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The New England Merchants In The Seventeenth Century
In detail Bailyn here presents the struggle of the merchants to achieve full social recognition as their successes in trade and in such industries as fishing and lumbering offered them avenues to power. Surveying the rise of merchant families, he offers a look in depth of the emergence of a new social group whose interests and changing social position powerfully affected the developing character of American society.
266 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1955
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June 3, 2018
It likely does not need to be said at this point that I love the historiography of Bernard Bailyn and find it both fascinating in its attention to historical detail and context and its unforced and implicit contemporary relevance to contemporary sociopolitical matters. As someone who has read a fair amount of the author's work before [1], it is pretty easy to appreciate what Bailyn is doing here even if the book is highly technical and (unsurprisingly) quite challenging in that it deals with a subject few people care about--the complexity of business and family relationships among generations of New England merchants, exploring their origins, their integration with the colonial governments as well as the imperial government based on London, and the establishment of local and international trade relationships that provided a high degree of wealth as well as social tension within New England societies. These are subjects I find interesting, but admittedly they are not something that many people seem to care about, which means that this book is likely to be an obscure work mainly of interest to those who are fond of early American economic history.
This particular book is about 200 pages and consists of seven chapters after two prefaces. The author begins by looking at the origins of trade in the period when England was trying to profit off of New England before establishing permanent colonies (1). After this Bailyn discusses the establishment of the Puritan merchants (2), a situation complicated by the struggles in finding profitable trade goods especially after the beaver trade collapsed and the tension between the desire of the merchants to make money and issues of social control on the part of the Puritan ministry. Then there is a discussion of adjustments and early failures (3) that demonstrated failed attempts at establishing iron works and efforts on the part of New England to find ways out of their specie shortage. After this comes a discussion of the legacy of the first generation of Puritan merchants (4) and the introduction of New England merchants to empire through the establishment of the triangular trade as well as the passing of the ambiguous Navigation Acts (5). AFter this there are discussions of the elements of change both economically and politically as Puritan culture declined and as colonial leadership became involved with British imperial patronage (6) before the book closes with a discussion of the merchant group of New England at the end of the eighteenth century (7).
There are at least a few angles of relevance of this book that appear highly implicit and are dealt with in Bailyn's usually subtle way. For one, the tension between moral greatness and slavish devotion to wealth, as well as the tension between freedom and the belief that government knows best were definitely very early tensions within our society that show themselves to have developed early in American history. Likewise, the tension between the well-being of peripheral regions and the desire of control the part of imperial centers is certainly an issue that has retained a great deal of force whether we look at internal or external patterns of colonial trade that still exist in the present world. This is a history that demonstrates how it was that people solved issues of trust and how the ambiguities of laws allowed for a great deal of freedom for colonial merchants who sought to ensure their own livelihood and the well-being of their regions by providing themselves with the means through their own trading capacity for purchasing trade goods that they were unable to manufacture for themselves. All in all, this is a great book that provides a thoughtful view of economic history in the United States and also manages to encourage the historian that there are many questions that remain unanswered and many aspects of historical research that remain unexamined.
[1] See, for example:
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2017...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2017...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2017...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2017...
This particular book is about 200 pages and consists of seven chapters after two prefaces. The author begins by looking at the origins of trade in the period when England was trying to profit off of New England before establishing permanent colonies (1). After this Bailyn discusses the establishment of the Puritan merchants (2), a situation complicated by the struggles in finding profitable trade goods especially after the beaver trade collapsed and the tension between the desire of the merchants to make money and issues of social control on the part of the Puritan ministry. Then there is a discussion of adjustments and early failures (3) that demonstrated failed attempts at establishing iron works and efforts on the part of New England to find ways out of their specie shortage. After this comes a discussion of the legacy of the first generation of Puritan merchants (4) and the introduction of New England merchants to empire through the establishment of the triangular trade as well as the passing of the ambiguous Navigation Acts (5). AFter this there are discussions of the elements of change both economically and politically as Puritan culture declined and as colonial leadership became involved with British imperial patronage (6) before the book closes with a discussion of the merchant group of New England at the end of the eighteenth century (7).
