most popular radio programs in the country ultimately gave rise to near-daily violence against Jews on the streets of the United States, often aided, abetted, exacerbated, and reinforced by the police and local politicians, there's not necessarily very significant evidence that more aggressive activism by what was still—and is still—a tiny minority within this country wouldn't've backfired, never mind merely not succeeded. And, most importantly, while this was clearly not Wyman's intent, the general effect of David Wyman's repeatedly—albeit well-meaningly—criticizing the American Jewish establishment was that of arguably blaming the victims of antisemitism in the United States, even as Wyman also blames the non-Jewish establishment. Ken Burns, once again, perhaps conveys a much better approach to this issue: While Burns does mention difference of opinion within the Jewish community during the 1930s and 1940s, in no way does he focus on it, or even repeat that issue very extensively; Burns' approach lays the blame for America's poor response to the Holocaust squarely at the feet of the wide swaths of antisemites in government and in the public sphere, as well as the xenophobia that had only worsened over decades in the United States, culminating in sufficiently restrictive immigration laws that virtually only "Aryans" (god, I hate using that word, but it fits here) were admitted to the United States in any significant numbers.
Yes, The Abandonment of the Jews is a valid and worthwhile, if not seminal, bit of scholarship on a subject vital to the understanding of even current American policymaking. (Yet again, though, Burns' approach drives home that the lesson of the Holocaust has bearing on the 2020s even more adeptly than did Wyman.) But Wyman's book isn't perfect, and if the scholarship is still valid (which it is), it's also incomplete at best.
Mark my words: Wyman is in fact quite thorough, The Abandonment of the Jews' including more than 100 pages of endnotes. And his scholarship is in fact mostly impeccable; Wyman's sources, both primary and secondary, speak for themselves, and are truly damning of the response of the American government at all levels, and of the American public themselves. It's just that Wyman's work here seems dated, of all things. Since Wyman retired, never mind wrote The Abandonment of the Jews, it's been more than thirty years, and since then we've learned so much more nuanced a picture, that Wyman's work is incomplete at best. For example, it's become abundantly evident that Pres. Roosevelt actually had much, much more wherewithal to actively take part in the rescue of European Jewry—but was largely hamstrung, both by the ostensibly more pressing need to bring the U.S. out of the Great Depression and especially by the vicious and virulently antisemitic and xenophobic and isolationist opposition in the United States Congress, as well as the State Department. And it's become abundantly evident that the seeds for the antisemitism in this country, wherein at least a third of the American public didn't want the Jews this country already had, much less refugees from Hitler's Europe, were laid at least a few decades before the Nazis even rose to power. As such, while Wyman's analysis and presentation does indeed make much information clear, the effect of the research he had available to him being itself incomplete mutes the overall reaction to the book, since with the benefit of hindsight we've gathered a much more nuanced view of FDR and the Shoah than Wyman arguably could possibly have gathered himself.
