Iraq: Sanctions And Beyond

by Anthony H. Cordesman, Ahmed S. Hashim

This volume provides analysis of the state of Iraq’s security and of current Western policy toward the country in the wake of the Gulf War. It also examines the political, economic, and security impact of sanctions, Iraq’s future role as an oil exporter, the U.S. policy of “dual containment” in relation to Iraq, and options for dealing with Iraq in the future.

416 pages, Hardcover

First published February 6, 1997

Reviews

[Joseph Stieb · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is one of those books that when I finished I said to myself, "Dang I deserve this degree. I am good enough and smart enough." I say this because while this book is an incredibly useful compilation of info about Iraqi politics, the economy, the military, etc., it is also *quite* dry. There is also a decent amount of repetition in the book; it could be 25 pages shorter. I will certainly use it as a reference, but only people doing major research or policy work on IQ would have use for it.. There is one compelling concept in the book: the tension between centrist and peripheral strategies for bringing down SH. A centrist strategy focuses on the people and groups surrounding Saddam himself: the RG and SRG, the military brass, the Tikriti elites, SH's family, and the top level of the Baath Party. These groups are most likely to have the information and resources to take SH down from within, but they are also likely to be very much like Saddam, which doesn't help the US too much in terms of WMD, regional stability, improving governance within IQ, etc. So any centrist strategy may be able to take out SH but will leave the basic political structure of IQ in place. A peripheral strategy, in contrast, seeks to empower groups outside the Sunni core to pressure if not take down the regime. These groups include the IQ opposition, the Kurds, and the Shia. There may be more hope that these groups would reshape IQ's internal politics and external behavior if they took over (maybe even pushing IQ toward democracy), but they are furthest from the centers of power and really have no way in. They are also too weak and divided to mount a direct challenge to the Sunni core. Cordesman's prudent solution to this problem is to refocus US policy as military containment and not worry too much about the internal political structures of IQ.