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How Physics Makes Us Free by J. T. Ismael
In 1687 Isaac Newton ushered in a new scientific era in which laws of nature could be used to predict the movements of matter with almost perfect precision. Newton's physics also posed a profound challenge to our self-understanding, however, for the very same laws that keep airplanes in the air and rivers flowing downhill tell us that it is in principle possible to predict what each of us will do every second of our entire lives, given the early conditions of the universe. Can it really be that even while you toss and turn late at night in the throes of an important decision and it seems like the scales of fate hang in the balance, that your decision is a foregone conclusion? Can it really be that everything you have done and everything you ever will do is determined by facts that were in place long before you were born? This problem is one of the staples of philosophical discussion. It is discussed by everyone from freshman in their first philosophy class, to theoretical physicists in bars after conferences. And yet there is no topic that remains more unsettling, and less well understood. If you want to get behind the facade, past the bare statement of determinism, and really try to understand what physics is telling us in its own terms, read this book. The problem of free will raises all kinds of questions. What does it mean to make a decision, and what does it mean to say that our actions are determined? What are laws of nature? What are causes? What sorts of things are we, when viewed through the lenses of physics, and how do we fit into the natural order? Ismael provides a deeply informed account of what physics tells us about ourselves. The result is a vision that is abstract, alien, illuminating, and-Ismael argues-affirmative of most of what we all believe about our own freedom. Written in a jargon-free style, How Physics Makes Us Free provides an accessible and innovative take on a central question of human existence."
Unknown Binding
Published January 1, 1657
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About the author
Jenann Ismael
5 books24 followersJenann Ismael is Professor of Philosophy at the Columbia University. She received her M.A. and Ph.D. from Princeton. Her areas of specialization are philosophy of physics, metaphysics, philosophy of science and the philosophy of mind.
She has held fellowships from the Mellon Foundation, the NEH, Templeton, the National Humanities Center, and Stanford’s Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (CASBS).
She has held fellowships from the Mellon Foundation, the NEH, Templeton, the National Humanities Center, and Stanford’s Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (CASBS).
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Displaying 1 - 18 of 18 reviews
April 19, 2018
A challenging read, but I think a fairly educational one. Ismael covers many topics related to free will in this book. But I am left with several questions about her view, which it did not seem (to me) that she answered.
1. Does she think that because we have free will in the sense she outlines, we are morally responsible? It seems that she does think this because she argues against Galen Strawson, who says that we are not free in the sense necessary for moral responsibility, because we are not our own ultimate causes. But if this is the case, it does not seem to me that she has done enough to motivate her argument. She argues at length that we do have control over our actions in the sense of our acting freely, but she does not show that this freedom is sufficient for moral responsibility.
Furthermore, if self-governance (along with, say, the knowing performance of actions) is sufficient for moral responsibility, does this entail Ismael to holding corporations and governments morally responsible? (She claims that these institutions are self-governing, just like regular human agents.) If this is the case, this seems to me to be an implausible implication of her view. While it is obvious that we hold people morally responsible for the actions of corporations that they control (or have a say in causing), it strikes me as implausible that we would hold the corporation itself morally responsible.
2. It seems that much of what she argues could have been argued without the appeal to physics. For instance, she argues at length that we are self-governing systems, i.e. that we have the power to determine the trajectory of our entire selves, based on examination of our beliefs, desires, values, etc. But don't we already accept this pretty clearly without an appeal to the fundamental composition of organisms? I admit that her appeal to physics was useful and enlightening when discussing whether actions really are caused by the laws of the universe and the universe's prior states. But I do not see why such deep explanation was necessary for all her arguments.
3. I wonder whether she is really solving the arguments that she claims she is. Take the consequences argument, which contends that because we are not in control of the laws of the universe or the prior states of the universe, and these two things determine everything we do, we are not responsible for any actions. She argues that this misconstrues causation and the laws of nature. Laws of nature are not conceived of in science as being these universally determining things, and causation actually does not occur from past to future, but rather between different variables, depending on which ones are (arbitrarily) held constant. The appearance that causation only occurs from past to future is due to the fact that we are practically incapable of causing the past because our actions have much greater effects in the future than the past.
Okay, I'll grant all that (not that I have much choice, as I am quite ignorant of the science behind her arguments), but why can't someone (van Inwagen, perhaps) respond by saying "Okay, so let's just say that the way that particles bounce against each other and states of the universe determine your conception, birth, the dispositions you have, the actions you do, etc. You are also practically incapable of altering the way that these particles were situated or bounced together, as Ismael admits. So you don't have control over how the particles determined your dispositions, actions, etc. So you don't have control over your actions."
I mean I'm sure that argument is quite hideous and probably unsound (if not blatantly invalid), but I do wonder whether something similar to that could be constructed that would defeat Ismael's argument. My point is, Does it really matter how we construe these particular concepts scientifically? Can't the same point still be made by appealing to less theoretically charged concepts? I could very well have imagined this concern due to my lack of understanding of how particles (don't) cause each other's behaviour. But if not, it seems that Ismael will have to provide further evidence for why her argument really does show that physics makes us free.
In fact, even contending that governments or companies have 'free will' sans responsibility seems far-fetched. I think I would need to be sold quite a lot more on this to believe it. If Ismael isn't committed to this, then so much the better for her view.
Hopefully after digesting the book further I will be able to work out the answers to some of these questions, but for now I will just say that it reflects well on the book that I am interested enough to think about these questions further.
1. Does she think that because we have free will in the sense she outlines, we are morally responsible? It seems that she does think this because she argues against Galen Strawson, who says that we are not free in the sense necessary for moral responsibility, because we are not our own ultimate causes. But if this is the case, it does not seem to me that she has done enough to motivate her argument. She argues at length that we do have control over our actions in the sense of our acting freely, but she does not show that this freedom is sufficient for moral responsibility.
Furthermore, if self-governance (along with, say, the knowing performance of actions) is sufficient for moral responsibility, does this entail Ismael to holding corporations and governments morally responsible? (She claims that these institutions are self-governing, just like regular human agents.) If this is the case, this seems to me to be an implausible implication of her view. While it is obvious that we hold people morally responsible for the actions of corporations that they control (or have a say in causing), it strikes me as implausible that we would hold the corporation itself morally responsible.
2. It seems that much of what she argues could have been argued without the appeal to physics. For instance, she argues at length that we are self-governing systems, i.e. that we have the power to determine the trajectory of our entire selves, based on examination of our beliefs, desires, values, etc. But don't we already accept this pretty clearly without an appeal to the fundamental composition of organisms? I admit that her appeal to physics was useful and enlightening when discussing whether actions really are caused by the laws of the universe and the universe's prior states. But I do not see why such deep explanation was necessary for all her arguments.
3. I wonder whether she is really solving the arguments that she claims she is. Take the consequences argument, which contends that because we are not in control of the laws of the universe or the prior states of the universe, and these two things determine everything we do, we are not responsible for any actions. She argues that this misconstrues causation and the laws of nature. Laws of nature are not conceived of in science as being these universally determining things, and causation actually does not occur from past to future, but rather between different variables, depending on which ones are (arbitrarily) held constant. The appearance that causation only occurs from past to future is due to the fact that we are practically incapable of causing the past because our actions have much greater effects in the future than the past.
Okay, I'll grant all that (not that I have much choice, as I am quite ignorant of the science behind her arguments), but why can't someone (van Inwagen, perhaps) respond by saying "Okay, so let's just say that the way that particles bounce against each other and states of the universe determine your conception, birth, the dispositions you have, the actions you do, etc. You are also practically incapable of altering the way that these particles were situated or bounced together, as Ismael admits. So you don't have control over how the particles determined your dispositions, actions, etc. So you don't have control over your actions."
I mean I'm sure that argument is quite hideous and probably unsound (if not blatantly invalid), but I do wonder whether something similar to that could be constructed that would defeat Ismael's argument. My point is, Does it really matter how we construe these particular concepts scientifically? Can't the same point still be made by appealing to less theoretically charged concepts? I could very well have imagined this concern due to my lack of understanding of how particles (don't) cause each other's behaviour. But if not, it seems that Ismael will have to provide further evidence for why her argument really does show that physics makes us free.
In fact, even contending that governments or companies have 'free will' sans responsibility seems far-fetched. I think I would need to be sold quite a lot more on this to believe it. If Ismael isn't committed to this, then so much the better for her view.
Hopefully after digesting the book further I will be able to work out the answers to some of these questions, but for now I will just say that it reflects well on the book that I am interested enough to think about these questions further.
December 28, 2016
The ultimate book on free will.
*I read this back in July, but I just discovered this really neat Goodreads feature; when you connect your kindle with your Goodreads account, if you mark the book as 'read' on your kindle, all your highlights and notes (if any) will show up attached to your review on Goodreads. So, I marked it as 'read' again, so that my friends who like similar subjects can enjoy some of what I found most interesting about the book. Of course, after that, you'll want to read the whole book because, well, it's brilliant.
*I read this back in July, but I just discovered this really neat Goodreads feature; when you connect your kindle with your Goodreads account, if you mark the book as 'read' on your kindle, all your highlights and notes (if any) will show up attached to your review on Goodreads. So, I marked it as 'read' again, so that my friends who like similar subjects can enjoy some of what I found most interesting about the book. Of course, after that, you'll want to read the whole book because, well, it's brilliant.
May 21, 2021
It was not the easiest book to read but was worth the time. Some of the ideas about determinism and free will were new for me. However, pick this one up only if you are willing to put in a shift.
August 20, 2017
Brilliant insights into causes and choice. The most valuable part of the book, in my eyes, is Ismael's explanation of self-governing vs self-organizing systems. She makes a beautiful and life-affirming case for democracy, and indeed for the value of consciousness.
Even better is that, unlike many physics philosophers, Ismael doesn't feel the need to appeal to quantum indeterminacy or other easily-misunderstood subjects. If you've had high school physics, you can follow her arguments.
The meat of the book is a series of compatibilist arguments for free will. That is, arguments that while determinism is true, we still do have free will. Ismael is most fond of an argument involving a "counter-predictor" - a person or thing that listens to a prediction of what it'll do, and then does the opposite. This struck me as sophistry at first, but she gradually convinced me that the ease of constructing such a system is indeed very good evidence that we have free will.
Another argument is a rebuttal of the claim that our choices are predictions, not choices per se, of what will happen to us. The argument Ismael makes here implies that we only have free will when we have faith/ hope that our actions will indeed have the results we intend.
The prose is pretty academic; I wouldn't recommend this as a first philosophy book. It's never painful to read, but you won't breeze through it.
If you want a rigorous, hopeful read, I recommend it.
Even better is that, unlike many physics philosophers, Ismael doesn't feel the need to appeal to quantum indeterminacy or other easily-misunderstood subjects. If you've had high school physics, you can follow her arguments.
The meat of the book is a series of compatibilist arguments for free will. That is, arguments that while determinism is true, we still do have free will. Ismael is most fond of an argument involving a "counter-predictor" - a person or thing that listens to a prediction of what it'll do, and then does the opposite. This struck me as sophistry at first, but she gradually convinced me that the ease of constructing such a system is indeed very good evidence that we have free will.
Another argument is a rebuttal of the claim that our choices are predictions, not choices per se, of what will happen to us. The argument Ismael makes here implies that we only have free will when we have faith/ hope that our actions will indeed have the results we intend.
The prose is pretty academic; I wouldn't recommend this as a first philosophy book. It's never painful to read, but you won't breeze through it.
If you want a rigorous, hopeful read, I recommend it.
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November 24, 2024Kitap toplumsal dinamikleri, fizik kurallarına tabii tutarak aslında neyi neden yaptığımızı ya da yapamadığımızı soruşturuyor. Toplumsal karar mekanizmalarının bağlı olduğu temel dinamikleri açığa kavuşturmaya çalışıyor. Aslında epey de heyecan verici bir gidişat izliyor. Fakat bana kalırsa bu kitapta bir tık eksik kalan, benim de tez yazarken beceremediğim çok düşünür laneti, genişlemek genişlemek ve toparlayamamak olmuş sanırım. Yani teorik fizik bilmeyen bizlere, basitçe teorik fizik anlatıp, oradan da toplum teorisine bağlama niyetiyle yazılmış gibi hissetirirken,, bazen de teorik fizik bilmeyene bizlere, teorik fizik öğretmeye çalışıyor gibi geldi ve zorlandım biraz takip etmekte. Bir yandan ben de biraz kuramsal metin okurken tembel birine dönüştüm, o sebeple de olabilir. Yine de her türlü tanışmaya değer bir kitap bence. Anlamaya daha çok emek verebilsem, daha çok sever miydim emin değilim?
January 27, 2025
Frustrating because there is so little physics in the book [the title is ridiculous and misleading] and even less that is at the cutting edge. Will anyone be swayed by Newtonian explanations? There are a few intriguing ideas, but they are not well developed or well explained.
2+ stars
2+ stars
August 22, 2020
Excellent compatibilist(?) argument for free will grounded in our current understanding of physics. By no means an easy read. Philosophical jargon used to ensure (I think) precision in the author's arguments is moderated somewhat by helpful analogies and a (frustratingly incomplete) glossary. That said, the book is a welcome salve for those of us bothered by the implications of a deterministic universe. I am excited to next read some of the author's recommended works in the endnotes.
If you pick this up and decide not read the whole thing, I recommend at least reviewing Chapter 7 on the Paradox of Predictability and Chapter 9's Closing Parable for an explanation as to why we are all capable of howling at the moon at the "Magical Moment of the Telling."
If you pick this up and decide not read the whole thing, I recommend at least reviewing Chapter 7 on the Paradox of Predictability and Chapter 9's Closing Parable for an explanation as to why we are all capable of howling at the moon at the "Magical Moment of the Telling."
October 23, 2025
Excellent book—deep and articulate.
The ideas are impactful, and the way everything comes together is highly original. Starting by explaining what the Self is, Ismael gradually dissects what classical physics and determinism truly bring to the table, leading to the question of free will.
I especially enjoyed the sections on physical laws and how the Paradox of Predictability is used. The chapter on fatalism summarizes both themes succinctly and clearly.
Jenann Ismael’s writing is impeccable, but as much as she tries—by using analogies and avoiding philosophical jargon—the text still feels academic. The style is stilted and, at some points, even convoluted, making it a dense read best digested slowly.
The ideas are impactful, and the way everything comes together is highly original. Starting by explaining what the Self is, Ismael gradually dissects what classical physics and determinism truly bring to the table, leading to the question of free will.
I especially enjoyed the sections on physical laws and how the Paradox of Predictability is used. The chapter on fatalism summarizes both themes succinctly and clearly.
Jenann Ismael’s writing is impeccable, but as much as she tries—by using analogies and avoiding philosophical jargon—the text still feels academic. The style is stilted and, at some points, even convoluted, making it a dense read best digested slowly.
August 28, 2024
The book is about compatibilism of free will with determinism. This, to my understanding, means that yes we are made of these deterministic cogs but hey they are so many that the overall behavior is unpredictable and we cannot pinpoint a single cog causing it. So yes everything is determined but maybe there's room for free will somewhere. Even though apparently compatibilists cannot really say where and how.
Difficult read, interesting from time to time but overall sloggish. I'm pretty sure the author can write a better and clearer book on the topic, that is a decent point of view on its own. And nor real physics really shows up anywhere.
Difficult read, interesting from time to time but overall sloggish. I'm pretty sure the author can write a better and clearer book on the topic, that is a decent point of view on its own. And nor real physics really shows up anywhere.
June 14, 2020
I don't read a ton of philosophy or nonfiction, so I came to this book from the perspective of a layperson who just happens to think a lot about determinism and free will. Ismael has some really insightful points and interesting examples, and she addresses most of the arguments for determinism (that I can think of off the top of my head). However, I felt like her writing style always edged on the side of being too wordy/having too many examples. Maybe I missed a lot of the nuance, but it felt like many of the chapters could have been distilled into much shorter points.
November 15, 2023
This book was not an easy read, Ismael is painstaking in her analysis of what consciousness is, how it comes to be, and why it means free will exists.
Dry, but informative. I am convinced. I will switch my multi-decades long opinion about the deterministic universe. I am now sure that we do, in fact, have a choice. That free will exists. That we are all masters of our fate, captains of our soul.
Not sure if I'm happy about it though.
Dry, but informative. I am convinced. I will switch my multi-decades long opinion about the deterministic universe. I am now sure that we do, in fact, have a choice. That free will exists. That we are all masters of our fate, captains of our soul.
Not sure if I'm happy about it though.
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February 13, 2024I tried and tried but this book is too dry for me and far too detailed. It felt like the author was almost purposefully making some subject matter more detailed just to obscure her arguments. Or she is just very detailed about her arguments. Either way, it was a slog and I will have to come back another time and revisit it. So, no rating...yet.
November 29, 2019
I didn't quite make it to the end. Started to get pretty hard to follow, but I did like the general premise of the self-governing system. Still didn't seem to be clear about the connection between that system and consciousness though. Maybe it just will take a second try.
October 26, 2021
Amazing ideas, but written/arranged quite poorly. Possibly a bit over done in places. But she really convinced me to move away from my more deterministic viewpoints, so kudos to Ismael
February 18, 2017
A thoroughly enjoyable read. It is also very illuminating on the emergence of a coherent self! Not for someone who wants a very rigorous (and potentially dry) discussion of free will, but is excellent for someone who wants a descriptively rich sense of how Newtonian physics could be compatible with free will. Even though I find myself not quite convinced of her arguments, I am able to better articulate where my obstacle is, and find myself nevertheless somehow reassured of my agency in the world.
April 7, 2021
I found this difficult to follow, especially the first part. However, there were some ideas, causality of physical laws and counter - predictive devices in particular that deserve further investigation. A difficult subject not rendered much more understandable for me by this book.
July 3, 2016
Too boring. Stopped reading very early on as I prioritized root canal treatment.
March 25, 2017
Elucidating and satisfying!
Displaying 1 - 18 of 18 reviews