There are at least a few angles of relevance of this book that appear highly implicit and are dealt with in Bailyn's usually subtle way. For one, the tension between moral greatness and slavish devotion to wealth, as well as the tension between freedom and the belief that government knows best were definitely very early tensions within our society that show themselves to have developed early in American history. Likewise, the tension between the well-being of peripheral regions and the desire of control the part of imperial centers is certainly an issue that has retained a great deal of force whether we look at internal or external patterns of colonial trade that still exist in the present world. This is a history that demonstrates how it was that people solved issues of trust and how the ambiguities of laws allowed for a great deal of freedom for colonial merchants who sought to ensure their own livelihood and the well-being of their regions by providing themselves with the means through their own trading capacity for purchasing trade goods that they were unable to manufacture for themselves. All in all, this is a great book that provides a thoughtful view of economic history in the United States and also manages to encourage the historian that there are many questions that remain unanswered and many aspects of historical research that remain unexamined.
[1] See, for example:
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2017...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2017...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2017...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2017...
February 21, 2023
RQ: Why did a merchant community develop in New England? How did its interests and social character crystallize by the close of the century? More importantly: why did Massachusetts lose its charter and autonomy?
T: As Bailyn frames it, his goal is to explain the crystallization of the Merchant Community in New England. But in fact, his story really describes the decline of Puritan magistracy in the colonies, and the nature of the imperial transition in New England. Bailyn ascribes this transformation largely to the efforts of New England merchants, who were politically, socially, and economically tied to England, and who had always clashed with the strict subordination expected of commerce in a godly society. This group changed over time, becoming increasingly less godly as waves of Anglican royalists and the needs of commerce drove them to look to England. Their agitation was critical to undermining the Massachusetts Bay Company, bringing the political leaders of England into conflict with the company, and ultimately to overthrowing the Dominion and replacing it with a system in which they held greater power.
General:
The focus on the formation of a merchant social group is very confusing to me. At times Bailyn seems to suggest that the social group crystallized by century’s end (VII); at other times he highlights that commerce was “not a social condition but a way of getting money” (194). I’m left a little unclear as to his claims about the group, particularly at century’s end. However, the general point he makes about conflict within NE in the 17th c between puritan magistrates and merchants is well argued - merchants represented a fifth column opposed for social and economic reasons to New England’s biblical isolation. They also resisted the vision of strict economic dominance posited by England after 1676 and enacted during the Dominion.
Misc Notes/Summary:
Bailyn notes that for the first generation of New England merchants, “religious considerations were highly relevant to the conduct of trade” (16). In practice, this meant that Puritan leaders were obliged to carefully monitor economic activity, where “the soul of the merchant was constantly exposed to sin by virtue of his control of goods necessary to other people,” and to ensure just prices and wages (21-22). Many Calvinist merchants, such as Robert Keayne, felt this tension acutely (41-44). Even so, from the beginning there were those who bucked under “the restrictive effect of these ideas when acted upon by a determined ministry and magistracy” (16). Merchants “did not attain control of the colonies’ governments” and instead colony leadership was in the hands of “Puritan gentlemen” “men whose main occupation was not trade” (38, 39, 19). The tension between these two groups - the gentlemen magistrates on the one hand, and the merchant tradesmen on the other, “was implicit from the start” (40).
The decline of the fur trade (due to over-exploitation, 56, 59) in the years 1640-1660 required New England’s merchants to direct their energies elsewhere. They channeled their energies towards several avenues: “the large-scale production of iron and cloth” (61) were attractive avenues toward economic independence, but failed to materialize due to slow profits and insufficient public desire to develop a cottage textile industry (61-74). Fishing became a deeply important part of New England’s trade in the 1640s and 50s (82) and this commerce became all the more important as New England began to trade foodstuffs to the monocropped colonies of Madiera, the Azores, and the West Indies (84-5). This made New England, not an independent economy, but a critical part of an English imperial system. “Outward from the larger ports in the British Isles flowed shipping, manufactures, and investments in colonial property, the enhanced value of which returned as colonial products… The New England merchants became important agents in maintaining the efficiency of this mechanism. They entered the flow of England’s Atlantic commerce to pay for their purchases and to profit by advancing the exchange of European goods for colonial products. In no way was their commerce independent… a breakdown in any part of the mechanism affected their trade immediately. Severance of the link to England would destroy the whole commercial system of New England” (86). The connection to England was “the umbilical cord” of NE’s commerce (90). Human relationships, networks of kinship and community which bound England to New England, were critical to the functioning of this system (87-91). Thus the merchants were not outside but “within the confines of the British colonial system” (91; cf Barnes and Andrews).
The puritan magistrates and the rural yeoman continued to oppose the trappings of empire and the dominance of the merchants. “The house of deputies was held by men from rural, inland towns whose sympathies were frequently antagonistic to the merchants” while the magistrates “remained faithful to the aims of the Founders who knew the value of the trade but who believed it served the community best when subordinated to the goals of religion” (103). The merchants then became engines of social change. “Their involvement in the world of Atlantic commerce committed them to interests and attitudes incompatible with life in the Bible commonwealths… **by performing their indispensable economic function, the merchants robbed the commonwealths of their cherished isolation**” (105). The merchants favored building a cosmopolitan society, where people and goods could come freely. The Puritans who wanted to preserve zion could never accept the religious toleration and loss of control that such a transformation would entail. At the same time, the merchant group began to transform, as Anglican royalist newcomers like Thomas Breedon and Richard Wharton arrived with a singular focus on trade (110-111).
In England after 1660, political leaders began to work out “a body of mercantilist theory.” Bailyn notes that these theorists had “no doubt about the need to subordinate the interests of the colonies to the good of the nation” (113). The merchants, particularly the Anglican royalists, turned to the metropole “seeking revenge” (114). This produced the commission of 1664, which aimed “to draw the colonies closely under English rule by insisting that the obligations and liberties, secular and religious, of Englishmen be maintained” (119). Moderate godly merchants and Anglican royalists alike were sympathetic to the commission, to the connections with England and the transformation of the empire so promised (124-5). It seemed before 1676 (when steps to enforce the Nav Acts escalated) that New England’s merchants “stood greatly to profit by England’s mercantilism” (128).
The conflicts of European states in the Atlantic made it impossible for New England to sustain its independence. The economic activity which was critical to its survival was dependent on merchants’ “membership in the English community. New England moved steadily, if reluctantly, toward full participation in the conflict of nations…// None knew better than the merchants how important it was that England’s wars were New England’s, too.” (131-132). “The majority of merchants, socially as well as economically oriented toward England, felt common bonds drawing them together, distinguishing them from other settlers in NE communities. Important differences among them were suppressed as they stood together in opposition to the reigning magistrates” (135). “Citizens of an international trading world as well as of New England colonies, the merchants took the pattern for their conduct not from the bible or from parental teachings but from their picture of life in Restoration England. To the watchmen of the holy citadel nothing could have been more insidious” (139). The merchants increasingly “sought to live like their London friends” (142).
As a way to achieve these ends, to flourish socially and economically, the merchants in the 1680s “sought political power” and allied themselves with Randolph (143, 160). By the end of the 1670s the merchants welcomed any help that would give them “political power proportionate to their economic and social influence”; “in Randolph’s needs and the intentions of the Lords of Trade they saw an opportunity to gain their immediate political goal” (160). The 1670s witnessed the tightening of the mercantilist system (144, 148-152), but in the 1670s the merchants did not feel that this outweighed the benefits of connections to England (159, 160).
The dissolution of the MBC “completely satisfied” the merchants’ political ambitions with the Dudley ministry. “Yet such independent, unfettered local power could not survive long in a mercantilist empire” (169). The Dominion helped merchants to distinguish between essentials and preferences - the rigid enforcement of the Navigation Acts was intolerable, and Andros “alienated most of them [the mmerchants] by denying them the controlling influence in the council” (170, 175-6). The Merchants who helped to overthrow Andros did so because of their “lack of influence,” but they had no desire to see a return to MA’s charter government and rapidly began “seeking another royalist government” that they could better control (191).
