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The Right to Private Property (Clarendon Paperbacks) by Jeremy Waldron
Presenting a comprehensive, critical examination of the claim that private property is one of the fundamental rights of humankind, Waldron here contrasts two types of arguments about those based on historical entitlement, and those based on the importance of property for freedom. He
illustrates this contrast with a detailed discussion of the theories of property found in Locke's Second Treatise and Hegel's Philosophy of Rights, and offers original analyses of the concept of ownership, the idea of rights, and the relation between property and equality, finding that traditional
arguments about property yield some surprisingly radical conclusions.
illustrates this contrast with a detailed discussion of the theories of property found in Locke's Second Treatise and Hegel's Philosophy of Rights, and offers original analyses of the concept of ownership, the idea of rights, and the relation between property and equality, finding that traditional
arguments about property yield some surprisingly radical conclusions.
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First published February 9, 1989
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
January 2, 2011
A fantastic book, written with the ridiculously thorough logic-chopping of an analytic philosopher, and yet crystal-clear, readable, and often compelling throughout. The book is so thorough, with important arguments and insights on every one of its 480 pages, that I took nearly three months of steady going to work my way through it, and I still have zillions of notes to type up.
Best of all, Waldron is not content to give a mere analytical unpacking of the logic of private property, but undertakes this task as part of a constructive enterprise to suggest a rather radical new approach to private property distribution in modern society. Many will not agree with his proposal, which ends up sounding remarkably like distributism, but that need not impede appreciation of this book, since he develops his argument slowly, piece-by-piece, dealing with all relevant issues along the way, rather than putting his own agenda front-and-center in an obnoxious or argumentative way.
His basic project is to distinguish between what he calls "special rights" and "general rights" arguments for private property--the former (of which Locke is the preeminent example) argue that a right to private property arises out of special qualifying actions that a person takes (i.e., enclosing and laboring upon an unclaimed plot of land), by virtue of which he acquires a right over against all the rest of mankind to exclude them from his possession; the latter (for which Waldron draws upon Hegel, though I think Belloc could have served as another good candidate) argues that private property possession is essential in various ways to the development of human freedom and moral integrity, etc., and therefore is something to which everyone has a right. Waldron subjects the Lockean strategy to painstaking dissection and criticism, and constructs a strong argument for the superior merits of a general right argument to private property.
Along the way (and this is what I gained more than anything from the book) he reveals just how carelessly we take for granted very complex problems about what private property is and when and how it is justified. I suspect that nine out of ten politicians and soap-box social commentators who make their sweeping declarations today that our economy and our society depend on a respect for the sacred institution of private property have no idea what they're talking about.
The greatest thing the book lacks, of course, is attention to the theological dimension, and the rich heritage of Christian reflection on property ethics. My teacher Joan O'Donovan mentioned to me that she gave a lecture once about the early Christian teaching against private property, and Jeremy Waldron, who was in the audience, was shocked to learn that there was any such thing. One of the foremost experts in property ethics had no idea that the early Church thought and taught extensively on the subject! (Of course, judging by today's Christians, he's not alone.) Theological resources could have strengthened Waldron's critiques of exclusively special-rights arguments for private property, and resources like Distributism and the Old Testament laws could have complemented his presentation of the case for a general-rights approach.
So, I suppose the job of synthesizing Waldron with the Christian tradition on property rights is something I have to tackle on my own now, something I've started doing here: http://www.swordandploughshare.com/ma...
Best of all, Waldron is not content to give a mere analytical unpacking of the logic of private property, but undertakes this task as part of a constructive enterprise to suggest a rather radical new approach to private property distribution in modern society. Many will not agree with his proposal, which ends up sounding remarkably like distributism, but that need not impede appreciation of this book, since he develops his argument slowly, piece-by-piece, dealing with all relevant issues along the way, rather than putting his own agenda front-and-center in an obnoxious or argumentative way.
His basic project is to distinguish between what he calls "special rights" and "general rights" arguments for private property--the former (of which Locke is the preeminent example) argue that a right to private property arises out of special qualifying actions that a person takes (i.e., enclosing and laboring upon an unclaimed plot of land), by virtue of which he acquires a right over against all the rest of mankind to exclude them from his possession; the latter (for which Waldron draws upon Hegel, though I think Belloc could have served as another good candidate) argues that private property possession is essential in various ways to the development of human freedom and moral integrity, etc., and therefore is something to which everyone has a right. Waldron subjects the Lockean strategy to painstaking dissection and criticism, and constructs a strong argument for the superior merits of a general right argument to private property.
Along the way (and this is what I gained more than anything from the book) he reveals just how carelessly we take for granted very complex problems about what private property is and when and how it is justified. I suspect that nine out of ten politicians and soap-box social commentators who make their sweeping declarations today that our economy and our society depend on a respect for the sacred institution of private property have no idea what they're talking about.
The greatest thing the book lacks, of course, is attention to the theological dimension, and the rich heritage of Christian reflection on property ethics. My teacher Joan O'Donovan mentioned to me that she gave a lecture once about the early Christian teaching against private property, and Jeremy Waldron, who was in the audience, was shocked to learn that there was any such thing. One of the foremost experts in property ethics had no idea that the early Church thought and taught extensively on the subject! (Of course, judging by today's Christians, he's not alone.) Theological resources could have strengthened Waldron's critiques of exclusively special-rights arguments for private property, and resources like Distributism and the Old Testament laws could have complemented his presentation of the case for a general-rights approach.
So, I suppose the job of synthesizing Waldron with the Christian tradition on property rights is something I have to tackle on my own now, something I've started doing here: http://www.swordandploughshare.com/ma...
February 27, 2017
What is property? What is PRIVATE property? Why should I respect your property rights?
Waldron asks these questions and more, in what can only be described as a momentous book. He lays the groundwork for a general rights-based account of property rights, and, in so doing, manages to clearly articulate the problems that any property-based enterprise must face. He draws important distinctions between various different ways of defending and critiquing private property, and offers reasons to be skeptical of the radical claims of Nozickean libertarians and Marxists alike.
But a book has the center somewhere, and this exhaustive book is, at its core, the best contemporary exploration and critique of John Locke's theory of property in all its details. He provides a firm basis for defending a type of private property as a human right, but one that does not look kindly on theories based on historical entitlement in the sense described by Robert Nozick. His systematic treatment of the faults in the theory of original appropriation go well beyond a competent critique of the faults of the labour mixing or the homesteading principles that underline anti-welfarist libertarian theories; sure, he offers viable critiques of both, but more than that, he provides systematic grounds for believing that private property appropriation and transfer must operated within the parameters of what he calls the Lockean "right to subsistence." Private property on Lockean grounds is justified, he claims, only against the background of universal access to (a basic level of) it. This argument is very well made, and I believe it makes for a very solid overall theory.
Some of the shortcomings of the book include an eclecticism towards theoretical foundations and an out-of-place reliance on Hegelian theory of property as the basis for a "general theory" as a replacement for the "special" theory of property acquisition as developed in the Lockean tradition. The problem with this choice is that I don't believe the two traditions jive together very well. I fail to be convinced that it is fruitful to combine a very superficial reading of Hegel's Philosophy of Right (based on a few selective passages in a notoriously difficult book) with a very thorough and multifaceted reading of Locke's Two Treatises. Slapping one on top of the other creates some interesting parallels but it also compounds difficulties and somewhat dilutes the overall message.
Where Waldron shines is in his analytical acumen and historical reach. He has clearly thought long and hard about these questions, and he manages to salvage an important core of the Lockean tradition while jettisoning some of its most troubling aspects. He makes passing references to Proudhon and other important thinkers of property. He also mentions Marx in passing, but the sidelining of the Marxist tradition is both deliberate and much needed. Turning to Hegel in his stead, without ever acknowledging that one is bypassing the student to reach the master, is a coy but wise move; but this means that one gets stuck with the incomprehensible drama of Hegelian philosophy, which is not much better than the unrealistic economics of Marxian philosophy.
The importance and quality of Waldron's book cannot be questioned. All subsequent works on property rights from a philosophical perspective must acknowledge the importance of this book. Even if the book only clears the floor for more substantial and coherent frameworks of property to come, and even if the choice of Hegel for a light at the end of the tunnel was a bad call, the shortcomings of this path-clearing enterprise are mostly mitigated by its singular achievements.
The book manages to make private property rights and redistributive schemes intellectually defensible again, against the attacks from both the left and the right, and thus paving the way for a new consensus of a "property-owning democracy" in the Rawlsian-Dworkinian tradition. Even if one disagrees with his conclusions, one cannot but admire the arguments used to get there.
Waldron asks these questions and more, in what can only be described as a momentous book. He lays the groundwork for a general rights-based account of property rights, and, in so doing, manages to clearly articulate the problems that any property-based enterprise must face. He draws important distinctions between various different ways of defending and critiquing private property, and offers reasons to be skeptical of the radical claims of Nozickean libertarians and Marxists alike.
But a book has the center somewhere, and this exhaustive book is, at its core, the best contemporary exploration and critique of John Locke's theory of property in all its details. He provides a firm basis for defending a type of private property as a human right, but one that does not look kindly on theories based on historical entitlement in the sense described by Robert Nozick. His systematic treatment of the faults in the theory of original appropriation go well beyond a competent critique of the faults of the labour mixing or the homesteading principles that underline anti-welfarist libertarian theories; sure, he offers viable critiques of both, but more than that, he provides systematic grounds for believing that private property appropriation and transfer must operated within the parameters of what he calls the Lockean "right to subsistence." Private property on Lockean grounds is justified, he claims, only against the background of universal access to (a basic level of) it. This argument is very well made, and I believe it makes for a very solid overall theory.
Some of the shortcomings of the book include an eclecticism towards theoretical foundations and an out-of-place reliance on Hegelian theory of property as the basis for a "general theory" as a replacement for the "special" theory of property acquisition as developed in the Lockean tradition. The problem with this choice is that I don't believe the two traditions jive together very well. I fail to be convinced that it is fruitful to combine a very superficial reading of Hegel's Philosophy of Right (based on a few selective passages in a notoriously difficult book) with a very thorough and multifaceted reading of Locke's Two Treatises. Slapping one on top of the other creates some interesting parallels but it also compounds difficulties and somewhat dilutes the overall message.
Where Waldron shines is in his analytical acumen and historical reach. He has clearly thought long and hard about these questions, and he manages to salvage an important core of the Lockean tradition while jettisoning some of its most troubling aspects. He makes passing references to Proudhon and other important thinkers of property. He also mentions Marx in passing, but the sidelining of the Marxist tradition is both deliberate and much needed. Turning to Hegel in his stead, without ever acknowledging that one is bypassing the student to reach the master, is a coy but wise move; but this means that one gets stuck with the incomprehensible drama of Hegelian philosophy, which is not much better than the unrealistic economics of Marxian philosophy.
The importance and quality of Waldron's book cannot be questioned. All subsequent works on property rights from a philosophical perspective must acknowledge the importance of this book. Even if the book only clears the floor for more substantial and coherent frameworks of property to come, and even if the choice of Hegel for a light at the end of the tunnel was a bad call, the shortcomings of this path-clearing enterprise are mostly mitigated by its singular achievements.
The book manages to make private property rights and redistributive schemes intellectually defensible again, against the attacks from both the left and the right, and thus paving the way for a new consensus of a "property-owning democracy" in the Rawlsian-Dworkinian tradition. Even if one disagrees with his conclusions, one cannot but admire the arguments used to get there.
May 31, 2012
What does “private property” mean, and who has a right to it? Jeremy Waldron takes up these two neglected areas of politics and philosophy. In doing so he crosses territory already marked out by John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin, which means the discussion will build on those two authors. But he also takes up the argument for private property laid out during that same era by Robert Nozick. Waldron casts a wide net in order to look at the concept of private property from every angle. This wide scope is one of the strengths of his book.
Like so many political thinkers, Waldron takes us often to that famous “state of nature” that factors into so much of the the moral justification of politics. The author takes up John Locke’s conception of a state of nature, among others, in order to pinpoint our problem: How did something already out there in the natural world come to belong to certain people? Seeing how this question has been answered in the past sheds light on our present conceptions of private property. Waldron argues that the appearance of government ends the state of nature and abolishes original concepts of property, such as first occupancy, replacing them with newer conceptions.
The idea of a “right” to something comes under scrutiny, with Waldron noting that negative rights are in fact duties imposed on others. From this concept the author brings us to two implicit conceptions of “rights”: Special Rights and General Rights. Which is a the better conception, a right that guarantees the private property of certain people or one that guarantees the private property of all? In the background lie two famous conceptions of private property, that of Locke, who argues for private property as a special right of those acquire it, and Hegel, whose writings imply a general right to private property for all persons.
Waldron so far seems to be veering to the left, but he’s not ready to go Marxist on us. After all, he’s talking about our rights, not some utilitarian calculus or an argument for collective property, both of which he dismisses. As to Nozick, Waldron points out that his argument for private property in Anarchy, State, and Utopia depend upon a theory of distributive justice, much as socialist policies do. He faults Nozick for an absence of grounding principles in his book which forces libertarian and anarcho-libertarian conceptions of private property back onto Locke.
After many interesting chapters and unique arguments, Waldron comes to his point: What conception of private property could defeat a Marxist pessimism about private property and Marx's conception of public property as a means of avoiding injustice? Again he turns to Hegel, and here he looks to the very definition of private property to suggest an intriguing answer.
This book gives us a thorough, strongly argued case for Waldron’s conception of private property. I recommend it to every political reader for its penetrating reach. For even if Fukuyama’s “end of history” has put collective property out of reach as a concept to be opposed to private property, the kind of private property that could best serve this new world order is relevant, but unexplored, factor for the success of that order.
Like so many political thinkers, Waldron takes us often to that famous “state of nature” that factors into so much of the the moral justification of politics. The author takes up John Locke’s conception of a state of nature, among others, in order to pinpoint our problem: How did something already out there in the natural world come to belong to certain people? Seeing how this question has been answered in the past sheds light on our present conceptions of private property. Waldron argues that the appearance of government ends the state of nature and abolishes original concepts of property, such as first occupancy, replacing them with newer conceptions.
The idea of a “right” to something comes under scrutiny, with Waldron noting that negative rights are in fact duties imposed on others. From this concept the author brings us to two implicit conceptions of “rights”: Special Rights and General Rights. Which is a the better conception, a right that guarantees the private property of certain people or one that guarantees the private property of all? In the background lie two famous conceptions of private property, that of Locke, who argues for private property as a special right of those acquire it, and Hegel, whose writings imply a general right to private property for all persons.
Waldron so far seems to be veering to the left, but he’s not ready to go Marxist on us. After all, he’s talking about our rights, not some utilitarian calculus or an argument for collective property, both of which he dismisses. As to Nozick, Waldron points out that his argument for private property in Anarchy, State, and Utopia depend upon a theory of distributive justice, much as socialist policies do. He faults Nozick for an absence of grounding principles in his book which forces libertarian and anarcho-libertarian conceptions of private property back onto Locke.
After many interesting chapters and unique arguments, Waldron comes to his point: What conception of private property could defeat a Marxist pessimism about private property and Marx's conception of public property as a means of avoiding injustice? Again he turns to Hegel, and here he looks to the very definition of private property to suggest an intriguing answer.
This book gives us a thorough, strongly argued case for Waldron’s conception of private property. I recommend it to every political reader for its penetrating reach. For even if Fukuyama’s “end of history” has put collective property out of reach as a concept to be opposed to private property, the kind of private property that could best serve this new world order is relevant, but unexplored, factor for the success of that order.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews