The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today: Library Edition

Riigikaitse raamatukogu

by Thomas E. Ricks, William Hughes (Read By)

From the #1 New York Times bestselling author of Fiasco and The Gamble comes an epic history of the decline of American military leadership from World War II to Iraq. History has been kinder to the American generals of World War II-Marshall, Eisenhower, Patton, and Bradley-than to the generals of the wars that followed. Is this merely nostalgia? In The Generals, Thomas E. Ricks answers the question No, it is not-in no small part because of a widening gulf between performance and accountability. During the Second World War, scores of American generals were relieved of command simply for not being good enough. Today as one American colonel said bitterly during the Iraq War, As matters stand now, a private who loses a rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who loses a war. In The Generals we meet great leaders and suspect ones, generals who rose to the occasion and those who failed themselves and their soldiers. Marshall and Eisenhower cast long shadows over this story, but no single figure is more inspiring than Marine General O. P. Smith, whose fighting retreat from the Chinese onslaught into Korea in the winter of 1950 snatched a kind of victory from the jaws of annihilation. But Smith's courage and genius in the face of one of the grimmest scenarios the marines have ever faced only cast the shortcomings of the people who put him there in sharper relief. If Korea showed the first signs of a culture that neither punished mediocrity nor particularly rewarded daring, the Vietnam War saw American military leadership bottom out. The My Lai massacre is held up as the emblematic event of this dark chapter of our history. In the wake of Vietnam, a battle for the soul of the US Army was waged with impressive success. It became a transformed institution, reinvigorated from the bottom up. But if the body was highly toned, its head still suffered from familiar problems, resulting in leadership that, from the first Iraq War through to the present, was tactically savvy but strategically obtuse-one that would win battles but would end wars badly. Thomas E. Ricks has made a close study of America's military leaders for three decades, and in his hands this story resounds with larger the transmission of values, strategic thinking, the difference between an organization that learns and one that fails. Military history of the highest quality, The Generals is also essential reading for anyone with an interest in the difference between good leaders and bad ones.

Genres: History, Military Fiction, Nonfiction, Military History, War, Leadership, American History

16 pages, Audio CD

First published January 1, 2012

About the author

Thomas Edwin "Tom" Ricks (born September 25, 1955) is an American journalist who writes on defense topics. He is a Pulitzer Prize-winning former reporter for the Wall Street Journal and Washington Post. He writes a blog at ForeignPolicy.com and is a member of the Center for a New American Security, a defense policy think tank.

He lectures widely to the military and is a member of Harvard University's Senior Advisory Council on the Project on U.S. Civil-Military Relations. He has reported on military activities in Somalia, Haiti, Korea, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Kuwait, Turkey, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Ricks is author of five books: the bestselling Fiasco: The American Military Adventure In Iraq (2006), its follow-up The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008 (2009), The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today (2012), the novel A Soldier's Duty (2001), and Making the Corps (1997) (from wikipedia)

Reviews

[Matt · Rating 3 out of 5]

I can just barely recall the last time a high-ranking general was fired. It was back in 2010, when General Stanley McChrystal gave an ill-advised interview to Rolling Stone magazine, in which he mocked civilian leadership and admitted that his favorite drink was Bud Light Lime. Shortly thereafter, he “resigned” his post and retired from the Army.

I think I speak for everyone when I say this: A man who drinks Bud Light Lime shouldn’t be making fun of anybody. In a democracy, generals should leave the politics to the politicians – because if you don’t, your role model is Douglas MacArthur, and that’s not a good thing.

Thomas Ricks’ The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today isn’t necessarily interested in the reason – a smug praetorianism – that McChrystal got fired. Rather, it ponders the question of why more generals aren’t canned. It is a 450-page call for greater accountability at the top of the Army.

The book is divided into five parts covering World War II, the Korean War, Vietnam, the Interwar Era, and finally the Middle Eastern Wars (Gulf I and II, Afghanistan). Within each part are a number of short chapters, usually focusing on one particular general.

Ricks begins his surprisingly breezy account with his thesis-general George C. Marshall. The Chief of Staff during World War II, Marshall is presented as the paragon of a commander. He stressed teamwork and competence. He was quick to relieve an underperforming leader, but also believed in second-chances. Thus, instead of cashiering someone who might be struggling at a certain posting, he moved that person where he might thrive. In effect, Ricks presents Marshall as a great utilizer of human capital (in comparison to today's Army, where many promising young leaders take an early exit).

Marshall is the gold standard, and the man to whom all other generals are compared. His presence haunts nearly every one of Ricks’ pages. Other generals receiving Ricks’ micro-biography include famous names, such as Eisenhower, MacArthur, Patton, Westmoreland, Schwartzkopf and Petraeus, as well as many lesser-lights such as Ridgeway (who, given the right war, might have been a great American hero), Taylor and DePuy.

If you’re saying to yourself right now, “that’s a lot of names,” well, you’re right. And that’s about half the generals surveyed (Ricks focuses exclusively on generals, and exclusively on the Army). Therein lies the problem with The Generals. Its execution does not rise to the level of its ambition. There is simply too much ground to be covered. Depth is sacrificed for breadth. Detail is forsaken for generalities. There is a great deal of telling, but very little showing. Ricks relies heavily on conclusions rather than supporting arguments.

Oftentimes, the chapters don’t feel connected. Ricks’ working thesis is that American military command has degraded since World War II. Back then, good generals kept their jobs, bad ones were relieved, and wars were won. Today, Ricks states, the Army rewards mediocrity, politicking, and ass-kissing, while it punishes free-thinkers and envelope pushers.

This notion is certainly worth exploring, but I don’t know that Ricks entirely succeeds.

For instance, at the start of The Generals, in the span of four chapters, he jumps from Eisenhower to Patton to Mark Clark to Terry de la Mesa Allen. Even after running that gauntlet, it is difficult to see how these particular avatars fits into Ricks theory. Obviously, Eisenhower was a top-notch general, the Supreme Allied Commander, a wrangler of personalities who never saw combat. Patton was a superb fighting general, but he almost lost his job anyway – indeed, his antics would’ve seen him relieved at any other time, in any other war. Mark Clark was the controversial commander of the invasion of Italy; he kept his job while making a botch of things. Meanwhile, Terry Allen was a competent fighter relieved by General Omar Bradley. Each of these men are interesting, in and of themselves, but laying their stories out end-to-end and pretending it coheres into some theory of command doesn’t work. Indeed, some of them disprove the Marshall Way of rewarding success and punishing failure.

While this is a thick book, it’s also a quick read. (Perhaps due to the shortness of the chapters, I felt like I flew threw it). Still, it is far from dazzling. Many of the stories told here – Douglas MacArthur verses Harry Truman, for example – have been told in many other places with much more verve and color. Other chapters, including the ones on Ridgeway, Vietnam, and the post-Vietnam rebuilding of the Army, definitely shed some light on historical corners with which I am not entirely familiar. Even then, Ricks often chooses to state, rather than explain, which left me wanting.

A lot of ground is covered in The Generals, and I wasn’t always sure that Ricks had a complete grasp of his subjects. There are many, many appeals to authority, where Ricks will simply quote some guy to make his point, rather than making it himself based on his knowledge and experience. And in a book this big, on a such a broad canvas, there are bound to be mistakes. For instance, in covering pre-World War II American military history, he writes:

During the Civil War, Stonewall Jackson famously fired a brigade commander who told him something could not be done. President Lincoln also relieved a series of commanders of the Army of the Potomac – Irvin McDowell, George McClellan, John Pope, McClellan again, Ambrose Burnside, Joseph Hooker, and George Meade.

Except John Pope never commanded the Army of the Potomac. Rather, it was the Army of Virginia that he led to grief at Second Bull Run. And George Meade was never relieved. He won at Gettysburg and remained at the head of the Army of the Potomac until cessation of hostilities (Grant, as commander of all Union armies, headquartered with Meade). This is minor sloppiness, of course, but also endemic of someone who’s done a lot of broad reading without burrowing into the material.

The Generals becomes a lot more sure-handed in covering America’s Middle Eastern conflicts. This makes sense, since Ricks is one of the foremost chroniclers of America’s involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, and has covered those wars personally.

Whatever else might be said about Thomas Ricks, he doesn’t pull any punches. He is savage and lacerating in his critiques of Tommy Franks, Ricardo Sanchez, and (surprisingly but fairly) the late Norman Schwartzkopf.

Based on this final section, I think a better book might have focused solely on the post-Vietnam American Army, which is highly-professional, extremely proficient, technologically superior to any other army on Earth, and yet surprisingly thickheaded at the top of the chain of command. By focusing on one discrete time-period, I think Ricks’ argument might have had more power. As it is, the scope of this book is a diminishing factor; it takes a strong argument and dilutes it into something resembling a bottle of Bud Light Lime.

[Mara · Rating 4 out of 5]

I am in no way well-versed in military history. My curiosity about the generals involved in WWII was piqued by my recent reading of The War . So, when I came across this work by Thomas E. Ricks, I thought it just might fit the bill. While I was able to follow Ricks’ overall thesis (which I'll get to momentarily), in when reading the sections on the Korean War and even Vietnam, I felt like I was in a class for which I had skipped the pre-requisite coursework. Though, as mentioned, I haven't exactly “studied” modern warfare, but my having been alive for the campaigns in the Gulf etc. felt sufficient for following the later sections. So, do with this information what you will. Onward!

Dismissals and Mistakes
The military of the United States is (as is perceived to be) a different creature today than it was in the era of World War II. That, unto itself, isn't much of a thesis statement, and there are a preponderance of factors, technological, geopolitical and sociological alike, that have contributed to this stark contrast. However, Ricks gives us a cohesive narrative by tracing the changing role of dismissals and its impact on the tactical and bureaucratic environment of the American military.

General George C. Marshall set the bar pretty high when it came to the rate at which leading officers were relieved while he was in command starting in September of 1939.



Though some may have seen this as "cold blooded," Marshall knew that unity had to come first in the course of coalition warfare . It was with this in mind that Marshall accelerated the promotion of Dwight Eisenhower , a man seen by the British forces as being a "strategic lightweight," but whose strength lay in his ability to prioritize and implement tactics, and who took seriously his charge from Marshall that he was to maintain cohesion among the Allied forces.



So where are all the pink slips? Well, there are certainly a bunch of names I didn't know prior to reading this that I could list who were ousted. Likewise, though not a "dismissal" per se, Marshall wasn't wed to formulaic promotion by seniority. If he had been, George S. Patton would have been in front of Ike in line for promotion.



Patton may have been good at a lot of things, but keeping a coalition together was not one of them. Furthermore, Marshall wasn't running a sort of run-and-gun, once you're out you're out, hang your head in shame firing environment. In order to give commanders the independence they were afforded in the field, they had to be in the right environment. Dismissals often gave way to reassignments, which, as it turned out, was a really good thing. The American army made many mistakes, but it was also adaptive, something that was noted by the British who had an experiential head start due to the United States' late entry into the war.

Mr. MacArthur Goes to Washington
Ricks gives General Douglas MacArthur the ignominious award as the "most overrated" man in the U.S. military (also, in his blog post, The worst general in American history?, he gives MacArthur the no. 1 spot). In addition to his general insubordination to a trifecta of presidents, MacArthur also resurrected the politicization of "the General."


While having generals in political office, unto itself, is not problematic, MacArthur is portrayed as a symbol for the worst possible relationship between the POTUS and military leadership.

What's to be done?
Yes, I'm skipping a whole bunch of wars, but there is a point to all of this. These days the dismissal (or whatever you want to call it) of a general is a big, CNN-covered deal—one filled with shame and often associated with human rights abuses and/or sex scandals. Ricks argues that relief from command should not terminate a career, and, furthermore, should be seen as a sign that the system is working. Ricks cites the responses of soldiers who have left the force in his closing arguments (the most common reason for leaving, as it turns out, has to do with frustration with bureaucracy). We have come to a place, Ricks argues, where we are institutionalizing mediocrity . Incompetence is tolerated, and excellence is insufficiently rewarded.

My take
I admit I sort of three-star enjoyed this book, but feel like much of that was due to my lack of background knowledge. Basically, I feel under-qualified to dock additional stars.

[KOMET · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book fully lives up to its billing. It begins by highlighting the state of the U.S. Army as it was upon the outbreak of the Second World War and the promotion of George Catlett Marshall as Army Chief of Staff. Marshall, while not a West Point graduate as were many of his contemporaries, had made a name for himself as a "brilliant planner" on the staff of General John J. Pershing in France during the First World War. Indeed, it was Marshall's grasp of logistics, of breaking down complex problems to their simpler elements and developing means of resolving said problems that would prove instrumental in the U.S. Army's victories in the Battles of Saint Mihiel and the Meuse-Argonne. Marshall was a deeply principled man who devoted his life to making the Army adaptive to the changing needs of the nation and the evolving nature of war.

As Chief of Staff throughout the Second World War, Marshall "devoted much effort to finding the right men for the jobs at hand. When some did not work out, they were removed quickly - but often given another chance in a different job." This came to be known as the "Marshall system", which created a generally well-led, cohesive Army instrumental in ensuring a resounding Allied victory in 1945.

In subsequent years and wars (Korea, Vietnam, Panama, the Gulf War, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan), this book shows how this system was gradually abandoned, and the largely negative impact that this abandonment had on the philosophy, education, culture and ethics of the officer corps.

In summing up, Ricks opines that "if the military... fails to restore the traditions of accountability, then it seems likely that the current trend will continue: When generals don't fire generals, civilians will. Thus it is really not a question of whether to relieve but of who will relieve them. As unhappiness with the conduct of a war increases, pressure will build to get rid of someone. That is the message of the historical record of the past sixty years. Since the Army lost the tradition of relief in the Korean War, each conflict has instead been marked by the firing of top commanders by civilians: MacArthur in that war, Harkins and Westmoreland in Vietnam, Woerner before Panama, Dugan during the Gulf War, Wesley Clark after Kossovo, Casey in Iraq, McKiernan and McChrystal in Afghanistan. These ousters are necessarily clumsier and tardier than internal military moves would be, because they are less like routine maintenance and more like blowing the safety valve on a boiler. But, as with a boiler under pressure, even a late move generally is better than the alternative of doing nothing."

[Chris · Rating 5 out of 5]

I devoured this book. Superb. Scathing. Scintillating. Why is it that no generals have relieved other generals since WW II? Army leadership has abdicated that task to its civilian leadership. General George Marshall fired generals by the dozen before the start of WW II and well into it. And when you were fired it wasn't always a badge of shame either. Not too many surprises here but I was struck by the mendacity of Westmoreland, the stupidity of Tommie Franks, and the mediocrity of Sanchez. Ricks goes chronologically from Marshall to the present in an informative and stimulating style. His writing reminds me of Rick Atkinson who makes history come alive. Basically the GO's are all messed up and our situation today is much like the British in WW I- our NCO's and JO's are lions led by donkeys. Occasionally Ricks brings up the Marines as a counterpoint. Basically the Army's GO's are all battalion commanders on steroids. They possess tactical skill but not the ability to think and be mentally agile. Ricks discusses training and education and the difference between the two. It's sort of sad how the Army's generalship evolved from a force of nature that the Germans generals actually respected and admired to a hollow shell-a scarecrow in need of a brain. Petraeus was an aberration-PhD. It's a good thing he was selected by the civilians over the objections of the status quo. The Navy is no stranger to relief. Routinely firing ship captains, etc.. Ricks doesn't go into this enough as a contrast. He mentions it briefly.

[Mike Kershaw · Rating 3 out of 5]

Senior Leadership in the Senior Service - The Generals by Tom Ricks.

“You don't necessarily get to go to war with the Generals you want" -
anonymous Sergeant Major in Baghdad, circa 2006

This is an important book on an important topic and one that should resonate with any Soldier who served in our Army, in particular, in Iraq during the 2006-2007 timeframe. Tom Ricks has written a book that should be read by all Americans who have an interest in how our military forces are led and, as current events have indicated, is a topic that garners great attention when things go wrong. Rick's approach, however, is long on description and short on analysis and thoughtful recommendation - but will hopefully generate a more thoughtful debate as the US Army transitions from wartime to peacetime footing - and prepares for its next set of challenges.
The author has been an active chronicler of the Army and his most current challenges. In his quest to address accountability in the senior leader ranks of the Army, Ricks mistakes a symptomatic fix (reliefs or lack of them) for the larger corrective which is needed - how we develop and select our most senior leaders. But he brings much to light which is valuable in the current debate -- and if a recent survey of books in airport bookstores from San Antonio to Chicago to Washington DC is any indication -- is one that one's hopes will spark a valuable debate on potential fixes to the problem.

Ricks uses the Army's management of General Officers in World War II as a standard of success and proceeds through Korea, Vietnam and the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, in particular, to demonstrate a decline in the quality of that leadership and its affect on national security. He not only categorizes senior leadership in each conflict (Marshall/Eisenhower in WWII; MacArthur/Ridgeway in Korea and Westmoreland/Taylor/Abrams in Vietnam) he also follows the key debates in the Army during the interwar periods -- each of which played a part in not only who took the Army to war in the ensuing conflict and what their experiences were. His assessment of Army Generalship in the most recent conflict uses Paul Yingling's article, "A Failure of Generalship" as its central thesis and critically assesses the roles played alternatively by General Franks, General Sanchez, General Casey and General Petraeus. Throughout he follows a number of key themes -- that 'reliefs' are a bellwether or successful accountability, that 'corporateness' or bureaucratization are endemic in Army Senior Leadership and in part responsible for less than successful attempts to hold Army General Officers accountable and that Senior Leaders play a decisive role in the conduct of a campaign. He closes with recommendations in which he brings together a potpourri of good ideas to close his book - some of which are supportable given his earlier arguments, some of which are undoubtedly of further consideration yet really aren't brought together in a fashion to engender action.

The book is a purveyor of what a recent reviewer has called 'the archaic great man' or 'indispensible man' theory of leadership, both in how it views successes and failures. Ricks frequently uses General Petraeus as an example of Generalship to be emulated - a shining example, exceptional although calling into question his legacy on the Army. From a historical standpoint, the author seems to be 'cherry picking' its way across Army leadership from Marshall to Petraeus and as it tries to tell its story across a daunting scope. Marshall is hoisted on such a pedestal that author evokes his ghost in his closing chapter to propose changes. For those who have served closer to the current crop of senior leaders that the author discusses, this repeated adulation makes the author seem less serious and his work bereft of the understanding on how complex organizations like the Army change under fire - a topic Ricks has written on at length.

The chapters that I believe offer the greatest insight include those on the turmoil of the post-Vietnam Army. For those of us raised by the officer corps of this conflict, Vietnam was more than an experience just to be forgotten or sung about in cadences. It scarred and shaped (depending on perspective) the officer corps that fashioned the All Volunteer Force and provided the senior leadership through the outbreak of 9/11. We would have benefited from a deeper look at this critical period although Ricks give us an insight into the degree of hostility which field grade officers in particular reacted to senior leader engagements at the Staff College and elsewhere. If anything, this is possibly muted to some degree, if the testimony of those officers I served with in the post-Vietnam era is to be believed. The author rightly highlights the role Depuy played in the post-War Army and his considerable influence -- and the Cushman-Depuy debate is explored in some detail. I would have been interested to hear an assessment of how the changes enacted after Vietnam affected the Army that fought both in the Hindu Kush and the Euphrates River Valley -- and how the author thought a similar assessment of the Army should proceed beyond just Senior Leadership. The 70s produced not just changes designed to facilitate the All Volunteer Force, as Ricks highlights, but also to address the negative legacies of the Vietnam experience on the Army. Centralized Command Selection for Battalion and Brigade Commanders, I was told by one of that generation of officers was an answer to the charges of careerism and 'ticket-punching' of the Vietnam Army. Has this been a success? Is this a model to be used elsewhere in our selection processes or has it failed to produce the tactical leaders it was designed to produce? Has this been to the degradation of our senior leadership? These topics, and others, one hopes are driving the Army as it assesses lessons learned from the slowly winding down period of conflict.

Rick's central arguments that 'reliefs' are some kind of bellwether for success should be scrutinized further. This is certainly a powerful part of his argument and I know every Captain in my formation in Iraq during 2006-2007 was familiar with the Yingling piece. Other have well-told the challenges faced by the US Army in Iraq - they have been documented by Jaffe and Cloud in "The Fourth Star", by Gordon and Trainer in "The Endgame" as well as many others. But reliefs in and of themselves have a mixed history - reliefs, at least at the battalion level were fairly commonplace in Vietnam and the post-war Army and were often cited as 'micromanaging' and creating a 'Zero-Defects' environment. Although he documents many notable reliefs in World War II, there is certainly a mixed bag of opinion on their effectiveness -- Patton, in particular, expressing reservations at widespread relief during the Northern European Campaign (see (then) Major Dan Bolger's Military Review Article, May 91). A much more succinct and deliberate analysis is to be found in Steven Taffee's 'Marshall and His Generals" which looks at selection of Corps, Army and Army Group Commanders during World War II. Taffee makes two points -- one (mentioned above and by Ricks), that officers were often given 'second chances' because their reliefs were seen as a result of inexperienced formations, lack of support from higher or even personal animosities which are inevitable in such circumstances. A second, and more important point, was that while Marshall is often credited with being solely responsible for Army Senior Leadership in World War II, as demonstrated in Taffee's book, he actually employed a more collegial system, giving great weight to not only theatre commanders (Eisenhower, MacArthur and Devers) but also to the Commander of Army Ground Forces, General McNair, who essentially oversaw for Marshall the training of stateside formations prior to their deployment to theatre. Rather than an imperious indispensible man, Marshall is seen as a careful manager, collaborating with his senior leaders (some of whom he enjoyed close personal relationships with (Eisenhower), others which he did not (MacArthur)) and often to deferring to them in matters of judgment. In fact, Taffee demonstrates the gap in approaches between Eisenhower and Marshall (Eisenhower valued combat experience more and also played favorites) quite convincingly and gives credence to one of Ricks argument that Marshall was much more tolerant of certain behaviors than Eisenhower.

Rick's overreliance on "Great Man Theory" is evident not only in the heroes of his story (Marshall, Eisenhower, Ridgeway and Petraeus) but also in the villains. Although not as deep into Lewis Sorley's Hero Worship of General Abrams (See "Thunderbolt" and "A Better War"), he is squarely in his camp of blaming almost all our problems in Vietnam on Westmoreland. He is interestingly critical of General Taylor as well but doesn't seem to realize that General Petraeus -- his most recent 'great man' -- may look a lot more like General Taylor to some of those still in the ranks -- especially those who seem to realize, as Ricks doesn't, that General Petraeus, in both good and bad terms, has had a great effect on the mid-level leaders of the Army today.

The uneven nature of this work shouldn't down play the contributions journalists can make to the profession. David Halberstam, in "The Coldest Winter" highlighted the effect he believed the rightful relief of MacArthur played on civil-military discourse in the run up to the Vietnam War. A similar discourse is needed but someone in the Army needs to take it on or we will wait, as we did when Halberstam got around to writing 'the book I always wanted to write'.

If we are dissatisfied with our Senior Leaders, we should look at the process by which we develop and select them. Ricks has jump started a dialogue -- and has made recommendations on the developmental aspect of this question; less so on the selection process. We have a recent experience (Vietnam/AVF) to draw on with enough parallels to make an analysis useful. There are valuable experiences, particularly in the SOF community, onlessons learned in assessment and selection, in particular. Younger officer and those with a SOF background have clamored for a Peer Evaluation or 360 Assessment as part of selection for senior ranks, which the Army has only tepidly supported. Ricks doesn't take on 'Cronyism' - a common theme when looking at senior leadership in certain prisms -- perhaps because it is in part based on Indispensible Man theory. The central topic I hope is raised by Tom Rick's valuable work is how we select our most senior leaders. What criteria are we using and what is our process? If, as Rick's argues, the existing process is not producing the kind of leaders we need for the Army we have, why would we think it would give us the leaders we need for the Army of tomorrow. Regardless, Rick's book needs to be read and debated because the Army is going to war everyday with the leaders it has -- whether it wants them or not.

[Jacob · Rating 4 out of 5]

For a nonfiction book that is an analysis of the successes and failures of the U.S. Army from WWII through Iraq and Afghanistan, this book is surprisingly readable. The one sentence summary, that the Army's fighting since WWII has declined because its generals are low quality because they don't get fired, is a bit simplistic. However, it's probably a big contributing factor. The problem is a little wider, in that among the officers the good performers aren't rewarded and the poor performers aren't punished. Not only does that kind of thing need to be done, it needs to be seen so people feel the system is fair and they know they are expected to perform. Ricks places this well in a context of the officers evolving into their own interest group where they are protecting themselves instead of American soldiers and the whole United States. That's easier to do when the Army is entirely composed of volunteers and there is no draft.

It was nice to get some more perspective on a few historical issues. I have a much better idea of Douglas MacArthur's shortcomings now than the mostly favorable American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964 conveys; I also learned a lot about why the war in Korea had to be limited and why we lost in Vietnam while winning (and it was nice to get some reinforcement on what I've already read that yes, we were winning quite a bit when we finally called it quits). The book also makes it more clear how the Army no longer values people who stand out, show individual initiative, or think in unconventional ways. That's probably why my parents always told me I'd be a terrible fit with the military.

