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Braintrust: What Neuroscience Tells Us about Morality
What is morality? Where does it come from? And why do most of us heed its call most of the time? In Braintrust , neurophilosophy pioneer Patricia Churchland argues that morality originates in the biology of the brain. She describes the "neurobiological platform of bonding" that, modified by evolutionary pressures and cultural values, has led to human styles of moral behavior. The result is a provocative genealogy of morals that asks us to reevaluate the priority given to religion, absolute rules, and pure reason in accounting for the basis of morality.
Moral values, Churchland argues, are rooted in a behavior common to all mammals--the caring for offspring. The evolved structure, processes, and chemistry of the brain incline humans to strive not only for self-preservation but for the well-being of allied selves--first offspring, then mates, kin, and so on, in wider and wider "caring" circles. Separation and exclusion cause pain, and the company of loved ones causes pleasure; responding to feelings of social pain and pleasure, brains adjust their circuitry to local customs. In this way, caring is apportioned, conscience molded, and moral intuitions instilled. A key part of the story is oxytocin, an ancient body-and-brain molecule that, by decreasing the stress response, allows humans to develop the trust in one another necessary for the development of close-knit ties, social institutions, and morality.
A major new account of what really makes us moral, Braintrust challenges us to reconsider the origins of some of our most cherished values.
Moral values, Churchland argues, are rooted in a behavior common to all mammals--the caring for offspring. The evolved structure, processes, and chemistry of the brain incline humans to strive not only for self-preservation but for the well-being of allied selves--first offspring, then mates, kin, and so on, in wider and wider "caring" circles. Separation and exclusion cause pain, and the company of loved ones causes pleasure; responding to feelings of social pain and pleasure, brains adjust their circuitry to local customs. In this way, caring is apportioned, conscience molded, and moral intuitions instilled. A key part of the story is oxytocin, an ancient body-and-brain molecule that, by decreasing the stress response, allows humans to develop the trust in one another necessary for the development of close-knit ties, social institutions, and morality.
A major new account of what really makes us moral, Braintrust challenges us to reconsider the origins of some of our most cherished values.
288 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2011
101 people are currently reading
3228 people want to read
About the author
Patricia S. Churchland
16 books212 followersPatricia Smith Churchland (born July 16, 1943 in Oliver, British Columbia, Canada) is a Canadian-American philosopher working at the University of California, San Diego (UCSD) since 1984. She is currently a professor at the UCSD Philosophy Department, an adjunct professor at the Salk Institute for Biological Studies, and an associate of the Computational Neuroscience Laboratory (Sejnowski Lab) at the Salk Institute. She won a MacArthur prize in 1991. Educated at the University of British Columbia, the University of Pittsburgh, and the University of Oxford (B.Phil.). She taught philosophy at the University of Manitoba from 1969 to 1984 and is the wife of philosopher Paul Churchland.
Churchland has focused on the interface between neuroscience and philosophy. According to her, philosophers are increasingly realizing that to understand the mind one must understand the brain. She is associated with a school of thought called eliminativism or eliminative materialism, which argues that folk psychology concepts such as belief, free will, and consciousness will likely need to be revised as science understands more about the nature of brain function. She is also called a naturalist, because she thinks scientific research is the best basis for understanding the nature of the mind. Her recent work focuses also on neuroethics, and attempts to understand choice, responsibility and the basis of moral norms in terms of brain function, brain evolution, and brain-culture interactions.
She was interviewed along with her husband Paul Churchland for the book Conversations on Consciousness by Susan Blackmore, 2006.
She attended and was a speaker at the Beyond Belief symposium on November 2006 and November 2007.
Patricia and her husband are noted for their attempts to apply their philosophical positions in their daily life. Emotions and feelings, for instance, are eschewed in favour of more precise formulations, such as the following which describes the state of Patricia after a hectic meeting:
"Paul, don't speak to me, my serotonin levels have hit bottom, my brain is awash in glucocorticoids, my blood vessels are full of adrenaline, and if it weren't for my endogenous opiates I'd have driven the car into a tree on the way home. My dopamine levels need lifting."
Churchland has focused on the interface between neuroscience and philosophy. According to her, philosophers are increasingly realizing that to understand the mind one must understand the brain. She is associated with a school of thought called eliminativism or eliminative materialism, which argues that folk psychology concepts such as belief, free will, and consciousness will likely need to be revised as science understands more about the nature of brain function. She is also called a naturalist, because she thinks scientific research is the best basis for understanding the nature of the mind. Her recent work focuses also on neuroethics, and attempts to understand choice, responsibility and the basis of moral norms in terms of brain function, brain evolution, and brain-culture interactions.
She was interviewed along with her husband Paul Churchland for the book Conversations on Consciousness by Susan Blackmore, 2006.
She attended and was a speaker at the Beyond Belief symposium on November 2006 and November 2007.
Patricia and her husband are noted for their attempts to apply their philosophical positions in their daily life. Emotions and feelings, for instance, are eschewed in favour of more precise formulations, such as the following which describes the state of Patricia after a hectic meeting:
"Paul, don't speak to me, my serotonin levels have hit bottom, my brain is awash in glucocorticoids, my blood vessels are full of adrenaline, and if it weren't for my endogenous opiates I'd have driven the car into a tree on the way home. My dopamine levels need lifting."
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December 20, 2015
I ended up reading this after an extended argument with a philosopher of science in England about morality and science. My major beef came from him conflating the position held by Churchland and by Sam Harris. It is true that Harris and Churchland both advocate ethical naturalism, but to me the gaps between the two are huge, not small like he seemed to think. Also, this philosopher was an advocate of ethical naturalism and seemed to view anybody who was not as being "anti-science." He and I also had issues because he is a deflationist in terms of truth, while I adhere to correspondence and he was such a hardcore empiricist that he held Hume's view that a priori knowledge was merely tautological. My view on the subject is more in line with Kant, so we had very little common ground to stem from. I had heard Churchland speak on the subject but had not read her book. So I read the book in a hope of finding the understanding between us.
The science of Braintrust is pretty solid and I appreciate how Churchland keeps evo-psych "just so" stories and neuro-sexism out of the picture. However, her arguments about morality and its connection with science is muddled. In fact, it doesn't even seem like a philosopher wrote this but a good scientist with a limited knowledge of philosophy. My issues with the book are as follows.
1. Chruchland concludes that social conventions and moral choices are "on the same spectrum" because the same part of the brain is active during both. While this is evidence to suggest her claim, this is rather simplistic. Both social conventions and moral choices are taught and enforced by culture and there may be differences in them, while they are not easily delineated. She spends a single line on this in the book, while I would have spent an entire chapter.
2. While Churchland spends a lot of the book dismissing Kant, she changes the biologist's definition of cooperation to "having mutual ends." So basically she has argued that the best definition for cooperation is a Kantian one.
3. Churchland admits that science cannot solve moral problems but is dismissive of both the is / ought and naturalism fallacies. This is odd. She defines Hume's Guillotine correctly and her argument about it being used incorrectly might be true for moral anti-realists but she does little to dent either arguments standing among non-natural realists, or moral skeptics.
4. Churchland spends a brief period addressing John Rawls, mostly by quoting philosophers who disagree with Rawls. Once again, this is dismissing an entire book and theory in a few short paragraphs.
5. Churchland argues against the Golden Rule but all her arguments against it would fail if she changed it to Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative which states that others are to be treated as ends in themselves not means to an end.
6. She argues against Kant's first version of the categorical imperative by stating she can come up with a maxim that would pass that would be unethical. Not only is the thing she comes up with something that there would be disagreement about, she provides no motive with the formulation of the maxim. Kant stated that a "good will" is important and the addition of a motive would make her maxim fail in most cases.
7. Churchland dislikes Utilitarianism and I found most of her arguments to be pretty sound but she liked John Stuart Mill mostly because his values she finds similar to Aristolte. This is a major problem about her book is that it is basically an argument for Virtue Ethics that is attempting to use science but failing, while Sam Harris's book is a book where he is arguing for utilitarianism based on science but failing. Churchland's book is better though.
The science of Braintrust is pretty solid and I appreciate how Churchland keeps evo-psych "just so" stories and neuro-sexism out of the picture. However, her arguments about morality and its connection with science is muddled. In fact, it doesn't even seem like a philosopher wrote this but a good scientist with a limited knowledge of philosophy. My issues with the book are as follows.
1. Chruchland concludes that social conventions and moral choices are "on the same spectrum" because the same part of the brain is active during both. While this is evidence to suggest her claim, this is rather simplistic. Both social conventions and moral choices are taught and enforced by culture and there may be differences in them, while they are not easily delineated. She spends a single line on this in the book, while I would have spent an entire chapter.
2. While Churchland spends a lot of the book dismissing Kant, she changes the biologist's definition of cooperation to "having mutual ends." So basically she has argued that the best definition for cooperation is a Kantian one.
3. Churchland admits that science cannot solve moral problems but is dismissive of both the is / ought and naturalism fallacies. This is odd. She defines Hume's Guillotine correctly and her argument about it being used incorrectly might be true for moral anti-realists but she does little to dent either arguments standing among non-natural realists, or moral skeptics.
4. Churchland spends a brief period addressing John Rawls, mostly by quoting philosophers who disagree with Rawls. Once again, this is dismissing an entire book and theory in a few short paragraphs.
5. Churchland argues against the Golden Rule but all her arguments against it would fail if she changed it to Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative which states that others are to be treated as ends in themselves not means to an end.
6. She argues against Kant's first version of the categorical imperative by stating she can come up with a maxim that would pass that would be unethical. Not only is the thing she comes up with something that there would be disagreement about, she provides no motive with the formulation of the maxim. Kant stated that a "good will" is important and the addition of a motive would make her maxim fail in most cases.
7. Churchland dislikes Utilitarianism and I found most of her arguments to be pretty sound but she liked John Stuart Mill mostly because his values she finds similar to Aristolte. This is a major problem about her book is that it is basically an argument for Virtue Ethics that is attempting to use science but failing, while Sam Harris's book is a book where he is arguing for utilitarianism based on science but failing. Churchland's book is better though.
September 3, 2018
Qualche anno fa, l’italia si divise tra colpevolisti e innocentisti a proposito di una signora di Cogne, in Valle d’Aosta, tale Annamaria Franzoni. Devo dire che ho dimenticato tutte le ragioni a favore degli uni o degli altri, il caso fece molto clamore, furono costruiti plastici dell’abitazione, prime serate, dirette tv. La signora Franzoni fu ritenuta colpevole e imprigionata.
Ricordo un aneddoto raccontato a proposito di un vecchio padre, un uomo con un grande senso della famiglia, che ammazzò quattro dei suoi sei figli, ammettendo in tribunale che aveva compiuto il delitto perché, a un tratto, gli erano sembrati troppi.
Perché rammaricarsi per un bimbo e non per la sorte della madre?
Il principe di Condé disse al cardinale Mazzarino davanti alla disfatta di Friburgo e ai suoi ventimila morti che bastava una sola notte di intensa passione a Parigi per compensare o rimpiazzare quelle perdite. Tali dovevano essere le fantasie più tenebrose dell’animo di Raskolnikov, avallate dal giudizio spinoziano dell’inesistenza di cose buone o cattive in sé, se l’uomo è davvero libero. La metà del mondo, ha scritto Ralph Waldo Emerson, non sa come vive l’altra metà (né può pronunciarsi sulla sua condotta).
Quando penso alla Franzoni, mi viene spesso in mente l’immagine di Spinoza, quella di una tigre che sbrana un bambino. Questo orrendo assassinio è un puro fatto, dice l’ebreo-portoghese, ma va risolto riflettendo sulla natura della tigre; la tigre è e non poteva non essere. Messa così il fatto avrebbe complicato la vita dei giudici, già impegnati nello sbrogliare le carte delle coordinate spaziotemporali dell’atto: l’autobus, la strada verso l’autobus, quindici minuti, il vicino, il secondo fratello... Si sarebbero trovati di fronte a un problema di carattere ontologico. La Franzoni e la tigre. L’azione è delittuosa per definizione.
A me ogni tanto capita di pensare alla Franzoni nella cella (non so se sia già uscita) che, forse per sostenere la monotonia del tempo carcerario o anche per impadronirsi di qualcosa che la civiltà le ha tolto, il ricordo del suo passato, immagina se stessa compiere l’atto e cerca di percepire le emozioni ad esso connesse. Minuziosamente si vede ripercorre i corridoi della sua casa di montagna. Ha bene in mente la disposizione delle stanze, dove è il letto del bambino. Ricostruisce pure il suo pianto, il lamento. Il pianto assordante del bambino è una buona motivazione all’orrendo gesto, innervosisce perché distrae dal pensare: e se la Franzoni pensa tutto il tempo nessuno lo sa davvero, tantomeno i giudici. Nessuno sa se ha delegato la vita ai suoi servi (la citazione è di Villiers de L’Isle-Adam). Nessuna sa se a lei spetta solo il compito di pensare. Il pianto del bambino è forse il delitto che si compie nei suoi confronti, ma cosa ci interessa?
La vediamo immaginarsi mentre compie l’atto nefando e la vediamo immaginarlo per tentare di evocare una crisi: la crisi morale che altri hanno invocato per lei. Ma la Franzoni, come ogni omicida, aderisce completamente al suo vizio e alla sua contumacia. Non ha bisogno di giungere a una crisi per sentirsi libera.
Perché l’ha fatto? È il grido sentenzioso. E allora pensiamo, quasi incautamente, che lei l’abbia fatto perché potesse entrare nella Storia: ripeterlo, riviverlo, raccontarlo e ri-raccontarlo per far vivere davvero un attimo. Uccidere forse vuol dire per la Franzoni ammazzare il “tempo profano”, come lo chiamava Mircea Eliade. Presuppone la cessazione di tutti gli istanti inconsistenti, presuppone una sostituzione di ruoli, da subente ad agente storico. La Franzoni rende eroica la sua esistenza attraverso una modificazione della corrente; semina l’oscurità nella bianchezza delle nevi nordiche, o viceversa illumina l’atto conscio spegnendo la luce attorno ad esso.
Agisce per una musa, Clio: colei che narra ciò che soltanto è possibile ri-narrare. Colei che disprezza il racconto pedissequo del mondo. Questa ambivalenza del teatro della memoria, come lo chiamava Sciascia, che ottunde i sensi, non ricorda, falsifica, omette e che hanno rinfacciato alla Franzoni dandole della spergiura, è il prezzo da pagare per un istante di pura luce. Lei, forse, non ha seguito il consiglio di Lao-Tzu: "abbassa la luce, diventa tutt’una con il mondo opaco".
C'è qualcosa nella mia coscienza che mi spinge a dichiarare a tutti: è un'assassina. Ma sono ben lungi dal sapere cosa sia questa cosa.
Ricordo un aneddoto raccontato a proposito di un vecchio padre, un uomo con un grande senso della famiglia, che ammazzò quattro dei suoi sei figli, ammettendo in tribunale che aveva compiuto il delitto perché, a un tratto, gli erano sembrati troppi.