T: As Bailyn frames it, his goal is to explain the crystallization of the Merchant Community in New England. But in fact, his story really describes the decline of Puritan magistracy in the colonies, and the nature of the imperial transition in New England. Bailyn ascribes this transformation largely to the efforts of New England merchants, who were politically, socially, and economically tied to England, and who had always clashed with the strict subordination expected of commerce in a godly society. This group changed over time, becoming increasingly less godly as waves of Anglican royalists and the needs of commerce drove them to look to England. Their agitation was critical to undermining the Massachusetts Bay Company, bringing the political leaders of England into conflict with the company, and ultimately to overthrowing the Dominion and replacing it with a system in which they held greater power.
General:
The focus on the formation of a merchant social group is very confusing to me. At times Bailyn seems to suggest that the social group crystallized by century’s end (VII); at other times he highlights that commerce was “not a social condition but a way of getting money” (194). I’m left a little unclear as to his claims about the group, particularly at century’s end. However, the general point he makes about conflict within NE in the 17th c between puritan magistrates and merchants is well argued - merchants represented a fifth column opposed for social and economic reasons to New England’s biblical isolation. They also resisted the vision of strict economic dominance posited by England after 1676 and enacted during the Dominion.
Misc Notes/Summary:
Bailyn notes that for the first generation of New England merchants, “religious considerations were highly relevant to the conduct of trade” (16). In practice, this meant that Puritan leaders were obliged to carefully monitor economic activity, where “the soul of the merchant was constantly exposed to sin by virtue of his control of goods necessary to other people,” and to ensure just prices and wages (21-22). Many Calvinist merchants, such as Robert Keayne, felt this tension acutely (41-44). Even so, from the beginning there were those who bucked under “the restrictive effect of these ideas when acted upon by a determined ministry and magistracy” (16). Merchants “did not attain control of the colonies’ governments” and instead colony leadership was in the hands of “Puritan gentlemen” “men whose main occupation was not trade” (38, 39, 19). The tension between these two groups - the gentlemen magistrates on the one hand, and the merchant tradesmen on the other, “was implicit from the start” (40).
The decline of the fur trade (due to over-exploitation, 56, 59) in the years 1640-1660 required New England’s merchants to direct their energies elsewhere. They channeled their energies towards several avenues: “the large-scale production of iron and cloth” (61) were attractive avenues toward economic independence, but failed to materialize due to slow profits and insufficient public desire to develop a cottage textile industry (61-74). Fishing became a deeply important part of New England’s trade in the 1640s and 50s (82) and this commerce became all the more important as New England began to trade foodstuffs to the monocropped colonies of Madiera, the Azores, and the West Indies (84-5). This made New England, not an independent economy, but a critical part of an English imperial system. “Outward from the larger ports in the British Isles flowed shipping, manufactures, and investments in colonial property, the enhanced value of which returned as colonial products… The New England merchants became important agents in maintaining the efficiency of this mechanism. They entered the flow of England’s Atlantic commerce to pay for their purchases and to profit by advancing the exchange of European goods for colonial products. In no way was their commerce independent… a breakdown in any part of the mechanism affected their trade immediately. Severance of the link to England would destroy the whole commercial system of New England” (86). The connection to England was “the umbilical cord” of NE’s commerce (90). Human relationships, networks of kinship and community which bound England to New England, were critical to the functioning of this system (87-91). Thus the merchants were not outside but “within the confines of the British colonial system” (91; cf Barnes and Andrews).
The puritan magistrates and the rural yeoman continued to oppose the trappings of empire and the dominance of the merchants. “The house of deputies was held by men from rural, inland towns whose sympathies were frequently antagonistic to the merchants” while the magistrates “remained faithful to the aims of the Founders who knew the value of the trade but who believed it served the community best when subordinated to the goals of religion” (103). The merchants then became engines of social change. “Their involvement in the world of Atlantic commerce committed them to interests and attitudes incompatible with life in the Bible commonwealths… **by performing their indispensable economic function, the merchants robbed the commonwealths of their cherished isolation**” (105). The merchants favored building a cosmopolitan society, where people and goods could come freely. The Puritans who wanted to preserve zion could never accept the religious toleration and loss of control that such a transformation would entail. At the same time, the merchant group began to transform, as Anglican royalist newcomers like Thomas Breedon and Richard Wharton arrived with a singular focus on trade (110-111).
In England after 1660, political leaders began to work out “a body of mercantilist theory.” Bailyn notes that these theorists had “no doubt about the need to subordinate the interests of the colonies to the good of the nation” (113). The merchants, particularly the Anglican royalists, turned to the metropole “seeking revenge” (114). This produced the commission of 1664, which aimed “to draw the colonies closely under English rule by insisting that the obligations and liberties, secular and religious, of Englishmen be maintained” (119). Moderate godly merchants and Anglican royalists alike were sympathetic to the commission, to the connections with England and the transformation of the empire so promised (124-5). It seemed before 1676 (when steps to enforce the Nav Acts escalated) that New England’s merchants “stood greatly to profit by England’s mercantilism” (128).
The conflicts of European states in the Atlantic made it impossible for New England to sustain its independence. The economic activity which was critical to its survival was dependent on merchants’ “membership in the English community. New England moved steadily, if reluctantly, toward full participation in the conflict of nations…// None knew better than the merchants how important it was that England’s wars were New England’s, too.” (131-132). “The majority of merchants, socially as well as economically oriented toward England, felt common bonds drawing them together, distinguishing them from other settlers in NE communities. Important differences among them were suppressed as they stood together in opposition to the reigning magistrates” (135). “Citizens of an international trading world as well as of New England colonies, the merchants took the pattern for their conduct not from the bible or from parental teachings but from their picture of life in Restoration England. To the watchmen of the holy citadel nothing could have been more insidious” (139). The merchants increasingly “sought to live like their London friends” (142).
As a way to achieve these ends, to flourish socially and economically, the merchants in the 1680s “sought political power” and allied themselves with Randolph (143, 160). By the end of the 1670s the merchants welcomed any help that would give them “political power proportionate to their economic and social influence”; “in Randolph’s needs and the intentions of the Lords of Trade they saw an opportunity to gain their immediate political goal” (160). The 1670s witnessed the tightening of the mercantilist system (144, 148-152), but in the 1670s the merchants did not feel that this outweighed the benefits of connections to England (159, 160).
The dissolution of the MBC “completely satisfied” the merchants’ political ambitions with the Dudley ministry. “Yet such independent, unfettered local power could not survive long in a mercantilist empire” (169). The Dominion helped merchants to distinguish between essentials and preferences - the rigid enforcement of the Navigation Acts was intolerable, and Andros “alienated most of them [the mmerchants] by denying them the controlling influence in the council” (170, 175-6). The Merchants who helped to overthrow Andros did so because of their “lack of influence,” but they had no desire to see a return to MA’s charter government and rapidly began “seeking another royalist government” that they could better control (191).
Read
July 28, 2021Given the unusual circumstances of this book, I won't include a rating here. However, i will include my review that I wrote for a class.
When people look at the founding of America, they turn their attention to the economics of Virginia and the Chesapeake colonies and turn to the religious nature of the New England colonies. However, economics still served as a driving force in the New England colonies and should be addressed more in history books. The New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century by Bernard Bailyn spends its entirety exploring the successes, failures, struggles, and advantages of the New England Merchants during this time period. Bailyn is able to identify the key players in this book while also understanding the full history of the region. However, despite some great anecdotes and some interesting facts, Bailyn produces an utterly bland and boring account that should be used less as a book for reading cover to cover, but rather as a reference material. Bailyn’s main point in the book is that many merchants immigrated to New England so as to earn a profit, but many struggled due to circumstances such as unknown territory, distance from European markets, and government interventions.