However, where I found The Abandonment of the Jews most problematic is probably not really Wyman's fault. One of the recurring themes of Wyman's book is that Wyman would have opted for an approach more akin to the Bergson Group's reaction to the Holocaust, the Bergson Group having been much more militant and activist about the rescue of European Jewry than the more conservative and subdued reactions of the overwhelming majority of the American Jewish establishment. (See Shake Heaven and Earth: Peter Bergson and the Struggle to Rescue the Jews of Europe, by Louis Rapoport for a more thorough review of the Bergson Group's efforts.) But there are two difficulties with Bergson's approach, and more importantly, Wyman's reaction thereto: First, as Ken Burns has made abundantly and heartbreakingly clear in his excellent documentary miniseries "The U.S. and the Holocaust", the degree of virulence of the antisemitism of the American public makes it not at all a given that a more aggressive approach to the rescue of the Jews of Europe would have been in any way successful. When arguably the most famous celebrity of the era was an open Nazi, when one of the most popular radio programs in the country ultimately gave rise to near-daily violence against Jews on the streets of the United States, often aided, abetted, exacerbated, and reinforced by the police and local politicians, there's not necessarily very significant evidence that more aggressive activism by what was still—and is still—a tiny minority within this country wouldn't've backfired, never mind merely not succeeded. And, most importantly, while this was clearly not Wyman's intent, the general effect of David Wyman's repeatedly—albeit well-meaningly—criticizing the American Jewish establishment was that of arguably blaming the victims of antisemitism in the United States, even as Wyman also blames the non-Jewish establishment. Ken Burns, once again, perhaps conveys a much better approach to this issue: While Burns does mention difference of opinion within the Jewish community during the 1930s and 1940s, in no way does he focus on it, or even repeat that issue very extensively; Burns' approach lays the blame for America's poor response to the Holocaust squarely at the feet of the wide swaths of antisemites in government and in the public sphere, as well as the xenophobia that had only worsened over decades in the United States, culminating in sufficiently restrictive immigration laws that virtually only "Aryans" (god, I hate using that word, but it fits here) were admitted to the United States in any significant numbers.
Yes, The Abandonment of the Jews is a valid and worthwhile, if not seminal, bit of scholarship on a subject vital to the understanding of even current American policymaking. (Yet again, though, Burns' approach drives home that the lesson of the Holocaust has bearing on the 2020s even more adeptly than did Wyman.) But Wyman's book isn't perfect, and if the scholarship is still valid (which it is), it's also incomplete at best.
September 18, 2021
So, yes, it took me two months to read this book and I skimmed/skipped the final chapters. It’s a tedious read due to its tremendous detail. It serves well the purpose for which I read it, a research/reference book. The information was invaluable for writing my novel *In the Night Seasons* (coming Jan 2022).
From a bird’s eye view, this book tells the tragic story of how America (and the world) failed to stop the Holocaust. If for some reason you’re a fan of FDR, you will be disappointed to learn that he was a self-serving politician who mostly ignored the Holocaust. His State Department was corrupt and actually obstructed efforts to rescue Jews.
Wyman does give as much of the “why” as possible, presenting a balanced view. In fact, the book is rather chilling in light of current events, because it was disbelief that was one of the greatest obstacles to action against Hitler’s genocide. It seemed too horrific, too implausible, too senseless, to be true. Tragically, the truth was worse than almost anyone realized.
From a bird’s eye view, this book tells the tragic story of how America (and the world) failed to stop the Holocaust. If for some reason you’re a fan of FDR, you will be disappointed to learn that he was a self-serving politician who mostly ignored the Holocaust. His State Department was corrupt and actually obstructed efforts to rescue Jews.
Wyman does give as much of the “why” as possible, presenting a balanced view. In fact, the book is rather chilling in light of current events, because it was disbelief that was one of the greatest obstacles to action against Hitler’s genocide. It seemed too horrific, too implausible, too senseless, to be true. Tragically, the truth was worse than almost anyone realized.
March 14, 2024
A HISTORIAN ASKS, ‘WHY DID AMERICA FAIL TO CARRY OUT A RESCUE EFFORT’?
Historian David Wyman wrote in the Preface to this 1984 book, “This book has been difficult to research and write. One does not wish to believe the facts revealed by the documents on which it is based. America, the land of refuge, offered little succor. American Christians forgot about the Good Samaritan. Even American Jews lacked the unquenchable sense of urgency the crisis demanded. The Nazis were the murderers, but we were the all too passive accomplices. Between June 1941 and May 1943, five to six million Jews perished at the hands of the Nazis and their collaborators… a substantial commitment to rescue almost certainly could have saved several hundred thousand of them, and done so without compromising the war effort… But America did not act at all until late in the war, and even then, though it had some success, the effort was a very limited one. This book is a report on America’s response to the Nazi assault on the European Jews… the present volume … brings out much information not previously published, and it offers several new answers to the key question: Why did America fail to carry out the kind of rescue effort that it could have?”
He observes, “The tendency to discount the extermination reports arose mainly from two causes. First, many people simply could not believe them… Skepticism about the annihilation reports also stemmed from the abuse of the public’s trust by British propagandists during World War I… During the late 1920s and the 1930s, historians had laid bare the falsity of Britain’s World War I atrocity propaganda… these exposures had worked their way into the popular mind, and atrocity stories in the first stages of World War II consequently met with much skepticism.” (Pg. 27)
Reform Rabbi and Zionist Stephen S. Wise “was convinced that FDR was personally anxious to help the persecuted European Jews in the 1930s, that he wanted to do everything possible to rescue Jews during the Holocaust years, and that he fully, though quietly, supported the Zionist movement. These assessments were wide of the mark and should have been recognized as such at the time. In retrospect, in view of Wise’s position as [one of] the foremost Jewish leaders, his total trust in Roosevelt was not an asset to American or European Jews.” (Pg. 69)
He reports, “The Bermuda conference grew out of the public reaction in Britain to the reports that the European Jews were being exterminated. Publicity about the Holocaust was more widespread and cries for action more forceful in England than in the United States.” (Pg. 104) He continues, “A great number of proposals had been submitted to the conference… Strictly prohibited was any special emphasis on Jews. And no steps were to be taken exclusively for Jews. State Department officials also imposed a three-part directive obviously calculated to keep refugees out of the United States.” (Pg. 113)
He recounts, “The American Jewish Conference took place … from August 29 through September 2, 1943… The Palestine Committee … recommended a strong resolution that called for the reconstitution of Palestine as the Jewish commonwealth, the immediate withdrawal of the White Paper, and the opening of Palestine to unlimited Jewish immigration under Jewish control… The third main issue, rescue, received little more attention… In the end, a paper resolution was what emerged… The Zionists had triumphed… [But the] Zionist victory had come at a high price. It ended the possibility of cooperation with the non-Zionist, ultra-Orthodox groups. And it eliminated or weakened the involvement of other important organizations. In addition, in many local Jewish communities it reawakened old Zionist versus non-Zionist animosities that had been dormant.” (Pg. 162-166)
He notes, “By far the most important cause for State Department inaction was fear that sizable numbers of Jews might actually get out of Axis territory… This fear determined the State Department’s entire response to the Holocaust, as it did that of the British. Behind it loomed the problem that both governments regarded as unsolvable: Where would masses of Jews be put if they did come out?... the basic policy was not rescue but the avoidance of rescue.” (Pg. 189)
He reports, “The ‘Christian Century,’ a highly influential Protestant weekly, reacted to the first news of extermination by charging that Stephen Wise’s statistics were exaggerated. (His estimates were actually far too low.) Thereafter, it reported on the Jewish catastrophe only occasionally, and only rarely did it speak out for rescue action. Such social-action periodicals as the ‘Churchman’ and Reinhold Niebuhr’s ‘Christianity and Crisis’ published even less on the Jewish tragedy. Yet these three journals carried more news on the issue than most Christian periodicals. The bulk of the Protestant press was silent, or nearly so.” (Pg. 318)
He suggests, “Another problem was the fabricated atrocity stories of World War I. This time, the editors were very skeptical. Yet well before word of the ‘final solution’ filtered out, numerous confirmed reports of Nazi crimes against civilian populations had broken down much of that barrier to belief… It is possible that editors took a cue from the New York Times… A perception that the Jewish-owned Times did not think the massive killing of Jews was worth emphasizing could have influenced other newspapers… The mass media’s response to the Holocaust undoubtedly was also affected by the complicated problem of credibility. Publishers and broadcasters feared accusations of sensationalism and exaggeration… Moreover, extermination of the Jews made no sense, because it served no practical purpose. The German explanation that Jews were being deported to labor centers seemed more plausible.” (Pg. 322-323)
He concludes, “It was not a lack of workable plans that stood in the way of saving many thousands more European Jews… The real obstacle was the absence of a strong desire to rescue Jews… the European Jews were not English. It was their particular misfortune not only to be foreigners but also to be Jews.” (Pg. 339-340)
This book will be of keen interest to those studying the issue of the U.S.’s reaction to reports of the Holocaust.