Perché rammaricarsi per un bimbo e non per la sorte della madre?
Il principe di Condé disse al cardinale Mazzarino davanti alla disfatta di Friburgo e ai suoi ventimila morti che bastava una sola notte di intensa passione a Parigi per compensare o rimpiazzare quelle perdite. Tali dovevano essere le fantasie più tenebrose dell’animo di Raskolnikov, avallate dal giudizio spinoziano dell’inesistenza di cose buone o cattive in sé, se l’uomo è davvero libero. La metà del mondo, ha scritto Ralph Waldo Emerson, non sa come vive l’altra metà (né può pronunciarsi sulla sua condotta).
Quando penso alla Franzoni, mi viene spesso in mente l’immagine di Spinoza, quella di una tigre che sbrana un bambino. Questo orrendo assassinio è un puro fatto, dice l’ebreo-portoghese, ma va risolto riflettendo sulla natura della tigre; la tigre è e non poteva non essere. Messa così il fatto avrebbe complicato la vita dei giudici, già impegnati nello sbrogliare le carte delle coordinate spaziotemporali dell’atto: l’autobus, la strada verso l’autobus, quindici minuti, il vicino, il secondo fratello... Si sarebbero trovati di fronte a un problema di carattere ontologico. La Franzoni e la tigre. L’azione è delittuosa per definizione.
A me ogni tanto capita di pensare alla Franzoni nella cella (non so se sia già uscita) che, forse per sostenere la monotonia del tempo carcerario o anche per impadronirsi di qualcosa che la civiltà le ha tolto, il ricordo del suo passato, immagina se stessa compiere l’atto e cerca di percepire le emozioni ad esso connesse. Minuziosamente si vede ripercorre i corridoi della sua casa di montagna. Ha bene in mente la disposizione delle stanze, dove è il letto del bambino. Ricostruisce pure il suo pianto, il lamento. Il pianto assordante del bambino è una buona motivazione all’orrendo gesto, innervosisce perché distrae dal pensare: e se la Franzoni pensa tutto il tempo nessuno lo sa davvero, tantomeno i giudici. Nessuno sa se ha delegato la vita ai suoi servi (la citazione è di Villiers de L’Isle-Adam). Nessuna sa se a lei spetta solo il compito di pensare. Il pianto del bambino è forse il delitto che si compie nei suoi confronti, ma cosa ci interessa?
La vediamo immaginarsi mentre compie l’atto nefando e la vediamo immaginarlo per tentare di evocare una crisi: la crisi morale che altri hanno invocato per lei. Ma la Franzoni, come ogni omicida, aderisce completamente al suo vizio e alla sua contumacia. Non ha bisogno di giungere a una crisi per sentirsi libera.
Perché l’ha fatto? È il grido sentenzioso. E allora pensiamo, quasi incautamente, che lei l’abbia fatto perché potesse entrare nella Storia: ripeterlo, riviverlo, raccontarlo e ri-raccontarlo per far vivere davvero un attimo. Uccidere forse vuol dire per la Franzoni ammazzare il “tempo profano”, come lo chiamava Mircea Eliade. Presuppone la cessazione di tutti gli istanti inconsistenti, presuppone una sostituzione di ruoli, da subente ad agente storico. La Franzoni rende eroica la sua esistenza attraverso una modificazione della corrente; semina l’oscurità nella bianchezza delle nevi nordiche, o viceversa illumina l’atto conscio spegnendo la luce attorno ad esso.
Agisce per una musa, Clio: colei che narra ciò che soltanto è possibile ri-narrare. Colei che disprezza il racconto pedissequo del mondo. Questa ambivalenza del teatro della memoria, come lo chiamava Sciascia, che ottunde i sensi, non ricorda, falsifica, omette e che hanno rinfacciato alla Franzoni dandole della spergiura, è il prezzo da pagare per un istante di pura luce. Lei, forse, non ha seguito il consiglio di Lao-Tzu: "abbassa la luce, diventa tutt’una con il mondo opaco".
C'è qualcosa nella mia coscienza che mi spinge a dichiarare a tutti: è un'assassina. Ma sono ben lungi dal sapere cosa sia questa cosa.
October 9, 2011
This is a brilliant work that accomplishes what the subtitle declares. In the introduction Churchland quickly deals with the notion that the project of the book is misbegotten because it falls prey to the naturalistic fallacy. She shows how the naturalistic fallacy has been misunderstood and that in fact her project follows in Hume’s footsteps. She concludes:
Naturalism, while shunning stupid inferences, does nevertheless find the roots of morality in how we are, what we care about, and what matters to us--in our nature. Neither supernaturalism (the otherworldly gods), nor some rarefied, unrealistic concept of reason, explains the moral motherboard.
She then makes explicit the ideas the book will explore:
The hypothesis on offer is that what we humans call ethics or morality is a four-dimensional scheme for social behavior that is shaped by interlocking brain processes: (1) caring (rooted attachment to kin and kith and care for their well-being), (2) recognition of others’ psychological states (rooted in the benefits of predicting the behavior of others), (3) problem-solving in a social context (e.g., how we should distribute scarce goods, settle land disputes; how we should punish the miscreants), and (4) learning social practices (by positive and negative reinforcement, by imitation, by trial and error, by various kinds of conditioning, and by analogy).
And so follows a powerfully reasoned but circumspect book on neuroscience and morality. It is an excellent neuroscience primer. In particular, the sections on mirror neurons cut through the hype that surrounds them. The next to last chapter is a thorough debunking of rule ethics. The final chapter adroitly debunks the notion that morality depends on commandments from on high. When all is said and done the result is a very compelling confirmation of the hypothesis. I strongly recommend this book.
Naturalism, while shunning stupid inferences, does nevertheless find the roots of morality in how we are, what we care about, and what matters to us--in our nature. Neither supernaturalism (the otherworldly gods), nor some rarefied, unrealistic concept of reason, explains the moral motherboard.
She then makes explicit the ideas the book will explore:
The hypothesis on offer is that what we humans call ethics or morality is a four-dimensional scheme for social behavior that is shaped by interlocking brain processes: (1) caring (rooted attachment to kin and kith and care for their well-being), (2) recognition of others’ psychological states (rooted in the benefits of predicting the behavior of others), (3) problem-solving in a social context (e.g., how we should distribute scarce goods, settle land disputes; how we should punish the miscreants), and (4) learning social practices (by positive and negative reinforcement, by imitation, by trial and error, by various kinds of conditioning, and by analogy).
And so follows a powerfully reasoned but circumspect book on neuroscience and morality. It is an excellent neuroscience primer. In particular, the sections on mirror neurons cut through the hype that surrounds them. The next to last chapter is a thorough debunking of rule ethics. The final chapter adroitly debunks the notion that morality depends on commandments from on high. When all is said and done the result is a very compelling confirmation of the hypothesis. I strongly recommend this book.
June 25, 2011
Braintrust: What Neuroscience Tells Us about Morality by Patricia S. Churchland
"Braintrust..." is the latest book from self proclaimed neurophilosopher Patricia S. Churchland, a fitting term for the accomplished author and philosopher. This book is about answering questions regarding moral values from a neuroscientist's point of view. Churchland uses a scientific sound approach to not only seek such answers but to tell us what we don't know about the brain and its relation with morality. This 288-page book is composed of the following eight chapters: 1. Introduction, 2. Brain-Based Values, 3. Caring and Caring For, 4. Cooperating and Trusting, 5. Networking: Genes, Brains, and Behavior, 6. Skills for a Social Life, 7. Not as a Rule, and 8. Religion and Morality.
