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179 pages, Paperback
First published April 1, 1984
“ideology is eternal” (L. Althusser, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses 1969 in: On Ideology, p.49, Verso, 2020)Over time ideology no longer corresponds to any social-force, class, etc. from which the ideology arose. The real world may change, entire social-forces becoming obsolete, rendering aspects of an ideology obsolete. There is a fundamental schism as soon as the ideal no longer represents the real… our minds wander off, while the real world changes on its own somewhere else. Simultaneously ideology does not exist as material history, yet exists “eternally” (or for much longer) as concepts:
“The tradition of all the generations of the dead weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living.” (K. Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte 1852, p.9, FLP, Peking, 1978)
“what thus seems to take place outside ideology (to be precise, in the street), in reality takes place in ideology. What really takes place in ideology seems therefore to take place outside it. That is why those who are in ideology believe themselves by definition outside ideology: one of the effects of ideology is the practical denegation of the ideological character of ideology by ideology: ideology never says, ‘I am ideological’.” (L. Althusser, p.49)For instance those who say: ‘take this pill’, ‘sign up for my course’, ‘go live in the forest’, ‘consume this product’, ‘dye your hair’, ‘read this book’, ‘change your clothing’, ‘be authentic’, ‘change your identity’, ‘travel the world’, ‘find your true self’, ‘escape the matrix’. It is all bourgeois ideology (that is, to remain within the confines of bourgeois-society while tricking our minds to think we have escaped it, when in reality, the whole structure is preserved even better because we have adapted to our environment without fundamentally changing it).
“ideology has no outside” (L. Althusser, p.49)To say we can escape ideology (proletarian or bourgeois) is itself a product of bourgeois ideology. Ideology is exactly: the spook that we can somehow eliminate ideology (as if ideology was a spook). As soon as there is community and statehood, there is subjectivity through ideology. Just the same, there is no ‘pure thought’ or ‘pure science’ outside of ideology. It is impossible to eliminate ideology from science. Science is entirely marred by class. Every day we see science being subjected to the bourgeoisie, and turned into bourgeois ideology, a bourgeois subject for bourgeois interests. To disarm the masses ability to detect bourgeois ideology in science is criminal. Althusser writes a lot to the contrary:
“from within ideology we have to outline a discourse which tries to break with ideology, in order to dare to be the beginning of a scientific (i.e. subject-less) discourse on ideology.” (L. Althusser, p.47)The following is Althusser's incorrect logic, where only premise 1 is correct:
“It is necessary to be outside ideology, i.e. in scientific knowledge, to be able to say: I am in ideology…” (L. Althusser, p.49)
“all scientific discourse is by definition a subject-less discourse, there is no ‘Subject of science’ except in an ideology of science…” (L. Althusser, p.45)
“Marxist philosophy must break with the idealist category of the ‘subject’ as Origin, Essence and Cause, responsible in its internality for all the determinations of the external ‘Object’, of which it is said to be the internal ‘Subject’. For Marxist philosophy there can be no Subject as an Absolute Centre, as a Radical Origin, as a Unique Cause.” (L. Althusser, Reply to John Lewis 1973, in: On Ideology, p.135, Verso, 2020)
“the question of the ‘subject’ of history disappears. History is an immense natural-human system in movement, and the motor of history is class struggle. History is a process, and a process without a subject.” (L. Althusser, p.83)
“the working masses are the subject of history and the motive force of social progress. History develops through the struggle of the masses to transform nature and society. That history develops precisely means that the position and role of the masses as the subject of history are enhanced. The socio-historical movement has its own peculiar laws which are different from those of natural motion. Of course, the social movement has something in common with the natural movement in that it is also a motion of material. The social movement, too, is governed by the universal laws of the material world. But the social movement has its subject, whereas there is no such thing in the motion of nature. In nature the motion takes place spontaneously through the interaction of material elements which exist objectively. In contrast, the social movement is caused and developed by the volitional action and role of the subject. The subject of the social movement consists in the masses of the people. Without the masses there would be no social movement itself, nor would it be conceivable to talk about historical progress.” (Kim Jong Il, On the Juche Idea, p.14-15, FLPH, Pyongyang, Korea, 1982)Just as there is confusion about subject and object, there is confusion about society and nature. Society and nature are separate, society does not develop naturally. Simultaneously, society (the economy) encompasses both objective and subjective processes. Humans are the subject of society, hence we have relative control over it. Plants, animals and organisms are (though animals are not conscious in the same way as humans, the human brain being the most complex-highest organization of organic matter - the organic initially arising from inorganic material - and thanks to the historical development from ape to man through social-labour, the capacity or potential for human positive change over time now-immediately is greater than that of animals, which also does not mean that animals have no potential, for it was man who arose out from an animalistic basic-biological-instinctual base) the subject of nature, which is a stretch, hence it is difficult to speak of a goal, aim, or progression in nature (beyond basic biological-instinctual-development) in comparison with society which develops with conscious human intervention towards a rationalization of the entire process of production. There is a distinction between natural-processes of nature which progresses or develops in history through subjective intervention (labour) towards the economic-processes of society (considered as natural), all of which are objective-processes, contrary to subjective-political-movements. Marx’s main task was:
“to reveal the economic law of motion of modern society…” (K. Marx, Capital Vol. 1 1867, p.92, Penguin, 1990)The confusion between subject and object arises out of the economic-processes in history being not only seemingly natural (self-moving or objective, non-subjective), that is, a process bearing the birth-pangs of nature, but also developing in to a subjective-process through state and class intervention. Historically whichever class dominates the economy, proletarian, bourgeois, aristocratic, etc. and hence the state, has the most control of society overall… manipulating both society and even nature to their liking. Individuals are simultaneously the subjects, and objects of society. First, individuals are the object of society when affected by the economy, the environment, and surroundings. Second, individuals are the subject of society when in control the economy. Then split into classes: while the bourgeoisie may play a part in impelling the working masses to revolution, in comparison with the working masses, the bourgeoisie does not contribute socially necessary labour to the economy, hence the bourgeoisie cannot be considered revolutionary subjects of history. In the final analysis, the bourgeoisie is not the agent of change (the catalyst) in comparison to the role of socially necessary labourers. The bourgeoisie may be a subject in relation to the objective process compelling the proletariat to labour and revolution, however both being subjects and objects are in a reciprocal relationship of internal-motion or self-movement of the class-struggle. The proletariat may be a slave to the bourgeoisie when the bourgeoisie (through the private-property laws of bourgeois society) expropriates the product of labour of the proletariat, however, the proletariat is still the master over the bourgeoisie, when the proletariat has mastery over labour… in this sense the proletarian-master can only be a master by first being a slave to the bourgeoisie, yet simultaneously, the bourgeois pseudo-master is still a slave to the proletarian-slave, relying on the proletariat to labour for the profits and system that serves the bourgeoisie. As Kojève writes:
“We see, by the way, that for Hegel, as for Marx, the central phenomenon of the bourgeois World is not the enslavement of the working man, of the poor bourgeois, by the rich bourgeois, but the enslavement of both by Capital.” (A. Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit, p.65, Cornell University Press, 1980)Hence the bourgeois and proletarian are both enslaved to capital, the system itself, yet this system serves bourgeois consumption, and can only increase the proletarian’s practical skills but ultimately degrades the proletarian’s life-quality. Both classes are in constant motion, they are not eternally fixed. It is precisely this unity of opposites which causes their movement. The economic raising or lowering, or emerging and decaying of a class’s position is a decisive factor in whether they can ever be revolutionary political subjects to guide society, the historical-process as a whole. The political can only be changed in a voluntarist way, because it is not a natural but social-movement… while only economic-evolution can facilitate political-revolution, although economic-revolutions can only be implemented on mass through political revolutions.
“Scientific-technical inventions in themselves, however, are insufficient to bring about a real change in the technique of production. They can remain ineffective so long as economic conditions favorable to their application are absent.” (N. Kondratieff, The Long Waves in Economic Life 1935, p.7, Martino, 2014)This whole situation concerns whether or not the economic base overcomes the superstructure, or what aspect of the superstructure overcomes the economic base. Looking deeper into the writings of Althusser (proficient in theory) explains why Hoxha (proficient in revolution and socialist construction) would write:
“Althusser […] want[s] to proceed more quickly on the revisionist road.” (E. Hoxha, Eurocommunism is Anti-Communism 1980, p.190, NEPH, Toronto, 2022)Revisionism meaning:
“the revisionists floundered [...] into the swamp of philosophical vulgarization of science, replacing ‘artful’ (and revolutionary) dialectics by ‘simple’ (and tranquil) ‘evolution.’” (V.I. Lenin, Marxism and Revisionism 1908, in: On Marx and Engels, p.87, FLP, Peking, 1975)So, the role of consciousness of course does play a role in history, since subjects can intervene into history creating secondary determinations. Of course, individuals or subjects can even accelerate the process of history, if they are in the correct economic-position, and social conditions are ripe for change, following the objective tendency:
“World history would indeed be very easy to make if the struggle were taken up only on condition of infallibly favourable chances. On the other hand, it would be of a very mystical nature if ‘accidents’ played no part. These accidents naturally form part of the general course of development and are compensated for by other accidents. But acceleration and delay are very much dependent upon such ‘accidents,’ including the ‘accident’ of the character of the people who at first stand at the forefront of the movement.” (K. Marx to Ludwig Kugelmann, London, April 17, 1871, in: K. Marx, F. Engels, Selected Letters, p.38, FLP, Peking, 1977)But Althusser goes so far as to write:
“Here too the term ‘man’ has disappeared. We are forced to say in this connexion that scientific history, like all history, is a process without a subject, and that scientific knowledge (even when it is the work of a particular individual scientist, etc.) is actually the historical result of a process which has no real subject or goal(s) [….] all scientific knowledge, in every field, really is the result of a process without any subject or goal(s).” (L. Althusser, p.90)Althusser may as well claim individuals do not exist, and say that we are composed of only material-relations! Descartes may have been solipsist, but with Althusser we have a Lacanian opposite:
“I think where I am not, therefore I am where I do not think […] I am not wherever I am the plaything of my thought; I think of what I am where I do not think to think.” (J. Lacan, The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious or Reason since Freud 1957, in: Écrits A Selection, p.166, Tavistock Publications, 1982)Whereas Descartes only exists for Descartes (himself) in concept, Althusser does not exist for Althusser (himself) in concept, but only materially, preserving the ‘what’ and negating the ‘who’, when in truth, the ‘who’ is composed of the ‘what’. For instance, we change and shape ourselves by ourselves for others + we are unconsciously shaped by others and the material-economic social-formations around us, to the point where we do not even recognize ourselves anymore, eliminating our subjectivity altogether. Yet simultaneously when in social-relations, we can, as a class (an abstraction), become concrete as subjects, through obtaining revolutionary subjectivity.