I also learned a lot from the coverage of wars during my lifetime, Iraq (kind of all one war) and Afghanistan. Ricks makes a significant case for the Army deciding after Vietnam they just didn't want to fight counterinsurgency-type wars, and deciding during Iraq and Afghanistan that yes, they still don't want to do counterinsurgencies. The shame is that is likely to be the only kind of war they fight because there isn't another superpower to wage a traditional war.

[Scott Hitchcock · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent synopsis and level headed analysis on each one of them. I couldn't help but think of the fictional Malazan Army while reading this and thinking about how the tactical marines would have faired much better in different campaigns. Erikson definitely uses a lot of history.

[John Harms · Rating 5 out of 5]

I absolutely loved this book for its insight and clear-eyed analysis of an incredibly complex topic: the evolution of the US military command structure since WWII. While I'll admit that it sounds like a dull subject, Ricks brings it to life, helping the reader relive some of the most contentious and influential military decisions of the past seventy years. Ricks' main thesis is a simple one. He asserts that our military and civilian leaders must "abide by the belief that the lives of soldiers are more important that the careers of officers -- and that winning wars is more important than either."

Ricks is unsparing in his criticism of lackluster or blustery military commanders like MacArthur (WWII and Korea), Westmoreland (Vietnam), and Franks (Iraq and Afghanistan). He harshly condemns their unwillingness to evolve and rise to new challenges while placing blame squarely on their shoulders for the deaths of thousands of soldiers, marines, and sailors. This is not a feel good story of military conquests. Rather, it is a clear eyed assessment of the mistakes of military and civilian leadership to make the difficult personnel and strategic decisions necessary to win wars.

At the same time, he heaps praise on Generals Marshall (WWII), DePuy (Post-Vietnam), and Petraeus (Iraq and Afghanistan) for their shared ability to step back and asses military readiness from strategic, tactical, and personnel points of view. These leaders were great because they were able to grasp the strategic challenges before them and adopt strategies and promote officers that were a good fit for that particular situation. Too often, military leaders are unable to admit that a strategy is unsuccessful due to reasons related to politics or personal-pride. It is the good leaders who are able to spot areas of improvement and implement successful strategies, while keeping troop morale up and politicians at bay. Ricks' standard of excellence for military leaders is so demanding as to border on unreasonableness. But when thousands of lives and the future of a nation are at stake, no standard is to rigorous for today's military command, he argues.

Ricks' takeaway thought is that the military (1) must continue to promote and relieve officers based on capability, not on rank or seniority, (he argues that the military of the 1950s and 60s placed too-high a value on "protecting its own" to the detriment of soldiers and the nation) and (2) must allow distention and critical self-assessment of military tactics and strategy so that the military can continue to evolve and adapt to modern conflicts.

I finished the book confident that our military, though in many ways a government bureaucracy of the worst kind, is capable of the critical self-assessment and strategic realignment necessary to meet the needs of future conflicts. I would recommend it to anyone interested in military history, strategic thinking, political history, organizational management, or leadership.

[James Casatelli · Rating 3 out of 5]

I had a hard time deciding what rating to give this book. For much of the book, I felt the author had more of an ax to grind than any pertinent advice to give, though I felt the epilogue sort of redeemed that. I think my biggest problem though was that he was insistent that the army was almost always wrong in its execution of strategy after WWII. That might be a fair statement, but only really with the benefit of hindsight. He fails to take into account any external considerations or the political climate of the times. It's only mentioned once in the section on Korea that the Army as a whole was more concerned with Russia than it was with Korea. It's a pretty big concern and deserves more credit than it was given. Counterinsurgency might be the best thing for the Army to know now, but that doesn't mean it will be in the future. And not all insurgencies are the same. Korea is not Vietnam, which is not the Middle East. That's why training is just as important as education, an assertion that the author seems to disagree with. All of the most successful people will tell you they couldn't have gotten anywhere without mastering the basics of their crafts.

One particular point of contention I had was on the section about the first Gulf War. It's great that we can look back and point to specific things that may or may not have contributed to the problems in the future war in Iraq (the author leads you to believe that that is the case, but never backs it up with any facts, only with assertions), but I am pretty sure the objective of the first Gulf War was to expel the Iraqis from Kuwait, and I'm pretty sure we succeeded in that. Not sure how that counts as a mistake, as the author would like you to believe it was. Missed opportunities maybe, but again, only with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight.

Also, the author went back and forth with generals distancing themselves from politics and embracing politics. Sometimes in the same paragraph! Well which is it, embrace or distance??

To be certain, there are definitely some great points made by the author, but all in all, I think this books attempt to focus on a narrow topic fails it as a whole. More time should have been spent on why the decisions that were made were made. That being said, I would recommend this book, because it will get you thinking about things you thought you knew about Americas past and present conflicts.

My favorite part of this book was that there was nothing but glowing reviews of the Marines every time they were mentioned. That always makes me proud to be a Marine.

[Jean · Rating 5 out of 5]

I found this book most interesting particularly the difference between Marine Corp leadership and the Army during the Korean War. Thomas Ricks compares the Army of WWII to the military of today, particularly looking at how General Marshall dealt with command officers compared to today.

General George C. Marshall was Chief of Staff during WWII and was ruthless in relieving subordinates who didn’t measure up to his standards. Between September 1939 and Dec 8, 1941 he cashiered at least 600 officers. Sixteen Army division commanders were relieved for cause out of a total of 155 officers who commanded divisions in combat during WWII. At least five Corps commanders were also relieved for cause. Marshall replaced them with officers like Eisenhower, Patton, and Bradley and so on. The author says that today the military is not policing its self. The only time an officer is removed is when the politicians intervene. For example the Walter Reed Army Medical Center Scandal or the Veterans Affairs Scandal is some current scandals that politicians have intervened in.

I found the comments by Ricks about the current Army’s upper command full of tactical planners and none trained as strategical planners. The author observation that the General staff is good at winning battles but unable to win the war is directly related to the lack of training in strategic thinking. I found a comment by Ricks about the military could easily apply to the business world, “training tends to prepare for the known problems, education prepares leaders to prepare for the unknown, the unpredictable, and the unexpected.”

Ricks sets out in the book to show how the Army has changed so dramatically in seventy years. Ricks ends the book with some suggestions for reform. The book is well written, deeply researched and pulls no punches. I read this as an audiobook downloaded from Audible. The book is narrated by William Hughes and lasts about 16 hours.

[Tripp · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is outstanding military cultural and historical analysis. Ricks argues that since World War 2, the standard of American military leadership has eroded thanks to an increased focus on institutional survival versus the core mission of supporting American national policy. He recasts the post-Vietnam rebuilding of the Army as a half-success at best. Yes, the Army got much better at winning tactical battles and dominating the operational space, but it perhaps became even worse at achieving strategic ends.

My only complaint is that Ricks narrows the policy prescription a bit too much. His focus is on the idea of relief. In WW2, generals were relieved with a frequency that is unthinkable today. He contrasts this to Vietnam and Iraq where incompetents were left in charge for far too long. This seems like a key tool that has been lost, but the larger problem is the flight from the challenge of true strategy.

Don't let that minor complaint stop you. This is engaging, informative writing that tells a compelling story.

[Andy · Rating 2 out of 5]

The stories chronicled in this book are well-written and can be useful as raw material for trying to come up with theories, but I was disappointed by the weakness of the author's case. How do we know that firing generals made a difference in WWII? There should be a rigorous way to measure this. In the absence of that kind of evidence, we're left with anecdotes. They are convincing because it is a self-evident tautology that replacing incompetent people with competent ones improves performance. The question is: Did the reliefs in WWII do this, and if so, what has changed over time to make this amazingly effective practice disappear?

Unfortunately, the author's explanation doesn't make much sense: he says it's because the wars since then were small and unpopular wars. He never connects the dots to demonstrate how size or public approval of the war affects the senior command's behavior in firing generals. And his examples don't quite work. Even the Gulf War, which is recent enough to be in the author's memory, is treated with odd counterfactual theories. That war was very small (relative to WWII) and was unpopular enough that a draft was completely off the table. Ricks considers it a failure of generalship because the war stopped with the successful expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, even though that was the stated political reason for the war. ??? I think the author is forcing facts to fit theories instead of the other way around, hence that war had to be a failure just because it didn't involve firing generals.

Personally, I think the change over time in the removal of incompetents is part of a much broader social/cultural shift. Thus an analysis limited to politics inside the Army will miss the picture.

The main lesson from this book is that George Marshall was a strategic genius, and that's without any mention of the Marshall Plan. Makes me wonder if there's a good book about Marshall.

