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Why Would Anyone Believe in God? (Cognitive Science of Religion) by Justin L. Barrett
Because of the design of our minds. That is Justin Barrett's simple answer to the question of his title. With rich evidence from cognitive science but without technical language, psychologist Barrett shows that belief in God is an almost inevitable consequence of the kind of minds we have. Most of what we believe comes from mental tools working below our conscious awareness. And what we believe consciously is in large part driven by these unconscious beliefs. Barrett demonstrates that beliefs in gods match up well with these automatic assumptions; beliefs in an all-knowing, all-powerful God match up even better. Barrett goes on to explain why beliefs like religious beliefs are so widespread and why it is very difficult for our minds to think without them. Anyone who wants a concise, clear, and scientific explanation of why anyone would believe in God should pick up Barrett's book.
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First published May 28, 2004
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August 30, 2016
In "Why Would Anyone Believe in God?", Justin L. Barrett explores the landscape of cognitive science to demonstrate how a belief in god or gods is a pervasive human phenomenon. Barrett contends that belief in gods is natural due to the way our minds operate and perceive the world. Barrett begins with an easy to follow explanation of how the brain uses a variety of tools without conscious awareness to make sense of our environments, memories, and experiences. His foundational argument is that beliefs make sense to us and become pervasive when they engage a wide variety of our mental tools. From this point, Barrett shows how a belief in god/s that have initially counterintuitive properties (such as being all-knowing, eternal, immortal, and/or super-powerful) actually become easy to accept and understand when they satisfy many of our non-conscious mental tools.
Barrett’s explanations of the science of belief are quite easy to follow. If anything, some sections tend to repeat the same themes and claims. However, this aspect of the writing arguably makes complex scientific concepts easier to digest. In my opinion, the most interesting portions of Barrett’s work rest in two latter chapters. Chapter 6 discusses how children develop an understanding of God intuitively. This chapter focuses particularly on how the properties of the Abrahamic concept of God contributed to its success in human history. This chapter references the most developmental psychology studies, but Barrett uses these studies to back up many interesting claims. I enjoyed his discussions on moral realism and how it relates to the belief in God, as well as the intricacies of our non-conscious mental tools. In chapter 8, Barrett argues that atheism is an “unnatural” phenomenon because it arises out of rare environments and only through fundamentally counterintuitive ways of thinking. This is a controversial argument, but Barrett’s reflections on both atheism and theism are clearly nonjudgmental and based on reasonable conclusions from scientific work.
This is not an emotionally compelling book on God. Although Barrett is a Christian himself, his own religious views are not relevant nor do they color his arguments. However, as a student of religions, I believe this piece of scholarship is incredibly important. Despite being published in 2004, Barrett’s arguments will, I suspect, ripple across many different areas of religious studies. If anything, this book helped me become more empathetic towards theists, atheists, and any believer in the supernatural. After all, the question of a higher power's existence is quite literally one that our brains cannot ignore.
October 21, 2022
Motivatedly sloppy and misleading clutching at straws.
Some books are the product of looking at the world through rose-tinted glasses. This book is a product of looking at selected human psychology through Calvinism.
Supposed Theory of Mind (ToM) applies equally well to non-religious fictional characters. Why does he seem unaware of this, and discuss what differentiates religious characters from them? The difference between a telepathic movie character and a god is the difference between an H.G. Wells novel and an Orson Welles radio adaptation thereof.
He can't help but let slip a few bits and pieces whose relevance he ignores. eg Since he knows of the effect of telling children what cats can do, why doesn't he confront head on the fact that children are told highly relevant details about religious characters that their "ToM" can operate on?
He gets atrociously bad in chapter 7 where he tries to justify Plantinga's non sense through a muddled exploration of the relationship between minds and bodies and brains.
And what about chapter 8, where he shows absolutely NO understanding of how I as an atheist experience the world? For instance on page 111 where he says that it is SUGGESTED that children MAY SEEM to have creationist tendencies, before demanding that to be an atheist I HAVE to spend prodigious efforts to subdue this kind of shit from pestering my mind. It's like insisting that if he SUGGESTS to me that there MAY be heavy hail later today here in sunny South Africa, I will HAVE to carry a steel umbrella to the shop. The man is an imbecile projecting his personal imbecility into my brain.
Some books are the product of looking at the world through rose-tinted glasses. This book is a product of looking at selected human psychology through Calvinism.
Supposed Theory of Mind (ToM) applies equally well to non-religious fictional characters. Why does he seem unaware of this, and discuss what differentiates religious characters from them? The difference between a telepathic movie character and a god is the difference between an H.G. Wells novel and an Orson Welles radio adaptation thereof.
He can't help but let slip a few bits and pieces whose relevance he ignores. eg Since he knows of the effect of telling children what cats can do, why doesn't he confront head on the fact that children are told highly relevant details about religious characters that their "ToM" can operate on?
He gets atrociously bad in chapter 7 where he tries to justify Plantinga's non sense through a muddled exploration of the relationship between minds and bodies and brains.
And what about chapter 8, where he shows absolutely NO understanding of how I as an atheist experience the world? For instance on page 111 where he says that it is SUGGESTED that children MAY SEEM to have creationist tendencies, before demanding that to be an atheist I HAVE to spend prodigious efforts to subdue this kind of shit from pestering my mind. It's like insisting that if he SUGGESTS to me that there MAY be heavy hail later today here in sunny South Africa, I will HAVE to carry a steel umbrella to the shop. The man is an imbecile projecting his personal imbecility into my brain.
June 24, 2009
This book, while a bit theoretical (out of necessity, given the young field), was very interesting to me. It makes me want to study cognitive science of religion. Maybe I will someday?
Part of what makes Barrett's work interesting (which he will be continuing with a new book about children "Born Believers") is that he comes from a Christian perspective. This differentiates him from the bulk of scholars in cognitive science of religion. Nevertheless, Barrett maintains a respectably neutral approach, his conclusions neither adding nor taking away from the truth claims of religion. In this way he reminds me of William James.
Part of what makes Barrett's work interesting (which he will be continuing with a new book about children "Born Believers") is that he comes from a Christian perspective. This differentiates him from the bulk of scholars in cognitive science of religion. Nevertheless, Barrett maintains a respectably neutral approach, his conclusions neither adding nor taking away from the truth claims of religion. In this way he reminds me of William James.
February 27, 2025
I read just chapters 1-3, 6 and 8 of this short book, which were presented as a coherent article on the internet. The book starts with an analysis religious thought that is lifted from Boyer (e.g., The Fracture Of An Illusion: Science And The Dissolution Of Religion), whom Barrett credits. The gist, as stated by Boyer, is that religious thoughts generally meet two conditions. They “(1) include a violation of domain-level intuitions (a talking tree violates the understanding that all plants are silent) and (2) allow inferences from relevant non-violated assumptions (talking trees still grow, have leaves).” Satisfaction of these conditions “is sufficient to account for the recurrent features of supernatural concepts the world over.” (Boyer, p. 29) As Barrett puts it, religious beliefs are can be accounted for as being interpretations of non-reflective beliefs. That is, one’s innate and unreflective understanding of how the world works (things fall down, they don’t pass through walls), and particularly one’s alertness to potential threats, are easily integrated by one’s “theory of mind” into an interpretation of the world that includes “religious entities”. (Barrett, p. 1) Following Boyer, Barrett explains that these entities typically are “minimally counterintuitive.” (P. 12) He says that it’s hard for people to make sense out of significantly counter-intuitive characteristics like omnipresence (p. 34), but then he adds that omnipresence really isn’t much of a hindrance after all (p. 35).
The problem with these chapters is that Barrett, after he has finished cribbing off of Boyer, has nothing sensible to say — he’s done almost no research, and the research he has done is worthless. He wants to prove not only that notions of religious entities are natural, but that even young children have well-developed notions of God and God’s powers. For example, he cites studies of childen from age 3 to 6 who, when quizzed answered that God certainly knew much more than their mothers did. Barrett concludes that young “children appeared to be theologically accurate from the first and did not lose this ability.” (P. 29) It apparently didn’t occur to Barrett that children could make the comparison only because they had been previously taught about God. Heiphetz et al. make this point in “How children and adults represent God's mind” (2015) (available at National Library of Medicine website). But it’s obvious even to a layman.
Again, Barrett relies on the notion, gleaned from Piaget, that young children think that God and all adults have superpowers: “to date I am aware of no evidence that challenges Piaget’s observation that young children assume adults have superpowers. Indeed, on this point, it seems likely that Piaget was correct. Children assume that all agents, including God and their parents, have superpowers and then pare back parents’ abilities as they discover human limitations.” (P. 32) Subsequently he cites studies that show that this assertion is certainly wrong (p. 33), but he sticks to his guns on this point (pp. 37 and 38) But no child — I dare say — thinks that his father can pick up an SUV or that his mother can fly up to a third-floor apartment. And certainly most children see their parents associating with other adults. It would be very odd if young children thought that all adults had superpowers, assuming that young children could even conceptualize the notion of superpowers.
Barrett also claims, again citing Piaget, that many children seven years and younger believe that the natural world was created by people, and that this belief is an integral step towards their belief in God. (P. 32) It’s very difficult to see Piaget as being correct on this point, and Barrett’s uncritical agreement doesn’t add credibility to the thesis. Indeed, the thesis apparently is not supported by recent reserarch. See Babakr & Kakamed, “Piaget’s Cognitive Developmental Theory: Critical Review” (2019) (available on Eric.ed website).
The final scandal in this selection comes in chapter 8, where Barrett turns the tables and asks, “Why would anyone not believe in God?” and finds it difficult to answer. Barrett presents special challenges that theism poses to atheists, and offers “suggestions for how atheists may attempt to solve these problems.” (P. 39) The suggestion are absurd and don’t bear repeating. One thing should be pointed out that Barrett overlooks. His entire argument for the naturalness of religious beliefs consists of scientific (psychological and sociological) analyses. He never cites a text from a revealed religion, or a folk belief, or testamony of a mystic or a modern theist. The touchstone for Barrett’s argument is science. At his most successful, Barrett shows religious belief is parasitic on various aspects of human nature attributable to evolution, but not that religion is a natural kind in itself. See Boyer (above) for a detailed discussion of this point.
The problem with these chapters is that Barrett, after he has finished cribbing off of Boyer, has nothing sensible to say — he’s done almost no research, and the research he has done is worthless. He wants to prove not only that notions of religious entities are natural, but that even young children have well-developed notions of God and God’s powers. For example, he cites studies of childen from age 3 to 6 who, when quizzed answered that God certainly knew much more than their mothers did. Barrett concludes that young “children appeared to be theologically accurate from the first and did not lose this ability.” (P. 29) It apparently didn’t occur to Barrett that children could make the comparison only because they had been previously taught about God. Heiphetz et al. make this point in “How children and adults represent God's mind” (2015) (available at National Library of Medicine website). But it’s obvious even to a layman.
Again, Barrett relies on the notion, gleaned from Piaget, that young children think that God and all adults have superpowers: “to date I am aware of no evidence that challenges Piaget’s observation that young children assume adults have superpowers. Indeed, on this point, it seems likely that Piaget was correct. Children assume that all agents, including God and their parents, have superpowers and then pare back parents’ abilities as they discover human limitations.” (P. 32) Subsequently he cites studies that show that this assertion is certainly wrong (p. 33), but he sticks to his guns on this point (pp. 37 and 38) But no child — I dare say — thinks that his father can pick up an SUV or that his mother can fly up to a third-floor apartment. And certainly most children see their parents associating with other adults. It would be very odd if young children thought that all adults had superpowers, assuming that young children could even conceptualize the notion of superpowers.
Barrett also claims, again citing Piaget, that many children seven years and younger believe that the natural world was created by people, and that this belief is an integral step towards their belief in God. (P. 32) It’s very difficult to see Piaget as being correct on this point, and Barrett’s uncritical agreement doesn’t add credibility to the thesis. Indeed, the thesis apparently is not supported by recent reserarch. See Babakr & Kakamed, “Piaget’s Cognitive Developmental Theory: Critical Review” (2019) (available on Eric.ed website).
The final scandal in this selection comes in chapter 8, where Barrett turns the tables and asks, “Why would anyone not believe in God?” and finds it difficult to answer. Barrett presents special challenges that theism poses to atheists, and offers “suggestions for how atheists may attempt to solve these problems.” (P. 39) The suggestion are absurd and don’t bear repeating. One thing should be pointed out that Barrett overlooks. His entire argument for the naturalness of religious beliefs consists of scientific (psychological and sociological) analyses. He never cites a text from a revealed religion, or a folk belief, or testamony of a mystic or a modern theist. The touchstone for Barrett’s argument is science. At his most successful, Barrett shows religious belief is parasitic on various aspects of human nature attributable to evolution, but not that religion is a natural kind in itself. See Boyer (above) for a detailed discussion of this point.
July 28, 2017
Barrett gives a cognitive science approach, breaking down "devices" brains use to recognize phenomena and establish belief. From this he formulates the argument that religious beliefs are quite natural. At times, however, the schema of Friedrich Max Müller and others about "development" of religious systems lurks in the background. The short book does not give enough of an account of its own social imbrication.
April 28, 2016
I'm a bit shocked to realize this book is already more than ten years old. I'd like to imagine I'm so up to date. I'm not, though, so I can't evaluate the strength of the book's claims in light of subsequent research; but I found it a fairly accessible synoptic account of the more central findings of the cognitive science of religion.
The first five chapters were the best, in my view, as Barrett developed his account of why belief in gods comes naturally to human beings. Simply entertained as possible entities, concepts of gods appeal to our sensibilities because they are "minimally counterintuitive," much like entities in ordinary experience for the most part, while departing from the norm in intriguing ways. Gods become more plausible in light of that part of our mental equipment Barrett calls the "Hypersensitive Agency Detection Device." We have evolved to pay particular attention to signs of possible agency and, thus, to attribute agency in phenomena in our environment far more often than perhaps is warranted. Gods are good candidate agents for explaining to ourselves unusual phenomena that we encounter. Once a god concept has established a foothold among our beliefs, it can be readily reinforced through playing roles in social and moral regulation, in the quest for information and control, and in the face of death. Systems of ritual secure and enhance belief in gods through groups and across generations.
I shall need to study Barrett's reasoning more carefully, but chapters 6-8, while still generally good, also made me suspicious. Chapter 6 argues that cognitive science of religion weighs against theories of religion as arising from processes of anthropomorphizing natural entities and traits because, really, we "agentize" rather than systematically anthromorphize in forming concepts of gods. This seems to me hairsplitting: an attempt to evade claims that gods are products of anthropomorphism rather than to refute them. I know of at least one other scholar in this field who holds that the origin of gods in the human tendency to anthropomorphize is the central finding of cognitive science of religion. The chapter also involves an argument that Jewish, Christian and Muslim monotheisms are more naturally believable than other concepts of gods.
Chapter 7 argues (taking off from Alvin Plantinga's well known book) that belief in gods is no less natural than belief in other minds. Maybe so, but that argument seems to operate with a tacit assumption that we don't just naturally suppose minds to be different from bodies [see Paul Bloom's Descartes' Baby for a great discussion of this topic], but that minds are different from bodies. I wonder how work on "embodied mind" might reshape the considerations Barrett brings to attention.
Chapter 8 gives excellent analysis of the social and cultural conditions that sustain atheism, but is also argues that atheism, because it comes less naturally, bears a higher burden of proof than theism. Again, Barrett seems here to conflate considerations of what comes naturally with what is true. To be clear, he knows this is a false equivalency, since he explicitly criticizes it elsewhere in the book. Still, in this and the previous two chapters I wonder if he is not drawing on it himself. My suspicion is made stronger by his confession in the conclusion that he is a Christian (although of just what sort, he doesn't say), and by the slide in his terminology from "gods" toward special attention to "God" as the personal name of the (vaguely) Christian deity, that sets in through chapter 6.
I do wonder, too, about the currency of the very modular, computational model of mind that informs Barrett's talk throughout the book of "mental tools." It's as if the mind is a machine, not me, and moreover a machine in the machine of the body. Then am I a little god riding around in the machine in the machine? But this smacks too much for my taste of the "homuncular theories" criticized by Owen Flanagan. I am inclined to think that mind is embodied - is the body, understood a certain way - and that what Barrett calls "tools" are instincts and habits.
Not that I can develop this thought into a theory of my own, yet. I should need a great deal more time and learning to do that, and Barrett would be a very good teacher and influence on me in that undertaking.
The first five chapters were the best, in my view, as Barrett developed his account of why belief in gods comes naturally to human beings. Simply entertained as possible entities, concepts of gods appeal to our sensibilities because they are "minimally counterintuitive," much like entities in ordinary experience for the most part, while departing from the norm in intriguing ways. Gods become more plausible in light of that part of our mental equipment Barrett calls the "Hypersensitive Agency Detection Device." We have evolved to pay particular attention to signs of possible agency and, thus, to attribute agency in phenomena in our environment far more often than perhaps is warranted. Gods are good candidate agents for explaining to ourselves unusual phenomena that we encounter. Once a god concept has established a foothold among our beliefs, it can be readily reinforced through playing roles in social and moral regulation, in the quest for information and control, and in the face of death. Systems of ritual secure and enhance belief in gods through groups and across generations.
I shall need to study Barrett's reasoning more carefully, but chapters 6-8, while still generally good, also made me suspicious. Chapter 6 argues that cognitive science of religion weighs against theories of religion as arising from processes of anthropomorphizing natural entities and traits because, really, we "agentize" rather than systematically anthromorphize in forming concepts of gods. This seems to me hairsplitting: an attempt to evade claims that gods are products of anthropomorphism rather than to refute them. I know of at least one other scholar in this field who holds that the origin of gods in the human tendency to anthropomorphize is the central finding of cognitive science of religion. The chapter also involves an argument that Jewish, Christian and Muslim monotheisms are more naturally believable than other concepts of gods.
Chapter 7 argues (taking off from Alvin Plantinga's well known book) that belief in gods is no less natural than belief in other minds. Maybe so, but that argument seems to operate with a tacit assumption that we don't just naturally suppose minds to be different from bodies [see Paul Bloom's Descartes' Baby for a great discussion of this topic], but that minds are different from bodies. I wonder how work on "embodied mind" might reshape the considerations Barrett brings to attention.
Chapter 8 gives excellent analysis of the social and cultural conditions that sustain atheism, but is also argues that atheism, because it comes less naturally, bears a higher burden of proof than theism. Again, Barrett seems here to conflate considerations of what comes naturally with what is true. To be clear, he knows this is a false equivalency, since he explicitly criticizes it elsewhere in the book. Still, in this and the previous two chapters I wonder if he is not drawing on it himself. My suspicion is made stronger by his confession in the conclusion that he is a Christian (although of just what sort, he doesn't say), and by the slide in his terminology from "gods" toward special attention to "God" as the personal name of the (vaguely) Christian deity, that sets in through chapter 6.
I do wonder, too, about the currency of the very modular, computational model of mind that informs Barrett's talk throughout the book of "mental tools." It's as if the mind is a machine, not me, and moreover a machine in the machine of the body. Then am I a little god riding around in the machine in the machine? But this smacks too much for my taste of the "homuncular theories" criticized by Owen Flanagan. I am inclined to think that mind is embodied - is the body, understood a certain way - and that what Barrett calls "tools" are instincts and habits.
Not that I can develop this thought into a theory of my own, yet. I should need a great deal more time and learning to do that, and Barrett would be a very good teacher and influence on me in that undertaking.
February 11, 2012
I use this in my Psych of Religion class because it summarizes a lot of the psych of religion literature and introduces them to evolutionary psychology and includes research from several branches of psychology (developmental, social, cognitive) as well as theory and research from anthropologists and sociologists. I am afraid the title might turn some of them off, but the author is a conservative Christian. It's written in a very accessible style, but I still worry that it might be over their heads. We'll see. They start it in mid October.
June 15, 2016
A promising attempt to apply psychological principles to the persistence of religious belief in human beings--on the surface. Barrett's token analysis of atheism (and the references he makes throughout) are two-dimensional and without foundation and the conclusions he draws are clearly informed by bias.
July 18, 2009
A short, readable account of the cognitive science behind religious belief. The chapter explaining the proliferation of atheism (and why it is only now happening) was especially interesting.
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