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The Zimmermann Telegram: Intelligence, Diplomacy, and America's Entry Into World War I
By the winter of 1916/17, World War I had reached a deadlock. While the Allies commanded greater resources and fielded more soldiers than the Central Powers, German armies had penetrated deep into Russia and France, and tenaciously held on to their conquered empire. Hoping to break the stalemate on the western front, the exhausted Allies sought to bring the neutral United States into the conflict.
A golden opportunity to force American intervention seemed at hand when British naval intelligence intercepted a secret telegram detailing a German alliance offer to Mexico. In it, Berlin's foreign secretary, Arthur Zimmermann, offered his country's support to Mexico for re-conquering "the lost territory in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona" in exchange for a Mexican attack on the United States, should the latter enter the war on the side of the Allies. The British handed a copy of the Telegram to the American government, which in turn leaked it to the press. On March 1, 1917, the Telegram made headline news across the United States, and five weeks later, America entered World War I.
Based on an examination of virtually all available German, British, and U.S. government records, this book presents the definitive account of the Telegram and questions many traditional views on the origins, cryptanalysis, and impact of the German alliance scheme. While the Telegram has often been described as the final step in a carefully planned German strategy to gain a foothold in the western hemisphere, this book argues that the scheme was a spontaneous initiative by a minor German foreign office official, which gained traction only because of a lack of supervision and coordination at the top echelon of the German government. On the other hand, the book argues, American and British secret services had collaborated closely since 1915 to bring the United States into the war, and the Telegram's interception and disclosure represented the crowning achievement of this clandestine Anglo-American intelligence alliance. Moreover, the book explicitly challenges the widely accepted notion that the Telegram's publication in the U.S. press rallied Americans for war. Instead, it contends that the Telegram divided the public by poisoning the debate over intervention, and by failing to offer peace-minded Americans a convincing rationale for supporting the war. The book also examines the Telegram's effect on the memory of World War I through the twentieth century and beyond.
A golden opportunity to force American intervention seemed at hand when British naval intelligence intercepted a secret telegram detailing a German alliance offer to Mexico. In it, Berlin's foreign secretary, Arthur Zimmermann, offered his country's support to Mexico for re-conquering "the lost territory in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona" in exchange for a Mexican attack on the United States, should the latter enter the war on the side of the Allies. The British handed a copy of the Telegram to the American government, which in turn leaked it to the press. On March 1, 1917, the Telegram made headline news across the United States, and five weeks later, America entered World War I.
Based on an examination of virtually all available German, British, and U.S. government records, this book presents the definitive account of the Telegram and questions many traditional views on the origins, cryptanalysis, and impact of the German alliance scheme. While the Telegram has often been described as the final step in a carefully planned German strategy to gain a foothold in the western hemisphere, this book argues that the scheme was a spontaneous initiative by a minor German foreign office official, which gained traction only because of a lack of supervision and coordination at the top echelon of the German government. On the other hand, the book argues, American and British secret services had collaborated closely since 1915 to bring the United States into the war, and the Telegram's interception and disclosure represented the crowning achievement of this clandestine Anglo-American intelligence alliance. Moreover, the book explicitly challenges the widely accepted notion that the Telegram's publication in the U.S. press rallied Americans for war. Instead, it contends that the Telegram divided the public by poisoning the debate over intervention, and by failing to offer peace-minded Americans a convincing rationale for supporting the war. The book also examines the Telegram's effect on the memory of World War I through the twentieth century and beyond.
320 pages, Hardcover
First published October 15, 2012
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Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
August 13, 2013
I knew little about the Zimmerman Telegram before reading the book besides the fact that my high school textbook called it a turning point during World War I. This book goes into voluminous detail about what led to the decision to send the Telegram. It profiles the German diplomatic corps, the infighting in the German government during World War I, and how British intelligence obtained the telegram and gave it to the Americans. The British "Room 40" are the protagonists of the book, but not necessarily the heroes; Boghardt does an excellent job of showing the problems of British intelligence and the harm caused by their methods.
The problem with military/diplomatic history is that it easily falls into the trap of "Great Man History." This book is not immune to that fault, but the author adds a fair deal of context about the financial situation during the war as well as an excellent chapter analyzing the impact of the Zimmermann telegram on public opinion during March, 1917. That chapter was my favorite part of the book, and I would highly recommend it to WWI buffs.
The book's main theme, in my opinion, is the advantages and the pitfalls of intelligence operations. Boghardt does an excellent job of walking the tightrope of respecting the importance of military innovation without hero worshiping the innovators. I found that the weakness of the book was that it focused too heavily on the European opinions of the Telegram. One chapter at the beginning of the book talks about Mexico's role in seeking alliances with Germany and a chapter at the end talks about Mexico's reaction to the telegram. There is not much from the Mexican point of view in between, though. The Japanese were also a big influence on the Zimmermann Telegram, and Boghardt does a poor job of contextualizing their motives in WWI diplomacy.
Overall, I thought the book was just over the 4.5 star line. Despite its failure to properly consider Mexican and Japanese diplomacy, it does an exemplary job of bridging the microhistory of the Zimmermann Telegram with the wider war.
The problem with military/diplomatic history is that it easily falls into the trap of "Great Man History." This book is not immune to that fault, but the author adds a fair deal of context about the financial situation during the war as well as an excellent chapter analyzing the impact of the Zimmermann telegram on public opinion during March, 1917. That chapter was my favorite part of the book, and I would highly recommend it to WWI buffs.
The book's main theme, in my opinion, is the advantages and the pitfalls of intelligence operations. Boghardt does an excellent job of walking the tightrope of respecting the importance of military innovation without hero worshiping the innovators. I found that the weakness of the book was that it focused too heavily on the European opinions of the Telegram. One chapter at the beginning of the book talks about Mexico's role in seeking alliances with Germany and a chapter at the end talks about Mexico's reaction to the telegram. There is not much from the Mexican point of view in between, though. The Japanese were also a big influence on the Zimmermann Telegram, and Boghardt does a poor job of contextualizing their motives in WWI diplomacy.
Overall, I thought the book was just over the 4.5 star line. Despite its failure to properly consider Mexican and Japanese diplomacy, it does an exemplary job of bridging the microhistory of the Zimmermann Telegram with the wider war.
June 17, 2019
A solid, insightful history of the people and forces behind Germany’s attempt to keep the US out of the war, and behind Britain’s attempt to achieve the opposite.
Boghardt describes how the idea originated in the German foreign ministry, how the telegram was intercepted during routine monitoring of American diplomatic traffic, how the British decrypted it, how they revealed it to the Americans while keeping their interception of American telegrams a secret, how Blinker Hall shared it with the Americans without authorization from superiors, and how it impacted American politics and public opinion.
Boghardt also covers how the idea had been circulating among German officials for years (rather than being the result of brain-dead German bureaucrats), and how the American public, rather than being outraged, quickly lost interest or suspected it was part of a British plot. Boghardt also does a great job describing the operations of Room 40 and its lack of oversight, as well as its impact on later British signals intelligence organizations.
Some more context on the Mexican Revolution might have helped. Still, a well-researched, well-written and engaging work.
Boghardt describes how the idea originated in the German foreign ministry, how the telegram was intercepted during routine monitoring of American diplomatic traffic, how the British decrypted it, how they revealed it to the Americans while keeping their interception of American telegrams a secret, how Blinker Hall shared it with the Americans without authorization from superiors, and how it impacted American politics and public opinion.
Boghardt also covers how the idea had been circulating among German officials for years (rather than being the result of brain-dead German bureaucrats), and how the American public, rather than being outraged, quickly lost interest or suspected it was part of a British plot. Boghardt also does a great job describing the operations of Room 40 and its lack of oversight, as well as its impact on later British signals intelligence organizations.
Some more context on the Mexican Revolution might have helped. Still, a well-researched, well-written and engaging work.
November 5, 2023
What distinguishes this book from Barbara Tuchman's eponymous work from 1958 is time and focus. Time opened more closed files and allowed other authors a chance to revisit the events of early 1917. Consequently a number of errors have corrected.
As noted by its subtitle, this work looks at Intelligence, Diplomacy, and America's Entry into World War I. I will note one significant error corrected by the book in each area. There is a lot more in the book, which is a well=-written must-read for anyone interested in any of the topics covered.
Intelligence: Early on in the war, the British cut Germany's overseas cable communication to the Americas, forcing them to use workarounds. Tuchman and others advanced the theory that Germany used three routes to get the Zimmermann Telegram to its envoy in Mexico: radio wiregram to a wireless station in New Jersey; forwarded by the Swedish Foreign Ministry; and in a cable sent by the US Ambassador in Berlin. (! President Wilson agreed to let Imperial Germany send messages via the US embassy in hopes of advancing his peace proposals.) Tuchman and others then claimed that it was the copy sent via Sweden that was intercepted by the UK. But Boghardt shows that this was British disinformation: German records show only one route, via US diplomatic traffic - the UK did not want to reveal that it was intercepting AND reading American diplomatic traffic, and hid that fact for decades.
Diplomacy: Zimmermann's rapid acknowledgement that Germany, and he, had proposed an alliance between Germany and Mexico has long been called a"blunder" (quoting Wilson's SecState Robert Lansing), a "historic boner" (Tuchman) and worse. Boghardt cites Zimmermann's own defense of the proposal as consistent with the wartime diplomacy of other belligerents, such as the extravagant promises of the Allies to Italy to induce's Rome's entry into the war in 1915. The proposal to Mexico is also consistent with prior actions taken by Germany, such as supplying arms via Vera Cruz in early 1914 (Ypiranga incident), covert operations run by Germany's military attache in Washington against the US, and other acts of sabotage. (See the excellent: Dark Invasion - 1915: Germany's Secret War and the Hunt for the First Terrorist Cell in America.) Zimmermann argued the problem wasn't the proposal, which was normal fare for the time, but its untimely (for Germany) revelation.
America's Entry into World War I: In his postwar memoirs, SecState Lansing cited a memo he wrote just after publication of the Zimmermann Telegram. As set out by Boghardt, Lansing wrote that the Telegram was "the profound sensation," and "resulted in unifying public sentiment throughout the United States against Germany, in putting the people solidly behind the government and making war inevitable." By carefully surveying public opinion as reflected in newspapers throughout the country, and assessing the Congressional debate in Washington for and against war in April 1917, Boghardt makes a substantiated, substantial and convincing case that the Telegram's effect on American public opinion and political stances was transitory. He goes on to show that the greatest effect was on President Wilson himself. Until the Telegram, Wilson wavered on how to respond to Germany's resumption of unlimited submarine warfare. The Telegram hardened Wilson's view: not so much the content of the Telegram itself, but the audacity and duplicity of Germany using America's own secure communications against it, a privilege specifically granted and enlarged (to the use of private ciphers in such messages) by Wilson himself.
Boghardt argues that Wilson could have gotten Congressional support for any resposne he proposed to Germany's actions; in such a situation, the Telegram's decisive effect was on Wilson himself.
Boghardt discusses one after-effect of the Telegram incident, and alludes to another. The head of Britain's wireless intercept organization, "Blinker" Hall, is seen as a key figure in the release of the so-called "Zinoviev letter" - an "October surprise" released just ahead of the 1924 UK General Election, purporting close links between the Soviet Comintern (headed by Zinoviev) to the Communist Party of Great Britain, instructring the latter to engage in seditious actions. The letter weakened support for the UK's first Labour Government, leading to the return of the "anti-Bolshevik" Tories (Hall was himself a Tory MP by this time). (The "Zinoviev letter" is now widely seen as a forgery, in contrast to the Zimmermann Telegram, whose authencity was almost immediatly acknowledged by Zimmermann himself). I would also note that the release of the Zimmermann Telegram was an early instance of the then-nascent US-UK intelligence alliance, now over a hundred years old and widened and strengthened into the current Five Eyes (US, UK, Canada, Australia, NZ).
As noted by its subtitle, this work looks at Intelligence, Diplomacy, and America's Entry into World War I. I will note one significant error corrected by the book in each area. There is a lot more in the book, which is a well=-written must-read for anyone interested in any of the topics covered.
Intelligence: Early on in the war, the British cut Germany's overseas cable communication to the Americas, forcing them to use workarounds. Tuchman and others advanced the theory that Germany used three routes to get the Zimmermann Telegram to its envoy in Mexico: radio wiregram to a wireless station in New Jersey; forwarded by the Swedish Foreign Ministry; and in a cable sent by the US Ambassador in Berlin. (! President Wilson agreed to let Imperial Germany send messages via the US embassy in hopes of advancing his peace proposals.) Tuchman and others then claimed that it was the copy sent via Sweden that was intercepted by the UK. But Boghardt shows that this was British disinformation: German records show only one route, via US diplomatic traffic - the UK did not want to reveal that it was intercepting AND reading American diplomatic traffic, and hid that fact for decades.
Diplomacy: Zimmermann's rapid acknowledgement that Germany, and he, had proposed an alliance between Germany and Mexico has long been called a"blunder" (quoting Wilson's SecState Robert Lansing), a "historic boner" (Tuchman) and worse. Boghardt cites Zimmermann's own defense of the proposal as consistent with the wartime diplomacy of other belligerents, such as the extravagant promises of the Allies to Italy to induce's Rome's entry into the war in 1915. The proposal to Mexico is also consistent with prior actions taken by Germany, such as supplying arms via Vera Cruz in early 1914 (Ypiranga incident), covert operations run by Germany's military attache in Washington against the US, and other acts of sabotage. (See the excellent: Dark Invasion - 1915: Germany's Secret War and the Hunt for the First Terrorist Cell in America.) Zimmermann argued the problem wasn't the proposal, which was normal fare for the time, but its untimely (for Germany) revelation.
America's Entry into World War I: In his postwar memoirs, SecState Lansing cited a memo he wrote just after publication of the Zimmermann Telegram. As set out by Boghardt, Lansing wrote that the Telegram was "the profound sensation," and "resulted in unifying public sentiment throughout the United States against Germany, in putting the people solidly behind the government and making war inevitable." By carefully surveying public opinion as reflected in newspapers throughout the country, and assessing the Congressional debate in Washington for and against war in April 1917, Boghardt makes a substantiated, substantial and convincing case that the Telegram's effect on American public opinion and political stances was transitory. He goes on to show that the greatest effect was on President Wilson himself. Until the Telegram, Wilson wavered on how to respond to Germany's resumption of unlimited submarine warfare. The Telegram hardened Wilson's view: not so much the content of the Telegram itself, but the audacity and duplicity of Germany using America's own secure communications against it, a privilege specifically granted and enlarged (to the use of private ciphers in such messages) by Wilson himself.
Boghardt argues that Wilson could have gotten Congressional support for any resposne he proposed to Germany's actions; in such a situation, the Telegram's decisive effect was on Wilson himself.
Boghardt discusses one after-effect of the Telegram incident, and alludes to another. The head of Britain's wireless intercept organization, "Blinker" Hall, is seen as a key figure in the release of the so-called "Zinoviev letter" - an "October surprise" released just ahead of the 1924 UK General Election, purporting close links between the Soviet Comintern (headed by Zinoviev) to the Communist Party of Great Britain, instructring the latter to engage in seditious actions. The letter weakened support for the UK's first Labour Government, leading to the return of the "anti-Bolshevik" Tories (Hall was himself a Tory MP by this time). (The "Zinoviev letter" is now widely seen as a forgery, in contrast to the Zimmermann Telegram, whose authencity was almost immediatly acknowledged by Zimmermann himself). I would also note that the release of the Zimmermann Telegram was an early instance of the then-nascent US-UK intelligence alliance, now over a hundred years old and widened and strengthened into the current Five Eyes (US, UK, Canada, Australia, NZ).
April 5, 2024
I read this for my World War 1 in American history class. I got to pick a book and was excited to learn more about the Zimmerman telegram, but I don’t know what it was about this book that made me hate it. Maybe it was the time of year or how long it was, but it felt like a drag and like it would never end. I found myself liking a lot of the other nonfiction World War 1 books I picked up for this class, but I clearly chose poorly for myself on this one.
September 22, 2021
I read this as a follow up to Barbara Tuchman’s Zimmermann Telegram book. This Boghardt work is more recent and benefits from the declassification of British, American, Mexican and German archives and WWI military papers. The author corrects a couple of errors that are found in Tuchman’s earlier work. This was much dryer and more academic.
September 30, 2013
A friend told me that he had read this very good book called "The Zimmerman Telegram". After checking on Amazon I asked him if he had the older book by Tuchman or the more recent book by Boghardt. He said he had read the older book. Even with his great recommendation on the Tuchman book Idecided to read the later one. I probably would have had more fun reading Tuchman's book since it describes a lot of drama about keeping how the information was obtained regarding the telegram. But Tuchman was using information that came from British intelligence and it was designed to to hide the fact that the British had been listening in on American secure transmissions for a long time and continued to do so long after the end of WWI. Boghardt went to great lengths to document not only the Zimmerman telegram but the British control of information to America. The book was not an easy read but if you are really interested in WWI then it was a very good book.
October 31, 2015
An interesting and concise text. I read/skimmed/gutted this book as part of a German History class in grad school and enjoyed it. I'd have to return to it to really dice out any particulars, but if you have an interest in diplomatic/intelligence history, this is a book for you.
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September 20, 2013940.3112 B6749 2012
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews