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On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the "Concordia"
Luis de Molina was a leading figure in the remarkable sixteenth-century revival of Scholasticism on the Iberian peninsula. Molina is best known for his innovative theory of middle knowledge. Alfred J. Freddoso's extensive introductory essay clears up common misconceptions about Molina's theory, defends it against both philosophical and theological objections, and makes it accessible to contemporary readers.
304 pages, Paperback
First published December 31, 1988
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June 5, 2023
Jesuits like Luis de Molina and Francisco Suarez wound up spearheading a resurgence of Scholasticism during the 16th century. They tackled a lot of the same subjects, but maybe with a bit more acumen. Suarez was so well versed in Scholastic thought that his writings were used as a source for Scholastic philosophy by later philosophers.
It may have been due to the theological position of Reformation thinkers with regards to freewill that made it a topic of debate during this period. De Molina’s position is certainly on the side of absolute freewill and not on the side of determinism. But his unique contribution may be his contention that God has a so-called “middle knowledge.” This allows God to know all possible futures and their contingencies. He certainly knows what will definitely happen, but He also knows what could happen through free choice. De Molina appeals to scripture where some word or revelation is given to a direct a path because of what could potentially happen. God directing David to not go to the inhabitants of Keilah because they would hand David over to Saul (1 Sauel 23:7-24) is one of the examples de Molina uses. Biblical examples like this do indicate that God knows what could potentially happen even if it won’t. Unlike de Molina though, I also think that God knows the predisposition of people, aside from His knowledge of future events. Still, many of his arguments are compelling.
If I were made to choose a position between determinism and absolute freewill, I would be more on the side of de Molina; indeed, it is apparent to me that the influential Protestant theologian Jacob Arminius had read and was influenced by him. The denomination I am more or less allied with is Arminian. I still feel compelled to find some middle ground between Luther’s absolute bondage of the will and de Molina’s absolute freedom of the will though. Paul’s argument in Romans chapter 7 stands in stark contrast to an absolute freedom of the will position. He seems to be explicating Jesus’ words regarding he who commits sin is a slave to sin in John 8:34. It indicates very strongly that Luther was at least partially correct in his theological interpretation. I certainly reject Calvin’s hardline determinism, but seeing human beings as absolutely free when it comes to the will is hard to accept even empirically. If I were to state my position it would be something like, we have enough freewill to be condemned for our actions, but not enough to be able to be saved by them.
This is quite an interesting book. It’s actually only a portion of a larger work called the Concordia. Apparently, this is the only portion of that work that has been translated into English. I would say it is essential reading if one is interested in the theological and philosophical debates regarding freewill and determinism.
It may have been due to the theological position of Reformation thinkers with regards to freewill that made it a topic of debate during this period. De Molina’s position is certainly on the side of absolute freewill and not on the side of determinism. But his unique contribution may be his contention that God has a so-called “middle knowledge.” This allows God to know all possible futures and their contingencies. He certainly knows what will definitely happen, but He also knows what could happen through free choice. De Molina appeals to scripture where some word or revelation is given to a direct a path because of what could potentially happen. God directing David to not go to the inhabitants of Keilah because they would hand David over to Saul (1 Sauel 23:7-24) is one of the examples de Molina uses. Biblical examples like this do indicate that God knows what could potentially happen even if it won’t. Unlike de Molina though, I also think that God knows the predisposition of people, aside from His knowledge of future events. Still, many of his arguments are compelling.
If I were made to choose a position between determinism and absolute freewill, I would be more on the side of de Molina; indeed, it is apparent to me that the influential Protestant theologian Jacob Arminius had read and was influenced by him. The denomination I am more or less allied with is Arminian. I still feel compelled to find some middle ground between Luther’s absolute bondage of the will and de Molina’s absolute freedom of the will though. Paul’s argument in Romans chapter 7 stands in stark contrast to an absolute freedom of the will position. He seems to be explicating Jesus’ words regarding he who commits sin is a slave to sin in John 8:34. It indicates very strongly that Luther was at least partially correct in his theological interpretation. I certainly reject Calvin’s hardline determinism, but seeing human beings as absolutely free when it comes to the will is hard to accept even empirically. If I were to state my position it would be something like, we have enough freewill to be condemned for our actions, but not enough to be able to be saved by them.
This is quite an interesting book. It’s actually only a portion of a larger work called the Concordia. Apparently, this is the only portion of that work that has been translated into English. I would say it is essential reading if one is interested in the theological and philosophical debates regarding freewill and determinism.
July 1, 2024
THE JESUIT PHILOSOPHER ARGUES FOR GOD’S “MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE” OF EVENTS
Luis de Molina (1535- 1600) was a Spanish Jesuit priest who was involved in the revival of scholasticism on the Iberian Peninsula. The present volume is Part IV of the larger book, “Liberi Arbitrii cum Gratiae Donis, Divina Praescientia, Providentia, Praedestinatione et Reprobatione Concordia,” first published in 1588.
Translator Alfred Freddoso wrote in the Preface, “Molina played a central role in one of the most tumultuous intramural doctrinal disputes in Catholic intellectual history. The dispute, revolving around the perennial theological question of how best to reconcile the doctrine of human freedom with the doctrines of grace, providence, foreknowledge, and predestination, pitted the youthful Society of Jesus (founded in 1540) against the more established religious orders.” (Pg. vii) He adds, “My hope is that this book as a whole will help to reshape and refocus the current discussion of divine foreknowledge in ways that make it more sensitive to the broader theological context within which questions about God’s knowledge have traditionally arisen.” (Pg. ix)
Molina states, “we will explain the way in which God knows future contingents, and, finally, we will reconcile divine foreknowledge with our freedom of choice and with the contingency of things.” (Disputation 47, 1, pg. 85) He says, “For the fact that all effects of the sort in question are such that they are able not to exist derives from God’s free will alone, and so God’s will must be called the soul source of and total explanation for their contingency.” (4, pg. 88)
He states, “the primary, though remote, source of contingency for the effects of all the secondary causes belonging to the natural order is God’s will, which created the free choice of human beings and angels and the sentient appetite of those beasts that seem to be endowed with some sort of trace of freedom with respect to certain acts; on the other hand, the proximate and immediate source is the free choice of human beings and angels, along with the sentient appetite of beasts with respect to those acts in which beasts seem to have a trace of freedom.” (10, pg. 94)
He observes, “from eternity God’s cognition extends simultaneously to all contingent things insofar as they are already present to Him in the duration of eternity with that very same existence outside their causes which they are going to have in the course of time.” (Disp. 49, 1, pg. 111)
He summarizes, “It is not simply because things exist outside their causes in eternity that God knows future contingents with certainty; rather, before … He creates anything at all, He comprehends in Himself… all the things which, as a result of all the secondary causes possible by virtue of His omnipotence, would contingently or simply freely come to be on the hypothesis that He should will to establish these or those orders of things with these or those circumstances; and by the very fact that through His free will He established in being that order of things and causes which He in fact established, He comprehended in His very self and in that decree of His all the things that were in fact freely or contingently going to be or not going to be as a result of secondary causes---and He comprehended this not only prior to anything’s existing in time, but even prior … to any created thing’s existing in the duration of eternity.” (8, pg. 115-116)
He asserts, “before anything exists, God foreknows future contingencies with certainty. Indeed, BEFORE the free decree of His will He know them through a sort of natural knowledge and on the hypothesis that He should will to create and arrange things in this or that way, whereas in that free decree, which as a cause precedes the existence of future contingents both in eternity and in time, He knows them absolutely and without any hypothesis or condition.” (13, pg. 122) Later, he adds, “God knows all future contingents with certainty in Himself as in a primary object, and He also knows them with certainty in their proper secondary causes as in a secondary object.” (Disp. 50, 16, pg. 142)
He argues, “God knows with absolute certainty, in His own self and in the secondary causes, what is going to happen contingently by virtue of the freedom of those causes; yet He knows this in such a way that (i) the opposite is able to occur, and that (ii) if it were going to occur, as it is really able to, then from eternity God would have known THIS with absolute certainty and not what He in fact knows. Thus, while the full force of created free choice is preserved and while the contingency of things remains altogether intact in the same way as if there were no foreknowledge of God, God knows future contingents with absolute certainty.” (Disp. 51, 18, pg. 157)