[Jacob · Rating 2 out of 5]

This is a very hard book to rate. Let's start off with where it shines. As a brief history of the US military from WWII to the Afghan War, to include very limited biographies of key generals, this is a great piece. I'm confident that even students of military history will learn something.

It's holes are numerous though. When I say brief, this is a very limited history that gets into the weeds on some irrelevant points while skimming right over key events/people. I mean, 6 pages on Patton? I'm not a Patton fan, but little was said about the man or how he fit into the thesis...ah the thesis.

At least this journalist had a thesis (many don't when they write books), but Mr. Ricks failed to stay focused and his narrative completely fell apart. Originally, his idea started out as the US Army functioned at its best under General Marshall who relieved generals that didn't perform. Interesting thesis, but as Mr. Ricks moves into the Korean War, he brushes off any reliefs as saying they aren't as clear cut as WW2, although he does acknowledge that this was a smaller politically based war, versus a larger world war, which created some constraints. However, Mr. Ricks fails to acknowledge that while 1100 generals cycled through WW2, only a fraction of that number were available in Korea to serve as replacements, as well as failing to acknowledge there is more than one way to fire someone-doing it differently than Marshall isn't a bad thing, leaving incompetent generals in command is.

As he wends his way into Vietnam, Mr. Ricks gives an example of General DePuy still using the old relief method, but implies that it wasn't valid as DePuy was doing it too quickly versus developing his subordinates. I can go with this idea as there is certainly a balancing act between development and relief for incompetence. Yet, in the narrative of Vietnam is where Mr. Ricks completely loses direction.

He starts to harp on generals not being as politically minded as they should be. Mr. Ricks thinks senior officers should be thinking ahead to political solutions and not focused on tactical and operational competence. I have two big problems with this:

1. Civilian leadership should dictate political policy and the military implement it - not crossing that line is paramount to the survival of our democracy. In his own exploration of Eisenhower and MacArthur, Mr. Ricks should understand this. Eisenhower was a political general in the sense that he managed a coalition, but he did not dictate the occupation zones of Germany in WW2 and where to stop troops during the occupation. MacArthur however, did try to ignore political direction in Korea and move to the Chinese border as he believed China was the real enemy and was summarily relived for making political decisions (as he should have been).

2. Very few generals make 3 or 4 star level, where political astuteness is more important. Lamenting that most senior officers (LTCs, Colonels, and Brigadier and Major Generals) are focused on tactical/operational competence and not wider questions about why are we conducting wars is laughable. Yes, senior commanders should have an understanding of the local political situation and counter-insurgency tactics, but I don't want to follow a battalion commander who knows Clausewitz better than tactics that will win the war. You don't train thousands of people for 20 jobs at the highest level, you train thousands of people for their current job and start to keep an eye out for those 20 exceptional officers that can advance to those top spots.

As the Army emerges from the Gulf War, Mr. Ricks cites the overwhelming victory as a clear lead up to the missteps and failings that followed in Iraq and Afghanistan. He says that the Army was doing misguided things like placing "a new emphasis on 'digitization' and other Information Age technologies." Mr. Ricks has firmly lost his original thread by this point, about the power of relieving poor performers, and is now suggesting that the Army spend less time on tactical/operational competence, to include modern technological breakthroughs, and more on producing politically minded 4 star generals.

As he moves into the Iraq War, Mr. Ricks says "Franks and his staff devoted almost all of their energies to the mission of removing a weak regime and almost none to the more difficult task of replacing it. This omission on his part became disastrous, because no one above him in the Bush Administration was focusing on the problem, either." What!?!? You can critique General Franks' conduct of the war, but laying the post invasion issues at his feet and saying that the military should plan for nation rebuilding is ludicrous. Mr. Ricks also cites a report that "particularly faulted the limitations on troop numbers imposed by Rumsfeld and enforced by Franks..." Again, what!?!? So Mr. Ricks would like generals to tell their civilian bosses that I don't have enough troops so I just called up my Air Force buddies and I've got 100,000 more arriving this week? This is an unrealistic critique and shows a glaring misunderstanding of the military's subordinate role to its civilian leaders.

As the book winds down, I believe that Mr. Ricks makes a correct observation about improving the Army through adaptability (really the way to improve any organization), but completely misses the mark on how to do it. It provides insight into Mr. Ricks' thought process that he sees the problem with rotating units out of wars as impeding the firing of officers, since they will be out of country soon anyway. He misses the point that what rotation truly impedes is deeper understanding of the war being fought and subsequent adaptability, as well as rotations provide a clear indication that politically there is no clear mission/end to the war. Mr. Ricks tries to invoke General Marshall in the epilogue saying that his method of firing would revitalize the adaptability of the Army to its myriad of missions it might be called upon to accomplish. Needless to say, this does not connect the dots very well.

At any rate, Mr. Ricks never proves his thesis, gets way off track while making some startlingly anti-democratic statements, and fails to truly analyze the issues in the 21st century US Army. I'm glad I read this book as it actually helped me form some of my own thoughts about the problems the Army faces, but ultimately this is a book that falls incredibly flat. Read it if you are a student of US military history--you will get something out of it. Otherwise leave this fractured, unfocused, poorly thought out work on the shelf.

[Dana King · Rating 4 out of 5]

Good, if uneven. The acknowledgements cite how many people had how much input at various points and drafts, which explains why the book sometimes feels as though it were written by a committee. The analysis of World War II and Korean War generals was excellent and informative, digging well beneath most histories. (Talk about the Forgotten War: Ricks’s description of how the generals handled the Battle of Chosin Reservoir has me looking for a good history of the “police action.”) Lots of good information from Vietnam, including horrifying details not commonly known about My Lai and the cover-up. The book seems to lose focus after that, using examples from both (so far) Iraq wars and Afghanistan to show how the Army has drifted from George Marshall’s and Dwight Eisenhower’s policy of “quick relief” when commanders don’t measure up, though he also seems to take it to some rigid extremes, as when he chides Norman Schwartzkopf for not removing a commander who didn’t move as quickly as Schwartzkopf wanted; the whole ground war lasted only four days. Quick relief is one thing, but damn. (Not that Ricks doesn’t point out several more valid examples of where Schwartzkopf should have done better.) Somewhat inelegant writing aside, this is a thought-provoking and well-documented examination of the caliber of American military leadership, its focus on tactics over strategy, and why we don’t seem to be able to end wars well anymore.

[John · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very engaging thesis: Our present system of training U.S. Army Generals is overly focused on the tactical side of combat and not enough on the strategic overall mission, primarily due to the army's officer core forgetting it central mission. Rick supports this thesis by examining the past seventy years of American generals, starting with his paradigm, General George C. Marshall and ending with General David Petraeus. He does not spend much time with any specific general or war, rather focusing on his overall themes. He does take time to discuss the Battles of Chosin Reservoir in Korea, even including a map. I wish he had done more of that.

The book did introduce me to several generals I had never heard of: William Simpson, O. P. Smith, William DePuy, and sparked my interest to learn more. For that reason I do wish he had included an analytical bibliography. At times he mentions that a specific history or memoir was the best in its field, but these are scattered throughout the book and hard to track down afterwards.

Overall a good, if critical, overview of our military leadership.

[Michael Burnam-Fink · Rating 3 out of 5]

"As matters stand now, a private who loses a rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who loses a war."

This quote, from Ricks' friend and colleague Lt. Col. Yingling, is at the heart of The Generals, which examines how army culture and personnel policies turned the winners of WW2 into the losers of Vietnam, and the tactically adept but strategically blind generals of the War on Terror. Ricks takes as his guidestone the policies and attitudes of General George Marshall, Chief of Staff during WW2. Marshall wanted optimistic, determined, energetic, resourceful team players, and he was ruthless in clearing out the failures to get them. Marshall and his top commanders, Eisenhower and Bradley in particular, sacked generals by the score. Relief was an ordinary part of being a general. By Vietnam, the situation had become completely reversed; Generals were almost never relieved for combat ineffectiveness, and the top brass were regarded as mendacious micro-managers. Post-Vietnam, the Army managed to rebuild its tactical leadership and integrity, but the generals promoted under the polices of General William DuPuy would lack strategic insight or the ability to work closely with their political counterparts.

The book itself consists of many biographical vignettes. Ricks knows how to write and has done his research: while I wasn't particularly surprised by the sections on WW2, Korea, and Vietnam, the post-Vietnam rebuilding was all new information for me. The sections on the War on Terror will be familiar to anybody who's read Ricks' Pulitzer-winning Fiasco.

However, this book is stuck at Lieutenant General (three stars-get it?), because of a little bad luck and some weak theory. The bad luck is General Petraeus, of whom Ricks is a major defender, who was brought down by scandal just after The Generals went to print. I can't find the article right now, but in the wake of the scandal I remember reading an insightful critique of Petraeus that argued that his true genius was managing the White House and the American public, and while an adept combat leader, his forte was more for PR than battle. It's bad luck that Ricks didn't have the time to consider this position, but the difference between combat effectiveness and the perception of combat effectiveness is at the heart of the problem of generalship that Ricks investigates. Major wars are infrequent generational affairs, how can good men be distinguished in peacetime?

The weak theory is a lack of something else to compare current Army policy to. Ricks makes a convincing case that because it is impossible to fire generals, it is impossible to improve their quality overall. However, the Navy relieves officers all the damn time. Are admirals better than generals? Hard to say, since the last fleet action was in WW2. Ultimately, the Army is a special organization: unlike business or the government, there's no way to bring in an experienced outsider to provide leadership. We should demand more from senior military leaders: more strategic insight, more integrity, more honest dialog with the White House and Congress. Unfortunately, in the absence of a 'super-general' like Marshall, and several decades of critical personnel policy, it seems unlikely that the corps of generals will be improved.

[Jarrod · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book covers the leadership of the US military from World War II through 2010(ish). It's harsh when it needs to be and not when it doesn't, but he doesn't mince words or hold back. Though the successes are expounded upon and the criticisms are accurate, this piece is much more of a piece defending a hypothesis. What seems to be missing is a conclusion to how to solve the problem moving forward. While this is touched on in the epilogue, there are no real studies or examples to back up what he proposes to do would actually work. What's needed is culture change. For someone with no military experience, he sure has a great opinion on how the system should change.

Times are different now. In the day's of WW II, the military was supported, but information moved slower and the enemy was pure and known. Now, it's not so much. Who was the enemy in NK? Vietnam? Iraq? They weren't so much the citizens, but the ideas and who was fighting those. Insurgency and rogue factions are much more difficult to fight. Especially with an apathetic army or worse populous - Iraq/Afganistan/Syria... It's easy to armchair QB Vietnam. Any modern historian or journalist (in this case) can do that. How do you do that to the first gulf war? Should we have wiped out Saddam's military that many didn't want to be there? They were surrendering enmasse because they didn't support the leader or the effort. Should we have driven to Baghdad and removed the Baath regime in 1991? We would have moved 2003 to 1992 with the same results. How could US Military leadership have acted differently given the ROE they were handed? What does the future hold and how should we change to be successful there?

He gets a little winded, but does good research. The second hand sources out-weigh the first hand accounts heavily. I agree with another reviewer here and to paraphrase - It's almost written like a position defense paper. The real fault of this book is its lack of vision. How do we change the military leadership to drive results for the future? Should we replace leaders that are not getting results? What do we do with those people? How do we do that in today's environment and still keep public support and not make the military political? Where is the vision that the military needs to move forward? It's not the 1940's any longer and the Marshall vision won't work. It's easy to say this guy failed or that guy failed. What should they have done differently to promote success? How could the culture of the military change to get better results? What would have been a better result in 1991 Gulf War? Should we have pulled out after 2003? How do you blame both Bushes for the fault of the Iraq wars conclusions, but not blame Clinton for keeping the culture of the Army and the downsizing in training programs and military technology initiative?

I did enjoy the book because it gives good history and is presented with facts. It's the interpretation of those facts and the conclusions where I have a problem. Add in the fact that he doesn't present an alternative for success and the book becomes lacking.

[Marks54 · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a study of American generals since WWII by the national defense/security correspondent for the Washington Post. Ricks wrote two superb book on the Iraq War (Fiasco; The Gamble). I had expected that the book would be a series of profiles of some of the key individuals to have enjoyed senior command rank in the Army. It is much more than that. Ricks has written a thoughtful management study focused on the issues of how generals are held accountable for their performance - the extent to which they are relieved of command by their superiors. The standard here is the system established by General George Marshall immediately prior to the start of WWII, by which poor performing generals were frequently relieved of command and either reassigned to other duties or retired. Ricks links such a policy to the success of US forces in WWII and the stabilization of the US position in Korea under Ridgeway. In subsequent wars, especially Vietnam, generals were not frequently relieved, with the result that accountability within the Army suffered, as did relations between the Armed Forces and civilian control. He follows the analysis through to the Iraq Wars and the Afghan War up through the departure of General David Petraeus to the CIA.

Overall, this is an excellent look at the relationship between personnel policies, leadership development, organizational culture, and the strategic performance of an organization. Ricks also considers the role of more general personnel policies regarding length of tours, reassignment, unit rotations, and the like. He is especially strong at separating the issues of organization and culture from the issues of personality that can often dominate popular discussions of military leaders and their occasional failings. Ricks also emphasizes that removals need not be totally negative and should be tied to "second chances" where possible.

The author tries to do too much in spots and cover too much ground. The failures of strategy and doctrine in Vietnam, for example, go far beyond policies regarding the relief of senior officers and have been covered elsewhere. Similarly, the author's treatment of the rebuilding of the Army after Vietnam is very enlightening but goes well beyond issues of generalship. It would also have been helpful to consider why the Marshall systems is not as feasible in a context of minor and more limited wars, which is the context most likely to be seen going forward. These are minor issues, considering the great strengths of the book, which is well written and well referenced.

I would highly recommend this book to anyone following current military and national security issues. Ricks is one of the very best writers on such topics (he also has a good blog). This book presents a striking example of his skills.

[Eric · Rating 5 out of 5]

Tom Ricks is a scrupulously honest, brutally candid assessor of the American military and its civilian bosses in war and between wars. He has been for decades, and at the highest professional levels. Fiasco, his courageously entitled coverage of the Iraq War leadership, has made him a hero to those who see the absolute requirement to recalibrate the system of America's war following a decade of that aimless adventure.

In The Generals, Ricks has cast a wider, deeper net that allows readers to follow the ebb and flow of high-level U.S. Army leaders through several system resets from World War II to our most recent examples. It's as if he had asked himself, after writing Fiasco: What tradition carried this bunch to the head of the class?

Beginning with George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower--the exemplars of U.S. Army top-level commanders in living memory--Ricks bends to the task in proven Ricksian style: straight from the shoulder, with deeply drawn examples, in blunt form and no-nonsense prose. In case after case--from the celebrated to the concealed--Ricks fires away with bouquets for the righteous and body blows for the malfeasant. His chapter on the My Lai cover-up and investigation, for example, will be a classic in telling it like it is--as, indeed, is the entire text.

Above all, The Generals understands the stakes in pointing out perpetual human flaws; it more than balances negative examples by showcasing one heroic truth-teller after another. At heart, it is a serious and deep study of all the things the army and its generations of rising stars have learned over seventy years, as well as what they forgot, what they relearned, what they forgot again, and what they must and will relearn.

This book is high art. It sizzles.

[Gordon · Rating 4 out of 5]

I would recommend this book for any military officer. I admit I started reading The Generals as a strong skeptic focusing on the inconsistencies, the provocative statements, the exaggerations and generalizations. In the end I have to agree with much of Tom Ricks' basic ideas. I support his idea that the ability to achieve results and the importance of accountability of generals in wartime command billets are paramount. How those results are assessed against an understanding of the operational / strategic environment is difficult, especially early on in a conflict (when no one may yet understand the nature - well stated by historian Michael Howard). How accountability is pragmatically achieved without the negative side-effects of side-lining promising officers or pre-empting success when results are slow in materializing is also important. Additionally, any policy of relief which squashes initiative, creativity, prudent risk-taking would also be deleterious. The key points of Tom Ricks I wholeheartedly endorse are focusing senior leader development on how to think (as well as many other "how-to"s I already advocate - how to communicate, how to influence, how to interact & empathize, how to lead...) as well as on educating officers broadly, on developing & nurturing strategic leaders / thinkers. Finally, I really like his idea of doing a wholesale review of strategic leadership in the past decade of war to determine what we need to change in leader development. We actually have done much already to review our Army Profession and think critically about Leader Development, but there is still more to do to ensure we are preparing ourselves for tomorrow's crises.

[J.J. Zerr · Rating 3 out of 5]

I would give this a four except for the basic premise: We won World War II because Gen. Marshall fired generals who didn't measure up and that we've failed in subsequent wars because we don't fire generals any more (except of course for political reasons rather than battlefield inadequacies). In World War II, we had very specific goals, pretty much the way Grant stated them. If a general fails to get the enemy to surrender, he gets fired. Generals, admirals, businessmen, and mother superior in the convent understand that simplicity.

