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264 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2012
[S]ecularism is not necessarily modern, nor is religion marginal or superfluous to a modern life. Instead, religion itself can become secularized (individualized, privatized) while the secular sphere becomes sacralized as profane images and practices are imbued with attributes of the sacred, and religious meanings and legitimacy are extended to new practices. (pp.4-5)Utilizing sociologist José Casanova's notion of aggiornamentos, re-adjustments and -framings of tradition which blur the lines between sacred and profane, White goes on to suggest that reinterpretations of modernity as much as of tradition have led to public interpellations of piety and democratization previously unimagined.
In practice national subjectivity is highly situational. It is the product of individual motives, the position and perspective of the actor, the intended audience, and the multiple frameworks (civilized, modern, conservative, Kemalist, secular, Muslim, liberal, and so on, as these are defined locally) within which an individual is situated while projecting his or her indentity at any given moment. . . [T]he definition of a culture must proceed from the individual's understanding and expression of cultural categories, which are always strategic. (p. 18)
National subjectivity are better described by delineating the processes by which people develop them, rather as categories to label them. (p. 183) as [Labels] gain meaning only when they are acted out. And in the process of being performed, root identifying traditions [...] are continually modified by experience, manipulated to meet subjective commitments and concerns, and disordered by contradictory interpretations imposed by one's gender, religious, racial, and social class positions. (p. 194)
White's perhaps most original contribution centres the ambiguous role of women in Turkish national meaning-meaning: throughout her analysis, she points out women's alienation from the traditional discourses of national subjectivity and its irrelevance to them as individuals. Muslim and secular (Kemalist) nationalists alike share a masculinist militarist notion of the state, for which the patriarchal family is microcosm, model and synecdoche, and a sexed bioessentialist attitude to national identity:[Men's] offspring would be haunted by a mixed-blood identity in a way that Christian women's offspring are not. Women's ideality has always been more malleable. It was permitted for a Muslim to marry a Christian woman as long as their children were raised as Muslims, while it would have been (and often still is) unacceptable for a Muslim woman to marry a Christian man. The man literally and figuratively plants the seed of identity in the soil of the woman's body. The metaphor of seed and soil is common enough to be encountered in folk sayings, religious sermons, and in daily conversation. A man's blood is the source of his children's identity, while the mother supplies a nurturing medium. This cultural attribute of women makes them "weak"carriers if national identity incapable of instantiating—only of nurturing—Turkish national identity. (p. 160)
a (i.)note: In Ch. 4, 'The Missionary and the Headscarf', White draws a parallel between the conceptualization of the state between Turkey and France, where Kemalism has historic roots and with which it shares a number of ideological assumptions regarding the role of the state (p. 89) and the state's right and duty to moderate the public. Citing Joan W. Scott's The Politics of the Veil in France, "the veil becomes a screen onto which projected images of strangeness and fantasies of danger—danger to the Fabric of French society and to the future of the republican nation."
What of find notable about this reference to a common genealogy is that Atatürk is also related and foundational to the forms of European fascism. What suggests itself, in an act of tracing and translation, is that the paternalism of the French Republic (and, perhaps, concretely, its policing of public veiling) is, in a distinct sense, proto-fascistic.
a (ii.) note and a timely meditation:Israeli political culture, [Uri Ram (in"Why Secularism Fails? Secular Nationalism and Religious Revivalism in in Israel." Int J Polit Cult Soc (2008) 21:57–73.] argues, moved away from a combination of strong nationalism/weak religionism in its early Zionist days to strong nationalist/strong religionism today. The strong nationalism/weak religionism type is strongly reminiscent of Kemalism, as Ram himself points out. . . Israel, Ram argues, is becoming increasingly nonsecular, because only Jewish nationality is officially recognized, not Israeli nationality, giving religious groups sway over defining the nation. Why is this the case? Jewish nationality means that belonging is determined by family of birth, while Israeli nationality is a potentially universal category open to all—Jews, Arabs, and other citizens. "In order to avert such a potential 'mix' and to secure the boundaries and membership of a 'pure'Jewish nationality, the state leans on Jewish religion(ism.)" Judaism is thus deployed as a shield against civic nationalism. Since they cannot be nationals, non-Jewish perforce are members of the devalued category of citizen. Religion used as a national standard thus disguises what is really political exclusion on the basic of ethnic racism. (p. 191,, emphasis mine)