Disarming Iraq

by Hans Blix

The chairman of the International Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction and the former leader of the U.N.'s weapons inspection team provides an objective, firsthand account of the events leading up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, detailing meetings with international leaders, the activities of his inspection team, and more. 75,000 first printing.

Genres: Nonfiction, Politics, History, War, Middle East, International Affairs

304 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2004

Reviews

[Mostafa · Rating 4 out of 5]

3.8 stars
خلع سلاح تسلیحات کشتار جمعی عراق در دو مرحله توسط کمیته سازمان ملل برای خلع سلاح عراق( آنسکام) و پس از آن توسط کمیسون کنترل و نظارت و بازرسی از عراق برای خلع سلاح توسط شورای امنیت با ریاست هانس بلیکس( نویسنده کتاب) انجام شد
در این مجموعه اقدامات که از سال ۱۹۹۱ تا ۲۰۰۳ و البته با ۴ سال وقفه بین سال های ۱۹۹۸ تا ۲۰۰۲ صورت گرفت بخش های زیادی از تسلیحات شیمیایی عراق توسط خودِ عراقی ها در ۱۹۹۱ معدوم شد.( معدوم سازی این تسلیحات بدون وجود ناظران بین المللی عواقب بدی برای عراق داشت و شاید علت اصلی جنگ بود) همچنین مجموعه ای از موشک های عراق با بُرد بالای ۱۵۰ کیلومتر که مدل بهبود یافته موشک های اسکاد بودند داوطلبانه معدوم شدند
اما در این میان آمریکا معتقد بود عراق کماکان دارای تسلیحات شیمیایی است و در زمینه فعالیت های نظامی هسته ای نیز فعال می باشد... اگرچه مدارک ارایه شده توسط آمریکا، برگرفته از اظهارات دانشمندان یا افراد دخیل در پروژه های نظامی عراق بود که به کشورهای دیگر فرار کرده بودند.... با این حال بعد از وقایع ۱۱ سپتامبر ، آمریکا عملا سیاست تغییر نظامِ حاکم بر عراق را کلید زد و تلاش همه جانبه ای کرد تا به جهانیان نشان دهد که صدام حسین کماکان به دنبال تسلیحات کشتار جمعی است... فعالیتی که در ادامه نتوانست شورای امنیت را مجاب کند و درنتیجه با استناد به ماده ۵۱ منشور سازمان ملل و استناد به تخطی عراق از قطعنامه ۱۴۴۸ اقدام به مواجه و برخورد نظامی یکجانبه با همکاری بریتانیا و اسپانیا نمود
با این وجود بعد از جنگ، نیروهای آمریکایی موفق به پیدا کردن تسلیحات ادعایی آمریکا نشدند که نشان دهنده ضعف سیستم های اطلاعاتی آمریکا بود این اقدام یکجانبه موجب آسیب به وجهه سازمان ملل و شورای امنیت به عنوان یک سازمان تامین کننده امنیت شد، اگرچه در این میان نمی توان بازگشت دموکراسی به عراق و سقوط یکی از خونخوارترین حکومتها بعد از جنگ جهانی دوم را نیز انکار کرد

[Mike · Rating 4 out of 5]

Whenever former Bush administration officials claim that "everyone thought Saddam had WMD," I remember back to March of 2003 when I watched on television in my college dorm room as Hans Blix gave his report to the UN. His speech was quite straight-forward: There was no evidence that Iraq had WMD, but there was no evidence to support Iraq's claim that they had destroyed all their weapons. Iraq was beginning to cooperate and more inspections were needed to gather evidence of either WMD or the lack thereof. It took two years for the UN to put together the inspecting team. After two months, the US was ready to invade. Indeed, they had been building forces since 2002 for just that purpose.

After the invasion, we discovered what inspectors would have probably soon uncovered: Iraq had stopped pursuing nuclear weapons in the 90s. In fact, evidence of this had existed in the form of information from defectors, previous inspections, and vows from every major Iraqi leader that they had destroyed all their chemical and biological weapons. The only question was whether or not Iraq had started up their weapons program in 1998. It was clear they did not have nuclear weapons. There was no hard evidence that they had any chemical or biological weapons. At best, the world was suspicious. This was enough for the US to push for invasion, against the wishes of the entire world, due to post-9/11 paranoia about terrorism.

Blix knew that inspections could work if they were firm, but respectful and beholden only to the UN. In taking over the process, Blix was caught between the U.S., who thought he wasn't forceful enough in his work, and the Iraqis, who thought he was a spy for the U.S. Iraq made matters worse by playing a cat-and-mouse game purely out of obstinance/pride. They had nothing to hide, but felt like opening their country to inspections would lead to humiliating searches of private palaces or political locales. They were essentially saying, "Trust us: we don't have weapons." Ultimately, the U.S. wanted to control the inspectors, to make them an arm of the CIA and to gather intel, whereas Blix was clear that none of that would occur. The simple truth was that the US didn't want the inspections to succeed because that would have led to lessening restrictions on Iraq, and the troop build-up would have been for nothing. It would have kept Saddam in power, which they could not tolerate. Likewise, the Iraqis didn't want the inspections to succeed (despite being in their own self-interest!) for fear of looking weak and powerless, or perhaps out of stupid pride.

The greatest insult came when the US attempted to paint Blix as inept or wrong--going so far as to spy on him and his inspectors--an ironic twist considering it was the US that ended up passing on bad intelligence. In the case of the infamous yellowcake intel, the CIA KNEW the information came from a forged document. Blix is surprisingly polite and even-handed in his criticism of the US, considering they did nothing less than try to destroy his credibility through lies and espionage. His conclusions are direct and factual, without any malice: "What we came to discover was that no sites given to us by intelligence were ever found to harbor weapons of mass destruction."

Blix continually emphasized that inspections were an alternative to war, not a prelude. Unfortunately, the US felt otherwise. We can learn quite a bit from Blix's book: 1) containment (through inspections, surveillance, and diplomacy) WORKS and is less costly (in money and human life) than "counter-proliferation" (military action). 2) Lack of evidence that weapons have been destroyed is not the same as evidence that they exist. 3) Inspections work when inspectors are given strong intelligence, but are independent and report only to the UN. 4) The Security Council can never again allow one nation to act unilaterally to go to war, as the US did. 5) "Preemptive wars" undercut the whole purpose of the UN in using international diplomacy to ensure military conflict is a last resort.

[Andy Marshall · Rating 2 out of 5]

Having vivid memories of the build up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the now-notorious claims regarding Iraqi WMDs, I was intrigued to find that Hans Blix himself had written a book about the build up to war.

Sadly, however, what should have been a fascinating insight into one of the most controversial conflicts of the last 50 years, by someone at the very heart of the whole thing, is instead a tedious slog through endless managerial accounts of all the meetings that Mr Blix attended over the various years, with numerous faceless bureaucrats and even detailing on which floor of the UN building these happened! Sadly little interesting insight arises from any of these meetings, only an endless rehashing of the same points and a persistent need to keep having endless meetings at which little seems to be achieved or accomplished.

Interesting and difficult questions are posed at times about the roles of inspections, the rights of countries to act in pre-emptive self defence, the role of the UN on the world stage et al. Sadly these are all too often answered with brief two or three sentences answers and moved on from, where instead they could have been a source of really fascinating incite.

For those who hold the view that the UN is an over-inflated bureaucracy full of its own self-importance that talks a lot but sadly achieves little, this book is only further fuel on that fire.

[Hugo · Rating 5 out of 5]

As I finished this book by Hans Blix and read the reviews of others on GoodReads I cannot help but notice how the book got a very low rating and quite angry comments raging from why Blix did not do more as United Nations to prevent such a catastrophic war and how the book contained "useless" details of back stage negotiations and endless bureaucratic meetings that seemed to give no importance to the unfolding events at hand.

However, as a UN humanitarian worker myself – it was refreshing to see top negotiators in our “expanded UN family” (my organization has a very different mandate and purpose) living and experiencing very similar dilemmas that we do “in the field” where we are implement humanitarian mandates and are sometimes caught up either in political dilemmas or have to push forward with actions that serve no other purpose than to ensure delivery of neutral and apolitical humanitarian aid (or protection) thus preserving sanctity of mandate at odds with the interest of large donors/member states. Blix tells the story of these men and women within his inspection team (with similar daily dilemmas as all of us in the system) that have to maintain neutrality in the face of incredible political and even – war – pressure. Not an easy task when you hold the weigh of the destiny of an entire nation on your shoulders.

The book also contains some humorous and personal passages that are strangely familiar to UN-career colleagues: delivering a speech with a wrinkled suit because so much time was spent on writing and re-writing the speech itself; wanting to be in Sweden when it starts to snow but you cannot because you have to go to yet another "world-saving conference" and long hours spent in transit airports and how these bring moment of incredible inner peace.

The book is long. Yes, at times dull. But here, the “devil is not in the details” but rather in the “overall picture” of the canvas Blix is panting for us. In this larger canvas, a couple of messages become vivid as one approaches the book’s closure:

1) No, there were no nukes in Iraq since early 90s and although inspectors had a strong sense of this – the “cat and mouse” game played by Iraq/Hussein contributed for the international community/UN not to be able to give that 100% certainty at the end of the day.
2) This also means that the system in place to prevent Iraq from re-arming through 90s and early 2000s as devised by the UN did in fact work and provided effective containment.
3) However, others were playing similar “cat and mouse” game with the UN – including the “pro-war/hawks” on the security council (US/UK) continuously trying to include hoops that were quite obviously impossible for Iraq to jump over.
4) Therefore, the UN did in fact “work” to ensure that the “international community” position, or in this situation, lack of one – ensured peace as long as the key players played the game.
5) The failure of Iraq in the sense that it did eventually lead to war was – in Blix’s opinion – a failure in “common sense” or trusting shaky evidence coming from defectors rather than the carefully produced UN reports by Blix’s team that today the world have proven to be as close to reality as one can get.
6) Interestingly – though – Blix mentions that he did not feel the pressure coming directly from the US administration in his different bilateral conversations/negotiations even though this was clearly demonstrated in the Security Council floor. “Was my skin too thick to feel it?” he questions at some point of the book. However, he did feel irritation for the continuous baseless accusations and attacks by the US media that continuously wanted him to walk the line of US/UK foreign policy.

Highly recommended!

[Cristina · Rating 3 out of 5]

Me esperaba un libro con algo más de acción, pero la narración de Blix se centra más en la parte burocrática que se estaba llevando a cabo en la ONU los meses previos a la invasión del país. Esto no es una crítica, desarrolla y explica claramente los puntos y el avance de los intentos de la organización para verificar la existencia o no de las armas de forma pacífica y gradual para intentar evitar la alternativa bélica propuesta por EEUU.

Al ser un libro escrito en 2004, realmente no resuelve dudas de sin realmente hubo algún tipo de esas armas o si se han ido cescubriendo algunas tiempo después de la invasión. Para descubrir lo sucedido hasta la actualidad en Iraq es necesario recurrir a otros libros o documentos para ver si en estos más de diez años se ha aclarado la existencia de esas armas.

Al ser un relato en primera persona de lo que ocurrió, siempre me quedan dudas de si en estos casos los autores intentan justificarse a través de la narración y si hay cierta objetividad en ello. De todas formas, es interesante saber los pasos previos a lo que finalmente ocurrió desde uma figura aparentemente clave.

[Joseph Stieb · Rating 3 out of 5]

There's truly no reason to read this book unless you are studying Iraq or anti-proliferation measures. Blix is an admirable guy, and his criticism of the Bush admin's handling of WMD intelligence is spot-on. However, he writes like, well, the Swedish diplomat that he is. The book is also poorly produced, with unhelpful chapter titles and poor signposting of where you are chronologically. So, even though it is pretty short, it is kind of a slog, with a lot of detail that isn't always explained clearly. Useful in many ways, but a little bit dull and kind of a rush job.

[Charlotte · Rating 2 out of 5]

*2.5
Dutch translation. Interesting, but a very dry read (and the translation was poor/incorrect at some points).

[William Smith · Rating 3 out of 5]

While Blix's account of UNMOVIC's search of WMD in Iraq is informative, it becomes a little too descriptive.

[Virtue · Rating 2 out of 5]

Mr.Blix: You climbed up your career ladder as a bureaucrat in the world of diplomacy, which is inherently irrational, morally corrupt and bullshit-saturated. It is a tragedy, that the leadership roles in the fact-finding organizations such as UNSCOM and UNMOVIC are given to non-technical, but political people, just like yourself. In this way, the United Nations mimics the modus operandi of national governments, but it suffers from the same illness: disrespect to material evidence and veneration of bullshit. You Sir were unable to understand that Iraq may not have any WMD in 1999, and you insisted that Iraq either presents those weapons for inspection, or provides documents on their destruction. You Sir grew up as a bureaucrat and so you firmly believed that there must be a written memo about just everything on Earth. You even tried to be funny when you argued that "anthrax is not a marmalade, and that if it had been disposed of, there must be records to support it!" Since Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction to present, and no documents to share, you concluded that Iraq is not genuinely cooperating with inspections, and you even stated that before the U.N. Security Council. This was enough for warmongers to justify the nasty war that followed. I would not say that you were personally calling for the war. You were in fact calling for continuing inspections. However, they were unnecessary, because there was nothing of relevance in Iraq and you did have enough leads from inspections in Iraq to conclude it, if you had been less susceptible to your own bullshit and bullshit voluminously supplied to you by a narrow group within your staff. You had an opportunity to stand behind hundreds of inspections that found nothing prohibited in Iraq and you could vocally appreciate full collaboration provided to you by Iraq to get out clean and certified WMD-free. It is my personal opinion that you did not have the necessary combination of wisdom, technical knowledge and manly courage to do what was right and for this reason you have essentially failed in your role. To your defense, I would say that you could not act differently, because you were a man of the system of political diplomacy, where the truth is less relevant than games and courage is missing. It is well known that the bureaucrats would not fight for justice, which they do not appreciate more than their enjoyable lives and uninterrupted careers. My respect goes to those few diplomats, whose moral strengths prevailed over conformism, such as H.E. Hans-Christof von Sponeck. My blame for work poorly done goes to you. You had a one-time opportunity to prevent a disastrous war and save tens of thousands of lives, or make it more difficult for warmongers to start the war, but you blew it.

[s · Rating 3 out of 5]

Disarming Iraq
Hans Blix
***1/2

With the U.S. presidential race shifting into high gear following U.S. President George W. Bush's address to the Republican National Convention in New York last week and the third anniversary of the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks days away, security is on Americans' minds.

Between the U.S. war on terror, the invasion of Iraq and the ongoing conflict there that has seen some 1,000 U.S. troops and as many as 13,800 Iraqi civilians killed, the war and the U.S. justification for it -- to topple the government of Saddam Hussein over an alleged refusal to eliminate so-called weapons of mass destruction -- are hot election issues.

"We knew his long history of pursuing, even using, weapons of mass destruction," Bush said of the deposed Saddam Hussein (setting aside that gas and biological weapons are actually known in military circles as "area denial" weapons since they cause no actual destruction). "We must, and we will, confront threats to America before it is too late."

It's a far cry from the assertions the administration made in the run-up to the war -- the subject of Hans Blix's Disarming Iraq. The book chronicles Blix's exit from retirement to head the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) -- charged with inspecting Iraq for prohibited weapons -- to the invasion and its aftermath.

Blix's history as a career diplomat is evident in his writing, and works to both positive and negative effect.

The book is a surprisingly easy read, written in a clear, concise style devoid of jargon, and is broken up into headlined subsections that highlight significant developments and events in the inspection process and political gamesmanship that surrounded the run-up to war.

But Blix's precision with language also dulls key points in the tale. As one might expect of a diplomat, Blix fails to ascribe blame for diplomatic failures or what appear to be deliberate misstatements of fact by key players -- such as the U.S. claim Iraq had sought yellowcake uranium from Niger, based on a document U.S. officials knew was a forgery -- choosing instead to chalk them up to error, or to build an argument but omitting the conclusion that ties the points together.

The result is an interesting historical document for diplomacy wonks that only delivers an understated, lukewarm conclusion the reader has been awaiting in the final chapter. It's a far cry from the type of bombshell one anticipates from an inside player such as Blix, and which Gen. Romeo Dallaire delivered in his book on Rwanda earlier this year.

Saleem Khan

[Saleem Khan · Rating 3 out of 5]

** spoiler alert **
My review, published in Metro, September 2005.

Disarming Iraq
Hans Blix
***1/2

With the U.S. presidential race shifting into high gear following U.S. President George W. Bush's address to the Republican National Convention in New York last week and the third anniversary of the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks days away, security is on Americans' minds.

Between the U.S. war on terror, the invasion of Iraq and the ongoing conflict there that has seen some 1,000 U.S. troops and as many as 13,800 Iraqi civilians killed, the war and the U.S. justification for it -- to topple the government of Saddam Hussein over an alleged refusal to eliminate so-called weapons of mass destruction -- are hot election issues.

"We knew his long history of pursuing, even using, weapons of mass destruction," Bush said of the deposed Saddam Hussein (setting aside that gas and biological weapons are actually known in military circles as "area denial" weapons since they cause no actual destruction). "We must, and we will, confront threats to America before it is too late."

It's a far cry from the assertions the administration made in the run-up to the war -- the subject of Hans Blix's Disarming Iraq. The book chronicles Blix's exit from retirement to head the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) -- charged with inspecting Iraq for prohibited weapons -- to the invasion and its aftermath.

Blix's history as a career diplomat is evident in his writing, and works to both positive and negative effect.

The book is a surprisingly easy read, written in a clear, concise style devoid of jargon, and is broken up into headlined subsections that highlight significant developments and events in the inspection process and political gamesmanship that surrounded the run-up to war.

But Blix's precision with language also dulls key points in the tale. As one might expect of a diplomat, Blix fails to ascribe blame for diplomatic failures or what appear to be deliberate misstatements of fact by key players -- such as the U.S. claim Iraq had sought yellowcake uranium from Niger, based on a document U.S. officials knew was a forgery -- choosing instead to chalk them up to error, or to build an argument but omitting the conclusion that ties the points together.

The result is an interesting historical document for diplomacy wonks that only delivers an understated, lukewarm conclusion the reader has been awaiting in the final chapter. It's a far cry from the type of bombshell one anticipates from an inside player such as Blix, and which Gen. Romeo Dallaire delivered in his book on Rwanda earlier this year.

Saleem Khan

[Gugu Maduna · Rating 5 out of 5]

Well written and documented, the events that transpired on the search of Weapons of Mass Destruction that where never found. USA and UK are bad countries and must never ever be trusted. They failed to comply with UN resolution and UN Security Council processes. Let alone giving the UNMOVIC AND IAEA more time in confirming that indeed there are weapons of mass destruction.

Hans Blix and Mohammed ElBaradei made means to ensure that the relevant processes and procedures are being followed and complied with from the UN Secutiry Council, UN Commission and Iraq engagement perspective.

Overall Iraq never had weapons of mass destruction. It was the US/UK intention to invade Iraq and cease their natural resources.

[Cody · Rating 3 out of 5]

It's interesting to see the build up to the Iraq war from the perspective of chief weapon inspector Hans Blix. I had assumed when I began that book that there'd be more on the ground descriptions of the search for WMD, but Han Blix recounts his travels, discussions and reportings with the Security Council. The phone discussions with Powell and Rice were rather interesting. This wasn't the most exciting book and it did take me a while to finish, but overall I found interesting and informative.

[Michael Mcclelland · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very interesting read on the workings of weapons inspections in Iraq and the machinations between the team and members of the Security Council on the eve of war. While enlightening and informative, the pace is more reflective of the deliberate, diligent and diplomatic manner that the inspection regime was taken in, than the race to a decision on war, peace, the relevance of the UN, the discovery of no WMDs, etc that it could have been.

[Julius Lehtinen]

Former head of UNSCOM during 90's and 2000's offering his narrative on the disarmament of Iraq. Was the war avoidable? Yes it was, thinks Blix who calmly describes the routines of finding the non-existent WMD's in the crossfire of Iraqi inspecrtion avoidance and American pressures and obstructions. A recommended read.

[Will Byrnes · Rating 3 out of 5]

The Swedish personality shines through. Hans is definitely a cure for insomnia. But despite that there are nuggets of information about the process of inspections and the politics surrounding them that make the book a worthwhile read.