In Vietnam, where as best I can tell, the only simple, clearly stated goal was to avoid doing anything that brought the Chinese in to the war. Judged on that basis, which was the basis to fire MacArthur in the previous fracas, (megatons of hubris hadn't gotten him fired) the war was a great success. Thus certainly no reason to fire General Westmoreland.
All that being said, the treatment of the Vietnam War was better than I expected, after reading his premise in the early part of the book.
There is good history in the book. I read the whole thing despite not liking the premise. I'm glad I did. It made me think. Recommendation: buy the book.

Other books I think are worth reading are: Prodigal Soldiers, Matterhorn, and Nightingale's Song. Authors Halberstam, Caputo, O'Brien. Service academies ought to have "Victory in Vietnam, the Official History of the People's Army in Vietnam 1954 to 1975" on their required reading list.

[Andrew Carr · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is broad military history for the purpose of society at its best. Ricks takes a contemporary problem (why did it all go wrong in Iraq for the US?) and explores how the changing nature of senior command shaped the might of the pre-eminent fighting force over the last 70 years.

In particular, Ricks highlights the significance of relief. The idea that generals and commanders who fail on the battlefield (either tactically or more significantly, strategically) may be replaced. Not humiliated out of their profession, but like a basketball team, temporarily sent to the bench such that a more suitable leader may step in. What was the ideal and practice of WW2, Ricks' argues, had through Korea and Vietnam virtually disappeared. In the 1990s and today, substitutions have become rare, made largely by civilians (which introduces its own problems) and command often passed simply the next available man.

Ricks writes engagingly and passionately. As a non-expert on the US military, I can't speak to the accuracy of each and every claim he makes, and I'd be keen to read the work of those who push back against this book in coming months. But it is a compelling and insightful book, both in the nature of leadership, and the challenges of contemporary civil-military relations. It goes a long way to helping to explain why the might of America was embarrassed in the deserts of the Middle East, and why it may be some time before the US military gets back to its winning ways.

[Mike (the Paladin) · Rating 3 out of 5]

I like history, I also have certain eras of history I read more in and about. I've read several books on World War 2, the American Revelation and so on. This book is more along the line of a historical argument used to prove the author's premise.

As far as that premise goes I agree with it. The author is of the opinion that military practice concerning command protocol (concerning general officers) has failed. In other words up through WW2 American Generals were assigned and relieved (read fired) based on performance. Since WW2 Generals (and command structures in general) have been maintained even if....egregiously incompetent.

He goes through history in sort of vignette form looking at various generals and the events that surround them and their actions. During Korea we see incompetent generals still being fired (and also insubordinate generals also). But after this we get into the era of Vietnam...when I was in the army.

And I must agree that there was something to be desired in command. That's from the very top down.

The book as "a book" isn't as readable as it might be, that makes following and staying involved somewhat slow. my interest sort of came and went. Had it been told as a straight history I think I would have been more interesting. Since however it is an argument for a point of view it's not quite as enthralling.

[Kelley · Rating 5 out of 5]

"During World War II, senior American commanders generally were given a few months in which to succeed, be killed or wounded, or be replaced. Sixteen Army division commanders were relieved for cause, out of a total of 155 officers who commanded Army divisions in combat during the war. At least five corps commanders also were removed for cause." Contrast that with the modern military where the only sure path to relief of a general involves criminal charges or moral laxness - not simple failure to perform. “You want generals who are adaptive to changing situations,” Ricks said. “We don’t have that. The way we get there is through accountability. Reward success, punish failure and promote people who do well. And right now that doesn’t happen.”

Ricks is deeply analytical and unafraid to criticize the military. His books offer keen analysis and a sobering look at at a profession that has changed greatly in a short period of time. A must-read for every Army Officer, and for anyone who cares about the Army profession.

[Lee Broad · Rating 4 out of 5]

An objective assessment of the history and current state of the US Army's general staff. Heartening and unnerving at the same time. The challenges of building an effective organization capable of achieving its mission by making critical, timely personnel decisions are as daunting for the military as for business, if not more so because so many lives depend on getting it right. Well researched and document, but a little repetitious in parts.

[Wilson · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of my all-time favorite books. Ricks does an outstanding job pulling apart the many complex relationships within the military and skillfully connects their failures partly to a lack of civilian/military communication, and the other half intestinal fortitude to discipline subordinates.

I myself am still seeing much of the risk-averse culture he condemns.

Recommend for anyone wishing to better understand the military/civilian divide!

[Joe · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was an excellent book. If you have ever wondered why the U.S. military has not been well-led since World War II, pick up this book. While I might not agree with all of the author's critiques, this is still a great look into why certain generals have made the decisions they have. It was written in 2012 so the discussion only covers the leadership up until about 2010 but it definitely explains why things in Iraq and Afghanistan occurred as they did until that point in time.

[Chad Handley · Rating 4 out of 5]

Overall, a very good survey of generalship over the last 70 years. I do believe his solutions are more altruistic than pragmatic with the bureaucracy that exists in the 21st century.

[George Casey · Rating 5 out of 5]

It really was not an easy time then still a sergent in the military then got a lot to tell from my own eye seeing than this book lol

[Fabio B Castro · Rating 5 out of 5]

Book Review - lembretes sobre livro

Nome: The Generals
Autor: Thomas E. Ricks
Autor também de Fiasco e de The Gamble


1. Cap 1: Gen Marshall e a formação do espírito vencedor de militares líderes forjados no comprometimento institucional, sem reservas ou corporativismo.
2. Nov de 1920, quando era ajudante de ordens de Pershing, Marshall descreveu uma lista com as características do líder:
a. Bom senso
b. Ter estudado sua profissão
c. Fisicamente capaz
d. Agradável e otimista
e. Possuir energia
f. Extremamente leal
g. Determinado.
3. Guerra da Korea
a. A abordagem estratégica desse conflito merece ser estudada com muita ênfase.
b. A Batalha de CHOSIN foi uma luta entre os americanos, capazes de realizar o combate na terceira dimensão, e tropas chinesas que possuíam um apoio de fogo minúsculo e armamento individual bastante deficitário. Perdas incontáveis norte-americanas, na ordem de 4550 homens/ I Marine Div. A vitória em Chosin foi um triunfo estratégico.
c. A atuação específica dos Marines é escolar e emblemática. O combate faz parte das páginas históricas dos Marines. Inúmeros vídeos estão disponibilizados no “youtube”, o que complementa a preciosa abordagem exposta pela narrativa do livro.
d. Os chineses tinham um médico para o efetivo de 33.000 soldados.
e. Quartel Gen de Mac Arthur era em Tóquio.
f. Gen Almond x Gen Smith.
g. Problemas disciplinares começaram a ser frequentes.
h. Subordinação cega à política é extremamente corrosiva à liderança.
i. Pag 151: “ a essência de ser general acontece quando ocorre o irrompimento da batalha”.
j. Durante toda a campanha os líderes não possuíam liberdade de ação para estabelecer engajamentos necessários.
k. US possuíam 12 Div, sendo 7 Div a comando de Mac Arthur na Korea. A China possuía 5 milhões de homens, distribuídos em 253 Div.
4. Guerra do Vietnam
a. Abordagem estratégica equivocada, segundo vários generais.
b. O inimigo determinava, sempre, o local, a intensidade e o momento dos combates. Quase 90% dos engajamentos foram iniciados pelo inimigo.
c. Gen Maxwel Taylor é considerado o arquiteto da derrota no Vietnam.
d. Os US treinaram e lutaram uma guerra de atrito, com base em uma abordagem estratégica convencional, procurando estabelecer cenários convencionais, contra um inimigo não convencional, furtivo que operava em um insurgência.
e. Westmoreland - Westy : não cursou Estado Maior nem Carlisle. Fez curso em Harvard.
f. Não admitiu a contratação de Vincent Lombardi em West Point.
g. De Puy - substitui frequentemente os incapazes de liderar em combate. Adotou a ação tática de “search and destroy” - tanto utilizada nos anos de guerra.
h. Admitiu que os Viet controlavam o “tempo” do combate enquanto que os US somente reagiam à iniciativa do inimigo. Nunca destruíram um ninho de Mtr, sem ajuda da aviação ou da artilharia.
i. Identificou falhas na liderança, mesmo nas pequenas frações, cujos líderes mascaram resultados de suas atuações, informando dados inverídicos.
j. “Carimbar a missão”
k. Rotatividade no front foi um fator muito negativo.
l. 1968 - experientes Cmt perdiam menos ⅓ de soldados por baixas que Cmt inexperientes.
m. ⅔ das baixas acontecia na primeira metade da missão, enquanto menos soldados morriam na segunda parte de suas missões.
n. Em 1968 - 18.991 soldados morreram nos seis primeiros meses de missão. 6759 morreram na segunda metade da missão.
o. O Massacre de My Lai muda o curso e o espírito da guerra. 500 pessoas assassinadas pelos norte-americanos. O Cmdo escondeu o que aconteceu. Os procedimentos foram maculados. Somente após uma carta e um testemunho as investigações foram abertas e o caso foi esclarecido. O Gen Koster, que estava como Cmt de West Point, perdeu o Cmdo da academia por ter sido negligente na apuração dos fatos.
p. Uma crescente perda de valores impactaram diretamente o resultado da guerra.
5. Reconstrução do Exército
a. TRADOC
b. Leavenwoth
c. SAMS (teórico para muitos)
d. Espinha dorsal - Abrams, Bradley, Patriot, Black Hawk e Apache.
e. “Carreirismo”
f. Apelo pela disciplina.
g. Em alguns momentos o excesso de sincronização fez com que as tropas atacantes tivessem a impulsão diminuída.
h. Constante dilema sobre a formação de Of de EM - mais reflexivos, de acordo com Cushman, ou mais táticos, conforme De Puy desejava.
i. Cushman (Leavenworth) x De Puy (TRADOC / Chief of Staff)
6. IRAQ
a. Em 1991 o US Army possuia 710 mil soldados, 80 mil a menos que possuiu ao tempo do Vietnam.
b. Collin Powell and Norman Schwartzkopf - cada um teve duas passagens no Vietnam.
c. A família militar e o apoio que ela recebe contou muito para o estudo de fechamento de quartéis realizado por Norman.
d. Coolin executou uma tarefa fundamental - cobriu as feridas entre US Army e o governo abertas pela guerra do Vietnam.
e. Collin admirava IKE. Era um resolvedor de problemas, como Ike.
f. Collin era parte do EM da Bda durante a tentativa de encobrir o massacre My Lai.
g. Embora, em 1988, por rodízio o Cmdo no Centcom não fosse a vez do Ex, Collin interveio para evitar que a Marinha colocasse um Almirante e, nesse caso, o nomeado fosse Norman, pela necessidade do serviço.
h. Diferente do que ocorreu na Korea e Vietnam, no caso da guerra do golfo o componente político estava alinhado com o militar.
7. Interessante notar os casos onde houve processos relacionados à disciplina na guerra do Vietnam, mais relacionadas ao consumo de ilícitos (drogas) e a atos de insubordinação.
a. 1965: 2.03/1000 “martial corts”. Nesse ano houve 47 apreensões de drogas.
b. 1970: considerando uma divisão de 15.000 homens houve 5.567 processos que levaram a “martial courts”. Nesse ano houve 11.000 apreensões de drogas.
8. 30 de abril de 1975 - Ocorre a queda de Saigon - Fall of Saigon.
9. Guerra do Golfo - 16 anos após a queda de Saigon. Powel x Cheney. Cheney evitava que o Powel interferisse ou se manifestasse sobre questões eminentemente políticas.
10. Interessante notar que a ofensiva Khafji, organizada pelo Iraqui, foi surpreendentemente derrotada pelo emprego do poder aéreo. Um Cmt Bda iraquiano chegou a mencionar que em 30 min de combate sofreu mais danos do que 10 anos de guerra contra o Irã.
11. Norman não teve sucesso ao comandar Frank Fredericks. Norma o chamava de jittery - medroso. Sofria com a lentidão de suas decisões. Na II GM um comandante que não seguisse a intenção do Cmdo Sp seria substituído, como forma MG John Lucas em Anzio e MG Prickett após Bulge.
12. Enfocando o ponto de vista estratégico, confunde-se a vitória no Iraque em 1991, com a estratégia de atrito imposta à Hanoi, a qual presumia que os vietnamitas ficariam de joelhos. Da mesma forma, a derrota das forças iraquianas levava a presumir que Sadam ficaria de joelhos perante o desgaste sofrido, fato que não se comprovou. A vitória em 1991 foi tática e careceu de profundidade estratégica.
13. Após 2003, escritos de Sadam foram descobertos e neles o próprio Sadam indagava o motivo pelo qual ele foi mantido no poder após a derrota de 1991. De acordo com a cultura árabe, isto não era considerada uma derrota e, sim, uma vitória.
14. Mesmo com o estabelecimento da No Fly Zone, os iraquianos podiam voar helicópteros de combate, o que impôs grandes perdas aos oponentes do regime de Sadam, em especial no Norte.
15. A guerra de 1991 nunca terminou. Outros embates, especial no ar, foram sendo estabelecidos. O maior deles, que atingiu 97 cidades, ocorreu em 1998, com o lançamento de 415 mísseis e 600 bombas, tendo como alvos estabelecimentos militares e centros de produção de militar.
16. Em 1991, os EUA realizaram 110.000 sortidas aéreas. Após 1991, durante a próxima década, os EUA realizaram 34.000 sortidas por ano, equivalendo a ⅓ do esforço de guerra em cada ano.
17. Após a guerra do golfo (1991), o curso de operações de Leavenworth concedeu o grau acima da média a 99.5% dos alunos, como efeito superlativo da vitória sobre Sadam.
18. O Exército foi cortado em tamanho no Gov de Clintos - peace dividends, em 1989 tinha 749.000 homens e uma década posterior tinha 462.000 homens.
19. Houve reduções, mas acompanhadas de aumento de eficiência e letalidade, com a introdução de novas organizações, dotadas de novos equipamentos como os carros de combate Strikers.
20. A falta de recursos humanos fez com muitos militares da reserva fossem ocupar posições na elaboração doutrinária. Tal fato acarretou a falta de feed back direto do campo de batalha e alguns documentos doutrinários se caracterizaram por serem eminentemente teóricos.
21. Os problemas de liderança ainda estavam presentes em líderes controladores e que adotavam o “micromanegement” (microgerenciamento).
22. Estudo realizado em West Point no final do Sec XX:
a. O Exército está se tornando uma instituição burocrática e não profissional. Os oficiais em maioria se vêem como integrantes de uma estrutura institucional, trabalhadores de uma entidade central e organizada.
b. A confiança entre integrantes do exército ficou corroída. Ao menos que a cultura da confiança seja restabelecida entre comandantes e subordinados, os soldados não se sentirão à vontade para compartilhar transparência em todos os reportes e relatórios, deixando de alimentar a confiança e a honestidade interpessoal, comprometendo a coesão. Isso tudo induz ao microgerenciamento por parte dos líderes.
c. A contração de militares da reserva para serem responsáveis pela formulação doutrinária não contribuiu de modo acelerado para a criação de novas técnicas e novas doutrinas de emprego, mesmo com a instrução de novos meios de combate. Os oficiais contratados normalmente estavam cristalizados pelas suas experiências, defasados tecnicamente e, não raro, alinhados com setores que produziam mais lucros do que eficiência operacional. Essa prática dificultou que novos conceitos operacionais fossem aplicados imediatamente, à medida que surgiam novas ideias e materiais inovadores. Isso impactou a eficiência operacional e criou dificuldades para a consecução de várias operações que exigiam uma abordagem doutrinária flexível e dinâmica.
d. Aparece o pensamento estratégico de Collin Gray.
i. Soldados profissionais elevaram a capacitação e a eficiência de toda a Força, exigindo mais dos escalões de comando e da própria liderança.
e. Powell não desfrutava de grande suporte por parte de Bush - em 2003. Era o secretário, no entanto não podia fazer política. O discurso dele não estava alinhado com o PR (Bush) nem com Cheney. Tal qual Mac Arthur na Korea, Powell era um General com restrições perante seu PR. A desavença daquele (Mac Arthur) estava relacionada com a falta de lealdade, diferente do que se passava com Powell, considerado obediente e um bom soldado. Sabe-se, agora, que suas preleções sobre armas químicas iraquianas, baseadas em informações de inteligência, são duvidáveis, senão inverídicas.
f. O livro narra que após Pearl Harbour alguns altos oficiais das FFAA foram mandados embora da força. Após o 9/11 tal expurgo não ocorreu.
g. Franks negou o desdobramento dos Rangers em Tora Bora para fechar as rotas de escape de Bin Laden. Talvez por orientação de Rumsfeld. Ele disse que as informações sobre o paradeiro de Bin Laden não eram totalmente precisas.
h. Em um evento em Newport - Naval War College, Franks foi questionado sobre o tipo de guerra estava lutando no Afeganistão. Ele titubeou na resposta. Deixou a impressão que ele estava se alinhando com Westmoreland, no Vietnam, ou seja, agarrado no nível tático e realizando o microgerenciamento de atividades.