Mind-Body Problem

The MIT Press Essential Knowledge

by Jonathan Westphal

Mind-Body Problem by Rebecca Goldstein. Penguin Books, Inc.,1983

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, Science, Psychology, Neuroscience

Unknown Binding

About the author

Jonathan Westphal is a Permanent Member of the Senior Common Room at University College, Oxford. He is the author of Colour: A Philosophical Introduction.

Reviews

[Kunal Sen · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is the first book I have read on this subject that attempts to organize all the philosophical and scientific work that has been done on the topic of mind-body problem, and the associated topic of consciousness, in a systematic way. It does a wonderful job of first establishing a framework, and then viewing each approach through history in terms of this common framework, thus making it possible for us to comprehend the similarities and differences between the different models.

My only disappointment is about something I have seen with many other philosophers working in this area. They all have a tendency to believe that consciousness necessarily needs a human brain, and any claim that a non-biological entity can be conscious is dismissed without any further consideration. The author here makes statements like since something is a stream of bits, it cannot be conscious, as if this statement should be self evident. There is also a lack of deep understanding or appreciation of the emergent processes in complex and recursive systems, which may hold the key to understanding consciousness, and may create conscious machines in the not too distant future. My knowledge of philosophy is barely enough to understand this book, but it is not enough to argue this point in philosophical language, but I'd love to follow that argument.

[Teo Mechea · Rating 3 out of 5]

I'm not so sure I would recommend this book to a non-philosophy student.
On the one hand, it's a fairly good summation of the attempts to resolve the problem dating back to Descartes; on the other, it is important to be able to appreciate the rigidity of some of the rules of logic to appreciate the cases Westphal makes here. No prior knowledge on the structure of logical or theoretical arguments won't make this easy.

I was left a bit disappointed that all he does is present most of the major theories, going in excruciating explanations on them sometimes, but failed to dive deeper into the actual IMPLICATIONS that these theories pose. I would love to have seen more theoretical playfulness on ideas of how they might function or how concepts like Free Will, God or Consciousness would be shaped by some of the ideas presented.

I haven't expected the rigid lexicon of accepted theories that I got and was wishing more philosophical meanderings and hearing Wesphal's own take on the subjects, which would be so much more interesting to read.

[Dbaguti · Rating 3 out of 5]

words be difficult

[Gregory Pelley · Rating 3 out of 5]

3 -1/2 stars, I guess. This is a relatively accessible survey of the mind-body problem and how various philosophers have attempted to resolve it, albeit unsatisfactorily. After presenting the arguments for one solution or the other, Westphal highlights their inadequacy. (Although, sometimes, his counter-arguments feel like a moving target.) I did appreciate his neutral-monist conclusion, which seems tenable and resonates with my issues in the whole mind-body question. However, I wish Westphal had offered at least some of that incisive critique of his own ideas.

One note: the book has numerous obvious typographic errors and editing problems, which seemed odd given the source/publisher. If one is to present a careful philosophical critique, one would expect that it be proofread thoroughly prior to publication.

[Kieran Wood · Rating 2 out of 5]

I have to be honest this book was hard to get through. I don't know if it's just that I found the topic uninteresting, or the book itself but I found it a chore to finish. It was hard to keep everything straight throughout reading because multiple ideas are presented in a single sub-heading on each chapter, and the author writes in a way that makes them meld together a bit.

I personally didn't enjoy this book, but I will admit it does have a lot of good information in it. I just wish it were presented in a more coherent way.

[Greg Gauthier · Rating 3 out of 5]

Excellent overview, but sub-optimal production

Westphal's explication of the mind-body problem is as serviceable an overview as I've yet experienced (and I've read a lot). The only thing better would be a proper university lecture series. I especially appreciated the syllogistic reductions in key chapters, which helped to keep the focus on the core paradox. If you're looking for a detailed exploration of the scientific theories of consciousness, this book is not for you. You might try Dennett instead.

Where the book (and the audio) fall down, is in the production quality. The reading is peppered with odd pause points (presumably, due to re-read edits), and inconsistent pronunciations. At one point, he pronounces "quale" as "quail", and at another, as "qua-lay" (the right way), for example. In the text, there are lots of misspellings, and there was no attempt to reformat the typesetting for digital. So, where in the print edition, you'd get large-print insets of important "pull quotes", what you get in the digital edition is whole blocks of repeated text, that looks like the rest of the text. That's very confusing for a reader. Overall, I'd still give this an above-average rating, for an introductory volume.

[Desollado · Rating 3 out of 5]

The primary merit of Jonathan Westphal's The Mind-Body Problem is its function as a concise overview of the major theories and arguments within the philosophy of mind. However, this merit is unfortunately overshadowed by significant shortcomings in its execution.

The most glaring issue is the author's handling of perspectives that diverge from his own. Competing theories are consistently presented as poorly constructed straw men, a tactic that will be apparent even to those with a foundational understanding of the topic. The portrayal of Chalmers' panpsychism, for instance, is a notable example of this reductionist approach. By creating caricatures of arguments—even those one might not personally find compelling—Westphal erodes the book's scholarly foundation.

Consequently, when the author finally presents his own view (neutral monism), his argument lacks force. Having failed to engage genuinely with the strengths of other positions, he does not offer a convincing rationale for the superiority of his own. The pervasive condescending tone and summary dismissals of alternative theories feel intellectually disingenuous and ultimately fail to advance his philosophical position.

[Erik · Rating 5 out of 5]

Westphal is great at framing the theories and problems in a maximally clear way, as evidenced by his opening with this unstable tetrad:
(1) The mind is a nonphysical thing.
(2) The body is a physical thing.
(3) The mind and the body interact.
(4) Physical and nonphysical things cannot interact

From here he goes on to deal with different physicalist and non-physicalist theories and arguments for and against each. Sometimes his treatment of some of these ideas or thought experiments is extremely brief, which might be confusing for an absolute beginner in the topic, but if you've read a book like Philosophy of Mind, A Very Short Introduction, the lack of repetition is welcome.

At times, Westphal seems too dismissive of specific theories or options, but it is welcome for the author even of a sort of introduction to forcefully announce his own stance. In the end, Westphal advocates for a version of neutral monism, which was introduced by Gilbert Ryle.

[bks · Rating 3 out of 5]

The question posted in this book is obviously an interesting one, with very long history.
The author did an amazing job in summarizing how philosophers and scientists trying to solve this problem via different field. Getting a grasp of those theories is interesting mental exercise. Some are logically coherent, but that all one can say about that theory.
I am personally biased towards using consciousness to explain the mind-body problem due to my neuroscience background. I also held this (unproven) belief that one day the neuroscience will advance in a way that we can understand those subjective experiences& feelings& motivations. Yet somehow this progress would frighten me, and it is like to lose the last tiny bits of privacy.
"During the scientific revolution... the mind was conveniently understood as whatever is left over from the successful mathematical sciences" pg146

[JonLuca De Caro · Rating 3 out of 5]

It was a decent introduction to the mind body problem. I don’t think it spent enough time going over the various physicalist arguments that dominate the modern discussion, but it touched on everything enough to be a pretty into introduction. It does take a thoroughly philosophical take on the problem - the author briefly touches on various scientific discoveries, but doesn’t seem to dive into the specifics.

At the end the author provides his opinion, which is that of a neutral monist, but still fails to provide a believable enough argument against physicalist modes of thought.

Highly recommended if it’s your first introduction to the mind body problem, but don’t expect it to get very specific or scientific. Use it as a frame for the problem with a decent but not complete set of historical “solutions”.

[Barkis · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent and comprehensive if you're interested in the field of the traditional mind-body problem and makes a fair job of locating this in contemporary approaches and the growing discussion around artificial intelligence. It makes clear how much of contemporary commentary in the latter context is actually rather shallow and would repay some study of what has been discussed in earlier times. Given how much has developed in the technology, there could be a second edition which addresses itself more specifically to that.

Strongly recommended. I know of no better survey and balanced discussion.

[Anthony O'Connor · Rating 4 out of 5]

A solid intro

A solid introduction to the hard problem. A look at various philosophical views. An explanation of why recent neuroscience models of consciousness as interesting as they are don’t really address the hard problem, but rather deny it in one or more of the standard well known ways. No surprises there.

[Abdul Alhazred · Rating 3 out of 5]

Good introduction to the issue, the MIT series has a knack for both serving as a boilerplate basics introduction but combining it with some asides into recent discussions in the field or noted controversies.

[cypher · Rating 4 out of 5]

i don't necessarily agree with all of the ideas, but this is an interesting philosophical debate. great to have the book. phenomenalism or non-phenomenalism, idealism or not...a difficult one, especially from the perspective of spiritual belief. intuition is the ghost in the machine.

[Joe Isler · Rating 4 out of 5]

A nice summary of "solutions" to the titular "problem" since Descartes. The author's "neutral monism" extends the idea first championed by Bertrand Russell. It would have been nice if perspectives from outside the Western tradition were included, e.g. from Chinese and Indian philosophy.

[Carolina · Rating 3 out of 5]

Very exhaustive analysis of all possible mind/body theories and explanations to the problem of consciousness....probably all you ever wanted to know about the subject.

[Şüheda Kozan · Rating 3 out of 5]

nice review of the problem but very repetitive

[Kelly · Rating 4 out of 5]

A bit tortuous to read, but still a very solid overview of the mind-body problem and various ideas and theories and solutions proposed throughout history.

[Michael Choi · Rating 4 out of 5]

difficult. esoteric

[Snowdenwald · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting case for neutral monism, even though I don't fully understand it yet. Might be an interesting alternative that takes serious the non-physicality of qualia... or maybe it doesn't.

[David Diaz · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is an excellent, brief primer on the mind-body problem. Good explanations of the most relevant positions.

[Phil · Rating 4 out of 5]

I'm not certain I would recommend The Mind-Body Problem to a non-philosophy student. On the one hand, it's a fairly good summation of the attempts to resolve the problem dating back to Descartes; on the other, it is important to be able to appreciate the rigidity of some of the rules of logic to appreciate the cases Westphal makes here.

The book begins with a very simple summation of what the mind-body problem is. It is, as Westphal argues, an easy proof to understand:

-the mind is a nonphysicial thing
-the body is a physical thing
-the mind and the body interact
-physical things and nonphysical things cannot interact

Each of these premises makes sense to us on its own, but taken together, they cannot be true. Looking at the four premises, it's also easy to try to begin picking the problem apart - perhaps the mind is a physical thing, perhaps the mind and the body do not really interact - and Westphal covers some of the philosophical attempts to tease out these rejections of the premises. For the most part, however, these attempts fall well short of the mark.

I particularly enjoyed Westphal's various dissections of physicalist approaches to the mind-body problem. The vestiges of the physicalist view have hardly been swept away - ask ten people to resolve the mind-body problem, and nine will likely tell you "well, the mind is the brain - the firing of electrons." - but physicalism has significant limitations. Westphal spends a significant amount of time discussing "qualia," or a philosophical concept for the experience we attach to an event. He uses the example of perceiving a cup of coffee to explain how our understanding of events or items transcends mere perception of colors or sounds. The shortcoming of the physicalist view, particularly the behaviorist view (which says that the 'mind' can essentially be reduced to behavior) is that it fails to account for the sorts of syntheses and interpretations that occur on a nonphysical plane.

In all, feel free to dive into this. My one word of advice for the non-philosophy student trying something new: don't get as hung up on the isms as the various arguments to resolve the problem.