He notes, “‘From eternity God foreknew that Peter was going to sin tomorrow; therefore, Peter is going to sin tomorrow.’ … Since, therefore, it is not within Peter’s power to bring it about that from eternity God did not foreknow that sin of his which is going to exist tomorrow, and since this is not within God’s power either, because there is no power over the past, it follows that it likewise does not lie within Peter’s power to bring it about that he is not going to sin tomorrow; and from this it follows that given the foreknowledge that God in fact has, no freedom of choice remains in Peter.” (Disp. 52, 7, pg. 166)
He suggests, “it is necessary for us to distinguish THREE types of knowledge in God. One type is purely NATURAL knowledge… Through this type of knowledge He knew all the things to which the divine power extended either immediately or by the mediation of secondary causes… The second type is purely FREE knowledge, by which, AFTER the free act of his will, God knew ABSOLUTELY and DETERMINATELY, without any condition or hypothesis, which ones from among all the contingent states of affairs were in fact going to obtain and… which ones were not going to obtain. Finally, the third type is MIDDLE knowledge, by which… He saw in His own essence what each such faculty would do with its innate freedom were it to be placed in this or that or, indeed, in infinitely many orders of things---even though it would really be able, if it so willed, to do the opposite…” (Disp. 52, 9, pg. 168)
He elaborates, “the knowledge through which God, before He decides to create a being endowed with free choice, foresees what the being would do ON THE HYPOTHESIS that it should be placed in a particular order of things---this knowledge depends on the fact that the being would in its freedom do this or that, and not the other way around. On the other hand, what is IN FACT going to happen because of created free choice is always FREE knowledge of God, and such knowledge depends on the free determination of His will, a determination by which He decides to create such-and-such a faculty of free choice in such-and-such an order of things.” (10, pg. 170)
He adds, “For (i) the things that issue forth from our choice or depend on it are not going to happen because they are foreknown to God as going to happen, but, to the contrary, they are foreknown by God as going to happen in this or that way because they are so going to happen by virtue of our freedom of choice---though if they were going to happen in a contrary way, as they are able to, then from eternity they would be foreknown as going to happen in that contrary way instead of in the way they are in fact foreknown as going to happen.” (29, pg. 184)
He summarizes, “(i) our freedom of choice and the contingency of things is perfectly compatible with divine foreknowledge, and that (ii) such foreknowledge in no way prevents it from being the case that with the help of God, who will always furnish as much help as each person needs, it is within our power to avoid all mortal sins, to recover from them after a lapse, and in the end either to attain or to lose eternal life, and that (iii) if we do not attain eternal life, then we ourselves are to blame in just the way we would be if there were in God no foreknowledge of future things.” (39, pg. 194)
He contends, “we may now distinguish… a sort of MIDDLE genus of things … comprising those things that (i) are indeed produced directly by God, even though a human or angelic intellect or will may concur in the production of them… and yet that (ii) depend on some other source of contingency besides God for their subject or for something else. The following are examples: the raising up of Lazarus; the granting of sight to the man born blind…” (Disp. 53, 3, pg. 240)
He admits, “it should nonetheless be affirmed that certain predeterminations on God’s part were necessary in order for those actions to be able to exist in reality through the created faculty of choice. Thus, if we are speaking of Peter’s threefold denial, all those predeterminations were necessary which we claimed above to be necessary for eliciting an INDIFFERENT act at the very moment at which Peter denied Christ… Furthermore, it was likewise necessary for there to be a predetermination to permit Peter, for the sake of the excellent end that God Himself intended by this permission, to perform the evil action that He foresaw would occur under those circumstances because of Peter’s free choice---that is, a predetermination not to alter the circumstances or to confer on Peter other aids in the presence of which he would not lapse into that denial because of the same freedom of choice.” (9, pg. 247)
He again summarizes, “this middle knowledge is a knowledge of all those effects in such a way that it is a knowledge of none of them except on the hypothesis of a predetermination of the divine will to choose to establish this or that order of things and to provide for and assist the order of things in question… in this or that way… it most assuredly follows that through His middle knowledge, prior to any act of His will, God foresaw nothing except on the hypothesis and under the condition that He should will to provide for the effect in question in this or that way.” (11, pg. 249)
This book, though hardly “light reading,” is of great interest to those studying theological issues such as Free Will, Predestination, etc.
Luis de Molina (1535- 1600) was a Spanish Jesuit priest who was involved in the revival of scholasticism on the Iberian Peninsula. The present volume is Part IV of the larger book, “Liberi Arbitrii cum Gratiae Donis, Divina Praescientia, Providentia, Praedestinatione et Reprobatione Concordia,” first published in 1588.
Translator Alfred Freddoso wrote in the Preface, “Molina played a central role in one of the most tumultuous intramural doctrinal disputes in Catholic intellectual history. The dispute, revolving around the perennial theological question of how best to reconcile the doctrine of human freedom with the doctrines of grace, providence, foreknowledge, and predestination, pitted the youthful Society of Jesus (founded in 1540) against the more established religious orders.” (Pg. vii) He adds, “My hope is that this book as a whole will help to reshape and refocus the current discussion of divine foreknowledge in ways that make it more sensitive to the broader theological context within which questions about God’s knowledge have traditionally arisen.” (Pg. ix)
Molina states, “we will explain the way in which God knows future contingents, and, finally, we will reconcile divine foreknowledge with our freedom of choice and with the contingency of things.” (Disputation 47, 1, pg. 85) He says, “For the fact that all effects of the sort in question are such that they are able not to exist derives from God’s free will alone, and so God’s will must be called the soul source of and total explanation for their contingency.” (4, pg. 88)
He states, “the primary, though remote, source of contingency for the effects of all the secondary causes belonging to the natural order is God’s will, which created the free choice of human beings and angels and the sentient appetite of those beasts that seem to be endowed with some sort of trace of freedom with respect to certain acts; on the other hand, the proximate and immediate source is the free choice of human beings and angels, along with the sentient appetite of beasts with respect to those acts in which beasts seem to have a trace of freedom.” (10, pg. 94)
He observes, “from eternity God’s cognition extends simultaneously to all contingent things insofar as they are already present to Him in the duration of eternity with that very same existence outside their causes which they are going to have in the course of time.” (Disp. 49, 1, pg. 111)
He summarizes, “It is not simply because things exist outside their causes in eternity that God knows future contingents with certainty; rather, before … He creates anything at all, He comprehends in Himself… all the things which, as a result of all the secondary causes possible by virtue of His omnipotence, would contingently or simply freely come to be on the hypothesis that He should will to establish these or those orders of things with these or those circumstances; and by the very fact that through His free will He established in being that order of things and causes which He in fact established, He comprehended in His very self and in that decree of His all the things that were in fact freely or contingently going to be or not going to be as a result of secondary causes---and He comprehended this not only prior to anything’s existing in time, but even prior … to any created thing’s existing in the duration of eternity.” (8, pg. 115-116)
He asserts, “before anything exists, God foreknows future contingencies with certainty. Indeed, BEFORE the free decree of His will He know them through a sort of natural knowledge and on the hypothesis that He should will to create and arrange things in this or that way, whereas in that free decree, which as a cause precedes the existence of future contingents both in eternity and in time, He knows them absolutely and without any hypothesis or condition.” (13, pg. 122) Later, he adds, “God knows all future contingents with certainty in Himself as in a primary object, and He also knows them with certainty in their proper secondary causes as in a secondary object.” (Disp. 50, 16, pg. 142)
He argues, “God knows with absolute certainty, in His own self and in the secondary causes, what is going to happen contingently by virtue of the freedom of those causes; yet He knows this in such a way that (i) the opposite is able to occur, and that (ii) if it were going to occur, as it is really able to, then from eternity God would have known THIS with absolute certainty and not what He in fact knows. Thus, while the full force of created free choice is preserved and while the contingency of things remains altogether intact in the same way as if there were no foreknowledge of God, God knows future contingents with absolute certainty.” (Disp. 51, 18, pg. 157)
He notes, “‘From eternity God foreknew that Peter was going to sin tomorrow; therefore, Peter is going to sin tomorrow.’ … Since, therefore, it is not within Peter’s power to bring it about that from eternity God did not foreknow that sin of his which is going to exist tomorrow, and since this is not within God’s power either, because there is no power over the past, it follows that it likewise does not lie within Peter’s power to bring it about that he is not going to sin tomorrow; and from this it follows that given the foreknowledge that God in fact has, no freedom of choice remains in Peter.” (Disp. 52, 7, pg. 166)
He suggests, “it is necessary for us to distinguish THREE types of knowledge in God. One type is purely NATURAL knowledge… Through this type of knowledge He knew all the things to which the divine power extended either immediately or by the mediation of secondary causes… The second type is purely FREE knowledge, by which, AFTER the free act of his will, God knew ABSOLUTELY and DETERMINATELY, without any condition or hypothesis, which ones from among all the contingent states of affairs were in fact going to obtain and… which ones were not going to obtain. Finally, the third type is MIDDLE knowledge, by which… He saw in His own essence what each such faculty would do with its innate freedom were it to be placed in this or that or, indeed, in infinitely many orders of things---even though it would really be able, if it so willed, to do the opposite…” (Disp. 52, 9, pg. 168)
He elaborates, “the knowledge through which God, before He decides to create a being endowed with free choice, foresees what the being would do ON THE HYPOTHESIS that it should be placed in a particular order of things---this knowledge depends on the fact that the being would in its freedom do this or that, and not the other way around. On the other hand, what is IN FACT going to happen because of created free choice is always FREE knowledge of God, and such knowledge depends on the free determination of His will, a determination by which He decides to create such-and-such a faculty of free choice in such-and-such an order of things.” (10, pg. 170)
He adds, “For (i) the things that issue forth from our choice or depend on it are not going to happen because they are foreknown to God as going to happen, but, to the contrary, they are foreknown by God as going to happen in this or that way because they are so going to happen by virtue of our freedom of choice---though if they were going to happen in a contrary way, as they are able to, then from eternity they would be foreknown as going to happen in that contrary way instead of in the way they are in fact foreknown as going to happen.” (29, pg. 184)
He summarizes, “(i) our freedom of choice and the contingency of things is perfectly compatible with divine foreknowledge, and that (ii) such foreknowledge in no way prevents it from being the case that with the help of God, who will always furnish as much help as each person needs, it is within our power to avoid all mortal sins, to recover from them after a lapse, and in the end either to attain or to lose eternal life, and that (iii) if we do not attain eternal life, then we ourselves are to blame in just the way we would be if there were in God no foreknowledge of future things.” (39, pg. 194)
He contends, “we may now distinguish… a sort of MIDDLE genus of things … comprising those things that (i) are indeed produced directly by God, even though a human or angelic intellect or will may concur in the production of them… and yet that (ii) depend on some other source of contingency besides God for their subject or for something else. The following are examples: the raising up of Lazarus; the granting of sight to the man born blind…” (Disp. 53, 3, pg. 240)
He admits, “it should nonetheless be affirmed that certain predeterminations on God’s part were necessary in order for those actions to be able to exist in reality through the created faculty of choice. Thus, if we are speaking of Peter’s threefold denial, all those predeterminations were necessary which we claimed above to be necessary for eliciting an INDIFFERENT act at the very moment at which Peter denied Christ… Furthermore, it was likewise necessary for there to be a predetermination to permit Peter, for the sake of the excellent end that God Himself intended by this permission, to perform the evil action that He foresaw would occur under those circumstances because of Peter’s free choice---that is, a predetermination not to alter the circumstances or to confer on Peter other aids in the presence of which he would not lapse into that denial because of the same freedom of choice.” (9, pg. 247)
He again summarizes, “this middle knowledge is a knowledge of all those effects in such a way that it is a knowledge of none of them except on the hypothesis of a predetermination of the divine will to choose to establish this or that order of things and to provide for and assist the order of things in question… in this or that way… it most assuredly follows that through His middle knowledge, prior to any act of His will, God foresaw nothing except on the hypothesis and under the condition that He should will to provide for the effect in question in this or that way.” (11, pg. 249)
This book, though hardly “light reading,” is of great interest to those studying theological issues such as Free Will, Predestination, etc.
June 8, 2015
I'm so fascinated with this idea of middle knowledge that I went to the source. Honestly, Molina got the better of me. I still barely understand Molinism after reading this, which is a shame.
Or maybe not. Maybe I'm making this concept harder than it is.
Or maybe not. Maybe I'm making this concept harder than it is.
November 11, 2014
Whether one is a Molinist or not, this is a must have for anyone interested in the writings and teachings of Luis de Molina.
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