It is an easy thing, now nearly 100 years since the most important event of the 20th century started, to dismiss World War I as a needless, pointless exercise that solved nothing and accomplished nothing. The Great War, a Combat History of the First World War, attempts to take the reader down the path that the military decision makers walked from the years leading up to the war, to the end on Armistice Day. By doing so, the reader should be able to see why decisions were made and why very often that military decision makers made the best choices in front of them.
Peter Hart, an oral historian at Britain's Imperial War Museum, brings to this work not only the IWM's unique access to the high level strategy and material artifacts of WWI, but the primary sources from the war that give this book an added dimension of realism. He divides the chapters chronologically, and geographically. What gives the chapters especially strong weight is his frequent use of stopping his narrative and having, at times, lengthy quotations from letters and interviews from the actual combatants, particularly junior officers and non commissioned officers, from all sides. By doing so, he is able to show, in real time, the consequences of strategic and tactical decisions on those who were tasked with actually having to carry them out on the many fronts of this war.
Hart places the weight of the blame on Imperial Germany, though he is free to cite the overreach of the other powers involved. He clearly writes of the strategy that Germany thought it needed to win the war outright, and to dominate Europe (and Europe's colonial lands), and why he believed that the western front was the key to victory and why he believed that Germany's ultimate main enemy was the British Empire. Even though most of the fighting on the western front was between French and German forces, he does logically maintain his thesis that Germany's main antagonist was Britain. The whole of Germany's main war plans involved winning the war quickly, within six months by knocking out France and removing British influence from the continent. Once Germany failed to force French capitulation by 1915, Hart shows how the war moved into a war of attrition, where Germany could not win, but hoped to avoid losing.
As a reader, you do get caught up in the battles - the terrors of combat that shook so many he quoted. The frustration of so many in military leadership, like British General Haig, for instance, at the unrealistic expectations that the politicians and general public back home had of the war is clear. You do understand and sympathize why so many Russian soldiers mutinied against their command, even as you know the coming darkness ahead for that land. And you do come away with tremendous respect for the many ordinary soldiers who so often went over the top, or through forests, or even worse, held their ground, in the face of hours and hours of relentless artillery fire. As a reader, you should feel a sickening discouragement of the many who breathed their last, went over the top, and died, by the tens of thousands, in numbers the world was not prepared for, for over four years.
The primary weakness of this work is that the primary sources relied upon are primarily British, and then a mix of French and German. Russian sources play a minor role, as do many others in the Austrian Hungarian services. So this is a British centric view of the conflict. The writing and combat understanding is sound though, so as a real war history, the reader should get this war, and understand why Hart does NOT simply dismiss the whole thing as pointless, but points again and again to the fact at how virtually everything since this war was influenced by it. The author takes a very realist view of human nature and its many violent tendencies, and the ability of men caught in awful situations to think through bad situations as well as they can. As a one volume combat history, this should sit well with John Keegan's narrative, even as this book is more narrowly focused.