In the beginning of the book, Bailyn outlines the issues that merchants had at the outset of the seventeenth century. These merchants based their desire to settle in America on the idea that “was simple and convincing: costs could be reduced, and profits greatly increased by sending settlers to New England, where, as self-sufficient residents, they could catch fish, collect first, and process other products for shipment to the entrepreneurs in England” (Bailyn 1955, 10). This provided the overall theory of Mercantilism and Colonialism, which helps not just with economics, but also with population control. Unfortunately, these early settlers often failed to return an investment, simply because they were unprepared for what life would be like in the New World. However, these early attempts were not made in vain, as Bailyn points out when he states that “Yet their efforts form the background of later, successful undertakings. Out of the frustration of their thwarted ambitions emerged accurate knowledge of New England” (Bailyn 1955, 2). As can be learned from any experiment based in trial and error, failure can often teach better than success.
As the book moves into its later chapters, it discusses the issues that merchants had with getting their goods to markets in Europe, particularly England. Because of the distance that separated the buyers and sellers, fur traders and other merchants preyed off the naivete of the local populations and even their colonial neighbors, stealing or hunting on lands that did not belong to them. The merchants felt this was necessary because they felt obligated to turn a profit after investing so much into their enterprises. Bailyn states that ““In this traffic in luxury goods sellers were separated from buyers and users by 3,000 miles, and the moral injunctions against taking advantage of a neighbor's distress and violating the laws of injustice business dealings lost their urgency. The fur merchants were free to pursue their gain as they could” (Bailyn 1955, 32). This provided the beginnings of the English leadership deciding to play a role in actually governing the merchants’ activities.
Because of the issues of distance and difficulty of getting goods to market, many merchants turned to other markets, including Canada and the West Indies, as places to sell their goods. In addition, Bailyn points out that these merchants had to find better resources when he states that “ Thenceforth merchants along the Connecticut River derived their main income and way of life from the land they cultivated. For them trade was not overseas commerce but the accumulation and wholesale disposition of their own neighbors' farm goods to other New England Merchants.” (Bailyn, 1955, 55). It was here that the merchants realized that real estate was essentially more valuable than the goods that they were hunting or fishing, and therefore the merchants found ways to utilize the resources on their lands for financial gain. One notable person discussed in the text, John Winthrop Jr, turned his attention from Fur trade to Iron Works on lands he purchased or leased, and would have been successful in the long run had it not been for other obstacles in his way.
It is at this point in the book that Bailyn turns the focus more and more to England, where both the businessmen, parliament, and even the Crown began meddling in the lives of the merchants. Bailyn points this out succinctly when he states, “And the Londoners had precisely what the New England merchants lacked: capital, shipping, and establish markets.” (Bailyn 1955, 79). Bailyn discusses how The Navigation Acts and bureaucrats such as Edward Randolph sought to line the aristocracy’s pockets with tariffs, taxes, and profits from the sales of the merchants’ goods. These bureaucrats had no desire for the merchants to be successful, but were rather looking out for themselves, and served as a detriment to the merchants’ well-being. This dichotomy of English priorities versus New England priorities may have contributed to the inklings in the long run to the frustration a full century later that led to the American Revolution.
While the book was informative and thorough, its writing style leaves much to be desired. Many of the ideas and concepts located in this book can be found in other places, without being bogged down in details of people, places, and events. The strongest point of the book was when it discussed how as the merchant class increased, the religious fervor and control of the Puritans in the New England colonies decreased. Bailyn discusses how “The desire to succeed in trade and to live the full life of English merchant-gentlemen was stronger than any counterforce the clergy could exert” (Bailyn 1955, 142). This book certainly has its place in history and its value to society but should not be the first resource used to educate future generations about the merchants of New England. Rather, newer and better books should be written that should do as the merchants of the seventeenth century did: learn from the past and make a better future.
When people look at the founding of America, they turn their attention to the economics of Virginia and the Chesapeake colonies and turn to the religious nature of the New England colonies. However, economics still served as a driving force in the New England colonies and should be addressed more in history books. The New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century by Bernard Bailyn spends its entirety exploring the successes, failures, struggles, and advantages of the New England Merchants during this time period. Bailyn is able to identify the key players in this book while also understanding the full history of the region. However, despite some great anecdotes and some interesting facts, Bailyn produces an utterly bland and boring account that should be used less as a book for reading cover to cover, but rather as a reference material. Bailyn’s main point in the book is that many merchants immigrated to New England so as to earn a profit, but many struggled due to circumstances such as unknown territory, distance from European markets, and government interventions.
In the beginning of the book, Bailyn outlines the issues that merchants had at the outset of the seventeenth century. These merchants based their desire to settle in America on the idea that “was simple and convincing: costs could be reduced, and profits greatly increased by sending settlers to New England, where, as self-sufficient residents, they could catch fish, collect first, and process other products for shipment to the entrepreneurs in England” (Bailyn 1955, 10). This provided the overall theory of Mercantilism and Colonialism, which helps not just with economics, but also with population control. Unfortunately, these early settlers often failed to return an investment, simply because they were unprepared for what life would be like in the New World. However, these early attempts were not made in vain, as Bailyn points out when he states that “Yet their efforts form the background of later, successful undertakings. Out of the frustration of their thwarted ambitions emerged accurate knowledge of New England” (Bailyn 1955, 2). As can be learned from any experiment based in trial and error, failure can often teach better than success.
As the book moves into its later chapters, it discusses the issues that merchants had with getting their goods to markets in Europe, particularly England. Because of the distance that separated the buyers and sellers, fur traders and other merchants preyed off the naivete of the local populations and even their colonial neighbors, stealing or hunting on lands that did not belong to them. The merchants felt this was necessary because they felt obligated to turn a profit after investing so much into their enterprises. Bailyn states that ““In this traffic in luxury goods sellers were separated from buyers and users by 3,000 miles, and the moral injunctions against taking advantage of a neighbor's distress and violating the laws of injustice business dealings lost their urgency. The fur merchants were free to pursue their gain as they could” (Bailyn 1955, 32). This provided the beginnings of the English leadership deciding to play a role in actually governing the merchants’ activities.
Because of the issues of distance and difficulty of getting goods to market, many merchants turned to other markets, including Canada and the West Indies, as places to sell their goods. In addition, Bailyn points out that these merchants had to find better resources when he states that “ Thenceforth merchants along the Connecticut River derived their main income and way of life from the land they cultivated. For them trade was not overseas commerce but the accumulation and wholesale disposition of their own neighbors' farm goods to other New England Merchants.” (Bailyn, 1955, 55). It was here that the merchants realized that real estate was essentially more valuable than the goods that they were hunting or fishing, and therefore the merchants found ways to utilize the resources on their lands for financial gain. One notable person discussed in the text, John Winthrop Jr, turned his attention from Fur trade to Iron Works on lands he purchased or leased, and would have been successful in the long run had it not been for other obstacles in his way.
It is at this point in the book that Bailyn turns the focus more and more to England, where both the businessmen, parliament, and even the Crown began meddling in the lives of the merchants. Bailyn points this out succinctly when he states, “And the Londoners had precisely what the New England merchants lacked: capital, shipping, and establish markets.” (Bailyn 1955, 79). Bailyn discusses how The Navigation Acts and bureaucrats such as Edward Randolph sought to line the aristocracy’s pockets with tariffs, taxes, and profits from the sales of the merchants’ goods. These bureaucrats had no desire for the merchants to be successful, but were rather looking out for themselves, and served as a detriment to the merchants’ well-being. This dichotomy of English priorities versus New England priorities may have contributed to the inklings in the long run to the frustration a full century later that led to the American Revolution.
While the book was informative and thorough, its writing style leaves much to be desired. Many of the ideas and concepts located in this book can be found in other places, without being bogged down in details of people, places, and events. The strongest point of the book was when it discussed how as the merchant class increased, the religious fervor and control of the Puritans in the New England colonies decreased. Bailyn discusses how “The desire to succeed in trade and to live the full life of English merchant-gentlemen was stronger than any counterforce the clergy could exert” (Bailyn 1955, 142). This book certainly has its place in history and its value to society but should not be the first resource used to educate future generations about the merchants of New England. Rather, newer and better books should be written that should do as the merchants of the seventeenth century did: learn from the past and make a better future.
Read
January 26, 2015My grandfather of 10 generations back is mentioned.
April 30, 2010
A little dated, but still good.
March 30, 2013
Dated, but an important book in the study of Atlantic trade.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews