What do you think?
Rate this book
France #3
To Lose a Battle: France 1940
During six weeks in 1940, Hitler's blitzkrieg shattered the redoubtable Maginot Line and, shortly thereafter, the French army. No historian has written a more definitive chronicle of that disaster than Alistair Horne, or one so emotionally gripping. Moving with cinematic swiftness from the battlefield to the Reichstag and the Palais de l'...lysée, To Lose a Battle overspills the confines of traditional military history to become a portrait of the French national soul in its darkest night.
726 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1969
100 people are currently reading
1515 people want to read
About the author
Alistair Horne
90 books200 followersSir Alistair Allan Horne was an English journalist, biographer and historian of Europe, especially of 19th and 20th century France. He wrote more than 20 books on travel, history, and biography. He won the following awards: Hawthornden Prize, 1963, for The Price of Glory; Yorkshire Post Book of the Year Prize and Wolfson Literary Award, both 1978, both for A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962; French Légion d'Honneur, 1993, for work on French history;and Commander of the British Empire (CBE), 2003.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 30 of 57 reviews
March 14, 2025
The third book in Alistair Horne's 'France' series, is a detailed narrative of the events that led to the fall of France during WWII, both from the German and French perspectives.
The book is a comprehensive analysis of the political, social and military factors that led to the defeat.
The book is a comprehensive analysis of the political, social and military factors that led to the defeat.
February 7, 2017
A very detailed and well readable account of the Fall of France, including a very good overview of the factors leading to the quick collapse of the French army
Every year, when I went on holiday with my parents, I always remember a particular spot on one of the autoroutes leading to the south of France where a sign points out a fortification claiming that at this point you pass the famous Maginot line. I always wondered how the French, up to this day, are able to still want to point this out to passing tourists when the Maginot line stands for all that went wrong in May 1940.
How was it possible that the German army, with less soldiers and tanks, was able to so quickly defeat the French army, that was considered at that time one of the mightiest armies on the continent? How was it possible that during the whole campaign, they never were able to materialize one counter-offensive or to disrupt the advance of the panzers?
In this book, Alistair Horne gives some good reasons why. First of all, the Maginot line (constructed at the border with Germany but planned up untill the Atlantic) was for the French not only a component of strategy, but a way of life. Second, the weak governments had signed the so called 'Matignon Agreement', promising a forty-hour workweek (whereas the Germans still worked for 60 hours a week), annual paid holidays and further advantages. However, the agreement could not come at a worse time for France, creating economic ills and lowering the French industrial production as 25% lower. Third, strategic thinking had stopped in 1918 and the French still saw war as being done along the lines established in the Great War. Why change, after all they had won, hadn't they?
Starting from 1936, even the French governments couldn't close its eyes anymore and started rearmament. It created two excellent new tanks, but the gravest defects of the French tank force were their poor operating range and the fact that four-fifths of them carried no radio. And due to lack of co-ordination and the hostility of the Popular Front and the 40 hour week, only resulted in the first delivery until a year after the new armamanet programme. The French were rearming, but on a much to slow basis.
Apart from that, the French strategy was still in its 1918 cadres. Charles de Gaulle, after writing his modern ideas in the book Vers l'Armee de Metier was struck from the 1936 promotion list after going against the established militairy thoughts. The German panzers would never be able to break such a sophisticated defense as that of France. And besides, the development of the anti-tank gun had already rendered the panzers obselete?
The role of the French air force was also clearly laid down: preparation for any attack was the work of the artillery and only troop concentrations or columns in the march or retreat were considered suitable targets. On of the serious faults however was the complete inability to appreciate the importance of dive-bombers.
The Germans in the meantime were ready. As in 1914 they were ready to invade France through Belgium, performing a Sichelschnitt through the Ardennes, thougt as imprenetrable by the French. The French were initially not bothered by the crossing of the Meuse, but quickly grew to acknowledge the danger of the break in the lines at Sedan. However, where a quick counteroffensive would have thrown the Germans back after crossing the Meuse with just some small detachments, the French were never able to make a quick response. The armoured divisions (which were the only ones who would be able to block the German panzers) were dispersed instead of concentrated and due to poor communication arrived always to late.
This was the end of the story. The panzers were never serious attacked and were able to drive a split between the southern French army and the northern part, including the BEF and Belgian army. The rest is history. France had fallen.
The book is roughly divided in two parts, the first part dealing with the events running up to the actual invasion in May 1940. The author really captures the underlying reasons of the French defeat. The second part is telling the advance itself, with much detail for the Sedan breakthrough and the subsequent drive to the Channel. Although it praised the German offensive, it also notes the weakness of the plan, causing Hitler to lose the war. There was no follow up for the invasion of Britain. Basically the Germans were surprised by their own succes.
I really enjoyed this book and especially the underlying factors resulting in the French defeat delivered me great insights.
Every year, when I went on holiday with my parents, I always remember a particular spot on one of the autoroutes leading to the south of France where a sign points out a fortification claiming that at this point you pass the famous Maginot line. I always wondered how the French, up to this day, are able to still want to point this out to passing tourists when the Maginot line stands for all that went wrong in May 1940.
How was it possible that the German army, with less soldiers and tanks, was able to so quickly defeat the French army, that was considered at that time one of the mightiest armies on the continent? How was it possible that during the whole campaign, they never were able to materialize one counter-offensive or to disrupt the advance of the panzers?
In this book, Alistair Horne gives some good reasons why. First of all, the Maginot line (constructed at the border with Germany but planned up untill the Atlantic) was for the French not only a component of strategy, but a way of life. Second, the weak governments had signed the so called 'Matignon Agreement', promising a forty-hour workweek (whereas the Germans still worked for 60 hours a week), annual paid holidays and further advantages. However, the agreement could not come at a worse time for France, creating economic ills and lowering the French industrial production as 25% lower. Third, strategic thinking had stopped in 1918 and the French still saw war as being done along the lines established in the Great War. Why change, after all they had won, hadn't they?
Starting from 1936, even the French governments couldn't close its eyes anymore and started rearmament. It created two excellent new tanks, but the gravest defects of the French tank force were their poor operating range and the fact that four-fifths of them carried no radio. And due to lack of co-ordination and the hostility of the Popular Front and the 40 hour week, only resulted in the first delivery until a year after the new armamanet programme. The French were rearming, but on a much to slow basis.
Apart from that, the French strategy was still in its 1918 cadres. Charles de Gaulle, after writing his modern ideas in the book Vers l'Armee de Metier was struck from the 1936 promotion list after going against the established militairy thoughts. The German panzers would never be able to break such a sophisticated defense as that of France. And besides, the development of the anti-tank gun had already rendered the panzers obselete?
The role of the French air force was also clearly laid down: preparation for any attack was the work of the artillery and only troop concentrations or columns in the march or retreat were considered suitable targets. On of the serious faults however was the complete inability to appreciate the importance of dive-bombers.
The Germans in the meantime were ready. As in 1914 they were ready to invade France through Belgium, performing a Sichelschnitt through the Ardennes, thougt as imprenetrable by the French. The French were initially not bothered by the crossing of the Meuse, but quickly grew to acknowledge the danger of the break in the lines at Sedan. However, where a quick counteroffensive would have thrown the Germans back after crossing the Meuse with just some small detachments, the French were never able to make a quick response. The armoured divisions (which were the only ones who would be able to block the German panzers) were dispersed instead of concentrated and due to poor communication arrived always to late.
This was the end of the story. The panzers were never serious attacked and were able to drive a split between the southern French army and the northern part, including the BEF and Belgian army. The rest is history. France had fallen.
The book is roughly divided in two parts, the first part dealing with the events running up to the actual invasion in May 1940. The author really captures the underlying reasons of the French defeat. The second part is telling the advance itself, with much detail for the Sedan breakthrough and the subsequent drive to the Channel. Although it praised the German offensive, it also notes the weakness of the plan, causing Hitler to lose the war. There was no follow up for the invasion of Britain. Basically the Germans were surprised by their own succes.
I really enjoyed this book and especially the underlying factors resulting in the French defeat delivered me great insights.
March 19, 2017
The memories of the fall of France are spotty. Spotted by the shame of defeat and the blood of those participants who didn't live to see the fall of Germany. It's also blurry on account of the sheer speed, with the Panzer spearhead reaching the coast within a week. Horne is in peak form here, switching from the lowly sentry to the erratic directions of the Allied high command.
Thus he connects the dots as the Wehrmacht first establishes bridgeheads across the Meuse, connects them & sticks out its tortoise head to cut the enemy lines in two like a scythe. The Allies have numerical superiority and their tanks that are just as good, but they react slowly. As a reader your speed is jerked along. One moment you race until you collapse from exhaustion next to Rommel, the next you trot as an 80 year old man laments "I went out in '70. I went out again in '14. I had hoped to die in the peace of my own home. .
The ghosts of the Great War linger, as they're wont to do among senior officers who went over the top. The French barricaded behind the Maginot line, their entire operational art geared towards the defence, the grand plan a countersweep against the Schlieffen plan. They knew what was coming, manoeuvers in 1938 even foresaw an intrusion via the Ardennes. Why the British went along is not made fully clear here. Industrial restrictions upon the establishment of an armoured fist ? the Belgian army never makes it out of the ghostly stage. (No fair.) Surprisingly, Dunkirk also remains in the margins. As it did at the time. France had fallen, most people didn't care too much exactly how the BEF cleared out - alltough a quarter of the evacuees were French to join De Gaulle.
The German High Command was too sceptical to believe its own luck sometimes, resulting in entire days lost... and yet more lost opportunities for their opponents, who locally could give as good as they got. Four French tanks, towing eachother in turn, accounted for a score of German vehicles in a day. These vehicles had earlier stood in line underneath the canopy of the Belgian firs, fuel trucks mixed between them, anxiously scanning the skies for the propellers of discovery. Behind them came the mass of the German Army, on foot like their fathers, their soles already callused from the Polish plains.
Don't let the pace fool you: there's a lot going on within these pages, with that mixed flavour of history and memory that became rare as the 1960s faded to a close. The final chapter on the reminiscence of the battle tastes the strongest, written when the veterans sent their children to school and started to agree that their were better things to life than to transfer hate to the next generation. Especially with Soviet nukes over the horizon.
You may not carry away a crystal-clear string of facts here, but you'll want more: The Battle of France and Flanders: Sixty Years On and Blitzkrieg: Myth, Reality, and Hitler's Lightning War: France 1940.
Thus he connects the dots as the Wehrmacht first establishes bridgeheads across the Meuse, connects them & sticks out its tortoise head to cut the enemy lines in two like a scythe. The Allies have numerical superiority and their tanks that are just as good, but they react slowly. As a reader your speed is jerked along. One moment you race until you collapse from exhaustion next to Rommel, the next you trot as an 80 year old man laments "I went out in '70. I went out again in '14. I had hoped to die in the peace of my own home. .
The ghosts of the Great War linger, as they're wont to do among senior officers who went over the top. The French barricaded behind the Maginot line, their entire operational art geared towards the defence, the grand plan a countersweep against the Schlieffen plan. They knew what was coming, manoeuvers in 1938 even foresaw an intrusion via the Ardennes. Why the British went along is not made fully clear here. Industrial restrictions upon the establishment of an armoured fist ? the Belgian army never makes it out of the ghostly stage. (No fair.) Surprisingly, Dunkirk also remains in the margins. As it did at the time. France had fallen, most people didn't care too much exactly how the BEF cleared out - alltough a quarter of the evacuees were French to join De Gaulle.
The German High Command was too sceptical to believe its own luck sometimes, resulting in entire days lost... and yet more lost opportunities for their opponents, who locally could give as good as they got. Four French tanks, towing eachother in turn, accounted for a score of German vehicles in a day. These vehicles had earlier stood in line underneath the canopy of the Belgian firs, fuel trucks mixed between them, anxiously scanning the skies for the propellers of discovery. Behind them came the mass of the German Army, on foot like their fathers, their soles already callused from the Polish plains.
Don't let the pace fool you: there's a lot going on within these pages, with that mixed flavour of history and memory that became rare as the 1960s faded to a close. The final chapter on the reminiscence of the battle tastes the strongest, written when the veterans sent their children to school and started to agree that their were better things to life than to transfer hate to the next generation. Especially with Soviet nukes over the horizon.
You may not carry away a crystal-clear string of facts here, but you'll want more: The Battle of France and Flanders: Sixty Years On and Blitzkrieg: Myth, Reality, and Hitler's Lightning War: France 1940.
January 19, 2016
The last part of Alistair Horne's trilogy recounting the great battles of the Franco-German conflicts of 1870-1940, and he maintains the high standards of the previous two books.
I suppose the events of May/June 1940 will be well enough known, at least in outline, to anyone who has read about WWII. Mr Horne describes the military story but also seeks to understand the underlying causes of the French collapse. He illustrates in detail just how thoroughly the French Army was paralysed by "Maginot Mentality" in 1940, with generals too cautious to attack in the west even when almost the entire German Army was fighting in Poland. Mr Horne sees the roots of Maginot Mentality in the 1916 Battle of Verdun, with the other great debilitating factor for France, the political rivalry of Left and Right, going back at least as far as 1789. Unlike so many modern authors, Mr Horne refuses to turn a blind eye to the failures of one side whilst ignoring the other. The Left were opposed to militarism by instinct and were more concerned with war profiteers than with the Nazis, whilst the Right, grotesquely anti-Semitic and obsessed with fear of "Bolshevism", went by the slogan "Rather Hitler than Blum!". Notes of discussions amongst the top levels of the French government reveal they were as much concerned with the ability of the Army to "maintain order" as its ability to fight the Germans. Depressing stuff.
The catastrophic defeat of 1940 led to many recriminations between France and Britain, and here Mr Horne very much backs the actions of Britain's politicians and generals. He makes his arguments well enough, but I would be interested to read another version, perhaps from someone like Max Hastings who is never shy about criticising the performance of the British Army in both World Wars.
However evil the Nazi cause, in WWII the Wehrmacht possessed senior commanders who were dynamic and imaginative. Their French counterparts were complacent, inflexible and out of date. In sporting parlance, the French High Command went up against a better team and were hopelessly outclassed.
I suppose the events of May/June 1940 will be well enough known, at least in outline, to anyone who has read about WWII. Mr Horne describes the military story but also seeks to understand the underlying causes of the French collapse. He illustrates in detail just how thoroughly the French Army was paralysed by "Maginot Mentality" in 1940, with generals too cautious to attack in the west even when almost the entire German Army was fighting in Poland. Mr Horne sees the roots of Maginot Mentality in the 1916 Battle of Verdun, with the other great debilitating factor for France, the political rivalry of Left and Right, going back at least as far as 1789. Unlike so many modern authors, Mr Horne refuses to turn a blind eye to the failures of one side whilst ignoring the other. The Left were opposed to militarism by instinct and were more concerned with war profiteers than with the Nazis, whilst the Right, grotesquely anti-Semitic and obsessed with fear of "Bolshevism", went by the slogan "Rather Hitler than Blum!". Notes of discussions amongst the top levels of the French government reveal they were as much concerned with the ability of the Army to "maintain order" as its ability to fight the Germans. Depressing stuff.
The catastrophic defeat of 1940 led to many recriminations between France and Britain, and here Mr Horne very much backs the actions of Britain's politicians and generals. He makes his arguments well enough, but I would be interested to read another version, perhaps from someone like Max Hastings who is never shy about criticising the performance of the British Army in both World Wars.
However evil the Nazi cause, in WWII the Wehrmacht possessed senior commanders who were dynamic and imaginative. Their French counterparts were complacent, inflexible and out of date. In sporting parlance, the French High Command went up against a better team and were hopelessly outclassed.
December 9, 2025
Phenomenal from start to finish, a true and thorough autopsy of the decisions and luck that went against and ultimately led to France's defeat.
Read
February 7, 2024We are familiar with the quick demise of the French from the 1940 German blitzkrieg. We’re also familiar with several factors that contributed to that memorable failure – especially an unwise peace at Versailles, much of French construction; hubris; myopia; an addiction to the path of least resistance following four years of slaughter; economic turbulence through the 1930s; political instability, with Soviet encouragement; German military adaptations combined with bold execution; and revenge. Had I missed something? Was there more to the story? The quick answer is no.
The French had many opportunities to create a different history, one that avoided catastrophe; it seems they squandered each one. Even when the Germans were days into their attack, the French could have exploited vulnerabilities. It was not to be, for the French forces proved feckless, their leadership incompetent. That this collapse was foreseen makes the story more perplexing. I’m reminded of Henry de Montherlant’s prewar writings where he derided his nation’s blindness – how many enemies among French intellectuals did he earn as a result? In 1938, he wrote: “It’s no use protesting that you love peace: the problem is how to be strong enough to impose peace on those who desire war.” This is the enduring lesson. How do we ensure peace in a world given to occasional madness? Perhaps peace is the opiate of the masses because we can easily lull ourselves – maybe with an injection of propaganda – into ignoring the bad actors that emerge on the global stage, some briefly, others for a lifetime. To further complicate this thought, how do we maintain the integrity of our own country, itself at times inclined to bad acts?
One important point missing from this author’s commentary was the consequence of this pathetic collapse on other regions. The rapid fall of France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands must have left an impression of great opportunity on the Japanese. Only a few months passed before that nation pounced.
The French had many opportunities to create a different history, one that avoided catastrophe; it seems they squandered each one. Even when the Germans were days into their attack, the French could have exploited vulnerabilities. It was not to be, for the French forces proved feckless, their leadership incompetent. That this collapse was foreseen makes the story more perplexing. I’m reminded of Henry de Montherlant’s prewar writings where he derided his nation’s blindness – how many enemies among French intellectuals did he earn as a result? In 1938, he wrote: “It’s no use protesting that you love peace: the problem is how to be strong enough to impose peace on those who desire war.” This is the enduring lesson. How do we ensure peace in a world given to occasional madness? Perhaps peace is the opiate of the masses because we can easily lull ourselves – maybe with an injection of propaganda – into ignoring the bad actors that emerge on the global stage, some briefly, others for a lifetime. To further complicate this thought, how do we maintain the integrity of our own country, itself at times inclined to bad acts?
One important point missing from this author’s commentary was the consequence of this pathetic collapse on other regions. The rapid fall of France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands must have left an impression of great opportunity on the Japanese. Only a few months passed before that nation pounced.
February 3, 2017
Horne is a great author and this book is another fine work in his collection. I had long wondered how the French Army (the largest in the world), combined with the B.E.F. and the storied Maginot Line, could be so thoroughly defeated by the smaller German Wehrmacht. Was blitzkrieg alone that much of a game changer? In a sense, yes. The blitzkrieg (today more commonly referred to as "combined arms" warfare) was an innovation that changed the playbook for everyone in the early 20th century. However, France suffered from a myriad of other problems as well. Political division that created a realistic threat of "fifth columnists", lack of leadership at the national level, and the legacy of Verdun all played as much of a role as the stagnation of military innovation in France following the Versailles Treaty. As Maxime Weygand noted, France went to war with the army of 1919, to fight the Wehrmacht of 1939.
August 19, 2012
This is a superior narrative history of the fall of France in 1940. Horne examines the political and social changes in France following the end of WW I, and how these affected the French military and their ability to resist the German invasion in 1940. Horne examines the diplomatic and political attempts to resist, in addition to the ineffective military response by the French army and air force. Horne utilized an amazing number of sources and his narrative reads as a novel. I was completely absorbed by this book, and what I found particularly interesting was his examination of all aspects of the Maginot Line. I highly recommend this book, as well as his other work, The Price of Glory: Verdun, 1916.
September 26, 2013
HORNE'S VIEW
It's a good forty years since Alistair Horne wrote "To Lose a Battle", his account of the German Invasion of Western Europe in May 1940. The third part of his trilogy of books on the conflicts between France and Germany it begins with an account of the French victory parade after The Great War, and moves on through the twenties and thirties, charting the disparate experiences of France and Germany up to the eve of the German invasion. This scene setting takes up a third of the book and includes the political, social, demographic and economic developments in France and Germany with a view to the war to come. He does stretch further a-field to paint a picture of the European scene including that in Britain, the Spanish Civil War, the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, and the negotiations between the Soviet Union, France and Britain that failed and gave rise to the Nazi-Soviet pact of August 1939.
The invasion itself was a highly fluid affair, a textbook example of movement and the combined use of air and ground forces. The reader, unless they has a firm grasp on the geography of the area and the order of battle, will rather rapidly find themselves bogged down trying to picture the movement of the forces detailed in the text and end up in full sympathy with the confusion in the French command. The most interesting parts are those where ordinary soldiers are quoted, which give an insight into the reality of the war from both sides, including the copious adventures of one Erwin Rommel. The French hardly acquitted themselves well, even taking into account that they were to an extent hamstrung by pre-war decisions of which the Maginot line (almost totally marginal to the battle) is the most blatant. That much is obvious, as well as the strengths of the German planning and their militaries execution of the invasion; whether the British were quite as heroic as Horne states appears to me a little questionable, especially giving the extravagant praise he applies to Lord Gort and the lack of any significant account of what the British Expeditionary Forces were up to in the early stages of the campaign.
Reasonably well written (though with enough exclamation marks for a medium sized revolutionary manifesto!), I was left thinking that Horne's view of the build up to and execution of the German invasion of France in 1940 is marred by his particular political outlook (much finger wagging at the left in France) which while obvious, is thankfully rather less crassly partisan than the laudatory footnotes regarding Israel, the 1967 and 1973 wars and Ariel Sharon's prowess on the battlefield. I suspect that this in inevitable in a writer who thanks William Buckley Jr in his acknowledgements, and has had the dubious duty of writing Henry Kissinger's official biography bestowed upon him (bravery or foolishness?). That said, it's not a bad book though I would be a bit shy about calling it impartial scholarship (no references either!), it's more one mans view of the build up to the 1940 invasion and the invasion itself, and despite it's limitations it's still an interesting read, though not in the same class as Horne's seminal work on the Algerian War of Independence ("A Savage War of Peace").
It's a good forty years since Alistair Horne wrote "To Lose a Battle", his account of the German Invasion of Western Europe in May 1940. The third part of his trilogy of books on the conflicts between France and Germany it begins with an account of the French victory parade after The Great War, and moves on through the twenties and thirties, charting the disparate experiences of France and Germany up to the eve of the German invasion. This scene setting takes up a third of the book and includes the political, social, demographic and economic developments in France and Germany with a view to the war to come. He does stretch further a-field to paint a picture of the European scene including that in Britain, the Spanish Civil War, the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, and the negotiations between the Soviet Union, France and Britain that failed and gave rise to the Nazi-Soviet pact of August 1939.
The invasion itself was a highly fluid affair, a textbook example of movement and the combined use of air and ground forces. The reader, unless they has a firm grasp on the geography of the area and the order of battle, will rather rapidly find themselves bogged down trying to picture the movement of the forces detailed in the text and end up in full sympathy with the confusion in the French command. The most interesting parts are those where ordinary soldiers are quoted, which give an insight into the reality of the war from both sides, including the copious adventures of one Erwin Rommel. The French hardly acquitted themselves well, even taking into account that they were to an extent hamstrung by pre-war decisions of which the Maginot line (almost totally marginal to the battle) is the most blatant. That much is obvious, as well as the strengths of the German planning and their militaries execution of the invasion; whether the British were quite as heroic as Horne states appears to me a little questionable, especially giving the extravagant praise he applies to Lord Gort and the lack of any significant account of what the British Expeditionary Forces were up to in the early stages of the campaign.
Reasonably well written (though with enough exclamation marks for a medium sized revolutionary manifesto!), I was left thinking that Horne's view of the build up to and execution of the German invasion of France in 1940 is marred by his particular political outlook (much finger wagging at the left in France) which while obvious, is thankfully rather less crassly partisan than the laudatory footnotes regarding Israel, the 1967 and 1973 wars and Ariel Sharon's prowess on the battlefield. I suspect that this in inevitable in a writer who thanks William Buckley Jr in his acknowledgements, and has had the dubious duty of writing Henry Kissinger's official biography bestowed upon him (bravery or foolishness?). That said, it's not a bad book though I would be a bit shy about calling it impartial scholarship (no references either!), it's more one mans view of the build up to the 1940 invasion and the invasion itself, and despite it's limitations it's still an interesting read, though not in the same class as Horne's seminal work on the Algerian War of Independence ("A Savage War of Peace").
November 11, 2019
‘The great battle in France is now ended. It lasted twenty-six years.’ This quote of a German soldier summed up the defeat of France in 1940 as well as World War 2 as whole. There was one world war, with a 20 year pause to regroup. Germany had her revenge, but at what would be a terrible cost. Alistair Horne is one of the great historical writers of my time, and this the best of the four books by him that I have read. Full of succinct anecdotes and quotes, and relying on the memoirs of Winston Churchill, Erwin Rommel, Heinz Guderian and other German participants as well as the American journalist stationed in Germany, William Shirer weaves a masterful explanation of the reasons for France's stunning defeat in six weeks from the July 14, 1919 victory parade through the interwar years through to the signing of the armistice on 22 June 1940.
June 11, 2025
Really excellent - I have read and admired many of Horne's books - particularly his book on the French debacle in Algeria - and I can not say enough to encourage anyone interested in France or WWII to read this book.
'To lose a Battle' is impossible to put down, which can come as no surprise after reading his books on the 'Siege of Paris' or 'A Savage War for Peace'. Alistair Horne is one of the few writers who are strong both on general background and detail and is equally at home describing 1930s politics or the strengths and weaknesses of the various tank and aircraft types
The first third of the book covers the pre-war period and Horne places the genesis of France's defeat in the excessive emphasis by the French army on defence, its lack of innovation and also the general mood in France in the 1930s. But he also clearly links these attitudes the cost in men and material and ravaged territory in WWI.
However, Horne is not a determinist in that he points out very clearly just how lucky the Germans were that bad weather in late 1939 prevented them from attacking (as Hitler wanted) based on a very mediocre rehash of the Schlieffen Plan, and how an aircraft crash actually made them can the old plans and come up with the much better Manstein plan. Further, the Germans were very lucky that the critical part of the French 'line' was occupied by below average troops, that the French were so painfully slow to counterattack (in fact their high command was often days behind the actual facts on the ground, not surprising as the High Command at the Château de Vincennes refused to be burdened by new fangled frippies like telephones).
Overall a brilliant and very readable history.
'To lose a Battle' is impossible to put down, which can come as no surprise after reading his books on the 'Siege of Paris' or 'A Savage War for Peace'. Alistair Horne is one of the few writers who are strong both on general background and detail and is equally at home describing 1930s politics or the strengths and weaknesses of the various tank and aircraft types
The first third of the book covers the pre-war period and Horne places the genesis of France's defeat in the excessive emphasis by the French army on defence, its lack of innovation and also the general mood in France in the 1930s. But he also clearly links these attitudes the cost in men and material and ravaged territory in WWI.
However, Horne is not a determinist in that he points out very clearly just how lucky the Germans were that bad weather in late 1939 prevented them from attacking (as Hitler wanted) based on a very mediocre rehash of the Schlieffen Plan, and how an aircraft crash actually made them can the old plans and come up with the much better Manstein plan. Further, the Germans were very lucky that the critical part of the French 'line' was occupied by below average troops, that the French were so painfully slow to counterattack (in fact their high command was often days behind the actual facts on the ground, not surprising as the High Command at the Château de Vincennes refused to be burdened by new fangled frippies like telephones).
Overall a brilliant and very readable history.
September 27, 2019
One of the best books I've ever read. I still keep a copy on my phone to re-read when I have 10 minutes to wait somewhere.
Up through my teenage years, I was a World War II buff. Since then I haven't covered too much of it; I don't feel there's too much for me to learn so my time is better spent elsewhere.
But, a while back, I was wondering how Germany beat France so quickly. I did know a lot about this, but more from a strategic perspective. I asked for recommendations on Quora, and this one got multiple likes.
It's 2019, and I recommend you read this with something like Google Maps available on a big screen computer. It doesn't dominate the book, but all over there's a sense that the generals of both countries were thinking in terms of the road net, so a road map will help you out. Also, the reputation is that the German attack through the Ardennes was somehow heroic because the country was so rough. But you read it and you realize they didn't do the thing cross-country: they followed the few roads that went through the Ardennes (and the Allies made a huge blunder by not effectively bombing the huge lines of traffic). They didn't need a thicker road net, they needed just enough of a road net.
You also get a very strong sense throughout of the huge level of denial on the part of the French. They thought they were doing OK for much of the battle. But you learn that a lot of them seemed to be off in a fantasy world, or unable to process reports effectively. In fact, probably the first quarter of the book is devoted to the goofed up politics of France in the 1930's, and how this contributed to the whole military system not functioning very well.
And the Germans were much more pessimistic. Especially the top generals back at headquarters. They were very worried about the whole thing, going back to the original planning in 1939. They didn't feel Germany had re-armed enough to take on France. Only Hitler, and the generals on the front, were confident that things were going their way.
Parts of the plan worked well. In 1871 the Germans had attacked through the center. In 1914 they attacked on the French left. This was more successful. And the French, knowing everyone was more mechanized in 1940, anticipate the Germans hitting the French left where the road net was thicker. So, when the attack started, the French and British advanced on their left, but the Germans came through the center (and ultimately cut off the Allied left flank, leading to Dunkirk).
And the French put some of their weakest units in their center, presuming the Germans would never bring mechanized stuff through the center. Even worse, they had the border between two armies in the center. And the Germans came west on 3 different roads and hit 3 different river crossings at about the same time, one of which was near the border between the two weak French armies.
Even so, it was a near thing. One hears stories that the French fought effectively at the small group level, and this is mostly correct. And the Germans concentrated their armor, and this is correct (a bigger problem was that when the French brought up their armor, they couldn't hit the Germans, who tended to move on quickly).
One also hears a lot about the usage of air support in German blitzkriegs. This was not new to me, but this book clarified a lot. The French had always taken huge pride in their artillery. And the soldiers in the field felt they were protected by the artillery barrage coming from behind. One of the big military restrictions on Germany was on artillery (because it was used so much in World War I). And it's expensive, and easily monitored, so the Germans built planes instead. So when the battle was joined, the Germans sent their planes after the French artillery batteries a few miles behind the lines, and effectively shut them down. When those long barrels stopped firing, the infantry up front started to melt away. This was a big problem where the two French armies bordered, because the Germans opened a whole that neither army felt responsible to fill.
Then it was a free for all. And the Germans commanders on the ground surprised everyone on both sides by ... driving. And really not very far: after all, these are tanks and cars in 1940, on mostly unpaved roads. Even so, the Germans broke through on those 3 crossings, and soon their armor was following the roads every which behind the French lines. The French or British would counterattack in one area, and then here news that it didn't matter because the Germans were already in half-a-dozen towns several miles to the west.
In retrospect, it's fairly obvious that this could have been defended with more defense in depth, and more air power. But there was essentially no defense in depth at any little village with a crossroads. By then the French had lost the ability to command smaller units to get out front of the Germans and dig in. So the Germans just kept driving. And the air power of both the British and French was stunningly disorganized. Yes, their planes weren't great, but they couldn't get them in the air with any alacrity. All they had to do was start bombing the traffic lines to turn them into traffic jams, and they managed basically zero of this.
I also found the shuttle diplomacy of Churchill towards the end of the book to be fascinating. It was a brand new thing for a leader of one country to fly over to their allies to talk face-to-face. Churchill did this more than once. And what he found was that the French had trouble establishing who was in charge, who was responsible, who to send order to, and so on.
The book winds down fairly abruptly, and does not cover the fall of France in any depth. After a week or two, France was done for, even though the Germans had not advanced yet as far as they had in World War I.
Up through my teenage years, I was a World War II buff. Since then I haven't covered too much of it; I don't feel there's too much for me to learn so my time is better spent elsewhere.
But, a while back, I was wondering how Germany beat France so quickly. I did know a lot about this, but more from a strategic perspective. I asked for recommendations on Quora, and this one got multiple likes.
It's 2019, and I recommend you read this with something like Google Maps available on a big screen computer. It doesn't dominate the book, but all over there's a sense that the generals of both countries were thinking in terms of the road net, so a road map will help you out. Also, the reputation is that the German attack through the Ardennes was somehow heroic because the country was so rough. But you read it and you realize they didn't do the thing cross-country: they followed the few roads that went through the Ardennes (and the Allies made a huge blunder by not effectively bombing the huge lines of traffic). They didn't need a thicker road net, they needed just enough of a road net.
You also get a very strong sense throughout of the huge level of denial on the part of the French. They thought they were doing OK for much of the battle. But you learn that a lot of them seemed to be off in a fantasy world, or unable to process reports effectively. In fact, probably the first quarter of the book is devoted to the goofed up politics of France in the 1930's, and how this contributed to the whole military system not functioning very well.
And the Germans were much more pessimistic. Especially the top generals back at headquarters. They were very worried about the whole thing, going back to the original planning in 1939. They didn't feel Germany had re-armed enough to take on France. Only Hitler, and the generals on the front, were confident that things were going their way.
Parts of the plan worked well. In 1871 the Germans had attacked through the center. In 1914 they attacked on the French left. This was more successful. And the French, knowing everyone was more mechanized in 1940, anticipate the Germans hitting the French left where the road net was thicker. So, when the attack started, the French and British advanced on their left, but the Germans came through the center (and ultimately cut off the Allied left flank, leading to Dunkirk).
And the French put some of their weakest units in their center, presuming the Germans would never bring mechanized stuff through the center. Even worse, they had the border between two armies in the center. And the Germans came west on 3 different roads and hit 3 different river crossings at about the same time, one of which was near the border between the two weak French armies.
Even so, it was a near thing. One hears stories that the French fought effectively at the small group level, and this is mostly correct. And the Germans concentrated their armor, and this is correct (a bigger problem was that when the French brought up their armor, they couldn't hit the Germans, who tended to move on quickly).
One also hears a lot about the usage of air support in German blitzkriegs. This was not new to me, but this book clarified a lot. The French had always taken huge pride in their artillery. And the soldiers in the field felt they were protected by the artillery barrage coming from behind. One of the big military restrictions on Germany was on artillery (because it was used so much in World War I). And it's expensive, and easily monitored, so the Germans built planes instead. So when the battle was joined, the Germans sent their planes after the French artillery batteries a few miles behind the lines, and effectively shut them down. When those long barrels stopped firing, the infantry up front started to melt away. This was a big problem where the two French armies bordered, because the Germans opened a whole that neither army felt responsible to fill.
Then it was a free for all. And the Germans commanders on the ground surprised everyone on both sides by ... driving. And really not very far: after all, these are tanks and cars in 1940, on mostly unpaved roads. Even so, the Germans broke through on those 3 crossings, and soon their armor was following the roads every which behind the French lines. The French or British would counterattack in one area, and then here news that it didn't matter because the Germans were already in half-a-dozen towns several miles to the west.
In retrospect, it's fairly obvious that this could have been defended with more defense in depth, and more air power. But there was essentially no defense in depth at any little village with a crossroads. By then the French had lost the ability to command smaller units to get out front of the Germans and dig in. So the Germans just kept driving. And the air power of both the British and French was stunningly disorganized. Yes, their planes weren't great, but they couldn't get them in the air with any alacrity. All they had to do was start bombing the traffic lines to turn them into traffic jams, and they managed basically zero of this.
I also found the shuttle diplomacy of Churchill towards the end of the book to be fascinating. It was a brand new thing for a leader of one country to fly over to their allies to talk face-to-face. Churchill did this more than once. And what he found was that the French had trouble establishing who was in charge, who was responsible, who to send order to, and so on.
The book winds down fairly abruptly, and does not cover the fall of France in any depth. After a week or two, France was done for, even though the Germans had not advanced yet as far as they had in World War I.
November 29, 2020
“The means by which Providence raises a nation to greatness are the virtues infused into her great men”
A quote by Burke that manifests all that France lacked in the period leading to the Second world war. In the era of internet and pseudohistoricism where factual history is as much a victim of distortion as news are, this book might highlight certain truths that have long been forgotten or distorted- the armies of France did not lack valour, but lacked leadership and purpose unlike their nemesis from the Rhine. Lack of great men leads to great defeats.
This great piece of scholarship, eloquently written and well researched might be used as a tool of prudence from statesmen and politicians - what might happen when a State or society becomes to weak or idle during during turbulent events. And the Third Republic is a subject of such a study.
A quote by Burke that manifests all that France lacked in the period leading to the Second world war. In the era of internet and pseudohistoricism where factual history is as much a victim of distortion as news are, this book might highlight certain truths that have long been forgotten or distorted- the armies of France did not lack valour, but lacked leadership and purpose unlike their nemesis from the Rhine. Lack of great men leads to great defeats.
This great piece of scholarship, eloquently written and well researched might be used as a tool of prudence from statesmen and politicians - what might happen when a State or society becomes to weak or idle during during turbulent events. And the Third Republic is a subject of such a study.
February 14, 2015
Horne is one of my all-time favorite historians and I loved this book. Although I read it more than a decade ago I still can recall many sections of what I read so long ago. It's not many books that I can say that for. That being said some aspects of the book are dated - as can be expected for a book written in 1969. Ernest R. May's book Strange Victory (2000) is a worthy successor to this book and both books read in tandem I believe provide all that can be said on this sad chapter of French history. Bravo to Horne for leading the way in this area of history!
April 30, 2010
A well-researched history of the Nazi's campaign against France 1940. The historical groundwork and terrain descriptions established by Alistaair Horne greatly helps the reader understand why the German Army was able to completely overrun France in about two weeks. This is an excellent read for anyone interested in World War II. In particular, I recommend this to company-level army and marine officers.
July 7, 2016
This is a terrific book for helping us understand the fall of France, although it is more detailed about the battles themselves than fully interested me. Thus, I skimmed through those parts. The conflicts and failures of communication between the British and the French as well as the politics surrounding the French decisions (whether to surrender, for example) are fascinating.
July 25, 2009
In its larger scope, this book reminds me of nothing so much as the movie Alien. There's the French army, girding itself to fight a normal, terrestrial enemy, and suddenly half a dozen panzer divisions burst out of its own chest. Very scary.
January 16, 2015
Maybe just a bit more detail than I needed, but a beautifully written account of the campaign. I do wish there'd been more at the end about the disposition of French military forces after the surrender, esp. the powerful French navy. I guess I'll have to read another book.
October 7, 2014
Achtung - Panzer!
December 26, 2022
Sad and deeply moving, although perhaps a bit too granular in detail. Military history people would have no trouble keeping the dates and locations straight, but the rest of us may be found wanting.
September 12, 2017
Arguably one of the best account of the French defeat in 1940 (in English), Horne's third book in his trilogy concludes his arc of French history, from its beginning during the days of the Paris Commune and the defeat of 1870, through Verdun, to the final inglorious end of the Third Republic.
A quick read, and a perfect introductory text, that gives the broad brush without too many details,. That said, Horne's narrative can bog down as he describes the maneuvers of the various belligerents. For a book on French history, Horne spent a lot of time talking about German generals. We hear much about Guderian and Rommel, and significantly less about the 51st Highlanders, the hard fighting French colonials, and DeGaulle. Not that they don't get their mention, but the focus is often elsewhere. There were "bright spots" on the French side, and stories that deserve to be told. Horne's unfortunate omissions are odd, as he frequently refers to French and British accounts as "well covered," before launching into the equally well-covered German accounts. For example, entire chapters are devoted to Guderian and Rommel, while the final stand of the French hedgehogs after the evacuation of Dunkirk is quickly glossed over (Dunkirk itself only gets a few pages).
Much of the book is devoted to the political squabbling and "inside the Quai d'Orsay" maneuvers before the battle and during. Horne tends to focus heavily on the dysfunction of the French military leadership, which is fair, but it is sometimes to the exclusion of much else. This is not the definitive account of 1940, but it is a good introduction and a pleasant read largely devoid of the turgid prose one can encounter in many academic treatments.
One minor quibble. The narrative is almost impossible to follow without maps. I have not seen the print version, as I read the Kindle version - which contains NO MAPS. Seriously, I HATE when publishers do that. So, be warned if you go the e-book route, and lay hands on some campaign maps either online or in print, unless you are intimately familiar with the French countryside.
A quick read, and a perfect introductory text, that gives the broad brush without too many details,. That said, Horne's narrative can bog down as he describes the maneuvers of the various belligerents. For a book on French history, Horne spent a lot of time talking about German generals. We hear much about Guderian and Rommel, and significantly less about the 51st Highlanders, the hard fighting French colonials, and DeGaulle. Not that they don't get their mention, but the focus is often elsewhere. There were "bright spots" on the French side, and stories that deserve to be told. Horne's unfortunate omissions are odd, as he frequently refers to French and British accounts as "well covered," before launching into the equally well-covered German accounts. For example, entire chapters are devoted to Guderian and Rommel, while the final stand of the French hedgehogs after the evacuation of Dunkirk is quickly glossed over (Dunkirk itself only gets a few pages).
Much of the book is devoted to the political squabbling and "inside the Quai d'Orsay" maneuvers before the battle and during. Horne tends to focus heavily on the dysfunction of the French military leadership, which is fair, but it is sometimes to the exclusion of much else. This is not the definitive account of 1940, but it is a good introduction and a pleasant read largely devoid of the turgid prose one can encounter in many academic treatments.
One minor quibble. The narrative is almost impossible to follow without maps. I have not seen the print version, as I read the Kindle version - which contains NO MAPS. Seriously, I HATE when publishers do that. So, be warned if you go the e-book route, and lay hands on some campaign maps either online or in print, unless you are intimately familiar with the French countryside.
December 5, 2018
Alistair Horne writes well-paced and well researched histories covering key episodes of French history from the Napoleonic era to, most recently, the Algerian War. He engages the reader's interest throughout by peppering his major themes with amusing and fascinating anecdotes. The tales of serial and comprehensive incompetence at the French High Command, and of the failure of political will to properly deal with the German threat, are staggering. When France's Generalissimo, Gamelin, was finally replaced - at the end of May 1940 and far too late - the incoming General Weygand said: 'we have created an army of 1918 facing a German army of 1940'.
What I enjoyed most was the political context - to which the first third of the book is devoted. It was this context that ultimately resulted France's catastrophic failure in May 1940 and that Alistair Horne guides us through very effectively. The Third Republic of the interwar years saw no less than nineteen changes of government in one sixteen year period. The divide between right and left - awash with extremists on both sides - tore the country apart. Horne shows us how this directly contributed to the defeat of 1940. The energetic new president, Reynaud, who took up the reins too late in the day, quickly recognised the incompetence of commander in chief Gamelin. His two concerted attempts to oust him were both out-manoeuvred by his political opponents.
Why this matters is that none of the events of 1940-1945 would have happened had the Allies, particularly the French, shown greater determination to contain Hitler when he entered the Rhineland, or had they managed a better, more modern defence. What a price Europe paid!
My only criticism of the book is that I occasionally got lost in the middle section where countless villages and small towns, and the fighting in and around them by various French and German army units is covered. This was probably my faults as I only discovered the maps and orders of battle after I'd almost reached the end of the book!
Highly recommended.
What I enjoyed most was the political context - to which the first third of the book is devoted. It was this context that ultimately resulted France's catastrophic failure in May 1940 and that Alistair Horne guides us through very effectively. The Third Republic of the interwar years saw no less than nineteen changes of government in one sixteen year period. The divide between right and left - awash with extremists on both sides - tore the country apart. Horne shows us how this directly contributed to the defeat of 1940. The energetic new president, Reynaud, who took up the reins too late in the day, quickly recognised the incompetence of commander in chief Gamelin. His two concerted attempts to oust him were both out-manoeuvred by his political opponents.
Why this matters is that none of the events of 1940-1945 would have happened had the Allies, particularly the French, shown greater determination to contain Hitler when he entered the Rhineland, or had they managed a better, more modern defence. What a price Europe paid!
My only criticism of the book is that I occasionally got lost in the middle section where countless villages and small towns, and the fighting in and around them by various French and German army units is covered. This was probably my faults as I only discovered the maps and orders of battle after I'd almost reached the end of the book!
Highly recommended.
March 11, 2018
A little long in the tooth, still a good read and source on the Fall of France. There were some quaint phrasings and perspectives which date the book. Horne, as is typical of British authors, speak of the French and Germans (and British, I will add) in stereotypes which, while important within the European prejudice of the time (Gallic pride, British steadfastness, Teutonic efficiency) made me feel a little like I was speaking to my late grandparents (who I loved, but were one generation removed from Europe and had difficulty unsubscribing from the stereotypes learned from their parents.)
What is there is the story of the disintegration of the French army, fighting the war of 1918 against an army of 1939 (this is from the book, not my creation). There is good detail on the activities of generals, but less than I would have liked concerning details of individual actions. For instance, the steadfast defense of the Forest of Mormal is referred to tangentally several times, enough to gain notice, but is never covered in detail. German advances are and the BEF are detailed, but I really wanted to hear more about this actions and other actions by French units.
A worthwhile read, but becoming dated.
What is there is the story of the disintegration of the French army, fighting the war of 1918 against an army of 1939 (this is from the book, not my creation). There is good detail on the activities of generals, but less than I would have liked concerning details of individual actions. For instance, the steadfast defense of the Forest of Mormal is referred to tangentally several times, enough to gain notice, but is never covered in detail. German advances are and the BEF are detailed, but I really wanted to hear more about this actions and other actions by French units.
A worthwhile read, but becoming dated.
November 6, 2023
From victory to defeat’s long shadow…
Only the French can attempt to carry on with routine when their freedom is at stake. Only the French can complain about irrelevancies when the wolf is at the door. I’ve always thought that the French were fickle; well, this excellent book proves it. From the highest to the lowest of French society they were a nation of defeatists who would prefer to scapegoat the English in 1940 for their failures. My grandfather, a Normandy Veteran, told me of the extremes that the French displayed on being liberated in 1944; from showing joy and utter delight to demonstrating outright hostility was how he described the French reception to being freed from the Nazi yoke. This book does nothing to dispel the myth that the French blame us because they’ve always shouldered a dislike for us. The first third of this book was tough going at times but once France and the Low Countries were invaded the brick was thrown onto the accelerator and I couldn’t put it down, with long reading into the early hours. I would recommend Horne’s trilogy on the French to anyone who wants to understand why the unpredictable French are the way they are. Outstanding 5 stars.
Only the French can attempt to carry on with routine when their freedom is at stake. Only the French can complain about irrelevancies when the wolf is at the door. I’ve always thought that the French were fickle; well, this excellent book proves it. From the highest to the lowest of French society they were a nation of defeatists who would prefer to scapegoat the English in 1940 for their failures. My grandfather, a Normandy Veteran, told me of the extremes that the French displayed on being liberated in 1944; from showing joy and utter delight to demonstrating outright hostility was how he described the French reception to being freed from the Nazi yoke. This book does nothing to dispel the myth that the French blame us because they’ve always shouldered a dislike for us. The first third of this book was tough going at times but once France and the Low Countries were invaded the brick was thrown onto the accelerator and I couldn’t put it down, with long reading into the early hours. I would recommend Horne’s trilogy on the French to anyone who wants to understand why the unpredictable French are the way they are. Outstanding 5 stars.
February 5, 2024
(Audiobook) Somehow, I think I liked Horne’s work a little better about Verdun, but maybe it was the subject matter. This one looks at one of the worst defeats in French history, when the Nazis ran through France with rapid speed and throughly embarrassed a world power. Yet, in Horne’s work, you see how issues with French leadership and command, along with questionable strategy and inaction at times by the French, along with calculated gambles and luck on the side of the Germans, ended up with the result of the Fall of France. The bulk of the work focuses on the military engagements in Spring 1940, when the Germans moved again on Belgium and managed to negate whatever advantages the Maginot Line offered in defense. Not that the French didn’t have their counterattack chances or opportunities to push the Germans back, but they just didn’t have the leadership or military flexibility to make a counterattack work.
Plenty of good lessons learned for any military historian here. Perhaps this one bogs down too much in military minutiae, but this is primarily a military work. Worth the read, if for no other reason than to get one of the most in-depth reviews of what happened in that series of weeks in 1940. The rating would be the same regardless of format.
Plenty of good lessons learned for any military historian here. Perhaps this one bogs down too much in military minutiae, but this is primarily a military work. Worth the read, if for no other reason than to get one of the most in-depth reviews of what happened in that series of weeks in 1940. The rating would be the same regardless of format.
October 30, 2024
I read this book in roughly the same amount of time it took for the Germans to reach Calais and box in the BEF. In that time, the Germans capitulated three whole nations and had nearly sealed the fate of two others.
Horne’s telling of the story of the Battle of France is a mixed bag of mostly good things, fleshing out often too well the facts and backstories of all the many facets. The issue with Horne’s very informed, very academic writing is that you often get lost in all the supplemental information and all the many “notes”. Precise dispositions of units are often intercut with many names of commanders and references to earlier moments in the story. But as good as that research is, it doesn’t always make the cadence of the narrative smooth or dynamic. But when it is, it really is. Wildly enough, for a book this long about an event that lasted only a few weeks, it sometimes feels rushed through. But the essential strokes of the tapestry are made, and if you have a map of northern France and Belgium in front of you when you read it, you’ll be able to follow along relatively easily.
Horne’s telling of the story of the Battle of France is a mixed bag of mostly good things, fleshing out often too well the facts and backstories of all the many facets. The issue with Horne’s very informed, very academic writing is that you often get lost in all the supplemental information and all the many “notes”. Precise dispositions of units are often intercut with many names of commanders and references to earlier moments in the story. But as good as that research is, it doesn’t always make the cadence of the narrative smooth or dynamic. But when it is, it really is. Wildly enough, for a book this long about an event that lasted only a few weeks, it sometimes feels rushed through. But the essential strokes of the tapestry are made, and if you have a map of northern France and Belgium in front of you when you read it, you’ll be able to follow along relatively easily.
May 25, 2025
To Lose a Battle: France 1940 by Alistair Horn
This is the second book by Alistair Horn I have read this year, the first was The Price of Glory: Verdun 1916 and in a way it’s an excellent companion piece, or should I say a continuation of the same story. Several of the same people are key figures in both. How was it possible for the victors of the first world war came to be the victim of the beginning of the second?
The author’s work is very well researched and written in an extremely easy to read manner. How was it possible. The German forces focused on a strategic area the “Schwerpunkt” or "center of gravity," to launch the main attack, while also exploiting other weaker points along the Maginot Line and through neutral countries like Belgium. Both the German and French participants are presented as real, flawed, and sometimes tragic players. The battle for France was not the horrific bloodletting that Verdun was, but it was a major step in the war that led to much more horrors and death than the first.
Highly recommended for those interested in going deeper into the history of this period.
This is the second book by Alistair Horn I have read this year, the first was The Price of Glory: Verdun 1916 and in a way it’s an excellent companion piece, or should I say a continuation of the same story. Several of the same people are key figures in both. How was it possible for the victors of the first world war came to be the victim of the beginning of the second?
The author’s work is very well researched and written in an extremely easy to read manner. How was it possible. The German forces focused on a strategic area the “Schwerpunkt” or "center of gravity," to launch the main attack, while also exploiting other weaker points along the Maginot Line and through neutral countries like Belgium. Both the German and French participants are presented as real, flawed, and sometimes tragic players. The battle for France was not the horrific bloodletting that Verdun was, but it was a major step in the war that led to much more horrors and death than the first.
Highly recommended for those interested in going deeper into the history of this period.
May 30, 2020
Excellent
I have read numerous WW2 books and this easily sits in the top 5%. The background chapters are essential in creating the complete shock and awe that was the Blitzkrieg into Luxembourg, Holland, Belgium and of course France. The detail of the war: militarily, politically and socially are all given due critique and space. This is especially true of the degrading relationship between France and ‘England’ somewhat manifest in the fields of the Low Countries and Dunkirk
What wasn’t expected was the discovery that the ‘Steel Tip’ of this Panzer assault spear was attached to a very long thin stick. A stick that could, if attacked correctly, so easily have altered the course of history. I believe the term is ‘ç'est la guerre.’
Thoroughly enjoyable read. I’m sure I will turn to it regularly in the future. As an aside, his ‘The Price of Glory’ Verdun 1916 is also excellent.
I have read numerous WW2 books and this easily sits in the top 5%. The background chapters are essential in creating the complete shock and awe that was the Blitzkrieg into Luxembourg, Holland, Belgium and of course France. The detail of the war: militarily, politically and socially are all given due critique and space. This is especially true of the degrading relationship between France and ‘England’ somewhat manifest in the fields of the Low Countries and Dunkirk
What wasn’t expected was the discovery that the ‘Steel Tip’ of this Panzer assault spear was attached to a very long thin stick. A stick that could, if attacked correctly, so easily have altered the course of history. I believe the term is ‘ç'est la guerre.’
Thoroughly enjoyable read. I’m sure I will turn to it regularly in the future. As an aside, his ‘The Price of Glory’ Verdun 1916 is also excellent.
February 10, 2025
If we ignore that I read this piecemeal over a shamefully long time, it's a very complete and detailed history of not only the first few months of the war and a recap of every misstep that lead to the fall of France, but also of what came before and had basically spelled danger should a war happen. The notes are really well documented, as is all the research, and honestly, it feels like a one-stop shop if anyone's ever curious about why the situation turned pear shaped so quickly. I will say, especially in the beginning, if you're not a French speaker you will be doing a lot of manual translation because the phrases in French are not translated in text or in the notes (at least in my print copy), but overall it's a very minor thing compared to the very rich and well written history.
April 29, 2025
Excellent read. I’ve always been a bit perplexed by how readily the French armed forces seemed to fold in the face of German armor in World War II, particularly given the numerical advantages the French had over Germany. This book explored the various factors as to why France lost, including the political climate, military structure, leadership (or lack thereof), and matériel differences.
The author had an pleasant writing style, and his keen observations (and willingness to express opinions) pushed this to the 5-star level for me. Audiobook narration was excellent, but be forewarned of at least one instance of offensive racial language about midway book. This author’s writing style reminded me of Barbara Tuchman’s prose in a good way.
The author had an pleasant writing style, and his keen observations (and willingness to express opinions) pushed this to the 5-star level for me. Audiobook narration was excellent, but be forewarned of at least one instance of offensive racial language about midway book. This author’s writing style reminded me of Barbara Tuchman’s prose in a good way.
Displaying 1 - 30 of 57 reviews