Historian David Wyman wrote in the Preface to this 1984 book, “This book has been difficult to research and write. One does not wish to believe the facts revealed by the documents on which it is based. America, the land of refuge, offered little succor. American Christians forgot about the Good Samaritan. Even American Jews lacked the unquenchable sense of urgency the crisis demanded. The Nazis were the murderers, but we were the all too passive accomplices. Between June 1941 and May 1943, five to six million Jews perished at the hands of the Nazis and their collaborators… a substantial commitment to rescue almost certainly could have saved several hundred thousand of them, and done so without compromising the war effort… But America did not act at all until late in the war, and even then, though it had some success, the effort was a very limited one. This book is a report on America’s response to the Nazi assault on the European Jews… the present volume … brings out much information not previously published, and it offers several new answers to the key question: Why did America fail to carry out the kind of rescue effort that it could have?”
He observes, “The tendency to discount the extermination reports arose mainly from two causes. First, many people simply could not believe them… Skepticism about the annihilation reports also stemmed from the abuse of the public’s trust by British propagandists during World War I… During the late 1920s and the 1930s, historians had laid bare the falsity of Britain’s World War I atrocity propaganda… these exposures had worked their way into the popular mind, and atrocity stories in the first stages of World War II consequently met with much skepticism.” (Pg. 27)
Reform Rabbi and Zionist Stephen S. Wise “was convinced that FDR was personally anxious to help the persecuted European Jews in the 1930s, that he wanted to do everything possible to rescue Jews during the Holocaust years, and that he fully, though quietly, supported the Zionist movement. These assessments were wide of the mark and should have been recognized as such at the time. In retrospect, in view of Wise’s position as [one of] the foremost Jewish leaders, his total trust in Roosevelt was not an asset to American or European Jews.” (Pg. 69)
He reports, “The Bermuda conference grew out of the public reaction in Britain to the reports that the European Jews were being exterminated. Publicity about the Holocaust was more widespread and cries for action more forceful in England than in the United States.” (Pg. 104) He continues, “A great number of proposals had been submitted to the conference… Strictly prohibited was any special emphasis on Jews. And no steps were to be taken exclusively for Jews. State Department officials also imposed a three-part directive obviously calculated to keep refugees out of the United States.” (Pg. 113)
He recounts, “The American Jewish Conference took place … from August 29 through September 2, 1943… The Palestine Committee … recommended a strong resolution that called for the reconstitution of Palestine as the Jewish commonwealth, the immediate withdrawal of the White Paper, and the opening of Palestine to unlimited Jewish immigration under Jewish control… The third main issue, rescue, received little more attention… In the end, a paper resolution was what emerged… The Zionists had triumphed… [But the] Zionist victory had come at a high price. It ended the possibility of cooperation with the non-Zionist, ultra-Orthodox groups. And it eliminated or weakened the involvement of other important organizations. In addition, in many local Jewish communities it reawakened old Zionist versus non-Zionist animosities that had been dormant.” (Pg. 162-166)
He notes, “By far the most important cause for State Department inaction was fear that sizable numbers of Jews might actually get out of Axis territory… This fear determined the State Department’s entire response to the Holocaust, as it did that of the British. Behind it loomed the problem that both governments regarded as unsolvable: Where would masses of Jews be put if they did come out?... the basic policy was not rescue but the avoidance of rescue.” (Pg. 189)
He reports, “The ‘Christian Century,’ a highly influential Protestant weekly, reacted to the first news of extermination by charging that Stephen Wise’s statistics were exaggerated. (His estimates were actually far too low.) Thereafter, it reported on the Jewish catastrophe only occasionally, and only rarely did it speak out for rescue action. Such social-action periodicals as the ‘Churchman’ and Reinhold Niebuhr’s ‘Christianity and Crisis’ published even less on the Jewish tragedy. Yet these three journals carried more news on the issue than most Christian periodicals. The bulk of the Protestant press was silent, or nearly so.” (Pg. 318)
He suggests, “Another problem was the fabricated atrocity stories of World War I. This time, the editors were very skeptical. Yet well before word of the ‘final solution’ filtered out, numerous confirmed reports of Nazi crimes against civilian populations had broken down much of that barrier to belief… It is possible that editors took a cue from the New York Times… A perception that the Jewish-owned Times did not think the massive killing of Jews was worth emphasizing could have influenced other newspapers… The mass media’s response to the Holocaust undoubtedly was also affected by the complicated problem of credibility. Publishers and broadcasters feared accusations of sensationalism and exaggeration… Moreover, extermination of the Jews made no sense, because it served no practical purpose. The German explanation that Jews were being deported to labor centers seemed more plausible.” (Pg. 322-323)
He concludes, “It was not a lack of workable plans that stood in the way of saving many thousands more European Jews… The real obstacle was the absence of a strong desire to rescue Jews… the European Jews were not English. It was their particular misfortune not only to be foreigners but also to be Jews.” (Pg. 339-340)
This book will be of keen interest to those studying the issue of the U.S.’s reaction to reports of the Holocaust.
May 23, 2018
Painful. You can't read it without taking breaks, because the material is just too harrowing. You get emotional, bummed out, and have to put it down. But then you pick it up, because you need to know this stuff. There are bits of sarcasm in here that help to relieve the sadness. There are parts I would have emphasized more, like when a State Dept. official referred to Jewish refugees as "odium."
August 3, 2023
From the Author: "This book has been difficult to research and write. One does not wish to believe the facts revealed by the documents on which it is based. America, the land of refuge, offered little succor. American Christians forgot about the Good Samaritan. Even American Jews lacked the unquenchible send of urgency the crisis demanded. The Nazis were the murderers, but we were the all too passive accomplices." ix "I look upon Israel as the most important line of defense against anti-Semitism in the world." "The killing was done by people to other people, while still other people stood by. The perpetrators, where they were not actually Christians, arose from a Christian culture. The bystanders most capable of helping were Christians. The point should have been obvious. Yet comparatively few American non-Jews recognized that the plight of the European Jews was their plight also. Most were either unaware, did not care, or saw the plight of the European catastrophe as a Jewish problem, one for Jews to deal with. That explains, in part why the United States did so little to help."
This book was very difficult to read. The subject of the Holocaust is heartrending and horrifying to me. It is even worse to read that some of it might have been averted.
(1) President Roosevelt and the State Department (under Welles Brackenridge Long and others) had received numerous reliable reports of the atrocities, yet they dallied upoon and actually blocked attempts at effective action.
(2) The media for the most part gave the extermination reports only some small sections on back pages, as minor news stories
(3) Some American Jewish leaders were ineffective because they fought too much among themselves.
(4) The Pope and other religious leaders could have broadcast appeals to hide and protect the Jewss in the Axis Countries.
(5) Rescue operations might gave been possible without weakening the war effort. Auschwitz and the rail lines leading to it could have been bombed toward the latter part of the war.
This book was very difficult to read. The subject of the Holocaust is heartrending and horrifying to me. It is even worse to read that some of it might have been averted.
(1) President Roosevelt and the State Department (under Welles Brackenridge Long and others) had received numerous reliable reports of the atrocities, yet they dallied upoon and actually blocked attempts at effective action.
(2) The media for the most part gave the extermination reports only some small sections on back pages, as minor news stories
(3) Some American Jewish leaders were ineffective because they fought too much among themselves.
