The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province

by Eric M. Bergerud

Some of the most active debate about the Vietnam War today is prompted by those who believe that the United States could have won the war either through an improved military strategy or through more enlightened social policies. Eric Bergerud takes issue with both of these positions. Carefully analyzing the entire course of the war in a single key province, The Dynamics of Defeat shows that the Vietnam War was a tragedy in the true sense of the American policy could not have been much different than it was and could only have led to failure.Examining the war at the operational level, where political policy is translated into military action, The Dynamics of Defeat provides a case study of the efficacy on the ground of policies emanating from Washington. Many of the policy alternatives now proposed in hindsight were actually attempted in Hau Nghia to one degree or another. Bergerud is able on that basis to critique these policies and to offer his own conclusions in a thought-provoking but utterly unpolemical fashion.Based on extensive research in U.S. Army archives and many personal interviews with those who experienced the war in Hau Nghia, The Dynamics of Defeat is a story full of violence, frustration, and numbing despair, but also one rich with lessons for American foreign policy.

Genres: Nonfiction, Military Fiction, Military History

402 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1991

Reviews

[Mike Kershaw · Rating 5 out of 5]

A cautionary tale for Coin-dinistas: The Dynamics of Defeat by Eric Bergerud. This book covers the Vietnam War from the perspective of the Hau Nghia province -- a political division formed coincidentally the same year President Diem assumed the leadership of South Vietnam (GVN). Sharing boundaries with the suburbs of Saigon and Cambodia, Hau Nghia was populated primarily by Vietnamese Peasants -- the key people that the political battle was being fought over. Bergerud's thesis is the political flaws of the Government of Vietnam (GVN) doomed it in the popular struggle for the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people against the National Liberation Front (NLF). While the US and ARVN military forces as well as other governmental agencies attempted many population-centric tactics, ultimately the lack of political reform made all these efforts indecisive. Eric Bergerud has written on combat in the Southwest Pacific in World War II ("Touched with Fire" and "Fire in the Sky") as well as chronicled the 25th Infantry Division during their tour in Vietnam in "Red Thunder, Tropic Lighting" . By following the war in one province -- adjacent to Saigon, populated predominantly by Vietnamese peasants, shared border Cambodia and with active US and ARVN forces -- Bergerud is able to examine many of the issues surrounding the war over time and trace the relative success and failure of the competing foes -- the GVN and US on one side, and the NLF and NVA on the other. He demonstrates convincingly why the GVN couldn't wrestle allegiance of the province's peasantry, the ineffectiveness of programs such as 'the Strategic Hamlet Program' and the effectiveness of insurgents targeted killings. He describes divergent aims of US Advisory teams and 25th Infantry Division, the early ineffectiveness of ARVN 25th Division while refuting many problems with the 'stereotype' of US Army efforts in Vietnam -- demonstrating that from the inception of the advisory effort, US officers attempted innovative, adaptive tactics in both conventional and advisory units. He sees the Korean experience seen as damaging -- leading to an early commitment to training predominantly conventional forces, disregard for political in viability, etc.... He examines the CORDS program which, although effective at a number of levels, is unable to overcome lack of appeal of GVN to peasantry. He also chronicles the problems with Phoenix program and Regional Force/Popular Force efforts. The introduction of conventional US units in 1965 in one sense, gives the government some breathing room, staving off defeat in the field. He follows the NLF as well, citing that the Front Forces suffered heavy losses in both 68 and 69 Tet's -- their low point would come in 1970. With the US withdrawal already decided even an improved ARVN (25th ARVN Div) couldn't overcome GVN intransigent -- in large part bought on by the political leadership sponsored by the US post Diem assassination. "The Dynamics of Defeat" is valuable as our Army conducts its post-mortem on our efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. We would do well to examine our efforts in both specific areas/provinces of Afghanistan and Iraq and evaluate their effectiveness and avoid the rotational analysis which seems to dominate both our outlook and the historical record to date in both Campaigns.

[Rowan · Rating 3 out of 5]

The central argument of this book is that while the US were not defeated in a strictly military sense, the Front (North Vietnam) were preordained to win the political, social and psychological war. Structural weakness within the South Vietnamese government hampered efforts at nation building ( e.g. Strategic Hamlets program). The constant fear of the North undermined the effectiveness of American military successes, and even in 1971 when the enemy was down, South Vietnamese officials still slept behind barbed wire. This book also explores the weaknesses of American strategy, such as the incremental approach of Johnson, when early and decisive action may have prevented the Front from dictating the tempo of the war. Ultimately for the American military campaign to have had meaning, the South Vietnamese state needed to posses the skill, êlan and confidence in victory possessed by the North Vietnamese. Only then could they have harnessed the material and technological firepower of American forces. Bergerud’s conclusion is that force should never be employed unless there is the political will to support it. Despite its title (i.e. focus on Hua Nghia province) it's a good overall history of the Vietnam conflict from 1965 onwards.

[Al · Rating 3 out of 5]

A decent overview of the operations of the 9th IN Division. Hackworth discusses some of the same events in a more personal style in his book. This is roughly the same type of analysis as that given by Krepinevich in "The Army and Vietnam." I don't agree with his operational conclusion; I think an effective counterinsurgency strategy would have been operationally more successful. Strategically, I think we should have followed Eisenhower's advice and not even got involved because the effort was doomed from the start, a point Bergerud made in his book.