Positives:
1. An accessible, well-written and well-researched book.
2. The Churchland name might as well be synonymous with neuroscience. Mrs. Churchland an accomplished philosopher herself is married to renowned neuroscientist Paul Churchland and has a son and daughter who are also neuroscientists. As a philosopher and with the aforementioned background, she has the best tools to write such wonderful books.
3. Great use of the most current scientific evidence and theories to answer the aforementioned profound questions. Many scientific studies spread across this book.
4. Great use of illustrations.
5. Professor Churchland is a skeptic's skeptic. What she does best is keeping science grounded to the facts. Scientists are human too and even they commit the fallacy of jumping to conclusions. Professor Churchland throughout the book states specifically when she feels that is the case and does so with compelling scientific evidence. By far the strongest suit of this book.
6. The importance of oxytocin in the evolution of mammalian brains.
7. The neural platform for morality established. Excellent.
8. Once again, mere speculations are put in their proper place.
9. The dynamics of cultural evolution.
10. The importance of oxytocin (OXT) and vasopressin (AVP) in the female mammalian brain.
11. Honestly, where would we be without evolution?
12. The interesting mechanisms of mate attachments.
13. You gotta' love bonobos.
14. The relations between genes and behavior, a many-to-many proposition.
15. The following statement captures one of the recurring themes of this book, "Speculations are of course useful in inspiring experiments, and are not to be discouraged. The point is, I prefer not buy into one, or be asked to, until some results bear upon its truth."
16. Moral claims hammered unmercifully.
17. Psychopaths!
18. Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert in the same book? Get out of here.
19. Mirror neurons in a totally different light.
20. What we know about intentions.
21. Some studies debunked.
22. Why we like imitation.
23. The Golden Rule in detail, interesting and unique take.
24. Consequentialism and utility.
25. A reality based morality.
26. Moore's theory debunked. Another one bites the dust.
27. "Whatever it is that makes something good or just right is rooted in the nature of humans and the society we make, not in the nature of the gods we invent." Excellent quote.
28. Extensive notes and a thorough bibliography.
29. Links work great, thank you Kindle.
30. An overall good read.
Negatives:
1. The book did an awesome job of telling us what we don't know about the brain and its relation to morality. I just felt it didn't do enough to tell me what we do know. It's the main reason I didn't give it five stars.
2. Oh I wanted so badly to have Professor Churchland go after the soul. The appetizer she provided was delicious but I wanted the entree.
3. I wanted more conviction on the things that we do know. A little more passion.
4. The book can be a little dry at times, especially when caught up in game examples.
In summary, I gained a lot of valuable knowledge from this book but I clearly wanted more. Neuroscience is indeed a very young field and there is so much more that we need to learn. Churchland clearly objects to scientists jumping to conclusions without meeting the burden of proof. At the other side, she makes it clear that morality is biologically based and uses current scientific studies to back her arguments. An important book indeed.
Recommendations:, "The Brain and the Meaning of Life" by Paul Thagard, "Human" by Michael S. Gazzaniga, "Hardwired Behavior: What Neuroscience Reveals about Morality" by Laurence Tancredi, "Moral Landscape" by Sam Harris and "The Myth of Free Will" by Cris Evatt.
"Braintrust..." is the latest book from self proclaimed neurophilosopher Patricia S. Churchland, a fitting term for the accomplished author and philosopher. This book is about answering questions regarding moral values from a neuroscientist's point of view. Churchland uses a scientific sound approach to not only seek such answers but to tell us what we don't know about the brain and its relation with morality. This 288-page book is composed of the following eight chapters: 1. Introduction, 2. Brain-Based Values, 3. Caring and Caring For, 4. Cooperating and Trusting, 5. Networking: Genes, Brains, and Behavior, 6. Skills for a Social Life, 7. Not as a Rule, and 8. Religion and Morality.
Positives:
1. An accessible, well-written and well-researched book.
2. The Churchland name might as well be synonymous with neuroscience. Mrs. Churchland an accomplished philosopher herself is married to renowned neuroscientist Paul Churchland and has a son and daughter who are also neuroscientists. As a philosopher and with the aforementioned background, she has the best tools to write such wonderful books.
3. Great use of the most current scientific evidence and theories to answer the aforementioned profound questions. Many scientific studies spread across this book.
4. Great use of illustrations.
5. Professor Churchland is a skeptic's skeptic. What she does best is keeping science grounded to the facts. Scientists are human too and even they commit the fallacy of jumping to conclusions. Professor Churchland throughout the book states specifically when she feels that is the case and does so with compelling scientific evidence. By far the strongest suit of this book.
6. The importance of oxytocin in the evolution of mammalian brains.
7. The neural platform for morality established. Excellent.
8. Once again, mere speculations are put in their proper place.
9. The dynamics of cultural evolution.
10. The importance of oxytocin (OXT) and vasopressin (AVP) in the female mammalian brain.
11. Honestly, where would we be without evolution?
12. The interesting mechanisms of mate attachments.
13. You gotta' love bonobos.
14. The relations between genes and behavior, a many-to-many proposition.
15. The following statement captures one of the recurring themes of this book, "Speculations are of course useful in inspiring experiments, and are not to be discouraged. The point is, I prefer not buy into one, or be asked to, until some results bear upon its truth."
16. Moral claims hammered unmercifully.
17. Psychopaths!
18. Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert in the same book? Get out of here.
19. Mirror neurons in a totally different light.
20. What we know about intentions.
21. Some studies debunked.
22. Why we like imitation.
23. The Golden Rule in detail, interesting and unique take.
24. Consequentialism and utility.
25. A reality based morality.
26. Moore's theory debunked. Another one bites the dust.
27. "Whatever it is that makes something good or just right is rooted in the nature of humans and the society we make, not in the nature of the gods we invent." Excellent quote.
28. Extensive notes and a thorough bibliography.
29. Links work great, thank you Kindle.
30. An overall good read.
Negatives:
1. The book did an awesome job of telling us what we don't know about the brain and its relation to morality. I just felt it didn't do enough to tell me what we do know. It's the main reason I didn't give it five stars.
2. Oh I wanted so badly to have Professor Churchland go after the soul. The appetizer she provided was delicious but I wanted the entree.
3. I wanted more conviction on the things that we do know. A little more passion.
4. The book can be a little dry at times, especially when caught up in game examples.
In summary, I gained a lot of valuable knowledge from this book but I clearly wanted more. Neuroscience is indeed a very young field and there is so much more that we need to learn. Churchland clearly objects to scientists jumping to conclusions without meeting the burden of proof. At the other side, she makes it clear that morality is biologically based and uses current scientific studies to back her arguments. An important book indeed.
Recommendations:, "The Brain and the Meaning of Life" by Paul Thagard, "Human" by Michael S. Gazzaniga, "Hardwired Behavior: What Neuroscience Reveals about Morality" by Laurence Tancredi, "Moral Landscape" by Sam Harris and "The Myth of Free Will" by Cris Evatt.
February 18, 2020
I believe that this book is aimed at both other philosophers and the general educated reader. In it Patricia S. Churchland explores how we develop morality and how it works in our moral lives from a neuroscience perspective. She goes through values, caring, cooperation and trust, moral behavior, and social skills. She also speaks on how a rule based morality is not a better path than a more nuanced approach. And finally, she discusses religion and morality.
The following are a few comments that at this time I can comprehend what I wrote when I took notes on pieces of the text (lol). Page numbers are in brackets [] from the 2011 Princeton University Press hardback edition.
[9] Churchland believes that what we "call ethics or morality is a four dimensional scheme for social behavior that is shaped by interlocking brain processes . . ." These are "caring," what is often called theory of mind, social learning, and problem solving. I would concur. She also notes that while this schema may be easily understood, it belies its complexity in social analysis and brain mechanisms that allow us to follow it. (author italics)
[117] "By and large humans are adept in empathizing, and more generally, in 'reading minds'—knowing what others feel, intend, want, and so forth." Maybe because there is no known exact brain mechanism one can describe, she defaults to folk psychology. She has in the past been an eliminative materialist which argues against the validity of folk psychology. I don’t know where she stands on this now. She could well still support this position still and defaults to folk psychology because it is still the only game in town.
[166] "Evaluation as discussed, is rooted in the emotions and passions that are endemic to human nature, and in social habits acquired through childhood . . . Reason does not create values, but shapes itself around them and takes them in new directions." This is basically supportive of my view that emotions and feelings motivate are moral actions. Without them reason does not produce a deliberated moral action.
[188] At this point I began to wonder if there is a negative form of Moore’s naturalistic fallacy. Is anything consider naturally bad. I would claim that disease maybe something that is bad for the body. So, in one sense it does not seem to be as compelling as the positive form using “good.”. The problem with Moore is he never realized that the world doesn’t come with labels “good” and “bad.” It is us human beings that do the labeling. Yes it does introduce a certain amount of relativism, but there is a large amount of agreement, and as much as some would like a firmer grasp on what is good or bad, it is the way the world is, and it is best to accept it in my opinion.
With this book Churchland shows why she should be at the moral banquet of philosophers, and why she continues to be among my favorite philosophers and writers. It is my opinion that her approach to ethics is sound as it is informed by science and that emotions and feelings are integral to moral behavior. The four star rating might only be from familiarity with her, and from the fact that I rarely give out a five star rating on goodreads.
Definitely a good book for anyone interested in ethics, especially those that believe science has something to contribute.
The following are a few comments that at this time I can comprehend what I wrote when I took notes on pieces of the text (lol). Page numbers are in brackets [] from the 2011 Princeton University Press hardback edition.
[9] Churchland believes that what we "call ethics or morality is a four dimensional scheme for social behavior that is shaped by interlocking brain processes . . ." These are "caring," what is often called theory of mind, social learning, and problem solving. I would concur. She also notes that while this schema may be easily understood, it belies its complexity in social analysis and brain mechanisms that allow us to follow it. (author italics)
[117] "By and large humans are adept in empathizing, and more generally, in 'reading minds'—knowing what others feel, intend, want, and so forth." Maybe because there is no known exact brain mechanism one can describe, she defaults to folk psychology. She has in the past been an eliminative materialist which argues against the validity of folk psychology. I don’t know where she stands on this now. She could well still support this position still and defaults to folk psychology because it is still the only game in town.
[166] "Evaluation as discussed, is rooted in the emotions and passions that are endemic to human nature, and in social habits acquired through childhood . . . Reason does not create values, but shapes itself around them and takes them in new directions." This is basically supportive of my view that emotions and feelings motivate are moral actions. Without them reason does not produce a deliberated moral action.
[188] At this point I began to wonder if there is a negative form of Moore’s naturalistic fallacy. Is anything consider naturally bad. I would claim that disease maybe something that is bad for the body. So, in one sense it does not seem to be as compelling as the positive form using “good.”. The problem with Moore is he never realized that the world doesn’t come with labels “good” and “bad.” It is us human beings that do the labeling. Yes it does introduce a certain amount of relativism, but there is a large amount of agreement, and as much as some would like a firmer grasp on what is good or bad, it is the way the world is, and it is best to accept it in my opinion.
With this book Churchland shows why she should be at the moral banquet of philosophers, and why she continues to be among my favorite philosophers and writers. It is my opinion that her approach to ethics is sound as it is informed by science and that emotions and feelings are integral to moral behavior. The four star rating might only be from familiarity with her, and from the fact that I rarely give out a five star rating on goodreads.
Definitely a good book for anyone interested in ethics, especially those that believe science has something to contribute.
May 23, 2011
Churchland's book is everything that the modern philosophy text should be. It is accessible, it is technically proficient and it straddles the great border between abstract philosophical theory and scientific fact. I must admit that I expected, from what I knew of Churchland, for there to be much more focus on neuroscience. There is plenty of discussion of brains, but it is well balanced with a qualification of historical philosophy and current events, a mark of a great writer, I think.
The content of the book is hotly debatable, but Churchland qualifies the portions of her text that are non-controversial (much of the scientific data) with what is (the application to philosophy of mind and the discussions of ethics). That is a rare thing in a lot of philosophy texts, and Churchland is very clear about the fact that her views are her views, and not strictly those of the scientific or philosophical community.
The only major concern I have is that Churchland, despite identifying strongly with Hume and Moore, doesn't always seem to take the two articulations of the naturalistic fallacy seriously enough in her concern about what constitutes a moral system. If Churchland intends to reject the conventional concepts of ethics as holding propositions that are true, in terms of correspondence, then she should say so. It seems that she strongly implies that that is her goal, but does not explicitly say that in the text.
In any case, I think that what Churchland is doing is phenomenal, both from a philosophy of mind standpoint (her ability to move between discussions of brain states and mental states is indicative of what I feel the philosophy of mind in the future will have to be like) and from the standpoint of ethics (which I was shocked by her proficiency in). Her ability to deal with top level theorists in both arenas makes this text a terrific read for anyone in either, and especially for those (like me) who are interested in the intersection in both. Churchland's book s the best I have read on the subject.
The content of the book is hotly debatable, but Churchland qualifies the portions of her text that are non-controversial (much of the scientific data) with what is (the application to philosophy of mind and the discussions of ethics). That is a rare thing in a lot of philosophy texts, and Churchland is very clear about the fact that her views are her views, and not strictly those of the scientific or philosophical community.
The only major concern I have is that Churchland, despite identifying strongly with Hume and Moore, doesn't always seem to take the two articulations of the naturalistic fallacy seriously enough in her concern about what constitutes a moral system. If Churchland intends to reject the conventional concepts of ethics as holding propositions that are true, in terms of correspondence, then she should say so. It seems that she strongly implies that that is her goal, but does not explicitly say that in the text.
In any case, I think that what Churchland is doing is phenomenal, both from a philosophy of mind standpoint (her ability to move between discussions of brain states and mental states is indicative of what I feel the philosophy of mind in the future will have to be like) and from the standpoint of ethics (which I was shocked by her proficiency in). Her ability to deal with top level theorists in both arenas makes this text a terrific read for anyone in either, and especially for those (like me) who are interested in the intersection in both. Churchland's book s the best I have read on the subject.
July 18, 2014
Wonderful read, interesting, and some absolute gems of dry wit hidden in the end notes. It has fewer good, solid answers than I'd like, but the data that it presents is interesting and the tone light and very readable–I inhaled it on a two hour flight. The author spends a fair portion of her time unpicking the basis of contrary opinions and models, but it doesn't wear unduly, and the chapters range over a broad set of subjects in support of the basic chemical thesis. An excellent read.
March 21, 2014
This is a fantastic book with a well argued case that morality is biological and environmental. "Actual human moral behavior, in all its glory and complexity, should not be cheapened by the false dilemma: either God secures the moral law or morality is an illusion. It is a false dilemma because morality can be--and I argue, is--grounded in our biology, in our capacity for compassion and our ability to learn and figure things out."
May 30, 2011
The thesis of this book, that morality arises out of biology, is both interesting and probable. I would have enjoyed a 10-page article describing it. This 200-page book provides Too Much Information for an average layman, from detailed brain anatomy and physiology to in-depth commentary on what various philosophers have said about morality.
February 27, 2014
Excellent book. I got a much better appreciation for the biology of morality, and a much better sense for what the current state of neuroscience is.
November 13, 2021
Nice book, full of factlets, but the author is far from coming up with a coherent framework for connecting morality with neuroscience.
Nonetheless, this book is a good starting point for creating a new field of research: "neuromorality" (or something...)
Notes I took with ideas I found interesing:
* "Constraint satisfaction" seems a better model for decision making than "Deriving an ought from an is"
* The author suggests that social behaviour might be an extention of a female's instincts to protect her babies, which might be an extension of the self-circle (an innate concept which helps animals protect themselves, by distinguishing their environment as different from themselves)
* Social behaviour might have evolved multiple times in multiple taxa (mammals vs social insects), and even between mammals, it differs a lot
* The "insula", a brain struct, reacts to exclusion, separation, disapproval
* Child abuse can cause sociopathic behaviour to develop in adulthood. 30-40% of ppl in prisons score high on sociopathy. This can be interpreted that if we'd abuse children less, we'd have fewer sociopaths
* "vegas nerve" - some neural organ modified in mamals compared to reptiles.
Reptiles can only freeze if they also feel fear. Mothers however can also freeze without fearing - this helps to suckle the infants.
* Members internalize the convictions of their groups. This leads to inertia in changing attitudes towards things. This change can also happen more likely and mostly between generations
* mimicry: people are sensitive to the mimicry target. If one mimics a "lower ranking" person, they're perceived worse than if they mimic a higher ranking one.
* basic fairness and the golden rule - the author suggests both are broken (soldiers killing soldiers - this refutes the golden rule in an extreme situation)
* Example with Socrates.
Some guy says: "Good is what gods say is good".
Socrates: "Does the fact the gods say it, makes it good, or do gods say things which in a higher sense are good - gods acting like messengers for a higher authority?"
I recommend this book to people interested in neurology and morality, but you should lower your expectations, because the field is too new to be useful for too much more other than to appear cool.
Nonetheless, this book is a good starting point for creating a new field of research: "neuromorality" (or something...)
Notes I took with ideas I found interesing:
* "Constraint satisfaction" seems a better model for decision making than "Deriving an ought from an is"
* The author suggests that social behaviour might be an extention of a female's instincts to protect her babies, which might be an extension of the self-circle (an innate concept which helps animals protect themselves, by distinguishing their environment as different from themselves)
* Social behaviour might have evolved multiple times in multiple taxa (mammals vs social insects), and even between mammals, it differs a lot
* The "insula", a brain struct, reacts to exclusion, separation, disapproval
* Child abuse can cause sociopathic behaviour to develop in adulthood. 30-40% of ppl in prisons score high on sociopathy. This can be interpreted that if we'd abuse children less, we'd have fewer sociopaths
* "vegas nerve" - some neural organ modified in mamals compared to reptiles.
Reptiles can only freeze if they also feel fear. Mothers however can also freeze without fearing - this helps to suckle the infants.
* Members internalize the convictions of their groups. This leads to inertia in changing attitudes towards things. This change can also happen more likely and mostly between generations
* mimicry: people are sensitive to the mimicry target. If one mimics a "lower ranking" person, they're perceived worse than if they mimic a higher ranking one.
* basic fairness and the golden rule - the author suggests both are broken (soldiers killing soldiers - this refutes the golden rule in an extreme situation)
* Example with Socrates.
Some guy says: "Good is what gods say is good".
Socrates: "Does the fact the gods say it, makes it good, or do gods say things which in a higher sense are good - gods acting like messengers for a higher authority?"
I recommend this book to people interested in neurology and morality, but you should lower your expectations, because the field is too new to be useful for too much more other than to appear cool.
Read
January 6, 2025Rozczarowanie. Autorka ma problem z wyważeniem konwencji książki biologicznej a książki filozoficznej.
W kwestii biologicznej: niezła. Niezbyt szczegółowa, co ułatwia zapoznanie się z tematem neuronauk w sposób przystępny dla laika. Pierwsze rozdziały książki nadają się w sam raz jako wstęp do tych zagadnień.
W kwestii filozoficznej: xd. Poziom wiedzy autorki na tematy moralności religijnej, a w szczególności moralności rzymskokatolickiej, jest żałośnie niski.
Ostatnie dwa rozdziały, czyli o regułach moralnych i o stosunku religii do biologii, polecam w ogóle odpuścić. Szkoda czasu
W kwestii biologicznej: niezła. Niezbyt szczegółowa, co ułatwia zapoznanie się z tematem neuronauk w sposób przystępny dla laika. Pierwsze rozdziały książki nadają się w sam raz jako wstęp do tych zagadnień.
W kwestii filozoficznej: xd. Poziom wiedzy autorki na tematy moralności religijnej, a w szczególności moralności rzymskokatolickiej, jest żałośnie niski.
Ostatnie dwa rozdziały, czyli o regułach moralnych i o stosunku religii do biologii, polecam w ogóle odpuścić. Szkoda czasu
June 14, 2019
"Sometimes there is no uniquely right answer, no uniquely good outcome, just some roughly decent ways of avoiding a worse horror."
Read
December 23, 2021No sé Patri... pero no me gusta cómo escribes
January 3, 2013
This book was absolutely wonderful. It was also somewhat paradigm shifting.
In particular, I'd really like to praise the chapter on behavioral genetics and the chapter on social cognition. The chapter on genetics takes a critical look at what it means to have a gene "x" for behavior "x". It discusses how genes work in networks and are not so simple. For anyone who wants a more in depth look at a modern understanding look at genetics I'd recommend The Epigenetics Revolution. As such it undermines a lot of what Steven Pinker had to say on genetics and innateness in The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature , which is not surprising since Patricia Churchland supports connectionist models of cognition and does not find the idea of a language of thought which Pinker subscribes to to be a coherent idea ( see her chapter on functionalist psychology in Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain
Of course, she is NOT denying that we have innate capacities, but her account is very different from the sort you often find in evolutionary psychology in that it is grounded in neuroanatomy. She is no "blank slate-er."
In her chapter on Social Cognition, she evaluates current claims about the role of mirror neurons in empathy and the ability to attribute intentionality to others, and concludes that there is still a lot more research to be done on the topic. I am a student of neuropsychology with a research internship, and one who aspires to be a professional researcher, so I really appreciate these sorts of critiques because it lets us know what needs to be further investigated. Honesty is needed in science, and pretending to have complete answers only gives the illusion of knowledge and thus science cannot progress.
The last two chapters on philosophy and religion as it relates to ethics are very well written, yet concise. I have a minor in philosophy, so I'm no stranger to the issues she discusses and I have to say I agreed with what she has to say.
This is a 5 star book if there ever was one, and if you have any interest in ethics, neuroscience, and psychology, or are just curious as to how and why people have morality, read this!
In particular, I'd really like to praise the chapter on behavioral genetics and the chapter on social cognition. The chapter on genetics takes a critical look at what it means to have a gene "x" for behavior "x". It discusses how genes work in networks and are not so simple. For anyone who wants a more in depth look at a modern understanding look at genetics I'd recommend The Epigenetics Revolution. As such it undermines a lot of what Steven Pinker had to say on genetics and innateness in The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature , which is not surprising since Patricia Churchland supports connectionist models of cognition and does not find the idea of a language of thought which Pinker subscribes to to be a coherent idea ( see her chapter on functionalist psychology in Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain
Of course, she is NOT denying that we have innate capacities, but her account is very different from the sort you often find in evolutionary psychology in that it is grounded in neuroanatomy. She is no "blank slate-er."
In her chapter on Social Cognition, she evaluates current claims about the role of mirror neurons in empathy and the ability to attribute intentionality to others, and concludes that there is still a lot more research to be done on the topic. I am a student of neuropsychology with a research internship, and one who aspires to be a professional researcher, so I really appreciate these sorts of critiques because it lets us know what needs to be further investigated. Honesty is needed in science, and pretending to have complete answers only gives the illusion of knowledge and thus science cannot progress.
The last two chapters on philosophy and religion as it relates to ethics are very well written, yet concise. I have a minor in philosophy, so I'm no stranger to the issues she discusses and I have to say I agreed with what she has to say.
This is a 5 star book if there ever was one, and if you have any interest in ethics, neuroscience, and psychology, or are just curious as to how and why people have morality, read this!
December 29, 2018
I really really enjoyed this book by Patricia S. Churchland. Churchland ties her philosophical background and her neuroscientific expertise to argue that morality is grounded in our biology rather than in an arbitrary law that's given from something we call 'God'.
She's not the first to argue this view. Others have done the same. I have never come across writing that covers so much of the data so eloquently. Churchland gathers data on Oxytocin, the social lives of mammals and other animals, neurophysiology. Among other things, I was introduced to the significance of the prefrontal cortex when it comes to how social we are, and why cherry-picking arguments in neuroscience is common. Churchland makes sure to cover her bases and mention views that she does not share such as John Rawl's work on morality & intuition.
Churchland discusses the is/ought problem, also known as Hume's Guillotine or the naturalistic fallacy. Hume held that we should not derive laws or moral maxims from what we currently. What is does not have to be. I was continuously impressed with Churchland's ability to simplify complicated topics. I've read about the is/ought problem so many times and I think that Churchland is among the best to explain it.
She addresses Jonathan Haidt's work on morality, Francis Collin's take on intuition derived from God's revelation, Franz de Waal's groundbreaking research on reciprocal altruism in chimpanzees & so much more.
I have benefited tremendously from this book & hence put it in my 'favorite' shelf. The conclusion is that if we continue to hold that Christian moral truth is self-evident, we deprive ourselves of understanding the basics on the literature on morality. There is so much more compelling work out there and so many more persuasive arguments that need focus & attention.
She's not the first to argue this view. Others have done the same. I have never come across writing that covers so much of the data so eloquently. Churchland gathers data on Oxytocin, the social lives of mammals and other animals, neurophysiology. Among other things, I was introduced to the significance of the prefrontal cortex when it comes to how social we are, and why cherry-picking arguments in neuroscience is common. Churchland makes sure to cover her bases and mention views that she does not share such as John Rawl's work on morality & intuition.
Churchland discusses the is/ought problem, also known as Hume's Guillotine or the naturalistic fallacy. Hume held that we should not derive laws or moral maxims from what we currently. What is does not have to be. I was continuously impressed with Churchland's ability to simplify complicated topics. I've read about the is/ought problem so many times and I think that Churchland is among the best to explain it.
She addresses Jonathan Haidt's work on morality, Francis Collin's take on intuition derived from God's revelation, Franz de Waal's groundbreaking research on reciprocal altruism in chimpanzees & so much more.
I have benefited tremendously from this book & hence put it in my 'favorite' shelf. The conclusion is that if we continue to hold that Christian moral truth is self-evident, we deprive ourselves of understanding the basics on the literature on morality. There is so much more compelling work out there and so many more persuasive arguments that need focus & attention.
September 14, 2016
The book consists of nice scientific details about the effects of Oxytocin and Vasopressin on trust issues of mammals. It didn't go much into detail about mirror neurons. But as it has been usual lately, when it comes to combining evolutionary altruism to philosophy, the author is in line with contemporary scientific moralists; she discreetly makes the propaganda of free market. Yet in the same book, she gives empirically proved examples from other species where 'competition' always undermines the trust among the members of the species and effective operation within the species. How do we expect our species to work at its best when we systematically praise the concept 'competition' in our beloved system capitalism?
At last they will make me write a leftist book that combines science and philosophy, sure, if i can sum up everything in my mind and establish that discipline to write a book :) By the way i know Peter Singer has a book that has a leftist approach to evolution, but i haven't read it yet. And as last; dear Patricia S. Churchland, 'sewers' and 'roads' are not 'institutions'.
3 stars for the scientific data, otherwise would be 2.
At last they will make me write a leftist book that combines science and philosophy, sure, if i can sum up everything in my mind and establish that discipline to write a book :) By the way i know Peter Singer has a book that has a leftist approach to evolution, but i haven't read it yet. And as last; dear Patricia S. Churchland, 'sewers' and 'roads' are not 'institutions'.
3 stars for the scientific data, otherwise would be 2.
May 19, 2011
I'll confess to skimming this rather than giving it a close read, but that's because it was just boring. To her credit, Churchland gives the reader exactly what the subtitle promises, which in the end turns out to be either 'not much, really' or 'it depends', both of which are pretty boring. Now it may well be that neuroscience just doesn't have that much to tell us about morality, which is fine, and kudos to Churchland for her honesty. But it may also be that Churchland is the kind of writer who so strenuously avoids saying anything controversial that she succeeds in never saying anything particularly interesting or anything that isn't already obvious. In which case, there are a lot of other books out there.
June 13, 2011
Whether morality arises from the brain stem or from the development of interaction with others the fine line is constantly being analysed by both scientists and philosophers alike.Patricia Churcland's contribution is to try and use the caring process and the development of the child and their brains as a way of integrating the philosophy of morality and the science of neurology.Does it work?It depends on where you stand.I enjoyed this for the courage of argument presented, although there are some deep stretches of analogy involved.Stuill, it is a start and a very readable book too.
Read
January 29, 2020I didn't finish reading this book. Nothing wrong with the book, but it's more technical than I expected, more for people interested in morals and the brain, ethics and the history, and speculation based on years of knowledge. I like books about brain workings but not this one, it seems. I can't rate it because I didn't read enough of it. I perused it and read bits, but it doesn't change from the early pages, and even though it has some nuggets for thought, I didn't want to spend time with it. I can't say anything bad about it. The writing is clear, but technical.
Want to read
October 24, 2011Publisher: http://bit.ly/r0Xr8Z
"In Braintrust, neurophilosophy pioneer Patricia Churchland argues that morality originates in the biology of the brain. She describes the "neurobiological platform of bonding" that, modified by evolutionary pressures and cultural values, has led to human styles of moral behavior. The result is a provocative genealogy of morals that asks us to reevaluate the priority given to religion, absolute rules, and pure reason in accounting for the basis of morality."
"In Braintrust, neurophilosophy pioneer Patricia Churchland argues that morality originates in the biology of the brain. She describes the "neurobiological platform of bonding" that, modified by evolutionary pressures and cultural values, has led to human styles of moral behavior. The result is a provocative genealogy of morals that asks us to reevaluate the priority given to religion, absolute rules, and pure reason in accounting for the basis of morality."
September 21, 2013
Writing about a book I finished two and a half months ago, it is clear I can't trust my brain to remember. So since my brain can't be trusted, I'd say that this book says that the evolutionary nature of our brain made it so the neural net that is me, finds morality quite appealing and necessary. Think of it as a treatise on materialistic morality and that it is a good thing our morality isn't based on our memory.
April 21, 2014
Interesting book. It shows how we are able to value moral laws as good or bad without any oder profound rules because our evaluation is grounded in the emotions and passions that are common in human beings since their childhood. The reason according to Churchland don't create value but grow up around them.
