Coleman is a masterful, clear writer. His ability to come up with helpful analogies to drive home his point is truly impressive. Regardless of whether you agree or disagree with Coleman’s thesis, you have to applaud his ability to clearly articulate his thesis and support his claims with persuasive arguments and evidence.
His thesis: we should adopt colourblindness, defined as consciously disregarding race in how we treat individuals and in setting public policy. Colourblindness shouldn’t be understood literally (“not seeing colour”), since we all “see” race, i.e., we notice that people have different skin pigmentation and have different ancestral backgrounds.
Coleman’s basic argument is persuasive to me. Contrary to “anti-racists” who posit that talking more about race will reduce racism, Coleman thinks the opposite: getting people to fixate more on their racial identity will lead to being more cognizant of racial divides, amplify people’s racial pride, and thus endgender more racial animus and polarizaton.
Coleman begins the book by remarking on the arbitrariness of race. He is careful not to outright disregard a genetic basis for race (or “populations”), acknowledging that modern cluster analyses roughly confirm that the geographical separateness of different populations roughly corresponds to modern-day racial identification. But there is plenty of arbitrariness in our social conception of race. For example, the “one drop rule” means that if one has even a minority of black ancestry, society identifies them as “black”; legal categories for race often group together diverse populations into the same racial category; and public policies like affirmative action can shift the incentives in how individuals self-identify (to take advantage of the benefits or avoid the harms of certain programs).
Instead, Coleman suggests—and I agree—that to more effectively help people, we should use a more direct proxy for disadvantage: income/class/socioeconomic status. Rather than target race, which will identify many people who are not disadvantaged (due to racial discrimination or otherwise), targeting income means we will help those most in need regardless of their race. Yet, modern “anti-racists”—whom Coleman calls “neoracists”—insist on amplifying the salience of race to the extent that many mainstream institutions (media, schools, academia, etc.) have been captured by this type of identitarian thinking. This type of neoracism is directly anathema to MLK Jr.’s / the civil rights movement’s aims and ethos: treating people not according to the colour of their skin but by the content of their character, i.e., colourblindness. Modern “anti-racists” completely eschew this. For example, Ibram X. Kendi thinks that “the only remedy to past discrimination is present discrimination”; Robin DiAngelo thinks that “I strive to be ‘less white.’ To be less white is to be less racially oppressive. This requires me to be more racially aware…”
In a rather short chapter, Coleman then turns his attention to why neoracism is spreading, documenting the rise in usage of certain terms since 2010—terms like “systemic racism” and “whiteness”. Coleman suggests two reasons for the rise in neoracism:
(1) “The end of these conflicts [the Cold War and War on Terror] has created a situation in which the United States no longer has a scary foreign enemy to fight. The absence of a common enemy has magnified the importance of domestic conflicts” (p. 73).
(2) The decline of Christianity has created an ideological and spiritual void that’s been filled by neoracism.
I find (1) to be more convincing, and it’s consistent with Francis Fukuyama’s thesis of “the end of history”: that secular liberal democracy is the highest form of civilization yet discovered/proposed/tried. I don’t find (2) to be especially convincing, as the majority of citizens do not subscribe to neo-racist ideology, and many who do are themselves also religious in the traditional sense. However, it’s hard to know what sort of data could validate or refute such hypotheses—I just wouldn’t put much stake in them either way.
I do agree with Coleman’s suggestion that the smartphone era and social media in particular have aided the spread of these ideas, but I’m not sure how explanatory these can be on their own. I think political polarization had to have existed as a precondition, which may explain why social media hasn’t led to the same spread of neoracist memes in other countries. Regardless of the true causal explanation, Coleman demonstrates how the spread in neoracism is rather decoupled from actual anti-black racism, with majorities of both whites and blacks having reported in 2021 that race relations are somewhat bad or very bad, whereas as recently as 2013, strong majorities reported race relations to be somewhat good or very good.
It is hard to document all the fallacious reasoning among neoracists. But Coleman tries in the penultimate chapter. He enumerates a list of fallacies:
-The Disparity Fallacy: racial disparities are conclusive evidence of [systemic] racism.
-The Myth of Undoing the Past: re: Kendi’s claim above that, new acts of discrimination can somehow make up for past acts of discrimination. (Has this ever worked throughout history anywhere?)
-The Myth of No Progress: many neoracists assert that America has made no progress in combatting racism.
-The Myth of Inherited Trauma: black people alive today inherit trauma experienced by their ancestors.
-The Myth of Superior Knowledge: black people supposedly have knowledge about racism that a white person could not.
-The Racial Ad Hominem: claims about racism by white people can be dismissed by dint of them being white
-The Myth of Black Weakness: white people have societal power and black people don’t.
In the final chapter, Coleman tackles the question of how we can turn these trends around via colourblind approaches. He doesn’t have any easy answers. We need to: end affirmative action (racially discriminatory policies); acknowledge that racial disparities are likely to occur for all sorts of benign reasons and thus stop caring about “equity” (equality of outcome); recommit ourselves to the principles of the civil rights movement, particularly with respect to providing educational opportunities to the most disadvantaged but in a colourblind way.
A couple of minor critiques:
(1) It’s unclear how far Coleman actually thinks we should go with colourblindness. He says there may be some cases where it does make sense to hire based on race, e.g., in the police force, if there is a tension between race-neutral merit-based standards and racial diversity, in order to enhance the perceived legitimacy of the police.
(2) Furthermore, Coleman both says he’s all for acknowledging and discussing actual racism, yet a steadfast commitment to colourblindness would seem to entail disregarding race in how we treat individuals. There’s a tension here that’s worth acknowledging. Perhaps a better rephrasing of the colourblind principle would leave room for exceptional circumstances in which someone’s racial identity needs to be taken into consideration.
Notwithstanding these minor critiques, this is a fantastic book: clear, persuasive, morally sane, and much-needed in the current climate. Highly recommended.