(4) The Pope and other religious leaders could have broadcast appeals to hide and protect the Jewss in the Axis Countries.
(5) Rescue operations might gave been possible without weakening the war effort. Auschwitz and the rail lines leading to it could have been bombed toward the latter part of the war.
June 19, 2024
“J’Accuse” would have been a great title for this book had not Emile Zola used it first to describe the Dreyfus Affair. Then as during the Holocaust, endemic antisemitism played a part in the willful ignoring of the plight of six million Jews by America and her allies.
Historian David Wyman methodically lays out many of the reasons for America’s inaction of almost any type of rescue attempt. Recovering from the Great Depression, the American public was fearful of lost jobs to immigrants, was nativist in nature and many harbored an undercurrent of antisemitism. FDR was indifferent to the plight of the Jews and reluctant to do anything hurt his political standing in the polls. The State Department, especially under Assistant Secretary Breckinridge Long, was obstructionist to the extreme, blocking any path that might conceivably save Jews. The Department of War was not much better, refusing out of hand to bomb death trains and Auschwitz, even when they were near legitimate military targets. The press failed to publicize news of the massacre of European Jewry or buried such news on inside pages. Finally, Jewish organizations were divided in how to approach rescue. Two organizations, The Committee for a Jewish Army and the Bergsonite Emergency Committee can be singled out for praise. It is a small consolation, that America’s allies, Great Britain and Russia, were worse at providing any type of help.
This is a well researched book that provides students of the Holocaust with reasons for America’s paltry attempt at help during this time of crisis.
Historian David Wyman methodically lays out many of the reasons for America’s inaction of almost any type of rescue attempt. Recovering from the Great Depression, the American public was fearful of lost jobs to immigrants, was nativist in nature and many harbored an undercurrent of antisemitism. FDR was indifferent to the plight of the Jews and reluctant to do anything hurt his political standing in the polls. The State Department, especially under Assistant Secretary Breckinridge Long, was obstructionist to the extreme, blocking any path that might conceivably save Jews. The Department of War was not much better, refusing out of hand to bomb death trains and Auschwitz, even when they were near legitimate military targets. The press failed to publicize news of the massacre of European Jewry or buried such news on inside pages. Finally, Jewish organizations were divided in how to approach rescue. Two organizations, The Committee for a Jewish Army and the Bergsonite Emergency Committee can be singled out for praise. It is a small consolation, that America’s allies, Great Britain and Russia, were worse at providing any type of help.
This is a well researched book that provides students of the Holocaust with reasons for America’s paltry attempt at help during this time of crisis.
November 5, 2022
Wyman's argument that the United States (and Great Britain) could have taken a number of actions that would have lessened the number of Jews murdered in the Holocaust is well documented. What is most shocking is the documented actions of people in government, in the media, in religious organization that actively resisted or refused to pursue such actions. While prosecution of the war effort and the defeat of the Nazis was undoubtedly the most important goal, the concerns about political position and focus on other agendas that were more important than the lives of millions of people by "leaders" of government and society make those people also responsible. And that military assistance was not provided as required by law, while such assistance was provided for other peoples compounds the responsibility.
This book is a depressing look at how humans treat one another. But is should be read so that we all have a proper understanding of whether "leaders" can be trusted and that people must be able to see into the workings of government and other organizations: hiding information from people rarely leads to good results.
This book is a depressing look at how humans treat one another. But is should be read so that we all have a proper understanding of whether "leaders" can be trusted and that people must be able to see into the workings of government and other organizations: hiding information from people rarely leads to good results.
May 5, 2019
I gave this a 5 star rating because of the serious, but sad, subject matter, not because it was fun reading. It is not light reading, but if you want to understand how the media and also the American Jews treated the Nazi decimation of the Jews during World War II, then this book will enlighten and disgust you. Even our own president, Roosevelt, dropped the ball when he could have done so much more. I learned so much but it took me about 2 weeks to get through the book.
September 3, 2020
Holy shit was this book depressing. This is an eye opening account of the different ways many Western nations failed the Jewish people during 1939-1945, due to anti-semitism, ignorance, and selfishness. Make sure you read it with a side of lithium.
December 10, 2022
An important book to understand how governments, religious organizations and the general public can find reasons to look the other way when genocide is happening. This is not a light read, but a valuable reference book you will want to keep on your shelf.
June 7, 2018
A terrifyingly sad, well-researched book on the US’ slow response to the Nazi atrocities against the Jews in Europe.
March 8, 2025
I didn’t finish got through about a third over several months so it wasn’t exactly a page turner for me, albeit I was reading on kindle and had other books on the go. An important message from history and what I read was disturbing, maybe I’ll return to it at some point.
January 20, 2015
This book suggests that the US stymied efforts to rescue the Jews in WWII. Resistance emanated from a number of key officials in the State Dept. Jewish organizations were unwilling to go against the State Dept and FDR. Mobilization of public support was key to stimulating action by the US government, and public support was driven by less established Jewish NGOs (e.g. Committee for Jewish Army). Major infighting between Jewish NGOs led to self-defeating efforts often. (Many good examples of how petty rivalries and power struggles resulted in damage to Jewish causes, motivated by stopping one faction from getting prestige from the other's successful efforts.) State Dept first resisted reporting and confirming that Germany was exterminating Jews, then created bureaucratic delays to stop the influx of Jewish refugees. Amazingly the State Dept was actually afraid that Germany would actually give Jews to the Allies. So quotas for Jewish immigration in the US were never fulfilled. Sec of State Cordell Hull, Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, Asst. Sec of State Breckinridge Long and others were responsible, though mainly Long and some mid level officials. Bermuda conference and Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees were State Dept attempts to defuse public pressure w/o doing anything. This demoralized Jews who saw it for what it was and led them to focus on the Zionist cause in Palestine at the Biltmore Conference in NY. Used mobilization of public opinion tactics very successfully to build public support in Congress. British were also under intense public pressure and also tried to delay and block the rescue and refugee efforts.
Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau was instrumental in breaking US govt apathy to the Jews. Fought to expose State Dept efforts. Treasury's staff produced "Report to the Secretary on the Acquiescence of This Government in the Murder of the Jews" which convinced Morgenthau to go to FDR. A major push in Congress led to the Rescue Resolution, and its certain impending passage forced FDR to establish the War Refugee Board. Using funding from Jewish NGOs, WRB started rescuing European Jews. Anti Semitism was rampant in the US at the time, with strong nationalist sentiment against relaxing immigration restrictions as the political background.
Influential Jews in or near powerful members of the administration and FDR did not press for rescue, e.g. 6 of 7 Jewish members of Congress and several FDR advisers. Most Christian and Catholic churches were indifferent and silent, except Quakers and Unitarians. Jewish people were also divided. Jewish intellectuals were not vocal. Even Jewish owned media did not cover it very well like the NY Times and the Washington Post, though NY Post coverage was adequate. Regular American media did not cover the Holocaust. Incredulity regarding whether or not the Holocaust happened lasted until war's end when legislators and newspaper editors were flown in personally to view the camps.
Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau was instrumental in breaking US govt apathy to the Jews. Fought to expose State Dept efforts. Treasury's staff produced "Report to the Secretary on the Acquiescence of This Government in the Murder of the Jews" which convinced Morgenthau to go to FDR. A major push in Congress led to the Rescue Resolution, and its certain impending passage forced FDR to establish the War Refugee Board. Using funding from Jewish NGOs, WRB started rescuing European Jews. Anti Semitism was rampant in the US at the time, with strong nationalist sentiment against relaxing immigration restrictions as the political background.
Influential Jews in or near powerful members of the administration and FDR did not press for rescue, e.g. 6 of 7 Jewish members of Congress and several FDR advisers. Most Christian and Catholic churches were indifferent and silent, except Quakers and Unitarians. Jewish people were also divided. Jewish intellectuals were not vocal. Even Jewish owned media did not cover it very well like the NY Times and the Washington Post, though NY Post coverage was adequate. Regular American media did not cover the Holocaust. Incredulity regarding whether or not the Holocaust happened lasted until war's end when legislators and newspaper editors were flown in personally to view the camps.
December 14, 2016
Excellent book that covers the U S response to the Halocaust. The actions of the government were spotty if not almost non/existent. FDR was cautious in his actions due to isolationist sentiment, antisemitic feeling of many and the feeling that the only rescue possible was to win the war. The author criticizes him for his failure to lead on this issue, it FDR was reluctant to jeopardize his programs, both domestic and foreign, in Congress. The State Department did all they could to delay and frustrate immigration of Jews. During the late thirties and during the war immigration quotas from Eastern Europe were never maximized. Part of the problem also was the failure of leading Jewish to be able to unite together to pressure the government to act. Publicity by newspapers,radio,and movies was also almost nonexistent. Most of the reasons given for not being able to rescue Jews didn't stop the rescue of other people who weren't Jewish. It's hard not to conclude that American and British inaction worsened the already tragic situation.
January 30, 2018
America refused to implement large scale rescue efforts for Europe's Jews and refused to bomb holocaust infrastructure. We were, however, willing to transport, feed, clothe, and shelter nearly 425,000 German POWs inside the United States.
Hitler pursued his "Final Solution" even while he was losing the war.
I could at least understand German anti Semitism given my belief that Zionists helped bring America into WWI, but I cannot but condemn America's unwillingness to help Europe's Jews in WWII.
This book needs to be read. We must know what we have done wrong and failed to do right, if we are ever to live up to American ideals.
Hitler pursued his "Final Solution" even while he was losing the war.
I could at least understand German anti Semitism given my belief that Zionists helped bring America into WWI, but I cannot but condemn America's unwillingness to help Europe's Jews in WWII.
This book needs to be read. We must know what we have done wrong and failed to do right, if we are ever to live up to American ideals.
December 27, 2020
Like the Titanic, we already know the outcome of the 6 million Jews murdered during WWII. However, unlike the ship disaster, we should understand how thousands, maybe millions could have been saved if not for the basic rampant anti semitism in America as well as other European countries.
This book has taken me years to finish, if only because of the sheer depressing reality of how phony Christians behaved and caused even American Jews to abandon their own people. Just what would have happened if the tables were turned and it was a majority of Christians who were being annihilated?
This book has taken me years to finish, if only because of the sheer depressing reality of how phony Christians behaved and caused even American Jews to abandon their own people. Just what would have happened if the tables were turned and it was a majority of Christians who were being annihilated?
August 23, 2014
A dense historical monograph, not for the fainthearted. Not for anyone with poor eyesight, either -- 350 pages of tiny print. The meticulous detail brings to mind the famous remark about the banality of evil.
This book effectively puts paid to the hagiography of "The Greatest Generation." Saving Jews from annihilation was not among the reasons the United States went to war with the Axis.
This book effectively puts paid to the hagiography of "The Greatest Generation." Saving Jews from annihilation was not among the reasons the United States went to war with the Axis.
December 26, 2014
Very interesting, but it got kind of repetitive in the information. Really opened my eyes at the lack of response by most Western countries to news of the Holocaust, which we didn't learn about in school.
March 2, 2008
While this book can get a bit bogged down in minutia, it is informative. I read it in a college class and was amazed how our state department handled the Holocaust. The title says it all.
April 25, 2008
excellent accounting of what america was not doing during WWII
david(the author) is a neighbor and friend of mine. an excellent piece of work
david(the author) is a neighbor and friend of mine. an excellent piece of work
September 11, 2012
Well documented and researched, this book looks at how the western world turned its back on the Jews during the holocaust.
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