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The Mechanical Mind: A Philosophical Introduction to Minds, Machines and Mental Representation
This edition has been fully revised and updated, and includes a new chapter on consciousness and a new section on modularity. There are also guides for further reading, and a new glossary of terms such as mentalese, connectionism, and the homunculus fallacy.
272 pages, Paperback
First published June 1, 1996
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716 people want to read
About the author
Tim Crane
37 books32 followersTim Crane is a professor of philosophy at the Central European University (CEU) in Budapest and Vienna.
He works in the philosophy of mind, and attempts to address questions about the most general nature, or essence, of the human mind, and about the place of the mind in the rest of nature.
He works in the philosophy of mind, and attempts to address questions about the most general nature, or essence, of the human mind, and about the place of the mind in the rest of nature.
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Displaying 1 - 26 of 26 reviews
March 26, 2018
The book is a very good place to start to think about intentionality. The introductory chapters are nice. However, I did not understand the thesis defended by Crane, i.e. what he calls Non-reductive materialism.
October 30, 2022
95% of this book went in one ear and out the other - that's not to say it was a bad book, just that it was too complex for me.
June 13, 2025
La mente mecánica es una introducción accesible pero rigurosa a las principales cuestiones filosóficas sobre la mente, especialmente en relación con la posibilidad de que procesos mentales puedan ser replicados o explicados por mecanismos como los de una computadora.
Uno de los conceptos centrales que articula toda la obra es el de intencionalidad, entendido como la capacidad de los estados mentales para referirse a o representar cosas —como cuando uno piensa "en París" o cree "que va a llover". El autor, Tim Crane, retoma esta noción desde la tradición fenomenológica (Brentano) y la reformula dentro del contexto de la filosofía analítica y la ciencia cognitiva contemporánea.
Crane sostiene que cualquier teoría satisfactoria de la mente debe dar cuenta de cómo es posible esta referencia mental a objetos, hechos o situaciones. Y aquí es donde se pone en cuestión la analogía con las máquinas: ¿puede una computadora, en sentido pleno, tener representaciones con intencionalidad genuina, o simplemente manipula símbolos sin entenderlos?
Para explorar esto, Crane discute teorías computacionales de la mente (como las de Jerry Fodor), el funcionalismo, y el realismo representacional, pero también objeta que muchas de estas teorías no logran explicar cómo los símbolos mentales adquieren significado. Analiza críticamente el experimento mental de la "habitación china" de John Searle, mostrando sus implicaciones para la disputa entre comprensión y procesamiento mecánico.
A lo largo del libro, Crane defiende una postura matizada: si bien las ciencias cognitivas y la inteligencia artificial son herramientas poderosas para entender algunos aspectos de la mente, hay elementos —como la intencionalidad y la conciencia— que no pueden ser reducidos sin pérdida significativa.
En cuanto a mi impresión personal, me ha parecido un libro un poco árido y difícil de seguir. Tim Crane escribió esta obra en 1996, quizás mucho antes de que se generalizaran conceptos sobre inteligencia artificial, consciencia y este tipo de ideas. Por lo tanto, quizás esté pagando el entrar en estos terrenos difíciles sobre los que especular, y mucho más sobre los que explicar. Además, creo que el autor se va por ideas demasiado abstractas y elevadas.
Por todo ello, 3 estrellas para una obra que yo considero que era un gran reto el escribirla.
Uno de los conceptos centrales que articula toda la obra es el de intencionalidad, entendido como la capacidad de los estados mentales para referirse a o representar cosas —como cuando uno piensa "en París" o cree "que va a llover". El autor, Tim Crane, retoma esta noción desde la tradición fenomenológica (Brentano) y la reformula dentro del contexto de la filosofía analítica y la ciencia cognitiva contemporánea.
Crane sostiene que cualquier teoría satisfactoria de la mente debe dar cuenta de cómo es posible esta referencia mental a objetos, hechos o situaciones. Y aquí es donde se pone en cuestión la analogía con las máquinas: ¿puede una computadora, en sentido pleno, tener representaciones con intencionalidad genuina, o simplemente manipula símbolos sin entenderlos?
Para explorar esto, Crane discute teorías computacionales de la mente (como las de Jerry Fodor), el funcionalismo, y el realismo representacional, pero también objeta que muchas de estas teorías no logran explicar cómo los símbolos mentales adquieren significado. Analiza críticamente el experimento mental de la "habitación china" de John Searle, mostrando sus implicaciones para la disputa entre comprensión y procesamiento mecánico.
A lo largo del libro, Crane defiende una postura matizada: si bien las ciencias cognitivas y la inteligencia artificial son herramientas poderosas para entender algunos aspectos de la mente, hay elementos —como la intencionalidad y la conciencia— que no pueden ser reducidos sin pérdida significativa.
En cuanto a mi impresión personal, me ha parecido un libro un poco árido y difícil de seguir. Tim Crane escribió esta obra en 1996, quizás mucho antes de que se generalizaran conceptos sobre inteligencia artificial, consciencia y este tipo de ideas. Por lo tanto, quizás esté pagando el entrar en estos terrenos difíciles sobre los que especular, y mucho más sobre los que explicar. Además, creo que el autor se va por ideas demasiado abstractas y elevadas.
Por todo ello, 3 estrellas para una obra que yo considero que era un gran reto el escribirla.
May 17, 2020
Mindfulness of the machine
A philosophical introduction to minds, machines, and mental representation
Does the image have more representation than words? This question opens the appetite for research in the mental representations that we practice without being aware of what it is, it is said that this age is the age of the image, especially after the technology produced high-quality imaging techniques with unique features, small and large hands of these cameras caught all sizes and types and became portable We have footage of the daily life of all people, this capture was transmitted through the media to be a representation similar to what it is in reality, on the other hand, the words that had the place of the forefront in the mental representation of things around us were absent and many intentional and unintended sensations were absent With it, the words carry a store of semantic feelings that are difficult for the image to carry in its folds, the image may convey anger, but through words you can measure the level of anger itself, in the picture the laugh is an open mouth, but in the words of giggling it begins with letters then sound and there are tones of laughs and there Laughs get drunk and tears fall from their abundance and ridiculous sarcastic laughs, my friend Hussein Al-Mahrous says, The picture does not convey to you any smell of what it is, pictures in the kitchen without the smell of food, pictures in nature without the smell of roses, and pictures on the sea without the smell of fish, it seems that we are in the era of representations So incomplete our feelings also became deficient We knew things imperfect, and therefore also cases of belief, desire, hope, and love become thoughts of thoughts that these thoughts will have two aspects, the first is the situation that it is on, and the second is the attitude that we take regarding the situation, and accordingly, our overall mental perceptions of the world as the picture will lack the true representation of what Indeed, the world is upon him, those perceptions shared by desires on one side and belief on the other hand that we accept for themselves because we do not have another alternative, and by this we also stop representing others by understanding their intentions except through the connotations of words and actions and this returns us to the beginning of the representation of the image versus your Matt, so here are the words and deeds, however understood, they will not represent the mind in real terms, and therefore the term "psychology of the masses" will be reasonably questioned as generalizations of the popular psychological state.
Modern technology also opens up the appetite for research on the reality of electronic computing and its location from the representation of reality. If some scholars ’opinions on the similarity of human thinking with artificial intelligence become true, then the reality of representation in artificial intelligence suffers from what suffered from representation in human thinking, so Jean-Sartre says,“ Representations are idyllic ” Psychologists have invented it. "As a start, we will reflect the idea instead of words having a mental and realistic representation. We say that representations are rooted in words and sentences and are the basis of the thinking process in our minds to be the media to keep the meaning present and then represent things outside in these mediums.
A philosophical introduction to minds, machines, and mental representation
Does the image have more representation than words? This question opens the appetite for research in the mental representations that we practice without being aware of what it is, it is said that this age is the age of the image, especially after the technology produced high-quality imaging techniques with unique features, small and large hands of these cameras caught all sizes and types and became portable We have footage of the daily life of all people, this capture was transmitted through the media to be a representation similar to what it is in reality, on the other hand, the words that had the place of the forefront in the mental representation of things around us were absent and many intentional and unintended sensations were absent With it, the words carry a store of semantic feelings that are difficult for the image to carry in its folds, the image may convey anger, but through words you can measure the level of anger itself, in the picture the laugh is an open mouth, but in the words of giggling it begins with letters then sound and there are tones of laughs and there Laughs get drunk and tears fall from their abundance and ridiculous sarcastic laughs, my friend Hussein Al-Mahrous says, The picture does not convey to you any smell of what it is, pictures in the kitchen without the smell of food, pictures in nature without the smell of roses, and pictures on the sea without the smell of fish, it seems that we are in the era of representations So incomplete our feelings also became deficient We knew things imperfect, and therefore also cases of belief, desire, hope, and love become thoughts of thoughts that these thoughts will have two aspects, the first is the situation that it is on, and the second is the attitude that we take regarding the situation, and accordingly, our overall mental perceptions of the world as the picture will lack the true representation of what Indeed, the world is upon him, those perceptions shared by desires on one side and belief on the other hand that we accept for themselves because we do not have another alternative, and by this we also stop representing others by understanding their intentions except through the connotations of words and actions and this returns us to the beginning of the representation of the image versus your Matt, so here are the words and deeds, however understood, they will not represent the mind in real terms, and therefore the term "psychology of the masses" will be reasonably questioned as generalizations of the popular psychological state.
Modern technology also opens up the appetite for research on the reality of electronic computing and its location from the representation of reality. If some scholars ’opinions on the similarity of human thinking with artificial intelligence become true, then the reality of representation in artificial intelligence suffers from what suffered from representation in human thinking, so Jean-Sartre says,“ Representations are idyllic ” Psychologists have invented it. "As a start, we will reflect the idea instead of words having a mental and realistic representation. We say that representations are rooted in words and sentences and are the basis of the thinking process in our minds to be the media to keep the meaning present and then represent things outside in these mediums.
January 3, 2022
Easy to read, Crane explains many theories and concepts in an easy to understand manner, but sometimes also over-complicate arguments a bit. The book gave many interesting angles and seeds for thought; I am not convinced the book's main argument(s) are valid, however it sparked new thoughts and have pointed me to new directions within philosophy to explore. To summarize I would say that the book is easy to read, it could have been shortened a bit (depending on the reader's background of course) and gave a good broad understanding of several theories on the subject of the mind and mental states.
August 3, 2013
A good introduction to the philosophy of mind, the text is well structured and succint. I found some of the things discussed boring and of low importance, a little too much nit-picking and attention to detail for my taste, but I suppose that's not unusual when it comes to philosophical texts [or philosophers].
February 13, 2019
I read it supplementary to the lectures I attended. Sometimes it was difficult to follow, but I gained a general overall idea of the mind and mental representation.
December 5, 2021
It's too useful as an introduction to give it less than 4-stars, but I'm annoyed to do so given some serious flaws in the book.
In general, I think the book is accessible and it really does give a good and concise introduction to the main questions and problems that philosophers and cognitive scientists are preoccupied with when trying to understand how we think about the world. How is it--for instance-- that my thoughts about Big Ben are actually about that landmark in London, and not, say, the Great Wall of China? We *know* that thoughts about Big Ben are about Big Ben-- it seems very obvious--but the idea is that we want an explanation as to why that is, just as we want an explanation of how gravity works even if we ordinary people understand that if you drop things, they fall. Some people may think this is pointless abstract philosophy, but work in artificial intelligence indicates that working on these problems is not so pointless after all.
Excellent, right? And at first I thought I would definitely be giving this book 5-stars with an enthusiastic review. But Crane has a bad habit of not doing so well with views he admittedly doesn't like, like the evolutionary approaches to understanding why the mind represents what and how it does. In these chapters, he sorta does OK with describing the teleosemantics project (one of these evolutionary approaches), but in the midst of one of the chapters, he goes on a rant about the absurdity of explanations from evolutionary *psychology*, like that men cheat on their partners because men evolved to spread their seed among multiple mates (or whatever). I don't know of anyone working in this area that takes this kind of evolutionary psych seriously-- it's entirely discredited, and placed where it is in Crane's discussion, it is one big red-herring. It does not reflect well on Crane.
A greater offense is that Crane makes it sound as though a concept originated with him when it in fact originated with Susan Hurley (2001). In Chapter 11 (I believe), when discussing a view called "enactivism," Crane talks about how enactivists criticize the "sandwich" model of the mind, in which thoughts lie between sensory input and action output. He does not give a citation in text, although the term "classical sandwich" was coined--as far as I know--by Susan Hurley (2001), who did a thorough critique of the model. This is the text I always see cited for the term, so if someone used it before her, people have not caught on. In the "Further Reading" part of the book, he finally does cite Hurley, but says that she discusses "what I have called the 'sandwich model'". This again makes it sound like it's his term, when it isn't. There is no reason to write 'I' there and not 'she'. If Crane did coin the term, he provides no citation to his own work as evidence (and I doubt there is such work). Unless he coined the term in a publication no one knows --and that's unlikely--he makes the same error back to back. I will give him the benefit of the doubt that it was unhappy mistakes (for roughly Hanlon's razor), but I still find it unprofessional.
Unfortunately, between the flaws concerning Hurley and those concerning the teleosemanticists, it turns out by coincidence that the discussion of the views of influential women philosophers gets somewhat shoddier treatment, because there happen to be a number of women teleosemanticists (Millikan, Neander, Pryce), and they just seem to be the biggest names (of women) in the whole discussion. It's still better than most introductory philosophy of mind books--which seem to think Anscombe is the only woman to have ever done philosophy of mind--but it's a real let-down for someone exhausted with the trend.
So, I highly recommend the book... but with some bitterness in my mouth. The Hurley issue made a vindictive 3-stars tempting, because though her book is difficult, it is insightful and already under-recognized outside of enactivist circles and curious randos (like me). It's not OK to use her term in the main text without her name in the main text. That is Academic Writing 101, and Crane knows better.
In general, I think the book is accessible and it really does give a good and concise introduction to the main questions and problems that philosophers and cognitive scientists are preoccupied with when trying to understand how we think about the world. How is it--for instance-- that my thoughts about Big Ben are actually about that landmark in London, and not, say, the Great Wall of China? We *know* that thoughts about Big Ben are about Big Ben-- it seems very obvious--but the idea is that we want an explanation as to why that is, just as we want an explanation of how gravity works even if we ordinary people understand that if you drop things, they fall. Some people may think this is pointless abstract philosophy, but work in artificial intelligence indicates that working on these problems is not so pointless after all.
Excellent, right? And at first I thought I would definitely be giving this book 5-stars with an enthusiastic review. But Crane has a bad habit of not doing so well with views he admittedly doesn't like, like the evolutionary approaches to understanding why the mind represents what and how it does. In these chapters, he sorta does OK with describing the teleosemantics project (one of these evolutionary approaches), but in the midst of one of the chapters, he goes on a rant about the absurdity of explanations from evolutionary *psychology*, like that men cheat on their partners because men evolved to spread their seed among multiple mates (or whatever). I don't know of anyone working in this area that takes this kind of evolutionary psych seriously-- it's entirely discredited, and placed where it is in Crane's discussion, it is one big red-herring. It does not reflect well on Crane.
A greater offense is that Crane makes it sound as though a concept originated with him when it in fact originated with Susan Hurley (2001). In Chapter 11 (I believe), when discussing a view called "enactivism," Crane talks about how enactivists criticize the "sandwich" model of the mind, in which thoughts lie between sensory input and action output. He does not give a citation in text, although the term "classical sandwich" was coined--as far as I know--by Susan Hurley (2001), who did a thorough critique of the model. This is the text I always see cited for the term, so if someone used it before her, people have not caught on. In the "Further Reading" part of the book, he finally does cite Hurley, but says that she discusses "what I have called the 'sandwich model'". This again makes it sound like it's his term, when it isn't. There is no reason to write 'I' there and not 'she'. If Crane did coin the term, he provides no citation to his own work as evidence (and I doubt there is such work). Unless he coined the term in a publication no one knows --and that's unlikely--he makes the same error back to back. I will give him the benefit of the doubt that it was unhappy mistakes (for roughly Hanlon's razor), but I still find it unprofessional.
Unfortunately, between the flaws concerning Hurley and those concerning the teleosemanticists, it turns out by coincidence that the discussion of the views of influential women philosophers gets somewhat shoddier treatment, because there happen to be a number of women teleosemanticists (Millikan, Neander, Pryce), and they just seem to be the biggest names (of women) in the whole discussion. It's still better than most introductory philosophy of mind books--which seem to think Anscombe is the only woman to have ever done philosophy of mind--but it's a real let-down for someone exhausted with the trend.
So, I highly recommend the book... but with some bitterness in my mouth. The Hurley issue made a vindictive 3-stars tempting, because though her book is difficult, it is insightful and already under-recognized outside of enactivist circles and curious randos (like me). It's not OK to use her term in the main text without her name in the main text. That is Academic Writing 101, and Crane knows better.
March 18, 2020
هذه مراجعة للكتاب في النسخة المترجمة للعربية بواسطة د. يمنى طريف الخولي. يتقدم الكتاب لحل المشاكل الأساسية في فلسفة الذهن من خلال النظرة المياكنيكية للأذهان, أي بكونها جزءا من نظام الطبيعة يتبع قانون العلية كامتداد لهذا القانون على العقل كما هو ممتد على ما دونه من الاشياء في العالم الطبيعي و يفرق بين الذهن الميانيكي (الآلي) و بين المقاربة الفيزيائية للذهن التي تدعي ان سبب الاحداث الذهنية انما هو احداث فيزيائية حصرا, و هكذا فان الذهن الآلي ليس بالضرورة أن يكون فيزيائ��ا فقط بينما الذهن الفيزيائي هو آلي بالضرورة.كذلك يبحث الكتاب في جدوى العلوم المعرفية و محاولتها لحل مشاكل الوعي و التمثيل باستخدام الحواسيب و الذكاء الاصطناعي, كذلك يظهر التمثيل باعتباره المشكلة الاساسية في فهم الذهن من خلال هذا الكتاب, و يتم تفسيره من خلال رده إلى عناصر أبسط او عن طريق اللاردية ( التمسك بالتمثل باعتباره ابسط ما يقال عن الذهن في اي نظرية تدرسه, بدون الحاجة إلى رده لما هو أبسط). بالتأكيد هو كتاب مهم جدا كمدخل لدراسة فلسفة الذهن لولا ما لدى الكاتب من إهمال لعلم النفس التطوري كحجر أساس لاي نظرية عن الأذهان او عن اي عضو وظيفي داخل الكائن الحي, فذهن الانسان تطور في جماعات رعي صيد صغيرة تحقيقا لما تطلبته الحياة في تلك الفترة و لم يتغير كثيرا منذ ذلك الحين, و على الرغم من أن الكاتب أدرك أهمية اكتشاف تشومسكي مثلا (النحو العالمي) في توضيح خصائص الذهن إلا انه لم يدرك أن مثل هذا النظام لابد أن يكون تطوريا إذا كان موجودا مسبقا داخل أدمغة أي انسان بدون تعلم(لأسباب يذكرها ديفيد ستاموس في كتابه), ربما يعلل هذا بأن الكتاب صدر في اواخر التسعينات قبل ثورة علم النفس التطوري في العقد الأول من القرن العشرين, وكان لمناهضي التفسير النفسي التطوري امثال ليونتين و ستيفن جاي جولد( رغم كونهم مبشرين نشيطين بنظرية التطور) صدى واسع, و لكن ما أثبته الوقت بلا شك هو أحقية التفسير التطوري داخل نظرية آلية عن الذهن و القدرة التفسيرية العالية له,و لكن مع هذا يبقى كتابا قويا لهذا القرع من الفلسفة الذي يبشر المستقبل بنتائج مبهرة فيه, ويحق الشكر للمركز القومي للترجمة ود. يمنى على الترجمة الجيدة و الاضافات المفيدة و نتمنى أن يبقى المركز راعي المعرفة الحقة في مصر كعادته.
December 23, 2023
A fantastic introduction to the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Crane lucidly and nimbly explains many of the key concepts and debates in the field, and the relevant arguments and empirical/mathematical work which bear on them. The book avoids being bogged down in details and technical debates which might be off-putting to someone coming to the topic for the first time, but goes into an appropriate amount of depth for readers to appreciate what's really at stake in the debates and to prepare them for further study. I cannot commend this volume enough.
September 10, 2020
It tickled a few interesting thoughts, but is somewhat dated given that it was written some time ago. Artificial Intelligence has advanced significantly, although not actionable theories about thought processes. More recent books might be a better use of your reading time.
April 19, 2020
This is a brilliant philosophy text, however, the formatting of the text made it more difficult than it needed to be at times!
Read
December 3, 2022read ch1-4
October 26, 2024
Probably warrants a second reading at some point
January 17, 2025
It's neither a good introduction to the subject nor a strong defense of d**lism.
February 28, 2024
An interesting presentation of some ideas in philosophy of mind. The style of it did not suit me too well however.
July 24, 2015
Another book subtitle I forgot to read before starting. You know how some people experiment with marijuana or sex in college, or really get into Ayn Rand when they're a teen? Most people go through a phase, become adults, and grow out of it. A few, however, become philosophers and spend their lives trying to convince people that they are gainfully employed and actually contributing something of worth to society. I have near-zero use for what passes for philosophy today and less for philosophers, quite simply because I have yet to see anything of rational value to emerge from what I've come to consider to be a waste of intellect. Despite that, I read these books hoping for some potential modicums of logical thought. I am usually disappointed by the nonsense, and come away wondering how these people can sleep at night knowing that they are selling snake oil.
Touted as accessible to the general public, Crane does do a good job of filtering more of the normally deliberately obfuscatory jargon that the fuzzy sciences must resort to to hide their lack of substance. Actually, I'm being kind...while he relaxes the lexicon, he masterfully weaves such a circuitous Möbius band of nonsense that I doubt even he knew he was writing in circles.About the only thing that Crane makes sense of in this book is that psychology is at best, an approximate generalization of probable outcomes that might apply to some people. He tries, and fails (though an agonizingly long dissertation on the Turing machine), to make his case that artificial intelligence is impossible. Too many problems to address, I'll just offer this silliness:
Um...the world "represents" the world. Hopes, beliefs, and desires have no effect on the world, though admittedly they do affect how one interacts with it.
I had hopes that my desire to exorcise irrational belief from the world might gain some ammunition through this work. So much for that.
Touted as accessible to the general public, Crane does do a good job of filtering more of the normally deliberately obfuscatory jargon that the fuzzy sciences must resort to to hide their lack of substance. Actually, I'm being kind...while he relaxes the lexicon, he masterfully weaves such a circuitous Möbius band of nonsense that I doubt even he knew he was writing in circles.About the only thing that Crane makes sense of in this book is that psychology is at best, an approximate generalization of probable outcomes that might apply to some people. He tries, and fails (though an agonizingly long dissertation on the Turing machine), to make his case that artificial intelligence is impossible. Too many problems to address, I'll just offer this silliness:
"...[h]opes, beliefs, and desires and so on represent the world,..."
Um...the world "represents" the world. Hopes, beliefs, and desires have no effect on the world, though admittedly they do affect how one interacts with it.
I had hopes that my desire to exorcise irrational belief from the world might gain some ammunition through this work. So much for that.
October 19, 2020
An excellent introduction to contemporary philosophy of mind, surveying a broad set of issues. The argument for a mechanistic (not necessarily physicalist) view of the mind built on representation is both convincing and nuanced. It also covers issues such as whether the mind is computational, how we think, common-sense psychology, the extent of the mind (and externalism) and what elements of the mind may be non-reductive. It briefly touches on the issue of consciousness and the mind-body problem in the last chapter.
Crane's writing style is clear and approachable. If you've ever taken an introductory philosophy course or simply read independently, you will find it easy to follow.
Crane's writing style is clear and approachable. If you've ever taken an introductory philosophy course or simply read independently, you will find it easy to follow.
September 17, 2015
Crane is one of that sane band of representationalists who are not physicalists. Here he gives a readable account of how mental characteristics might profitably be described as computational functions, or mechanical manipulations of representations. Representations have "causal potentency", as he nicely puts it. Notwithstanding this fact, the mind-body problem presents extreme difficulties for anyone trying to reduce the whole of our experience to physical terms. Thought is not computation, reasoning is not reckoning, and crucially, normativity is a precondition of representation itself.
April 5, 2013
Si quieres que te hagan pensar que eres analogable a un robot, adelante. Si eres fisicalista le encontrarás mucho sentido.
En realidad no es mala, es una novela expositiva con una retórica interesantemente escrita.
En realidad no es mala, es una novela expositiva con una retórica interesantemente escrita.
July 28, 2016
I read this book in 2005 and thinking about how well AI is doing now some of the challenges described in this book are still quite relevant however there seems to be light at the end of the tunnel with recent advancements!
October 24, 2019
A very good primer on the analytic approach to the philosophy of mind. Definitely read this before jumping into Dennet, Searle, Chalmers, or any of the other contemporary leaders on the subject. Crane talks to the novice-- and does so masterfully.
December 6, 2007
I read this early in my years at uni and surprisingly found it extremely useful in my master thesis work.
April 13, 2011
Great and clear introduction to philosophy of mind, artificial intelligence, and related issues. Crane does a great job making complex and difficult issues accessible to a popular audience.
January 19, 2011
Two stars isn't great, and to be fair, I just couldn't hack it. I'll have another pop at it one day.
Read
August 11, 2013isim talihsiz.
Displaying 1 - 26 of 26 reviews