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Air Raid
On April 8, 1945, several American bomber squadrons were informed that their German targets were temporarily unavailable due to cloud cover. As it was too late to turn back, the assembled ordnance of more than two hundred bombers was diverted to nearby Halberstadt. A mid-sized cathedral town of no particular industrial or strategic importance, Halberstadt was almost totally destroyed, and a then-thirteen-year-old Alexander Kluge watched his town burn to the ground.
Translated by Martin Chalmers, Kluge’s Air Raid is a touchstone event in German literature of the post-war era. Incorporating photographs, diagrams, and drawings, Kluge captures the overwhelming rapidity and totality of the organized destruction of his town from numerous perspectives, bringing to life both the strategy from above and the futility of the response on the ground. Originally published in German in 1977, this exquisite report, fragmentary and unfinished, is one of Kluge’s most personal works and one of the best examples of his literary technique. Now available for the first time in English, Air Raid appears with additional new stories by the author and features an appreciation of the work by W.G. Sebald. “More than a few of Kluge’s many books are essential, brilliant achievements. None are without great interest.”—Susan Sontag
Translated by Martin Chalmers, Kluge’s Air Raid is a touchstone event in German literature of the post-war era. Incorporating photographs, diagrams, and drawings, Kluge captures the overwhelming rapidity and totality of the organized destruction of his town from numerous perspectives, bringing to life both the strategy from above and the futility of the response on the ground. Originally published in German in 1977, this exquisite report, fragmentary and unfinished, is one of Kluge’s most personal works and one of the best examples of his literary technique. Now available for the first time in English, Air Raid appears with additional new stories by the author and features an appreciation of the work by W.G. Sebald. “More than a few of Kluge’s many books are essential, brilliant achievements. None are without great interest.”—Susan Sontag
138 pages, Hardcover
First published November 15, 2012
3 people are currently reading
259 people want to read
About the author
Alexander Kluge
139 books64 followersKluge was born in Halberstadt at the year 1932.
He studied history, law and music at the University of Marburg Germany, and the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University of Frankfurt, where befriended the philosopher Theodor W. Adorno, who was teaching at the Institute for Social Research, or Frankfurt School.
In 1960 he shooted his first films, before the launch of the New German Cinema.
He also is a remarkable fiction writer, which tend toward the short story form, significant for their formal experimentation and insistently critical thematics.
He studied history, law and music at the University of Marburg Germany, and the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University of Frankfurt, where befriended the philosopher Theodor W. Adorno, who was teaching at the Institute for Social Research, or Frankfurt School.
In 1960 he shooted his first films, before the launch of the New German Cinema.
He also is a remarkable fiction writer, which tend toward the short story form, significant for their formal experimentation and insistently critical thematics.
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May 20, 2024
W.G. Sebald’ın , II. Dünya Savaşı'nın Alman halkı üzerindeki tahribatını özellikle müttefiklerin bir kısmı amaçsız ve keyfi olan Alman şehirlerini yoğun olarak bombalamasının etkilerini edebi olarak ele aldığı “Hava Savaşı ve Edebiyat” kitabını okuduğum için Kluge’nin daha 13 yaşındayken yaşadığı şehir Halberstadt’ın bombalanması hakkında bizzat yaşadıklarını, hatırladıklarını ve düşündüklerini içeren kitabı içim cızlayarak okudum.
Hitlerin ölmesinden 22 gün, Almanyanın teslim olmasından tam bir ay önce ne askeri, ne stratejik ne de ekonomik bir özelliği olmayan Halberstadt şehrinin üzerine, sırf “pahallı bombalar ziyan olmasın” diye başta İngiliz savaş uçaklarıyla onlara eşlik eden Amerikan bombardıman uçaklarının şehrin tümüne bomba yağdırmasının tanıklıklar, resimler ve başka benzer hikayelerle desteklenen anlatımı.
Müttefiklerin hiç sorgulanmayan savaş suçlarından sadece birisinin gerçek hikayesi. Sebald’ın kitabı okunursa eski tarihte yazılan bu kitap daha anlaşılır olur.
Hitlerin ölmesinden 22 gün, Almanyanın teslim olmasından tam bir ay önce ne askeri, ne stratejik ne de ekonomik bir özelliği olmayan Halberstadt şehrinin üzerine, sırf “pahallı bombalar ziyan olmasın” diye başta İngiliz savaş uçaklarıyla onlara eşlik eden Amerikan bombardıman uçaklarının şehrin tümüne bomba yağdırmasının tanıklıklar, resimler ve başka benzer hikayelerle desteklenen anlatımı.
Müttefiklerin hiç sorgulanmayan savaş suçlarından sadece birisinin gerçek hikayesi. Sebald’ın kitabı okunursa eski tarihte yazılan bu kitap daha anlaşılır olur.
March 22, 2021
Air Raid is a reportage on the carpet bombing of the town of Halberstadt in Germany on April 8, 1945. The town was largely reduced to rubble. The first wave of some 200 American (It could have been British or Canadian. Everyone with the capability was doing it.) bombers flew over the town systematically dropping exploding and incendiary bombs on the town. This first wave of bombers was later followed by another 115 planes. The goal of the action was to inflict maximum destruction.
Alexander Kluge, the author, was present in Halberstadt on that day as a 13-year-old boy. Interestingly, in this book, first published in German in 1977, he does not speak of his own experience. Rather, he reports other people’s stories. Also of note is the fact that there is no attempt to make the stories worse than they were for victims with horrific facts. What comes through is often the sense that people just want to keep on with their routines, to do what they set out to do that day and then to clean things up and get on with their lives. I shall use a few extensive quotes to demonstrate.
Frau Schrader (cinema manager): “This was probably the most powerful shock that the cinema had ever experienced during the time Frau Schrader was in charge, the effect triggered by even the best films is hardly comparable. For Frau Schrader, a seasoned cinema professional, however, there was no perceivable shock, which could call in question the division of the afternoon into four fixed screenings (or six with matinee and late show). But meanwhile the 4th and 5th assault waves, which dropped their bombs on the town from 11.55 am, approached with an unpleasant and 'low' humming sound, Frau Schrader heard the whistle and the roar of the bombs, the explosions, so she hid herself in a corner between box office and cellar entrance. She never went down to the cellar, since she didn't want to be buried under rubble. Once her eyes were more or less functioning again, she saw through the shattered glass of the little box office a string of silver machines flying off the direction of the Deaf School.”
“She circled the plot with the ruin of the cinema and from the courtyard of the neighbouring building managed to reach the cellar emergency exit. She had got hold of soldiers, who helped force a way in with pickaxes. In the cellar corridor lay some six members of the matinee audience, the pipes of the central heating had been ruptured by explosions and poured a jet of hot water onto the dead. Frau Schrader wanted to establish some order here at least, placed the boiled and scattered body parts—whether dismembered as a result of this occurrence or of explosive force—in the wash cauldrons of the laundry room. She wanted to make a report to some responsible authority, but in the course of the evening was unable to find anyone willing to accept a report.”
Frau Zacke and Frau Arnold (observers in a church tower reporting to authorities on attack): “Underneath the women the wooden casing inside the tower had begun to burn, also parts of the cupola. Flames 'crackle' from the tower onto the houses to the side of Martiniplan. Burning are: Café Deesen, Krebsschere Lane, the "Sour Snout ', etc. Frau Zacke does not want to' burn up 'on the stone ledge of the tower gallery. She nudges her colleague, grabs folding chair, binoculars, walkie-talkie and runs into the tower and down the wooden stairs. Frau Arnold clatters down behind her. A powerful draft or storm wind presses the women against the railing. As they go Frau Zacke shouts into the radio: 'Church is burning. On our way. ' The substructure of the stairs slips away under their running feet right through a column of flame and crashes onto the tower foundations. Frau Arnold, lying under burning beams, doesn't move, doesn't respond to the calls of Frau Zacke, whose thigh is broken. She's lying below the fire, close to the little door to the church nave, towards which she crawls, dragging the lower part of her body together with its pains behind her ('trailing'). She pulls herself up by a stone strut, so that arms and head reach the lower part of the closed door. She shouts for help, bangs on the wooden door with one hand. Unconscious for a while, after that she collects herself, bangs.
. . .
She finds a bar, scorched iron, which has cooled down, it must be late at night, and knocks against the door with it. Inhabitants from the houses on Martiniplan had taken shelter in the nave. They survived the collapse of the burning church roof in side chapels, and now open up to Frau Zacke, who has fallen across the threshold, pull her into the nave. Thank you so much, she says.”
An American military report on why Halberstadt was targeted:
“The 8th Air Force, US Army Air Forces, made plans to attack targets in the vicinity of Berlin on 8. 4. 1945. "These targets were, however, within the Russian bomb line and could not be attacked by US forces without prior clearance from Russian authorities. When such clearance was not received, the 8th Air Force put in effect an alternative plan to use 25 groups of B-17s and 7 of B-24s for attacks on other targets in Germany. groups Two of the targets selected for bombing were an airfield at Zerbst and an oil-storage depot at Stassfurt. Both these objects were to be attacked visually. If they were obscured by clouds, the planes were to bomb the marshalling yard at Halberstadt. . . .”
American squadron leader chosen a target:
“As he flies the last two mountain ridges Braddock in the lead plane of the first combat block sees a long tree-lined road crossed by a railway line. Inhabitants of the town are hurrying along this avenue with junk, handcarts towards the mountain forest. It is known from the attack files that caves have been enlarged to serve as shelters there. Braddock orders the six aircraft following him to drop one stick of bombs each on this target, since it is available. This is one of the few 'personal' decisions made within the time frame of the attack as a whole.”
I am getting a bit carried away here. I will have to leave something for those who choose to read the book. There is a good section on bombing strategies that leave no doubt that destroying the civilian population is a strategic goal. Street intersections are bombed first to create as much rubble as possible in the intersections, so as to block escape. Then the houses are bombed so as to remove the roofs, if possible down to the ground floor as most combustible material is there. Then the incendiary bombs are dropped so as to start fire storms - which, of course, will cause maximum deaths, even in basement shelters. There is also an interesting discussion with an American officer as to what the aim of such horrific destruction was.
There is a lot more in this slim volume that gives stories of both victims and attackers. Of course, we always need to keep in mind that in any war, no side maintains a copyright on horror or inhumanity. Alexander Kluge doesn’t comment on the morality of the event. He assigns no right or wrong. The material speaks for itself.
Alexander Kluge, the author, was present in Halberstadt on that day as a 13-year-old boy. Interestingly, in this book, first published in German in 1977, he does not speak of his own experience. Rather, he reports other people’s stories. Also of note is the fact that there is no attempt to make the stories worse than they were for victims with horrific facts. What comes through is often the sense that people just want to keep on with their routines, to do what they set out to do that day and then to clean things up and get on with their lives. I shall use a few extensive quotes to demonstrate.
Frau Schrader (cinema manager): “This was probably the most powerful shock that the cinema had ever experienced during the time Frau Schrader was in charge, the effect triggered by even the best films is hardly comparable. For Frau Schrader, a seasoned cinema professional, however, there was no perceivable shock, which could call in question the division of the afternoon into four fixed screenings (or six with matinee and late show). But meanwhile the 4th and 5th assault waves, which dropped their bombs on the town from 11.55 am, approached with an unpleasant and 'low' humming sound, Frau Schrader heard the whistle and the roar of the bombs, the explosions, so she hid herself in a corner between box office and cellar entrance. She never went down to the cellar, since she didn't want to be buried under rubble. Once her eyes were more or less functioning again, she saw through the shattered glass of the little box office a string of silver machines flying off the direction of the Deaf School.”
“She circled the plot with the ruin of the cinema and from the courtyard of the neighbouring building managed to reach the cellar emergency exit. She had got hold of soldiers, who helped force a way in with pickaxes. In the cellar corridor lay some six members of the matinee audience, the pipes of the central heating had been ruptured by explosions and poured a jet of hot water onto the dead. Frau Schrader wanted to establish some order here at least, placed the boiled and scattered body parts—whether dismembered as a result of this occurrence or of explosive force—in the wash cauldrons of the laundry room. She wanted to make a report to some responsible authority, but in the course of the evening was unable to find anyone willing to accept a report.”
Frau Zacke and Frau Arnold (observers in a church tower reporting to authorities on attack): “Underneath the women the wooden casing inside the tower had begun to burn, also parts of the cupola. Flames 'crackle' from the tower onto the houses to the side of Martiniplan. Burning are: Café Deesen, Krebsschere Lane, the "Sour Snout ', etc. Frau Zacke does not want to' burn up 'on the stone ledge of the tower gallery. She nudges her colleague, grabs folding chair, binoculars, walkie-talkie and runs into the tower and down the wooden stairs. Frau Arnold clatters down behind her. A powerful draft or storm wind presses the women against the railing. As they go Frau Zacke shouts into the radio: 'Church is burning. On our way. ' The substructure of the stairs slips away under their running feet right through a column of flame and crashes onto the tower foundations. Frau Arnold, lying under burning beams, doesn't move, doesn't respond to the calls of Frau Zacke, whose thigh is broken. She's lying below the fire, close to the little door to the church nave, towards which she crawls, dragging the lower part of her body together with its pains behind her ('trailing'). She pulls herself up by a stone strut, so that arms and head reach the lower part of the closed door. She shouts for help, bangs on the wooden door with one hand. Unconscious for a while, after that she collects herself, bangs.
. . .
She finds a bar, scorched iron, which has cooled down, it must be late at night, and knocks against the door with it. Inhabitants from the houses on Martiniplan had taken shelter in the nave. They survived the collapse of the burning church roof in side chapels, and now open up to Frau Zacke, who has fallen across the threshold, pull her into the nave. Thank you so much, she says.”
An American military report on why Halberstadt was targeted:
“The 8th Air Force, US Army Air Forces, made plans to attack targets in the vicinity of Berlin on 8. 4. 1945. "These targets were, however, within the Russian bomb line and could not be attacked by US forces without prior clearance from Russian authorities. When such clearance was not received, the 8th Air Force put in effect an alternative plan to use 25 groups of B-17s and 7 of B-24s for attacks on other targets in Germany. groups Two of the targets selected for bombing were an airfield at Zerbst and an oil-storage depot at Stassfurt. Both these objects were to be attacked visually. If they were obscured by clouds, the planes were to bomb the marshalling yard at Halberstadt. . . .”
American squadron leader chosen a target:
“As he flies the last two mountain ridges Braddock in the lead plane of the first combat block sees a long tree-lined road crossed by a railway line. Inhabitants of the town are hurrying along this avenue with junk, handcarts towards the mountain forest. It is known from the attack files that caves have been enlarged to serve as shelters there. Braddock orders the six aircraft following him to drop one stick of bombs each on this target, since it is available. This is one of the few 'personal' decisions made within the time frame of the attack as a whole.”
I am getting a bit carried away here. I will have to leave something for those who choose to read the book. There is a good section on bombing strategies that leave no doubt that destroying the civilian population is a strategic goal. Street intersections are bombed first to create as much rubble as possible in the intersections, so as to block escape. Then the houses are bombed so as to remove the roofs, if possible down to the ground floor as most combustible material is there. Then the incendiary bombs are dropped so as to start fire storms - which, of course, will cause maximum deaths, even in basement shelters. There is also an interesting discussion with an American officer as to what the aim of such horrific destruction was.
There is a lot more in this slim volume that gives stories of both victims and attackers. Of course, we always need to keep in mind that in any war, no side maintains a copyright on horror or inhumanity. Alexander Kluge doesn’t comment on the morality of the event. He assigns no right or wrong. The material speaks for itself.
October 18, 2022
Having come to a particular point of horror, it no longer matters who was responsible for it: one just wants it to end.
Seemingly a contradiction in terms, this tome is pellucid yet harrowing, philosophical but anti-rational. This powerful book offers glimpses of the 1945 Allied bombing of Halberstadt. The author at age 13 was there at Halberstadt as his hometown was destroyed. Air Raid becomes a mediation on industry and responsibility. It beckons the heavens as to the cost of social organization. Kluge truly haunts me--both as a witness and as the Borges of asymmetrical warfare. I will pursue his work with relish at this point.
Seemingly a contradiction in terms, this tome is pellucid yet harrowing, philosophical but anti-rational. This powerful book offers glimpses of the 1945 Allied bombing of Halberstadt. The author at age 13 was there at Halberstadt as his hometown was destroyed. Air Raid becomes a mediation on industry and responsibility. It beckons the heavens as to the cost of social organization. Kluge truly haunts me--both as a witness and as the Borges of asymmetrical warfare. I will pursue his work with relish at this point.
December 12, 2024
Savaşın tek mantığının mantıksızlığı oluşuna dair okuduğum en unutulmaz metinlerden biri olacak Alexander Kluge'nin Halberstadt Hava Saldırısı: 8 Nisan 1945 kitabı. İnsana dair her şeyi (şiddet, dayanışma, itaat, ahlak, aşk...) barındıran ve bunların topunu sorgulatan pek acayip bir kitap bu.
Olay özetle şöyle; arka kapaktan alıntılıyorum: "8 Nisan 1945’te, Amerikan bombardıman filosuna, bulut örtüsü nedeniyle Alman hedeflerine geçici olarak ulaşılamayacağı bildirildi. Geri dönmek için çok geçti; bu yüzden iki yüzden fazla bombardıman uçağı mühimmatlarıyla beraber yakındaki Halberstadt’a yönlendirildi. Savaş ekonomisi ve stratejik açıdan önemsiz olan orta büyüklükteki Halberstadt, bu hava saldırısıyla neredeyse tamamen yok edildi ve o zamanlar on üç yaşında olan Alexander Kluge, şehrinin yanıp kül oluşunu izledi."
Kluge bu metni olayın üzerinden çok zaman geçtikten sonra, ta 1977'de toparlamış. Metnin biçimi ziyadesiyle özgün, yayınevi "fragmantal rapor" diye tanımlamış, sanırım en isabetli tanımlama bu olacaktır sahiden. Tanıklıklar, fotoğraflar, belgeler, seneler sonra yapılmış röportajların metinleri, teknik analizler. Hepsini bir arada sunuyor yazar ve resim tamamlanınca başta da dediğim gibi meselenin mantıksızlığı iyice belirginleşiyor.
Örneğin bombardımanda yer alan askerlerden biriyle yapılmış bir röportaj var, "neden asıl hedefinize gidemeyeceğiniz anlaşılınca bombalarla geri dönmediniz veya boş bir araziye, ormana vs bırakmadınız" diye soruluyor, "bunlar çok pahalı bombalardı, ziyan mı etseydik" gibi bir cevap veriyor. Burada durup dakikalarca boşluğa baktım, savaşla ilgili yazılmış ve yazılacak milyonlarca cümleden çok daha fazlasını söylüyor çünkü bence.
Kitabın sonunda, -hala bir kitabını okuyamadığım- W. G. Sebald'ın da bir değerlendirmesi var metne dair. Kendisi de Hava Savaşı ve Edebiyat kitabında bu meseleyi didiklemiş, "yaşanılan dehşete ilişkin bir gerçeklik bilinci geliştirmeye çalışırken karşılaşılan otosansürü, bireysel ve kolektif hafıza kaybını irdelemiş", bu sayede öğrendim.
Ezcümle: gerek içeriği gerek biçimi itibariyle okuması zor ama eşsiz bir metin bu.
Olay özetle şöyle; arka kapaktan alıntılıyorum: "8 Nisan 1945’te, Amerikan bombardıman filosuna, bulut örtüsü nedeniyle Alman hedeflerine geçici olarak ulaşılamayacağı bildirildi. Geri dönmek için çok geçti; bu yüzden iki yüzden fazla bombardıman uçağı mühimmatlarıyla beraber yakındaki Halberstadt’a yönlendirildi. Savaş ekonomisi ve stratejik açıdan önemsiz olan orta büyüklükteki Halberstadt, bu hava saldırısıyla neredeyse tamamen yok edildi ve o zamanlar on üç yaşında olan Alexander Kluge, şehrinin yanıp kül oluşunu izledi."
Kluge bu metni olayın üzerinden çok zaman geçtikten sonra, ta 1977'de toparlamış. Metnin biçimi ziyadesiyle özgün, yayınevi "fragmantal rapor" diye tanımlamış, sanırım en isabetli tanımlama bu olacaktır sahiden. Tanıklıklar, fotoğraflar, belgeler, seneler sonra yapılmış röportajların metinleri, teknik analizler. Hepsini bir arada sunuyor yazar ve resim tamamlanınca başta da dediğim gibi meselenin mantıksızlığı iyice belirginleşiyor.
Örneğin bombardımanda yer alan askerlerden biriyle yapılmış bir röportaj var, "neden asıl hedefinize gidemeyeceğiniz anlaşılınca bombalarla geri dönmediniz veya boş bir araziye, ormana vs bırakmadınız" diye soruluyor, "bunlar çok pahalı bombalardı, ziyan mı etseydik" gibi bir cevap veriyor. Burada durup dakikalarca boşluğa baktım, savaşla ilgili yazılmış ve yazılacak milyonlarca cümleden çok daha fazlasını söylüyor çünkü bence.
Kitabın sonunda, -hala bir kitabını okuyamadığım- W. G. Sebald'ın da bir değerlendirmesi var metne dair. Kendisi de Hava Savaşı ve Edebiyat kitabında bu meseleyi didiklemiş, "yaşanılan dehşete ilişkin bir gerçeklik bilinci geliştirmeye çalışırken karşılaşılan otosansürü, bireysel ve kolektif hafıza kaybını irdelemiş", bu sayede öğrendim.
Ezcümle: gerek içeriği gerek biçimi itibariyle okuması zor ama eşsiz bir metin bu.
October 5, 2025
Is this story of the air raid on Halberstad on April 8th, 1945, a novel or a journalistic report? The many photos, illustrations and citations, give the impression this is a work of non-fiction. On the other hand, it is so perfectly constructed that it is a work of literature too. People may have said in such situation exactly the same words; things may have happened exactly in this way. What is clear above any doubt, is that the air raid on Halberstad at end of World War II was pointless and devastating. It had killed thousands of people and destroyed the old town almost completely.
This book is the story of one air raid on one city during one war, but it could have been the story of many other bombed cities, including cities which are being bombed just right now, in the Ukraine. The combination of stories of civilians who are being bombed with what the bombing air forces tell, is shocking. What ruins one’s life maybe just a routine work for another.
Personally, I was deeply touched by the story of Frau Arnold and Zacke of the Civil Defence Service, sitting high on the tower of the Martini church to signal airplanes reaching the city. My grandfather did exactly the same during that war on the roofs of London…
This book makes you feel how war feels. As one person at the end of the book says: Reaching a certain point of cruelty, it doesn’t matter anymore who started it. It just has to stop!
This book is the story of one air raid on one city during one war, but it could have been the story of many other bombed cities, including cities which are being bombed just right now, in the Ukraine. The combination of stories of civilians who are being bombed with what the bombing air forces tell, is shocking. What ruins one’s life maybe just a routine work for another.
Personally, I was deeply touched by the story of Frau Arnold and Zacke of the Civil Defence Service, sitting high on the tower of the Martini church to signal airplanes reaching the city. My grandfather did exactly the same during that war on the roofs of London…
This book makes you feel how war feels. As one person at the end of the book says: Reaching a certain point of cruelty, it doesn’t matter anymore who started it. It just has to stop!
June 12, 2017
Noch vier Wochen vor Kriegsende, am 8. April 1945, bombardierten die Alliierten im östlichen Harzer Vorland das 51.000 Einwohner zählende Halberstadt. Die Junkers-Flugzeugwerke und die im Sommer 1941 ausgehobenen Stollen für die unterirdische Waffenproduktion machten die Stadt zum Angriffsziel der Alliierten. Der Regisseur und Schriftsteller Alexander Kluge hat das Ereignis nach allen Seiten hin recherchiert, Material zusammengetragen und stellt das Mosaik des Angriffs, den er selbst als Dreizehnjähriger miterlebt hat, in verschiedenen Einzelepisoden dar. Der Suhrkamp Verlag bringt das 1977 erstmals erschienene Werk, ergänzt um „17 weitere Geschichten zum Luftkrieg“ und einen Artikel von W.G. Sebald zur „literarischen Beschreibung totaler Zerstörung“, nun in einer Neuauflage heraus.
Anders als etwa Thomas Bernhard in seinem Bericht von der Bombardierung Salzburgs („Die Ursache“, 1975) grenzt Kluge das Persönliche bewusst aus. In einer detaillierten Rekonstruktion des Unglücks stellt er die entfesselte Gewalt des Bombenkriegs in kleinen Momentaufnahmen dar. Mit Ausnahme weniger kurzer Abschnitte konzentriert er sich auf den Tag und den Ort des Ereignisses. Der 8. April 1945 gerät zum Kristallisationspunkt der Geschichte, der vom Beginn des Bombardements um 11.32 Uhr bis zum Feuersturm am späten Nachmittag linear nachgezeichnet wird. Zwei nachgestellte Passagen spielen einige Tage bzw. knapp zwei Monate nach dem Angriff. Im Zentrum stehen die Halberstädter Bürger, für die sich an diesem Tag der Zweite Weltkrieg in ihrer Stadt konzentrierte.
Im ersten Teil des Bandes widmet sich Kluge dem Erlegen des Angriffs durch die Betroffenen. Stellvertretend stellt er die Erlebnisse einer Kino-Leiterin dar, eines Fotografen, zweier Luftschutzbeobachterinnen, einer als Munitionsarbeiterin eingesetzten Lehrerin und Mutter, eines Feldarztes, eines Heizers, eines Feuerwehr-Offiziers, des Personals der Verteidigungszentrale, des Kreisleiters und des Verteidigungskommissars der Stadt. Ihre Bewältigungsstrategien, mit denen sie dem Ereignis begegnen, ihr Bemühen um den Erhalt von Handlungsstrukturen, bezeichnet Kluge als „Strategie von unten“.
Das Ineinandergreifen von zivilen und militärischen Ebenen des Krieges an der Heimatfront wird an den verschiedenen militärischen Begriffen deutlich. Der außergewöhnlichen Situation des Luftangriffs stehen die Menschen hilflos gegenüber. Sie können nicht ausweichen, weglaufen oder sich verteidigen. Gegen die Angreifer sind sie schutzlos. Umso mehr orientieren sie sich an den ihnen vertrauten Strukturen. Die „Strategie von unten“ bezeichnet die Suche nach Normalität im Unnormalen, im Chaos des Krieges wird versucht, Sicherheit in der Ordnung zu finden. Das Militärische wird Teil der zivilen Reaktion auf das Bombardement. Die Strategien des Überlebens werden selbst in militärische Begriffe gekleidet, die Sicherung des Hausrats auch in der Familie militärisch straff organisiert. So wird der Besitz aus den Trümmern gezerrt und auf einem abgegrenzten, markierten Flecken gesammelt, „zwei Mann Bewachung“ davor. Die Wasserschläuche der Feuerwehr geraten im Bericht zur „Schlauchlinie“, die Familie wird zur „Truppe“, die zusammenhalten muss.
Auf der anderen Seite stehen die Angreifer und ihre „Strategie von oben“, die im zweiten Teil behandelt wird. Hier stellt der Autor das Erleben der Piloten, Veteranen, Planer, des Oberbefehlshabers, des Zielmarkierers sowie verschiedener Experten und Reporter dar. Der Kriegsakt aus der Distanz gerät zum ausschließlich technischen und ökonomischen Handlungsablauf. Dem modernen, anononymen Krieg – hier repräsentiert durch die Beschreibung der technischen Abläufe des Bombardierungsvorgangs – setzt Kluge die menschliche Dimension des Erlebens entgegen und erschließt so die zeitliche und räumliche Dimension des Angriffs.
Durch die multiperspektivische Beschreibung des Geschehens folgt Kluge seinem Leitsatz, dass ein Unglück, das eine Vielzahl von Menschen betrifft, von zwei Augen allein nicht erfasst werden kann, da für jeden „Beteiligten“ seine Erfahrung bloß Teilperspektive eines unüberschaubaren Ganzen ist. Durch die Summierung der verschiedenene Perspektiven wird eine die Einzelerfahrungen übersteigende kollektive Katastrophe rekonstruiert.
Die Relativität der Beobachtungsschwerpunkte in Kluges Montage grenzt sich wohltuend von vereinfachenden und verallgemeinernden Opferperspektiven ab, wie sie in der heutigen Publizistik immer wiederkehren und auch in Untersuchungen auftauchen, die einen historischen Anspruch erheben. Dokumentation und Fiktion sind im Wechsel zwischen den Perspektiven der Betroffenen und des Erzählers – Interviews, ergänzende Anmerkungen, Fotos und Skizzen – ununterscheidbar ineinander verwoben.
Noch immer scheitern viele literarische und historische Arbeiten zum Thema an der Darstellung der komplexen kollektiven Erfahrung. Viele geschichtswissenschaftliche Arbeiten konzentrieren sich auf die rein materiellen Aspekte des Bombenkrieges, auf die Zerstörung historischer Bausubstanz, den Verlust von Produktionsstätten, die Anzahl der umgekommenene Menschen. Die individuellen Erlebnisse treten dahinter oftmals zurück, und ein tatsächlicher Eindruck vom Erleben des Bombardements kann sich so nicht vermitteln. Auch den um eine Objektivität des Faktischen bemühten persönlichen Aufzeichnungen von Augenzeugen gelingt dies nicht, bleiben sie doch auf die jeweilige Einzelperspektive beschränkt. In jüngster Zeit wendet sich die Geschichtsschreibung jedoch in zunehmendem Maße der multiperspektivischen Erlebnisebene des Luftkrieges zu, wie zahlreiche aktuelle Forschungsprojekte belegen.
Vollständige Rezension zu:
Alexander Kluge: Der Luftangriff auf Halberstadt am 8. April 1945. Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt/M. 2008, 139 S.
Erstabdruck der Rezension in: Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft (ZfG) 10/2009, S. 859-861.
Siehe auch: "Zett-und-Zett - Zeitgeschichte und Zeitgeschehen" URL: >https://zettundzett.wordpress.com/201...
Anders als etwa Thomas Bernhard in seinem Bericht von der Bombardierung Salzburgs („Die Ursache“, 1975) grenzt Kluge das Persönliche bewusst aus. In einer detaillierten Rekonstruktion des Unglücks stellt er die entfesselte Gewalt des Bombenkriegs in kleinen Momentaufnahmen dar. Mit Ausnahme weniger kurzer Abschnitte konzentriert er sich auf den Tag und den Ort des Ereignisses. Der 8. April 1945 gerät zum Kristallisationspunkt der Geschichte, der vom Beginn des Bombardements um 11.32 Uhr bis zum Feuersturm am späten Nachmittag linear nachgezeichnet wird. Zwei nachgestellte Passagen spielen einige Tage bzw. knapp zwei Monate nach dem Angriff. Im Zentrum stehen die Halberstädter Bürger, für die sich an diesem Tag der Zweite Weltkrieg in ihrer Stadt konzentrierte.
Im ersten Teil des Bandes widmet sich Kluge dem Erlegen des Angriffs durch die Betroffenen. Stellvertretend stellt er die Erlebnisse einer Kino-Leiterin dar, eines Fotografen, zweier Luftschutzbeobachterinnen, einer als Munitionsarbeiterin eingesetzten Lehrerin und Mutter, eines Feldarztes, eines Heizers, eines Feuerwehr-Offiziers, des Personals der Verteidigungszentrale, des Kreisleiters und des Verteidigungskommissars der Stadt. Ihre Bewältigungsstrategien, mit denen sie dem Ereignis begegnen, ihr Bemühen um den Erhalt von Handlungsstrukturen, bezeichnet Kluge als „Strategie von unten“.
Das Ineinandergreifen von zivilen und militärischen Ebenen des Krieges an der Heimatfront wird an den verschiedenen militärischen Begriffen deutlich. Der außergewöhnlichen Situation des Luftangriffs stehen die Menschen hilflos gegenüber. Sie können nicht ausweichen, weglaufen oder sich verteidigen. Gegen die Angreifer sind sie schutzlos. Umso mehr orientieren sie sich an den ihnen vertrauten Strukturen. Die „Strategie von unten“ bezeichnet die Suche nach Normalität im Unnormalen, im Chaos des Krieges wird versucht, Sicherheit in der Ordnung zu finden. Das Militärische wird Teil der zivilen Reaktion auf das Bombardement. Die Strategien des Überlebens werden selbst in militärische Begriffe gekleidet, die Sicherung des Hausrats auch in der Familie militärisch straff organisiert. So wird der Besitz aus den Trümmern gezerrt und auf einem abgegrenzten, markierten Flecken gesammelt, „zwei Mann Bewachung“ davor. Die Wasserschläuche der Feuerwehr geraten im Bericht zur „Schlauchlinie“, die Familie wird zur „Truppe“, die zusammenhalten muss.
Auf der anderen Seite stehen die Angreifer und ihre „Strategie von oben“, die im zweiten Teil behandelt wird. Hier stellt der Autor das Erleben der Piloten, Veteranen, Planer, des Oberbefehlshabers, des Zielmarkierers sowie verschiedener Experten und Reporter dar. Der Kriegsakt aus der Distanz gerät zum ausschließlich technischen und ökonomischen Handlungsablauf. Dem modernen, anononymen Krieg – hier repräsentiert durch die Beschreibung der technischen Abläufe des Bombardierungsvorgangs – setzt Kluge die menschliche Dimension des Erlebens entgegen und erschließt so die zeitliche und räumliche Dimension des Angriffs.
Durch die multiperspektivische Beschreibung des Geschehens folgt Kluge seinem Leitsatz, dass ein Unglück, das eine Vielzahl von Menschen betrifft, von zwei Augen allein nicht erfasst werden kann, da für jeden „Beteiligten“ seine Erfahrung bloß Teilperspektive eines unüberschaubaren Ganzen ist. Durch die Summierung der verschiedenene Perspektiven wird eine die Einzelerfahrungen übersteigende kollektive Katastrophe rekonstruiert.
Die Relativität der Beobachtungsschwerpunkte in Kluges Montage grenzt sich wohltuend von vereinfachenden und verallgemeinernden Opferperspektiven ab, wie sie in der heutigen Publizistik immer wiederkehren und auch in Untersuchungen auftauchen, die einen historischen Anspruch erheben. Dokumentation und Fiktion sind im Wechsel zwischen den Perspektiven der Betroffenen und des Erzählers – Interviews, ergänzende Anmerkungen, Fotos und Skizzen – ununterscheidbar ineinander verwoben.
Noch immer scheitern viele literarische und historische Arbeiten zum Thema an der Darstellung der komplexen kollektiven Erfahrung. Viele geschichtswissenschaftliche Arbeiten konzentrieren sich auf die rein materiellen Aspekte des Bombenkrieges, auf die Zerstörung historischer Bausubstanz, den Verlust von Produktionsstätten, die Anzahl der umgekommenene Menschen. Die individuellen Erlebnisse treten dahinter oftmals zurück, und ein tatsächlicher Eindruck vom Erleben des Bombardements kann sich so nicht vermitteln. Auch den um eine Objektivität des Faktischen bemühten persönlichen Aufzeichnungen von Augenzeugen gelingt dies nicht, bleiben sie doch auf die jeweilige Einzelperspektive beschränkt. In jüngster Zeit wendet sich die Geschichtsschreibung jedoch in zunehmendem Maße der multiperspektivischen Erlebnisebene des Luftkrieges zu, wie zahlreiche aktuelle Forschungsprojekte belegen.
Vollständige Rezension zu:
Alexander Kluge: Der Luftangriff auf Halberstadt am 8. April 1945. Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt/M. 2008, 139 S.
Erstabdruck der Rezension in: Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft (ZfG) 10/2009, S. 859-861.
Siehe auch: "Zett-und-Zett - Zeitgeschichte und Zeitgeschehen" URL: >https://zettundzett.wordpress.com/201...
February 9, 2017
At 11.32 a.m. on 8 April 1945 catastrophe was visited on the medium-sized town of Halberstadt in north Germany by 200 U.S.A.F. B-17s and B-24 bombers which arrived in a series of waves to leave behind a mushroom cloud, a firestorm and wholesale destruction. Four days earlier General Eisenhower, SACEUR, had ordered the cessation of carpet bombing by Allied forces, not that these pilots or planners had heard that. Moreover Halberstadt was not the planned target, it was an unfortunate reserve. But 'Air Raid' is not about the senselessness of this bombing, nor is it a history. It serves to recreate experience lost to total confusion at the time, and subsequent amnesia – experience repressed by fear.
It was W.G.Sebald’s afterword that first intimated to me that Alexander Kluge was more than just ‘acclaimed’, and I subsequently learnt he is a ‘cultural institution in the German-speaking world’ who has published five major volumes and received all of Germany’s important prizes for literature. To quote Susan Sontag: ‘More than a few of Kluge’s many books are essential, brilliant achievements’. I found the book interesting but on learning about him afterwards felt Kluge’s work merited a second read, as it did.
Not standard history, this is fictionalized documentary with an analytical edge created by precise detail from shifting points of view; the subjective testimony of witnesses on the ground and in the air, written in an ironic, deadpan, unemotional tone. The destruction could only have been horrific but a sense of horror doesn’t feature in the writing. Something like professional analysis does. Using short story and interview in the present tense the author interpolates the text with photos, diagrams and drawings. Sebald points out Kluge’s insight – that ‘experience in the real sense was simply not possible because of the overwhelming rapidity and totality of destruction and can only occur by way of the detour of later learning’. During the raid, clock time and sensory time diverged, Kluge notes. This is a report on lost time. He is not interpreting history.
Air Raid is a translation of 'Der Luftangriff auf Halberstadt am 8. April 1945' published in 2008, which in itself is a compilation of texts, the longest written in 1977, dealing with the destruction of Halberstadt. Other pieces written more than 20 years later cover that raid, as well as bombing and air warfare and other related experience. These provide background and eclectic details which set the context for the Halberstadt raid, the heart of the book. Kluge himself was a participant in that event though we rarely hear the voice of this teenager who survived the first waves in a cellar then ran off in panic.
Kluge looks at how the bombed react, how they thought, or didn’t think, how they looked back on that day (for some the destruction of their town was a ‘temporary state of affairs’ so that it was 50 years before it became a ‘conclusive fact’); he uses the distant perspective of professional firemen stood watching another German city burn at night as well as a fireman in rescue mode in the flames; he notes swifts returning to their old nesting locations that summer, to houses that are now cold ruins; or the animals, silent and calm in opened cages in Hamburg zoo after the firestorm; he records ‘Flying Fortresses’ going down in Lake Constance, as seen from the Swiss side.
Pay attention to the footnotes! It was here I found one of the most memorable metaphors, ‘200 middling-sized industrial plants fly toward the town’, courtesy of an American participant, a U.S.A.F. colonel now retired, interviewed in 1977. For the colonel this was akin to a factory day shift. So when the original target was cancelled the bombers couldn’t just drop their bombs on forest or open country, or fly them home – the endeavor demanded the ‘merchandise’ be dropped on the reserve target because ‘it’s expensive stuff’. Individual pilots had no leeway to decide; it was all organized, in the plan. ‘Did you have an idea what the attack was supposed to achieve?’ ‘Not a very clear one’.
Despite problems with one or two short passages, less intelligible to ordinary mortals, and issues with translation, I came away with a strong appreciation of the scale of this planned destruction – the result of human industry and endeavor to engineer a firestorm – and its fateful impact on another people and their lives. This was more than a simple takeaway from a literary report, it was an experience to remember.
It was W.G.Sebald’s afterword that first intimated to me that Alexander Kluge was more than just ‘acclaimed’, and I subsequently learnt he is a ‘cultural institution in the German-speaking world’ who has published five major volumes and received all of Germany’s important prizes for literature. To quote Susan Sontag: ‘More than a few of Kluge’s many books are essential, brilliant achievements’. I found the book interesting but on learning about him afterwards felt Kluge’s work merited a second read, as it did.
Not standard history, this is fictionalized documentary with an analytical edge created by precise detail from shifting points of view; the subjective testimony of witnesses on the ground and in the air, written in an ironic, deadpan, unemotional tone. The destruction could only have been horrific but a sense of horror doesn’t feature in the writing. Something like professional analysis does. Using short story and interview in the present tense the author interpolates the text with photos, diagrams and drawings. Sebald points out Kluge’s insight – that ‘experience in the real sense was simply not possible because of the overwhelming rapidity and totality of destruction and can only occur by way of the detour of later learning’. During the raid, clock time and sensory time diverged, Kluge notes. This is a report on lost time. He is not interpreting history.
Air Raid is a translation of 'Der Luftangriff auf Halberstadt am 8. April 1945' published in 2008, which in itself is a compilation of texts, the longest written in 1977, dealing with the destruction of Halberstadt. Other pieces written more than 20 years later cover that raid, as well as bombing and air warfare and other related experience. These provide background and eclectic details which set the context for the Halberstadt raid, the heart of the book. Kluge himself was a participant in that event though we rarely hear the voice of this teenager who survived the first waves in a cellar then ran off in panic.
Kluge looks at how the bombed react, how they thought, or didn’t think, how they looked back on that day (for some the destruction of their town was a ‘temporary state of affairs’ so that it was 50 years before it became a ‘conclusive fact’); he uses the distant perspective of professional firemen stood watching another German city burn at night as well as a fireman in rescue mode in the flames; he notes swifts returning to their old nesting locations that summer, to houses that are now cold ruins; or the animals, silent and calm in opened cages in Hamburg zoo after the firestorm; he records ‘Flying Fortresses’ going down in Lake Constance, as seen from the Swiss side.
Pay attention to the footnotes! It was here I found one of the most memorable metaphors, ‘200 middling-sized industrial plants fly toward the town’, courtesy of an American participant, a U.S.A.F. colonel now retired, interviewed in 1977. For the colonel this was akin to a factory day shift. So when the original target was cancelled the bombers couldn’t just drop their bombs on forest or open country, or fly them home – the endeavor demanded the ‘merchandise’ be dropped on the reserve target because ‘it’s expensive stuff’. Individual pilots had no leeway to decide; it was all organized, in the plan. ‘Did you have an idea what the attack was supposed to achieve?’ ‘Not a very clear one’.
Despite problems with one or two short passages, less intelligible to ordinary mortals, and issues with translation, I came away with a strong appreciation of the scale of this planned destruction – the result of human industry and endeavor to engineer a firestorm – and its fateful impact on another people and their lives. This was more than a simple takeaway from a literary report, it was an experience to remember.
August 19, 2018
German literature has clearly had a very unique context, following World War II, in which to reckon w/ recent history. How does a writer - in the context of speaking of, w/, and for his fellows - engage the madness, horror, and senseless destruction brought on by the rise and mad hubris of National Socialism? Kulge (aside from being a writer, he was one of the prime movers of the New German Cinema) takes a sober approach, and one that is two-pronged: he starts on the ground, w/ the townspeople who respond to the chaos of a cataclysmic and strategically pointless air raid, and then goes up into the air. What is up in the air? The organized science of insane destruction, for one. But also the vantage of history. The injunction here is for us on the ground to organize. There is a self-conscious Marxist component to Kluge's reduction of air bombardment to a whole logic of industrial production; an organized and methodical logic is at play. On the ground there is chaos. We remain the people on the ground. We remain the people in chaos. This retrospective analysis of one air raid (which leads into a couple short glances at other analogous historical moments), is part of a process of organization. The air raid in question was a raid on Kluge's hometown. He was there, a thirteen year old boy. But this in not autobiography. It is a making sense. War is not, in fact, senseless. We don't have to be either. There is a passage in the book which mentions how much of the disorder and poor reasoning of the response on the ground, in all the panic, could have been better handled by 'the brains of tomorrow.' Kulge's book is setting in motion or keeping in motion the work of such a brain.
November 28, 2025
Wie ist der Blick eines zu Tode Gehetzten im Flammeninferno einer gerade bombardierten Stadt? Was kann er wissen, tun, später erinnern? Kluge setzt seinen "Bericht" aus unverbundenen Teilstücken zusammen wie ein Puzzle, das mehr und mehr die Gestalt eines Bildes entbirgt. Da ist die verwirrte Kinoverwalterin am Anfang, die den Eingangsbereich ihres kaputten Kinos räumen will, weil sie Halt nur noch in der fixen Idee findet, wie sonst auch täglich vier Vorstellungen zu geben. Was kommt einer Lehrerin in den Sinn, die fürchtet, nicht alle ihre Kinder unbeschadet aus der brennenden Straße herauszubekommen? Sie setzt auf den Jungen, dessen Leben "wertvoller" sei. Mädchen könne sie später "ersetzen". Warum sie so denkt? Denk dir selbst deinen Teil, Leser/in. Warum gelang dem Fotografen, dessen Bilder ab diesem Fragment den Text illustrieren (?), die Flucht? Kann so oder so gewesen sein. Im Chaos gibt es viele Varianten...
Dann versachlicht sich der Text. Wie in einem Handbuch der Luftkriegsführung wird erklärt, warum die Angriffsformationen sich so und nicht anders herausgebildet haben. Die gnadenlose Effizienz industriellen Tötens erhellt ein Interview mit dem Kommandeur der Staffel: Selbst wenn die Stadt mit weißen Fahnen kapituliert hätte, hätte man das von oben höchstens als Täuschungsmanöver gewertet. Einmal gestartet, läuft die Aktion seelenlos und wie eine Tötungsmaschine. Ausdrücklich erklärt der Offizier, dass Bomben teure Waren seien, die man nicht einfach irgendwo abwerfen kann, sondern die man maximal effizient einsetzen muss. Ich hatte vorher nie daran gedacht, dass es Pläne geben könnte, zuerst Feuerwehren zu attackieren, um dann Eckhäuser zu bombardieren. Deren Schutt versperre Kreuzungen und hindere die Zivilbevölkerung am Entkommen. Dann muss man Dächer wegsprengen, damit zum Schluss Brandbomben im Inneren der Häuser ungehindert auf brennbares Material stoßen können. Macht man das fächerförmig von einem markanten Punkt ausgehend, kann man einen "Feuersturm" entfachen, aus dem es kein Entrinnen gibt...
Ob die Flieger darüber nachgedacht hätten? Nein, sie haben den Auftrag erfüllt und waren ja auch weit oben. Man will halt fertig werden und nach Hause, ehe vielleicht doch noch deutsche Jagdflieger auftauchen.
Das alles kommt emotionslos sachlich rüber und offenbart gerade deswegen die blinde Brutalität einer Kriegsführung, die ca. 600000 Deutsche, aber auch fast 80000 amerikanischen und britischen Soldaten im Luftkampf das Leben kostete. Interessantes Detail: Schon bald hatten die Stäbe erkannt, dass ihr Ziel, durch Terror das deutsche Volk gegen Hitler zu mobilisieren, nicht aufgehen würde. Eher das Gegenteil sei der Fall. Trotzdem ging der Terror weiter. Die Bomben waren halt bestellt, bezahlt und produziert und mussten nun weg. So ist das eben mit Rüstungsgütern- sie entfalten ihre eigene Sachlogik: Ihr Markt ist der Krieg! Erschütternd die Aussage einer Frau, die ein Amerikaner zitiert, der die möglichen Hassgefühle der Deutschen in Halberstadt erkunden sollte, um das darin steckende Gefahrenpotential für die Besatzungstruppen einschätzen zu können. Er traf keinen Hass. Warum? "An einem gewissen Punkt der Grausamkeit angekommen, ist es schon gleich, wer sie begangen hat. Sie soll nur aufhören." (88) Ich wünschte, man wäre in der Ukraine schon so weit.
Womit klar ist, dass der Text aktuell ist. Viel zu wenig denken die nachgeborenen Generationen bei all dem Gedöns über unsere Luftwaffe, die "siegfähig" (Freuding) sein müsse, daran, wie sie selbst einem "Feuersturm" entkommen würden. Was ist das überhaupt? Wer sich immer mal gefragt hat, warum die Leute in Hamburg oder Dresden auf offenen Straßen verbrannten oder in ihren Kellern erstickten, der kann bei Kluge nachlesen, wie ein Feuersturm funktioniert und was eine Luftwaffe tun muss, um ihn zu entfachen. So was plant man nämlich, genau wie die Russen planen, dass eine zerstörte Heizungs- und Energieinfrastruktur den Durchhaltewillen eines Volkes im Winter mehr trifft, als Angriffe auf militärisch bedeutsame Objekte. Das haben die Deutschen gemacht, das machten die Amerikaner, nun machen es die Russen und auch sonst werden alle Luftwaffenoffiziere in aller Welt das lernen. Und nicht darüber nachdenken. Es würde ja nur die Anderen, den Feind, diese moralische Sau, treffen. Denkste! Lies Kluge und du wirst klüger.
Dann versachlicht sich der Text. Wie in einem Handbuch der Luftkriegsführung wird erklärt, warum die Angriffsformationen sich so und nicht anders herausgebildet haben. Die gnadenlose Effizienz industriellen Tötens erhellt ein Interview mit dem Kommandeur der Staffel: Selbst wenn die Stadt mit weißen Fahnen kapituliert hätte, hätte man das von oben höchstens als Täuschungsmanöver gewertet. Einmal gestartet, läuft die Aktion seelenlos und wie eine Tötungsmaschine. Ausdrücklich erklärt der Offizier, dass Bomben teure Waren seien, die man nicht einfach irgendwo abwerfen kann, sondern die man maximal effizient einsetzen muss. Ich hatte vorher nie daran gedacht, dass es Pläne geben könnte, zuerst Feuerwehren zu attackieren, um dann Eckhäuser zu bombardieren. Deren Schutt versperre Kreuzungen und hindere die Zivilbevölkerung am Entkommen. Dann muss man Dächer wegsprengen, damit zum Schluss Brandbomben im Inneren der Häuser ungehindert auf brennbares Material stoßen können. Macht man das fächerförmig von einem markanten Punkt ausgehend, kann man einen "Feuersturm" entfachen, aus dem es kein Entrinnen gibt...
Ob die Flieger darüber nachgedacht hätten? Nein, sie haben den Auftrag erfüllt und waren ja auch weit oben. Man will halt fertig werden und nach Hause, ehe vielleicht doch noch deutsche Jagdflieger auftauchen.
Das alles kommt emotionslos sachlich rüber und offenbart gerade deswegen die blinde Brutalität einer Kriegsführung, die ca. 600000 Deutsche, aber auch fast 80000 amerikanischen und britischen Soldaten im Luftkampf das Leben kostete. Interessantes Detail: Schon bald hatten die Stäbe erkannt, dass ihr Ziel, durch Terror das deutsche Volk gegen Hitler zu mobilisieren, nicht aufgehen würde. Eher das Gegenteil sei der Fall. Trotzdem ging der Terror weiter. Die Bomben waren halt bestellt, bezahlt und produziert und mussten nun weg. So ist das eben mit Rüstungsgütern- sie entfalten ihre eigene Sachlogik: Ihr Markt ist der Krieg! Erschütternd die Aussage einer Frau, die ein Amerikaner zitiert, der die möglichen Hassgefühle der Deutschen in Halberstadt erkunden sollte, um das darin steckende Gefahrenpotential für die Besatzungstruppen einschätzen zu können. Er traf keinen Hass. Warum? "An einem gewissen Punkt der Grausamkeit angekommen, ist es schon gleich, wer sie begangen hat. Sie soll nur aufhören." (88) Ich wünschte, man wäre in der Ukraine schon so weit.
Womit klar ist, dass der Text aktuell ist. Viel zu wenig denken die nachgeborenen Generationen bei all dem Gedöns über unsere Luftwaffe, die "siegfähig" (Freuding) sein müsse, daran, wie sie selbst einem "Feuersturm" entkommen würden. Was ist das überhaupt? Wer sich immer mal gefragt hat, warum die Leute in Hamburg oder Dresden auf offenen Straßen verbrannten oder in ihren Kellern erstickten, der kann bei Kluge nachlesen, wie ein Feuersturm funktioniert und was eine Luftwaffe tun muss, um ihn zu entfachen. So was plant man nämlich, genau wie die Russen planen, dass eine zerstörte Heizungs- und Energieinfrastruktur den Durchhaltewillen eines Volkes im Winter mehr trifft, als Angriffe auf militärisch bedeutsame Objekte. Das haben die Deutschen gemacht, das machten die Amerikaner, nun machen es die Russen und auch sonst werden alle Luftwaffenoffiziere in aller Welt das lernen. Und nicht darüber nachdenken. Es würde ja nur die Anderen, den Feind, diese moralische Sau, treffen. Denkste! Lies Kluge und du wirst klüger.
December 5, 2020
Kluge's book on the bombing of his small town when he was 13 years old is horrifying in its depiction of small details. What happens when a place is bombed in such a systematic way. The aim is to create a fire storm. Certain bombs perform specific tasks, like penetrating the building's roof and falling down straight to the basement. Corner buildings are bombed first to block entry and exit. Incendiary bombs dropped last to finish it all off, rendering what remains nothing but ash. When a US pilot is asked whether this seemingly unnecessary attack on a place that was not originally intended as a target was a moral act or an act to break down morale of the population, his answer is chilling.
February 12, 2018
An appalling account of the Allied destruction of a small town chosen as primary targets were unavailable - of no strategic or military importance - that was wantonly and completely destroyed by the ordnance of 200 allied bombers. “We see how the history of industry and its objective existence, are the open book of man’s essential powers, human psychology made present and perceptible...” so said Marx
November 16, 2022
A shocking indictment of the Allied strategy of pattern bombing of German town and cities during WWII. Clearly the survivors were shocked not just beyond words, but seemingly beyond remembering...
July 19, 2021
When a favourite author (Sebald) penned a glowing account of a book I'd never heard of I had to seek it out. While it was published originally in 1977, the first English translation only appeared in 2014. The book is a short scrapbook of true accounts and images from the horrifying nightmare of a bombing raid by over 200 bombers on a small town in Germany. Sebald is right about how effective this light touch approach is in connecting the reader to what is happening on the ground. We also get the planners viewpoint which reveals the thought that has gone into achieving maximum destruction: first block the roads so few can escape, then drop heavy explosive bombs to smash everything up, then incendiary bombs to get the fires going, and a few timer bombs to go off an hour later when rescue operations might be underway. And the planners often use the time, cost and effort that has gone into making the bombs to justify using them as intended.
Clearly this is an important book and Sebald tells us that it is going somewhere that German literature has avoided in addressing some difficult WW2 issues. I would be tempted to give it five stars and can understand why some readers have done, but this Seagull edition is so poorly done I can only give it two. Aside from the dustjacket (showing a squadron of P51 Mustangs which is completely irrelevant to the book) many sections of the text either make no sense or are badly translated. The translator was highly regarded but died the year this book was published - was it unfinished? Some sentences read like Google Translate has done the job and the inclusion of part of Sebald's essay at the end of the book allows comparison with the essay in his collection 'Campo Santo' which is translated by Anthea Bell. I'll give just one example:
From Campo Santo - "Twelve minutes after the air raid warning, a wedding party in the Zun Ross Inn is buried, together with all its social differences and animosities"
From Air Raid - "A wedding party at the Horse Inn is already buried 12 minutes final warning along with its social differences"
Clearly this is an important book and Sebald tells us that it is going somewhere that German literature has avoided in addressing some difficult WW2 issues. I would be tempted to give it five stars and can understand why some readers have done, but this Seagull edition is so poorly done I can only give it two. Aside from the dustjacket (showing a squadron of P51 Mustangs which is completely irrelevant to the book) many sections of the text either make no sense or are badly translated. The translator was highly regarded but died the year this book was published - was it unfinished? Some sentences read like Google Translate has done the job and the inclusion of part of Sebald's essay at the end of the book allows comparison with the essay in his collection 'Campo Santo' which is translated by Anthea Bell. I'll give just one example:
From Campo Santo - "Twelve minutes after the air raid warning, a wedding party in the Zun Ross Inn is buried, together with all its social differences and animosities"
From Air Raid - "A wedding party at the Horse Inn is already buried 12 minutes final warning along with its social differences"
March 28, 2019
Air Raid is a pretty interesting read. Its not a novel, nor is it really just primary source material. Instead, its an outline or gathering of first hand accounts and images that is akin to research for a novel. Each section is self contained, dealing with a moment before, during, or after the destruction of the city. The sections range in scope from the death of an entire wedding party to a discussion of the unstoppable force of labor that went into creating the bombs. Kluge does a really good job at creating a strong feeling of senselessness both in the allied bombers and in the response by city officials. This pointlessness is perfectly summed up in a interview conducted during the air raid. The man in charge of the bombers admits that morale bombing does not affect the morale of the population. The pointless destruction of a city in 20 minutes is followed by a real potent feeling of loss and trauma. The people struggle to come to grips with such sudden and total destruction. So much so that there is a collective amnesia surrounding the event.
This edition also includes is an excellent article by W. G. Sebald that really delves into Kluge's presentation.
Also included in this edition are an additional series of stories that range from 9/11 to bombings of other German cities.
This edition also includes is an excellent article by W. G. Sebald that really delves into Kluge's presentation.
Also included in this edition are an additional series of stories that range from 9/11 to bombings of other German cities.
November 17, 2021
"Having come to a particular point of horror, it no longer matters who was responsible for it: one just wants it to end."
The first-hand chronicle of an unnecessary American bombing of a small German town in the last days of World War 2. Kluge, a famed German filmmaker and author, was 13 at the time and the account is culled from his own recollections and lots of eyewitness testimony from other townsfolk.
Needless to say this short study is a litany of horrors as townspeople, dulled by the sudden, unrepentant horrors raining down on them, try to survive and cope with what is happening. There are accompanying photos and drawings. Of particular interest are later interviews with "strategic" folks from America and England who are brought to account for the atrocity of the attack. Interestingly, the standing story is that the town was called upon to surrender, refused, and was thus bombed. As becomes clear in this work and attested to by the Allied interviewees, the bombing was done simply to expend unused ordinance that couldn't be used on the primary targets due to cloud cover and were thus dropped on hapless Halberstadt.
The first-hand chronicle of an unnecessary American bombing of a small German town in the last days of World War 2. Kluge, a famed German filmmaker and author, was 13 at the time and the account is culled from his own recollections and lots of eyewitness testimony from other townsfolk.
Needless to say this short study is a litany of horrors as townspeople, dulled by the sudden, unrepentant horrors raining down on them, try to survive and cope with what is happening. There are accompanying photos and drawings. Of particular interest are later interviews with "strategic" folks from America and England who are brought to account for the atrocity of the attack. Interestingly, the standing story is that the town was called upon to surrender, refused, and was thus bombed. As becomes clear in this work and attested to by the Allied interviewees, the bombing was done simply to expend unused ordinance that couldn't be used on the primary targets due to cloud cover and were thus dropped on hapless Halberstadt.
July 12, 2024
Really interesting but sad book about the destruction of a German city called Halberstadt. Everyone has heard of the destruction of Dresden but this was a smaller city that was destroyed seemingly on a whim. Every single death is devastating and this goes into the description of how people tried to survive as bombs were raining down on them from a devilish sky.
Best bits:
When the bombs fell she always held her breath for a long time, held her breath till it was over, because she had heard that the pressure wave of the bombs tore the air sacs of the lungs, i.e. produced a build-up of pressure in the lungs.
You see, it's hard to get intact buildings to burn. The roofs have to be got rid of first, and explosive bombs have to create open-lings down as far as the first floor or the ground floor if possible, where the combustible material is. Otherwise we don't have any extensive fires, no fire storm, etc. My brother is an air-force medic. It's just the same with the extensive treatment of a wound. A closed encrusted wound won't heal, it's a bit like an encrusted town, grown over the centuries, the wound has first of all to be torn open again, so that fresh blood vessels can set to work, and then thick ointment and gauze on top.
REPORTER. There are rumors. At half past nine in the morning the defense headquarters of the town is supposed to have been called from Hildesheim by an American colonel using the normal telephone network: Surrender the town, remove the anti-tank obstacles! The mayor was not present, how-ever. The Party district leader, Detering, present in his function as Defence Commissioner, rejected the request. Thereupon the bombing took place. It is said, that if the mayor had got up earlier and had accepted the request, the town would have avoided the attack. If by 11 a.m. a large white flag had been raised on the left-hand tower of St Martin's Church (on the left, seen from the south) then the bomber squadrons would have turned round again. A woman is said to have tried to bring a white cloth sewn together from four sheets to the town headquarters or to the church.
'There are epochs that say individual men are of no concern to them, that one must use them like bricks, that one must build from them and not for them. The Assyrian master builders treat the human mass like material of which there must be enough and which must be delivered in large quantities' (Ossip Mandelstam, Humanism and the Present', 1923).
Cooperative Behaviour: After the air raid of 11 February 1943 the charred remains of a man were found in a house in Blaubach. One resident of the house maintained, that they were the remains of her husband. A second woman from the same house declared, her husband had likewise been sitting in this destroyed cellar, probably one was sitting next to the other. These were also the remains of her husband's body. She too would want to be able to visit a grave.
Ar that the woman who had first returned to the ruined building-suggested dividing the remains of the charred man.
On the other hand, states the report of a parallel study group of Section II of Reich Security Head Office (RSHA), a fantastic alteration of all mental states, prompted by the fire storm, razing of the town, and loss of contacts with reality, could PROVOKE A RUPTURE WITH BOURGEOIS EXIS-TENCE, releasing reserves of strength for the FINAL BATTLE.
What do we know, said SS Colonel Eberlein to fire-brigade officer Künnecke, about what powers are still present in desperate people, before which the enemy should have a HOLY DREAD. Because it is not only bombs that explode or cities that burn, but inside men there are bombs that burn up reality. How, responded Künnecke, do you intend to direct this inner fire against a PARTICULAR ENEMY? To the best of my knowledge fire moves outwards in all directions simultaneously, in rings.
And if you do not commit your life, you will never win life ... At the risk of her life Sigrid Berger has rescued a little dog at the corner of Gneisenaustrasse. Why, asks Frau Schaffner, did you risk your life? Frau Berger did it 'without thinking' Something living whimpered. At that she lost her head.
In May 1944, Fireman Büttner has been ordered with his fire engine to tackle an emergency at an industrial plant struck by bombs. On his way to the scene of the Daze, he drives past his own house, sees that it has been destroyed. He does not know his family has been saved. But he is part of a convoy of 29 fire engines, to vehicles more of less push Buttner along the chain of command to his place of
deployment.
In the war to come, asserted General Douhet, enemies would never come face-to-face on a battlefield. They would meet for the first time on neutral territory on the occasion of the unconditional capitulation of the side that had been chemically bombarded. Douhet's paper was a high point in the planning of long-range combat. Such long-range combat, said the general, is particularly suited to absolutely avoiding the horrors of the First World War.
To the question, do you bomb for moral reasons or do you bomb morale?' the officer replies: 'We bomb morale. The spirit of resistance must be removed from the given population by the destruction of the town.' Later he concedes, how-ever, that this morale cannot be hit by bombs.
This confirms Brecht's remark that human beings learn as much from catastrophes as laboratory rabbits about biology.
Only the maintenance of a critical dialectic between past and present can set a learning process in motion which is not from the start doomed to have a fatal outcome.
Best bits:
When the bombs fell she always held her breath for a long time, held her breath till it was over, because she had heard that the pressure wave of the bombs tore the air sacs of the lungs, i.e. produced a build-up of pressure in the lungs.
You see, it's hard to get intact buildings to burn. The roofs have to be got rid of first, and explosive bombs have to create open-lings down as far as the first floor or the ground floor if possible, where the combustible material is. Otherwise we don't have any extensive fires, no fire storm, etc. My brother is an air-force medic. It's just the same with the extensive treatment of a wound. A closed encrusted wound won't heal, it's a bit like an encrusted town, grown over the centuries, the wound has first of all to be torn open again, so that fresh blood vessels can set to work, and then thick ointment and gauze on top.
REPORTER. There are rumors. At half past nine in the morning the defense headquarters of the town is supposed to have been called from Hildesheim by an American colonel using the normal telephone network: Surrender the town, remove the anti-tank obstacles! The mayor was not present, how-ever. The Party district leader, Detering, present in his function as Defence Commissioner, rejected the request. Thereupon the bombing took place. It is said, that if the mayor had got up earlier and had accepted the request, the town would have avoided the attack. If by 11 a.m. a large white flag had been raised on the left-hand tower of St Martin's Church (on the left, seen from the south) then the bomber squadrons would have turned round again. A woman is said to have tried to bring a white cloth sewn together from four sheets to the town headquarters or to the church.
'There are epochs that say individual men are of no concern to them, that one must use them like bricks, that one must build from them and not for them. The Assyrian master builders treat the human mass like material of which there must be enough and which must be delivered in large quantities' (Ossip Mandelstam, Humanism and the Present', 1923).
Cooperative Behaviour: After the air raid of 11 February 1943 the charred remains of a man were found in a house in Blaubach. One resident of the house maintained, that they were the remains of her husband. A second woman from the same house declared, her husband had likewise been sitting in this destroyed cellar, probably one was sitting next to the other. These were also the remains of her husband's body. She too would want to be able to visit a grave.
Ar that the woman who had first returned to the ruined building-suggested dividing the remains of the charred man.
On the other hand, states the report of a parallel study group of Section II of Reich Security Head Office (RSHA), a fantastic alteration of all mental states, prompted by the fire storm, razing of the town, and loss of contacts with reality, could PROVOKE A RUPTURE WITH BOURGEOIS EXIS-TENCE, releasing reserves of strength for the FINAL BATTLE.
What do we know, said SS Colonel Eberlein to fire-brigade officer Künnecke, about what powers are still present in desperate people, before which the enemy should have a HOLY DREAD. Because it is not only bombs that explode or cities that burn, but inside men there are bombs that burn up reality. How, responded Künnecke, do you intend to direct this inner fire against a PARTICULAR ENEMY? To the best of my knowledge fire moves outwards in all directions simultaneously, in rings.
And if you do not commit your life, you will never win life ... At the risk of her life Sigrid Berger has rescued a little dog at the corner of Gneisenaustrasse. Why, asks Frau Schaffner, did you risk your life? Frau Berger did it 'without thinking' Something living whimpered. At that she lost her head.
In May 1944, Fireman Büttner has been ordered with his fire engine to tackle an emergency at an industrial plant struck by bombs. On his way to the scene of the Daze, he drives past his own house, sees that it has been destroyed. He does not know his family has been saved. But he is part of a convoy of 29 fire engines, to vehicles more of less push Buttner along the chain of command to his place of
deployment.
In the war to come, asserted General Douhet, enemies would never come face-to-face on a battlefield. They would meet for the first time on neutral territory on the occasion of the unconditional capitulation of the side that had been chemically bombarded. Douhet's paper was a high point in the planning of long-range combat. Such long-range combat, said the general, is particularly suited to absolutely avoiding the horrors of the First World War.
To the question, do you bomb for moral reasons or do you bomb morale?' the officer replies: 'We bomb morale. The spirit of resistance must be removed from the given population by the destruction of the town.' Later he concedes, how-ever, that this morale cannot be hit by bombs.
This confirms Brecht's remark that human beings learn as much from catastrophes as laboratory rabbits about biology.
Only the maintenance of a critical dialectic between past and present can set a learning process in motion which is not from the start doomed to have a fatal outcome.
September 10, 2018
It's a translation so that immediately makes it a more challenging read, but the style is fairly out there - especially for what the book is trying to communicate.
100% worth reading the endnotes by W G Sebald as it will bring the whole book into context and consequently, the book will make more sense.
100% worth reading the endnotes by W G Sebald as it will bring the whole book into context and consequently, the book will make more sense.
June 24, 2024
Kluge's account of the bombing of Halberstadt is a remarkable work. Heterogeneous and fragmented in nature, this mixture of eye-witness accounts, interviews and factual diagrams, photographs and drawings, is a literary simulacrum for the shattered town once it had been flattened by wave after wave of bombers.
February 23, 2023
in many ways (content and form) can be used as a kind of skeleton key to most of Sebald's writings. probably the best starting point for Kluge that I can think of, nice that there are some accessible english translations kicking around again.
September 3, 2024
This is the story of the pointless bombing and destruction of a German town at the very end of WWII. The author shows the extensive planning that went into the bombing and how, once started, it would not be stopped. An excellent book showing how pointless war can be.
Want to read
December 6, 2021SBB 122
December 3, 2025
Hervorragendes Nachwort; idealer Einstieg in Kluges umfangreiches Werk
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