Grant's Secret Service: The Intelligence War from Belmont to Appomattox

by William B. Feis

William B. Feis offers us the first scholarly examination of the use of military intelligence under Ulysses S. Grant’s command during the Civil War. Feis makes the new and provocative argument that Grant’s use of the Army of the Potomac’s Bureau of Military Information played a significant role in Lee’s defeat. Feis’s work articulately rebuts accusations by Grant’s detractors that his battlefield successes involved little more than the bludgeoning of an undermanned and outgunned opponent.

Genres: History, Civil War, Espionage, Nonfiction, War, American Civil War, Military Fiction

330 pages, Hardcover

First published March 1, 2002

Reviews

[Bob R Bogle · Rating 3 out of 5]

Intriguing and tantalizing as William B Feis'2002 book Grant's Secret Service: the Intelligence War from Belmont to Appomattox is, ultimately it fails to live up to its promise, which perhaps is less the fault of Feis than a failure of the supporting evidence and stories we most want to know to survive the intervening fourteen decades.

Feis successfully grafts on a new dimension to the story of US Grant at war, providing the names of certain spies and scouts and networks of the same, providing intermittent streams of intelligence, accurate and flawed, in Grant's general direction. By itself this is useful and often fascinating information, as American Civil War history has a way of gravitating to decisions made by generals which are presented in a vacuum: here are identified some of the voices of those who contributed to those decisions in the higher echelons. Unfortunately, we get relatively little sense of the personalities of these clandestine figures, and much less do we hear what their whispered voices actually said. Feis makes known their ghostly presence in the periphery and in the lonely, dangerous wilderness beyond, but the significance of the contribution of their intelligence remains elusive.

Of course it's a matter of good spy- and scout-craft to leave footprints as light as possible. Feis paints a broad picture of some of Grant's sources of intelligence, but it's doubtful we'll ever learn what those reports said and what importance they actually had in influencing Grant's decisions and choices. And as Feis points out again and again, Grant as a rule preferred holding onto the initiative to relying on military intelligence.

Discussion of Grenville Dodge's network of scouts centered at Corinth was most illuminating, as was the perception of Jubal Early's raid on Washington as an intelligence failure: the linking of the last Shenandoah Valley campaign with the Petersburg campaign as an integrated strategy by Lee was enlightening.

At the ends of most chapters Feis presents a few paragraphs of summary that usually are intended to show how intelligence influenced individual battles or campaigns. As often as not I felt opposite conclusions might as well have been drawn from the same evidence that had been presented: that is to say, he seemed to be cherry-picking his conclusions to fit his thesis that intelligence operations were more central to Grant's decision-making than we might have supposed. I will say the maps in this book are truly superb. Curiously, a number of editorial errors are present: use of a wrong word, improper punctuation of "its", etc. Nevertheless, this book is a quick read and a real page-turner: it's just that it doesn't quite deliver the goods we most want. (Even the Corinth interval comes somewhat to life in the material about Dodge.) This may be the best book that could be written about this subject. One wishes that a more illuminating book had been possible, and hopes against hope that in the future more solid evidence will be discovered that provides clearer insight into the personalities of the spies in the shadows, and the specific contributions of military intelligence in Grant's military career.

[BT Philips · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book offers good insight into the mind of General Grant during his height as a commander of armies in the Civil War. Grant's dual reliance upon comprehensive intelligence gathering and dogged determination is well documented in this book. Each of Grant's actions in the war, ranging from Missouri and Kentucky in 1861 to the last days of the war in Virginia, are covered with detail. The specific focus Feis gives to the intelligence-gathering side of Grant's campaigns helps highlight the qualities that led Grant to great success, and some bits of failure, as a war general. While it is admitted here that military intelligence was not the sole factor in Grant's successes, the Union armies under Grant's command would've had prolonged difficulty in winning the war without it.

[Chris Miller · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a great look at Ulysses Grant and his interactions with the gathering, analyzing, and using information and intelligence in the Civil War. Dr. Feis certainly dots his Is and crosses his ts with his research and writing. He approaches the subject chronologically and is careful to show how the General used, misused, or ignored what the 'other side' was doing. Dr. Feis also provides a class on the intelligence arm itself with careful explanations of what is or is not 'knowable.' A great read for the military or Civil War buff.

[David Engel · Rating 3 out of 5]

A look at the use of information from spies, deserters, scouts and other sources within the Confederacy, the use of that information and Grant's stance on the importance of it. I enjoyed seeing his campaigns from this perspective.

[Roger King · Rating 4 out of 5]

Even the most seasoned USG fans will learn much from this book!