October 31, 2011
I read this to find out about the neuroscience. The book started out well, but started to bore me midway. It was not concise and fell into repetition or went into meandering digressions on moral philosophy. Not enough science, too much philosophy.
September 10, 2017
Book is very informative, exact and interesting. It's not very easy reading, but it's full of facts.
Almost 1/3 is about philosophical thoughts, not about science, what was kind of disappointment for me.
Almost 1/3 is about philosophical thoughts, not about science, what was kind of disappointment for me.
January 15, 2015
This book will teach you all about origin of morality and neurobiology.
May 10, 2017
A solid read on the science of human values. I wish, however, that Churchland expanded more on the implications that science has on metaethics and normative ethics.
January 14, 2012
Look for my interview of Patricia Churchland on episode 81 of the Brain Science Podcast.
May 15, 2025
Książka niby na jeden z najbardziej interesujących mnie tematów, a jakoś tak ciężko mi wchodziła. Język wydaje się prosty i zrozumiały ale czegoś brakuje, może polotu (a może to wina tłumaczenia?). A może to chodzi o to, że autorka jest filozofką, a w książce wychodzi poza swoją dziedzinę i wychodzi to jakoś dla mnie niestrawnie... Ponadto mam wrażenie, że książka jest bardziej o zwierzętach niż ludziach, ja rozumiem że to jest w kontekście ewolucji, ale jednak brak mi tego czegoś. No Sapolsky to to nie jest ;) Ani Gazzaniga (mogę to już chyba powiedzieć, bo teraz czytam książkę tego drugiego). Temat jest ciekawy i nie nudziłem się, ale.... o, może tak powiem: nie oceniam całkiem nisko, bo coś na pewno z niej wyciągnąłem... tylko nie umiem powiedzieć co :D
Na koniec jednak dwa cytaty z ciekawymi informacjami, które przykuły moja uwagę, oraz jeden dość zabawny:
- teraz to ma sens, znaczy ta "czystość" wychwalana przez religie.
:D
(czytana/słuchana: 5-8.05.2025)
3+/5 [6/10]
Na koniec jednak dwa cytaty z ciekawymi informacjami, które przykuły moja uwagę, oraz jeden dość zabawny:
"Chcąc wyjaśnić różnice w usposobieniu społecznym, Tost i współpracownicy zasugerowali, że u osobników wyposażonych w allel rs53576A niestandardowe struktury i połączenia pomiędzy podwzgórzem, ciałem migdałowatym i przednią częścią zakrętu obręczy mogą zazwyczaj generować mniej pozytywne, a nawet negatywne uczucia towarzyszące interakcjom społecznym. To, co przez osoby z grupy kontrolnej uznawane jest za umiarkowanie przyjemną interakcję, taką jak rozmowa z nieznajomym w kolejce w sklepie spożywczym lub pomaganie komuś w pozbieraniu rozrzuconych artykułów spożywczych, dla nich okazuje się być nieprzyjemnym. Jest to możliwe, biorąc pod uwagę to, co wiemy na temat ważnej roli ciała migdałowatego w odczuwaniu i reakcjach lękowych, a także w pozytywnych reakcjach społecznych."
(pdf.str.68)
"Problem ten ilustruje włączenie przez Haidta świętości i czystości do grona cnót podstawowych. Jego pomysł jest taki, że podczas ewolucji ludzkiego mózgu religie sprzyjały dobrobytowi osób należących do grupy, które stosowały się do zasad religijnych. A zatem skłonność ta została bezpośrednio wyselekcjonowana w biologicznej ewolucji ludzkiego mózgu. Zgodnie z tym poglądem intuicje dotyczące czystości i niewinności, pierwotnie związane z jedzeniem, w sposób naturalny zostają połączone z lokalnymi obrzędami religijnymi. Jest to zarys tego, co Haidt uznaje za wrodzoną skłonność do przynależności religijnej, a co ma pomóc w wyjaśnieniu powszechności występowania religii."
(pdf.str.131)
- teraz to ma sens, znaczy ta "czystość" wychwalana przez religie.
"Niektórzy ewangeliccy kaznodzieje twierdzą, że posiadają szczególną wiedzę na temat tego, co Jezus chce, abyśmy zrobili w sprawie kontroli broni, projektów wojskowych, premii na Wall Street i AIDS. George W. Bush, gdy był prezydentem Stanów Zjednoczonych, stwierdził, że komunikował się z Bogiem w sprawie niektórych kwestii państwowych. Wszyscy ci, którzy mówią o roszczeniach Boga, podkreślają własną wiarygodność, co sugeruje, biorąc pod uwagę ich wzajemne sprzeczności, że żaden z nich nie odbiera boskich informacji na dobrej częstotliwości."
(pdf.str.218-219)
:D
(czytana/słuchana: 5-8.05.2025)
3+/5 [6/10]
September 8, 2023
This is an impressive and original work that offers a neuroscience account of morality. It integrates also cognitive psychology, genetics, evolutionary biology. The book features detailed studies and experimental results in those disciplines. The main proposal is that morality originates from social behaviour of caring and bonding which are generated by brain-based values induced in the internal milieu of brain networks affected by oxytocin and vasopressin
Peptides such as oxytocin and vasopressin affects mammalian caring of offspring and social interactions with others which contribute to its brain-based values of social behaviour. The brain stem and hypothalamus of a mammal monitor the inner state of networks that matters for survival. So the social behaviour relates to homeostatic reactions or survival related reactions. An important part of the brain that regulates emotional responses is the paralimbic area which includes the hippocampus, orbitalfrontal cortex, lateral temporal lobe, corpus callosum. A study mentioned was psychopaths have a smaller paralimbic area, and lower level of activity in emotional learning and decision making.
In terms of genetic study, due to pleiotrophy, the notion that a gene plays multiple roles including the functionality of organs and emotional responses such as caring and aggression that it is difficult to isolate genetically a gene for specific emotion of the genotype. However there are studies of mirror neurons in mammals that shed lights on how mammals attribute mental states to others enabling them to learn behaviour from others, as well as revealing how similarity in shared behaviour affects social interactions. Studies in the prefrontal cortex and its pathways to emotional brain structure yields intelligence in human social behaviour.
The book has a wealth of experimental results and studies, to include those that are inconclusive and misguided. To name one is a model that suggests moral values as innate similar to the internal grammar of Chomskyan I-language seemed to be misguided because of the difficulty of locating a notion of universal innate moral values.
Peptides such as oxytocin and vasopressin affects mammalian caring of offspring and social interactions with others which contribute to its brain-based values of social behaviour. The brain stem and hypothalamus of a mammal monitor the inner state of networks that matters for survival. So the social behaviour relates to homeostatic reactions or survival related reactions. An important part of the brain that regulates emotional responses is the paralimbic area which includes the hippocampus, orbitalfrontal cortex, lateral temporal lobe, corpus callosum. A study mentioned was psychopaths have a smaller paralimbic area, and lower level of activity in emotional learning and decision making.
In terms of genetic study, due to pleiotrophy, the notion that a gene plays multiple roles including the functionality of organs and emotional responses such as caring and aggression that it is difficult to isolate genetically a gene for specific emotion of the genotype. However there are studies of mirror neurons in mammals that shed lights on how mammals attribute mental states to others enabling them to learn behaviour from others, as well as revealing how similarity in shared behaviour affects social interactions. Studies in the prefrontal cortex and its pathways to emotional brain structure yields intelligence in human social behaviour.
The book has a wealth of experimental results and studies, to include those that are inconclusive and misguided. To name one is a model that suggests moral values as innate similar to the internal grammar of Chomskyan I-language seemed to be misguided because of the difficulty of locating a notion of universal innate moral values.
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