Richmond Must Fall: The Richmond-Petersburg Campaign, October 1864

Civil War Soldiers and Strategies

by Hampton Newsome

A study of Grant’s and Lee’s battles in the weeks before the 1864 election In the fall of 1864, the Civil War’s outcome rested largely on Abraham Lincoln’s success in the upcoming presidential election. As the contest approached, cautious optimism buoyed the President’s supporters in the wake of Union victories at Atlanta and in the Shenandoah Valley. With all eyes on the upcoming election, Robert E. Lee and Ulysses S. Grant conducted a series of large-scale military operations outside Richmond and Petersburg, which have, until now, received little attention. In Richmond Must Fall, Hampton Newsome examines these October battles in unprecedented scope and detail. The narrative begins with one of Lee’s last offensive operations of the war at the Darbytown Road on October 7, 1864, and ends with Grant’s major offensive on October 27 to seize the South Side Railroad, the last open rail line into the Confederate stronghold at Petersburg. The offensive would spark sharp fighting at Burgess Mill south of Petersburg and on the Williamsburg Road east of Richmond. The October 1864 operations offer important insights into the personalities and command styles of Lee and Grant, including Lee’s penchant for audacity and overwhelming thirst to strike a blow against his opponent even against bitter odds and Grant’s willingness to shoulder heavy responsibility in the face of great risk. The narrative explores the relationships within the high command of both armies, including Grant’s sometimes strained partnership with the cautious George Meade. It also illustrates Grant’s efforts to guide the strong-willed political general Ben- jamin F. Butler, whose steadfast support for African American troops would spark a prisoner controversy that would bring the war’s underlying issues of slavery and race into bold relief. For the Confederates, the month’s operations illustrate Lee’s necessary reliance on his key combat commanders at Petersburg, including the formidable William Mahone. Drawing on an array of original sources, Newsome focuses on the October battles themselves, examining the plans for the operations, the decisions made by commanders on the battlefield, and the soldiers’ view from the ground. At the same time, he places these military actions in the larger political context of the fall of 1864. With the election looming, neither side could afford a defeat at Richmond or Petersburg. Nevertheless, Grant and Lee were will- ing to take significant risks to seek great advantage. These military events set the groundwork for operations that would close the war in Virginia several months later.

Genres: Civil War, American Civil War, History

400 pages, Hardcover

First published November 1, 2012

Reviews

[Edgar Raines · Rating 5 out of 5]

In _Richmond Must Fall_, Hampton Newsome examines Grant's Sixth Offensive against Richmond and Petersburg in detail. The operation started as a feint North of the James River by Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler's Army of the James coupled with an ambitious effort South of the James by the Union IX, V, and II Corps of Maj. Gen. George Gordon Meade's Army of the Potomac to mask Confederate forces along Hatcher's Run while at the same time destroying the South Side Railroad, vital to the supply of General Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia defending Richmond and Petersburg. It ended with failed (and bloody) assaults against Confederate lines North of the James and a somewhat disappointing reconnaissance in force South and West of Petersburg. The most serious combat occurred at the Burgess Farm, South of Hatcher's Run, when Confederate Maj. Gen. William Mahone's attack almost cut Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock's II Corps in two, but Hancock's counterattacks virtually destroyed two veteran Confederate brigades and restored the situation. Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant drew from this comparative failure the lessons that would inform his conduct of his April 1865 offensive that ended in Lee's surrender at Appomattox Court House.

Newsome writes generally very clear prose but the work suffers from misplaced antecedents. A pronoun will precede the thing that it modifies, sometimes by more than a sentence. This certainly breaks up the reader's flow. This is the sort of thing that a good proof reader should have caught and corrected. That said, the research is superb. Moreover, the book is very strong in delineating command relationships and in recounting the role of intelligence in shaping planning. Kent State University Press is to be commended for including the number of detailed maps, although a list of the maps following the table of contents would have greatly assisted readers in keeping their bearings. The author understands and illustrates the interplay between national strategy, what is now called "the operational level of war," and the tactical fight. All in all, this is a model campaign study and deserves to stand along side the very best studies of Civil War campaigns, such as Edwin Coddington on Gettysburg, Timothy Smith on Shiloh, John J. Hennessy on Second Bull Run, John Bigelow on Chancellorsville, and Richard J. Sommers' study of Grant's Fifth Offensive against Richmond and Petersburg, to name only a few. I heartily recommend it.

[Sean Chick · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book in many ways does it all. It is well researched and the prose, if not superb, flows well and makes for an easier read than most. It is also the only book to cover the campaign in its entirety. One might quibble with some points. I think Newsome is too kind to Grant although the failure of the operation was not really his fault. Yet, overall the analysis of the commanders is fair and Newsome does not fall for the trap of seeing the operation as a Pyrrihic Union victory (which is common in more pedestrian takes on the fighting at Petersburg). Rather, it was a defeat for the Union, but not enough of a Rebel victory to prevent Lincoln's reelection.