History of the Art of War Within the Framework of Political History: The Modern Era: (Contributions in Military Studies) by Hans Delbruck

History of the Art of War #4

by Hans Delbrück

By the fifteenth century the Swiss method of warfare, in which disciplined foot soldiers fought in tightly formed units, was being imitated. The Germans and Spanish took notice when in 1479 Archduke Maximilian and his victorious Flemish infantrymen used their long pikes to prevent the mounted French knights from charging. The era of modern warmaking was at hand.In this last volume of his classic history of the art of war, Hans Delbrück considers new the use of gunpowder, the invention of firearms, and the employment of noisy large cannon that shot stone and, later, iron balls. After reviewing the establishment of a European infantry, Delbrück discusses the transformation of loose confederations of knights into cavalry (well developed by the last Huguenot wars), the organization of fighting mercenaries (followed by wives and prostitutes), and the changing of mercenary bands into standing armies.The Dawn of Modern Warfare is colored by larger-than-life Niccolo Machiavelli, the theoretician of the new art of war; Maurice of Orange, renovator of the art of drill and father of military discipline; Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, perfecter of infantry tactics; Oliver Cromwell of England, reorganizer of a citizen militia into a professional army; and Frederick the Great and Napoleon Bonaparte, military strategists par excellence.

Genres: History, Military Fiction, Military History, War, Nonfiction, World History, Modern

Hardcover

First published April 25, 1985

About the author

German historian who looked at military history in the context of world history.

Sat in the Reichstag, was Professor of History at the University of Berlin and was a member of the German delegation to the Versailles Peace Conference after the First World War.

Reviews

[Hades Lutifiglus · Rating 4 out of 5]

Książka bardzo ciekawa, obejmująca historię sztuki wojennej od wynalezienia prochu i wojny stuletniej do epoki napoleońskiej. Kompletnie ominięta jest w niej Polska, Turcja i Rosja - co najwyżej kilka zdań opisujących ewolucje tamtejszych sztuk wojennych bardzo ogólnie i bezrefleksyjnie. Widać natomiast skupienie autora na Francji i Niemcach(Prusach) w pierwszej kolejności oraz Włochach, Szwajcarach, Anglikach i Szwedach. Czytając to trzeba znać historię opisywanych wojen i bardzo szczegółowo okres nowożytny, a autor nie kwapi się do szerszych wyjaśnień. Widać jednocześnie, że pisał to Niemiec, który wychwala Fryderyka Wielkiego. Można odnieść wrażenie że ta książka w 60% jest właśnie o nim. Delbrück używa go do porównania z Napoleonem, wyjaśnienia strategii manewrowej, wyniszczenia i zniszczenia oraz pokazania formowania się armii stałych, a także w wielu innych okolicznościach, których pisząc to nie jestem sobie w stanie przypomnieć. Jednocześnie autor zamieszcza wiele "wrzutek" z swego rodzaju autobiografii opisującej jego spory z innymi znawcami sztuki wojennej na temat właśnie Fryderyka Wielkiego. Również kończąc książkę Delbrück zamyka ją przykładem z historii tego władcy Prus. Pomimo tego jest to praca dobra, rzetelna i godna uwagi. Skupienie na Fryderyku mimo wszystko pozwala dobrze zrozumieć różnice w różnych rodzajach strategii oraz bitw. Ewolucje sztuki pokazuje też ciekawie i na wielu przykładach.

[Volodymyr Kramskyi · Rating 5 out of 5]

Classics of military history. Highly recommended to read before anything else on the subject.

You may not agree with something. Few statements become somewhat obsolete as new evidence appears. However, the amount of work done, of events juxtaposed, of processes and trends analyzed, is just staggering! Every statement is supported by at least some arguments. Usage of sources is extensive.

But while this all sounds good, it is not the primary reason to read the book. The first and foremost value of the book for any person interested in military history (or even just history in general) is in the author's critical thinking. Prof Delbruck is always suspicious about evidence from sources, he never accepts a statement without assessing every piece of information available to him. His willingness to ask crucial questions is of principal importance. Regardless of your interests in this book or in the subject, there are plenty of ways in which this book might enrich your thinking patterns. Even if you disagree with the author on some of his ideas. Especially if you disagree.

Being a German author, Prof Delbruck inclines more to the examination of military practices on German lands but not to an extent for any major military development to be missed. Last editions contain a lot of discussion between the author and other scholars, though I personally regard those discussions as rather outdated and not necessary to read unless you are particularly interested in the early 20th-century historiography of the subject.

[Richard · Rating 4 out of 5]

Re-read this classic and it is well worth the time. Delbruck looks at the evolution of strategy and tactics over time, with particular attention to the long standing strategic debate "Battle of Annihilation" versus "War of Attrition". This volume ends with a comparison of Napoleon -- Annihilation -- and Frederick the Great -- Attrition. Delbruck's conclusion is that Napoleon was the first commander who had an army capable of battle(s) of Annihilation, so those before him needed to campaign on the attrition strategy or lose. Thus Frederick the Great did the best with what he had.

[sologdin · Rating 3 out of 5]

carries the argument of the prior volumes through the Thirty Years' War and Napoleon. Solid, &c.