Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power

by Robert Dallek

With his JFK biography, "An Unfinished Life," Dallek cemented a reputation as a great historian. Now he offers a portrait of a pair of leaders who dominated the world stage, changing the course of history.
Decades after working side-by-side in the White House, Richard Nixon & Henry Kissinger remain two of the most contradictory & powerful men in America in the 20th century. While their personalities could hardly have been more different, they were magnetically drawn together. Both were ambitious, self-made men, driven by their own inner demons, often ruthless in pursuit of their goals. At the height of power, their rivalry & collaboration led to policies defining the Nixon presidency.
Utilizing declassified archives, Dallek uncovers details about their personal relationship & how they struggled to outdo each other in foreign affairs. He also analyzes their dealings with power brokers at home & abroad--including Vietnam, the China opening, detente with the USSR, the Yom Kippur War, Allende's overthrow & war between India & Pakistan--while recognizing how both men plotted to distract the public from scandal. He details Nixon's erratic behavior during Watergate & how Kissinger helped use national security to prevent impeachment.
1 Brethren of a kind
Nixon
Kissinger
1968
2 The limits of power
The Nixon-Kissinger White House
Hope & illusion
The politics of foreign policy
Troubles galore
Crisis managers
Winter of discontent
3 The best of times
The road to détente
Détente in Asia: gains & losses
The warriors as peacemakers
Tainted victories
4 The worst of times
New miseries
In the shadow of Watergate
The Nixon-Kissinger presidency
The end of a presidency

Genres: History, Biography, Politics, Nonfiction, Presidents, American History, Us Presidents

752 pages, Hardcover

First published April 24, 2007

About the author

Robert A. Dallek is an American historian specializing in the presidents of the United States, including Franklin D. Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Richard M. Nixon.
In 2004 he retired as a history professor at Boston University after previously having taught at Columbia University, the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), and Oxford University.
He won the Bancroft Prize for his 1979 book Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945, as well as other awards for scholarship and teaching.

Reviews

[Matt · Rating 4 out of 5]

“This book is about the exercise of power by two of the most important practitioners of the art in the twentieth century: President Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger…We know almost all of what they did during their five and a half years in the White House; their major initiatives were and remain landmarks in the history of American policy. Why and how they acted, however, is incomplete and imperfectly understood – partly hidden behind the façade the two men consciously and unconsciously erected to disguise their intentions…”
- Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power

“The illegal we do immediately; the unconstitutional takes a little longer.”
- Henry Kissinger, National Security Advisor and Secretary of State for President Nixon


Has there ever been a duo in American political life to compare with Richard Nixon, 37th President of the United States, and Henry Kissinger, who served Nixon as National Security Advisor and later as Secretary of State? If you like complicated figures, where arguable greatness is in eternal struggle with venality, where vision is foreshortened by ambition, where just about any action can be justified as done for “the good of the country,” then either Nixon or Kissinger is worth a lifetime of study. Trying to tackle them at once, parsing their successes, their failures, and their codependency, is a herculean task.

Robert Dallek gives this task his best shot in Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power. He succeeds admirably, even though all the twists and turns, the ins and outs, the endless debates and analysis, is far too much for one book, even one that stretches to a relatively robust 623 pages of text. There is a density to this volume that makes it feel longer than it is, a density that comes from trying to pack a lot of information into limited pages, as though this book is carry-on luggage, and Dallek wanted to avoid a checked bag fee.

While enjoyable, it can also be exhausting, and left me – similar to Nixon during Watergate – in need of a drink.

***

Dallek begins Nixon and Kissinger with brief biographical chapters devoted to each of his principal subjects. He also has a chapter on the 1968 election, which gives you a lot of the context for the actions taken in Nixon’s presidency. These opening chapters are helpful if you are unfamiliar with these men, though I would stop short of saying this is popular history. While accessible, it does not have room for background amplification. Thus, if you aren’t already familiar with the contours of Nixon’s presidency, you might feel like you’re missing something.

From page 89 till the end, Dallek focuses on Nixon and Kissinger’s interplay in the White House. Because Nixon made foreign policy the centerpiece of his presidency, and because foreign policy was Kissinger’s job, Dallek tethers the narrative to this topic, ignoring Nixon’s domestic policy. While understandable, it’s a bit like viewing the Nixon presidency with one eye closed. Foreign policy was Nixon’s top priority, but domestic issues affected the execution of his goals. Even a brief primer on these matters would have given a fuller picture of Nixon’s administration.

Regardless, there are plenty of matters to chew on. Dallek covers the opening of China, détente with the Soviet Union, the endless friction in the Middle East, the India-Pakistani War, and the overthrow of Allende’s government in Chile. And that’s just for starters. Vietnam hovers over everything, with Nixon and Kissinger trading blood and coin for the nebulous concept of “peace with honor.”

Also, there’s that little item about the burglars and the hotel and some hush money and it’s all on tape.

***

Dallek covers these potentially explosive incidents with a certain amount of restrained criticism. He comes across as an old school, centrist historian, careful in his research, methodical in his presentation, and even-keeled with his judgments. It would be very easy to go off the rails, either delivering an adjective-fueled tirade against Nixon’s duplicity, or going the other way, and making an impassioned revisionist argument for Nixon’s unrealized legacy. Dallek does neither. He sort of just lays things out. He scolds Nixon, but does so gently, an academic critique that lacks energy.

Nevertheless, Dallek does take a definite position on these power partners. He sees both men as essentially torn in two. They were visionaries, seeing relationships and stability where others saw only fear and distrust; but they were also cynics, embarking on diplomatic crusades in order to distract the public from Watergate. Always Dallek has to measure deed versus intent. China, for instance, has burnished Nixon’s legacy. His opening of relations is now seen as a tremendous success. Of course, as Dallek reminds us, Nixon bucked his own reputation as an anti-red, anti-communist pit-fighter in bringing about this coup. (One imagines the hell he would’ve raised, had a Democrat tried to normalize relations with Red China).

Unsurprisingly, Dallek is most critical of Nixon when it comes to Vietnam. He tends to support the view that the Paris Peace Accords in 1973 got Nixon exactly what he could have achieved in 1968, with the exception of the further loss of 20,000 American soldiers and untold thousands of Vietnamese troops and civilians.

***

For me, the real draw of Nixon and Kissinger is the interplay between the two protagonists of this story. Due to the fact that Nixon recorded so many conversations, we really get a detailed and intimate look at how Nixon and Kissinger interacted. It’s something! You have to read it to believe it. Here is a sampling of their partnership, occurring just before Nixon resigned, which just scratches the surface of the pathologies involved:

After some unhappy reflections from Nixon on the possibility that he would face criminal prosecutions, Kissinger promised to resign “if they harass you.” Henry became so emotional at the thought of Nixon in the dock or perhaps himself forced to leave office to rescue the president and the country from a public nightmare, he began to cry. Nixon broke down as well and between sobs insisted that Henry not resign…After an hour and a half of this emotional rollercoaster, Henry started to leave. But on their way to the elevator that would liberate Henry from Nixon’s embarrassing display of self-pity, the president asked him to kneel with him in prayer. As they prayed, Nixon began sobbing again amid cries of anguish at the misery his enemies had inflicted on him.

The President and his Secretary of State, weeping together in the White House: a strangely fitting end-scene for a relationship that Dallek notes “partly rested on deception and hostility.”

***

The more you think of the presidency, the more you have to wonder about what type of person wants this job in the first place, much less thinks they can do it. Presidents make hard decisions, and those decisions affect people’s lives. A lot of times, those decisions end people’s lives. That is a tremendous, near-unimaginable amount of power to possess. You cannot fairly blame a president for everything that goes wrong – since he (or someday, hopefully, she) – is only human, and therefore of limited ability to foresee all ends.

I can blame a president for a faulty decision-making process. For taking serious actions for unserious reasons. For discarding human lives for political gain. For disrupting the real for the sake of the theoretical. For putting yourself above the country you swore to lead and defend. That’s the Nixon that Dallek presents, a Nixon abetted by Kissinger. It’s a story worth reading and pondering, because Nixon’s presidency should be viewed as a warning, not an aberration.

[Anthony · Rating 3 out of 5]

Their Way

Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger are two of the most infamous and divisive figures in modern American history. Robert Dallek’s book Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power looks at this complex and consequential partnership. Dallek, a renowned historian, who’s book on JFK really impressed me, delves deep into the intertwined personal and political lives of Nixon and Kissinger, capturing their ambitions, rivalries, and shared vision for remaking America’s role in the world. The book provides a nuanced portrait of two figures who were both brilliant strategists and deeply flawed individuals, driven by a volatile mix of insecurity, ambition, and opportunism.

In Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power, Dallek does not merely recount the events of Nixon and Kissinger’s time in power; he also explores the psychological dynamics of their relationship. Nixon is portrayed as deeply paranoid, insecure, and prone to vindictiveness, while Kissinger emerges as a man of vast intellectual arrogance, adept at flattering and manipulating his way to influence. Their relationship, while fraught with mistrust, was ultimately symbiotic—both men needed each other to achieve their geopolitical goals.

Dallek excels in his examination of key policies and events, such as détente with the Soviet Union, the opening to China, and the Vietnam War. He provides clear and accessible analysis, showing how Nixon and Kissinger’s grand strategy often came at a great human and moral cost. For instance, their secret bombing campaigns in Cambodia and Laos are portrayed as emblematic of their realpolitik approach, prioritizing power and prestige over ethics and transparency.

While Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power is richly detailed, I found the narrative dense and hard to follow at times. Dallek’s meticulous approach to documentation occasionally slows the pacing, and his reliance on psychological analysis, though insightful, can feel repetitive. Additionally, critics have argued that the book leans heavily on Nixon’s flaws, perhaps underemphasising some of his achievements and contributions to foreign policy.

In the end Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power is a solid exploration of a consequential era in American history and the personalities that shaped it. Dallek’s work is always worth reading, however for me this just wasn’t his best work. But for those interested in Cold War diplomacy, presidential history, and the intricate dynamics of political partnerships there is a lot of quality information here. Also, while it may not completely satisfy readers looking for a more balanced view of Nixon and Kissinger’s legacies, it offers a deeply researched and compelling account of their shared rise and fall.

[Cora · Rating 4 out of 5]

I love Richard Nixon. Actually, let me rephrase that. I love reading about Richard Nixon. The White House taping system ensures that we have as unfiltered a view of the man as one could possibly expect from a historical figure, and it happens to be the one who had a legendarily extreme personality. He was capable of great vision--at one point on the tapes he is rhapsodizing about the historic nature of the China summit--and great pettiness, since five minutes later he's scheming to ensure that Henry Kissinger and Secretary of State William Rogers don't take credit. The mixture of the two opposing elements often expressed itself as self-pity, megalomania, paranoia, and some combination of the three. On a number of occasions, he tells an underling that he intends to smash 'the American establishment' which stands in opposition with average Joes like him. (One wonders what definition of "establishment" wouldn't include a well-educated politician with a thirty year career in the Republican party.)

Standing along Nixon, as the Renfield to Nixon's Dracula, was Henry Kissinger. I knew less about him before reading NIXON AND KISSINGER, but I was aware of his cultivated air of cosmopolitanism and realism, and it was revealing to learn that he was capable of being the most unctuous toady. Kissinger seems to have held Nixon in some amount of contempt, but he was always ready to validate Nixon's worst impulses and praise him as a historic figure striding across the world stage, with each insight more brilliant than the one before them. Meanwhile, to anyone else, Kissinger was an insufferable tyrant--Dallek tells a story about Tony Lake, who fainted from nervous exhaustion after working many seven-day work weeks in a row; Kissinger was seen standing over him, screaming at him to get up and get back to work.

Dallek argues effectively that this combustible relationship affected even the most successful of Nixon's foreign policies, and at worst caused much unnecessary bloodshed as the result of Cold War biases or straight-up cynicism. Nixon saw himself as a great man of history, and had little patience for dealing with lesser nations. (The sense of personal affront comes out a lot in his descriptions of North Vietnam: "this shit-ass country", "a fourth-rate power," "a fifth-rate agricultural country", etc.) Kissinger was of a similar mindset; he reportedly told the Chilean ambassador in 1969 that "[n]othing important can ever come from the South. History has never been produced in the South. The axis of history starts in Moscow, goes to Bonn, crosses over to Washington, and then goes to Tokyo. What happens in the South is of no importance. You're wasting your time."

So as a result, these two cold-hearted realists often operated under the most absurd misconceptions. They often pestered the Soviet Union to bring the Vietnam War to a close, as if the Soviets were able to do so. When Marxist Salvador Allende was elected president of Chile in 1970, Nixon became alarmed that the combination of Chile and Cuba turned Latin America into a "red sandwich" that could bring down capitalist governments as far away as Italy. Most dangerously, Nixon and Kissinger saw the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 as a blatant power grab by Soviet-aligned India against China-aligned Pakistan. Fearing Soviet dominance in South Asia, they urged the Chinese government to send troops to the Indo-Chinese border, which may well have expanded the war into a messier regional conflict. (China politely ignored the suggestion.)

It's also hard to stomach Nixon's hypocrisy on the Vietnam War. He often played the patriotism card against liberal war critics, while secretly believing the war was basically unwinnable. He attempted to intervene during the 1968 election to prevent the possibility of a peace treaty that would aid Hubert Humphrey. After 1968, his war aims were basically to prevent the fall of South Vietnam until after his re-election. His expansion of the war into Cambodia and Laos seems particularly reckless in this context.

I wish Dallek had explored a little more the question of whether Nixon was the indispensable man that he portrayed himself as. There's an old Vulcan proverb that "only Nixon could go to China," on the theory that only Nixon with his rock solid anti-communist credentials could defeat the powerful Taiwan lobby within the United States. If true, one could argue that you have to take the bad parts of Nixon to get the good parts of Nixon. But to my mind, this is worth calling into question: the failure of Vietnam undermined a lot of Cold War thinking in the United States, and the logic of detente dates back to Kennedy's test ban treaty with the Soviets and growing unease about the arms race. (It's not even necessarily a question of finding the right foreign policy team; Hubert Humphrey apparently intended to hire Kissinger for his administration as well.)

Not surprisingly, Nixon often trumpeted his foreign policy during Watergate to give the impression that he could not be replaced without undermining the (relatively) good relations with China and the Soviet Union. But, in the most amazing part of the book, Dallek discusses the degree to which Nixon had checked out of foreign policy during Watergate, leaving Kissinger to largely run foreign policy. Kissinger began to ignore intemperate instructions, to work around Nixon's excessive drinking, and give instructions in Nixon's name. During the Yom Kippur War, Kissinger held one meeting in the White House while Nixon was incapacitated by sedatives, in which he ordered the military to be put on higher alert while sending an official message to Brezhnev about preventing a wider war. More than twenty-four hours went by before he told the president what decisions his administration had made.

I occasionally had issues with Dallek's style, which struck me as clunky in too many places, but I found the subject matter to be continually fascinating and the book is filled with really astonishing moments. Nixon is probably the most memorable politician of the era, and this is a good account of him doing the thing that he loved doing best, for better and for worse.

[Jonfaith · Rating 3 out of 5]

Nixon: "Our hand doesn't show on this one though."
Kissinger: "We didn't do it . . . "
Nixon: "That is right. And that is the way it is going to be played . . . "

This one wound up being grueling, especially on holiday, especially on holiday during the World Cup. There is considerable stomach turning detail. The idea that both men were thin-skinned and manipulative percolated my own internal inventory. It makes one wonder. This book is strictly an account of the foreign policy of the Nixon Administration and the role Kissinger played in executing such. This continues until Watergate at which point the narrative delineates the relative madness of the White House until Nixon's resignation.

The above quote is about Chile, not domestic dirty tricks. The sections detailing the "handling" of the Vietnam War were brilliant history though one larded with excessive detail and too many full quotes of both men being vulgar and unreasonably optimistic, given the circumstances on the ground.

I made a conscious effort to avoid politics this week and perhaps for the entire World Cup. Certain images and political retreats were still able to grab me, but I will stop here before making any parallels with the infamous personalities detailed in Dallek’s book.

[Bakunin · Rating 2 out of 5]

"Where is the wisdom lost in knowledge
Where is the knowledge lost in information?"

This book was flat and presented nothing new. I was curious if there was any new perspectives on Nixon and Kissinger but alas that was the one thing the book did NOT provide. Instead there was copious amount of information. It also seemed to me that the author seemed bent on interpreting every act the two committed as egotistical, machiavellian and therefore destructive. To be sure there was a lot of backstabbing going on during that administration but what about the accomplishments of their foreign policy? The fact that both have large egos and share a common paranoia does not diminish this.

What I really wanted to know is how come a person like Nixon came to think like a realpolitiker rather than take the view of his predecessors. Who was Nixon? Kissingers take is this: "There is no true Nixon [...] several warring personalities struggled to preeminence in the same individual. One was idealistic, thoughtful, generous; another was vindictive, emotional. There was a reflective, philosophical, stoical Nixon; and there was an impetuous, impulsive and erratic one" (p. 206). This does not seem enough to do his complexity justice.

[Lewis Weinstein · Rating 5 out of 5]

excellent ... lots of fascinating details presented like a novel

[Mara · Rating 4 out of 5]

Caveats I was in third grade when Richard Nixon died and remember that my class got to go to the school library to watch a video I interpreted as being mainly about his Cocker Spaniel, Checkers.* Other than seeing the movie Dick starring teenage Michelle Williams and Kirsten Dunst** when I was in high-school, it's safe to say that my knowledge of our 37th president remained pretty limited. As a result, reading Partners in Power, at times, felt like seeing the "behind the music" for a band I never knew. However, with some careful cross-referencing and good ol' Google by my side, I was able to enjoy the incredible, in-depth view Robert Dallek provides of Nixon, Kissenger and their time together in the White House.

Not that it was really on the table, but after reading this book I am more sure than ever that I do not want to be President. I also think it's a position that was pretty ill-suited to meet Richard Nixon's need not only to rise to a position of power but to be validated by others once there. I don't have the sort of knee-jerk desire to boo and hiss at the mention of Nixon that I might had I lived through his administration. That's not to say that he comes off as particularly likable. Nixon's "cultural anti-Semitism," and persistent beliefs that he was being persecuted by the liberal, intellectual, Northeastern elite are attributes I find beyond unappealing (I, personally, want people who know more about stuff than I do to make decisions about said "stuff"). He certainly displays little tact in describing his reticence to let Kissinger take part in early decisions regarding the Middle East.

His [Kissinger's] people were crucified over there. Jesus Christ! Five- six million of them popped into big ovens!

Kissinger is certainly not always a charismatic character, but his more off-putting attributes at least seem to be more justified.

Kissinger took refuge in his intellectual superiority... Intellectual arrogance born of Kissinger's uncommon brainpower partly explains his capacity to overcome his own weakness and ward off attacks from hostile critics.

Nixon's overwhelming need to receive credit for foreign policy while he was in office is persistent throughout his rise and fall and underlies much of his conflict with Kissinger. Kissinger describes this as "the monomaniacal obsession of the Nixon White House with public relations" (p.329). Indeed, at times the need for positive PR in combination with a free press (which I am totallyfor by the way) could seem almost like unfair disadvantages when dealing with Communist regimes "unencumbered" by consequences of public reaction. (Again, I'm big into free speech, but I see how having a reactive audience could make it hard to play poker...)

This book was slow but fascinating reading for me due to my lack of familiarity with the times. I certainly don't fault Dallek for this. This book would have been unwieldy and epic if he had tried to fully delve into the world events addressed by the eponymous dynamic duo. As Kissinger described, there is something timeless and tragic about the arc of Nixon's story knowing from the beginning how he will meet his end:

"It was like one of those Greek things where a man is told his fate," Henry told Hugh Sidey, "and fulfills it anyway, knowing exactly what is going to happen to him."

Turns out it wasn't all puppies and rainbows in the Nixon White House. However, there was definitely one task that Kissinger and any presidential dog-walker have in common... (I'll leave that one up to you to figure out)


* My presidential pet obsession was kind of a thing- I received an 8x10 glossy photo of the Bush's English Springer Spaniel puppies from the Office of the President after I was devastated to learn that "Mrs. Bush was out walking them" when I asked to meet Millie and her brood while touring the White House on a family vacation.
** Especially exciting as the two leading ladies became presidential dog-walkers (pretty much my dream job at the time)

[Nathan · Rating 5 out of 5]

One doesn't know where to start. Nixon and Kissinger is much more than another tome about Tricky Dick and Watergate. (In fact, several hundred pages elapse before Watergate even enters into the picture.) Dallek's research, which draws on a number of recently declassified archives, tape transcripts and interviews, examines how the personalities of two men influenced American foreign policy during the final years of the Vietnam War. Richard Nixon won his first term as president promising to end the conflict in Vietnam. For four years after that, the attempt to end the war turned into a protracted battle to win an election he was already going to win. That debates about ending the war were dominated by political concerns more than strategic or moral concerns is only one of the shocking aspects of the Nixon-Kissinger dynamic. This dynamic starts with Richard Nixon, a power hungry, newly elected president, and an ambitious, brilliant, insecure adviser named Henry Kissinger, a man who understood, as Alexander Haig said, that "access to the monarch is power." The story ends with a president so distracted and so broken that a Secretary of State is literally running the country while presidential aids try to keep track of the president's mental stability. In between these two extremes, Dallek's remarkable history clarifies how a man who started his career chasing communists went on to visit China and make the first steps toward Détente. It's a story that veers through Chile, with the CIA plotting to get rid of Allende, and through Israel, with Nixon and Kissinger jockeying Big Oil concerns with Cold War tensions against arms shipments to Israel and favoritism to Pakistan over India. We see a portrait of a president, paranoid and prejudicial, that makes clear the truth in the old Vulcan proverb, "Only Nixon could go to China." Questions arise... Does the CIA corrupt the president or does the president corrupt the CIA? Is this how talking points and "wag the dog" syndrome got started? Just how long has Bob Novak been leaking things for the White House? Would I get more of these in-jokes if I'd read Dobrynin's book? Why were so many bombing raids named after meals? Is a drunk president better than no president? Attention is also drawn to the Middle East; or rather, it's noted how often our attention wasn't on the Middle East when it should have been. It is also noted that the Vietnam conflict, when it finally ended, ended on the same terms Nixon could have ended it on when he walked into office four years earlier. Dallek's book is somewhat alarming for how often it seems that politics and platitudes outweigh strategy or solid planning, never mind a solid objective. But as Henry said to Dick, "This way, at least we're coming off like men."

NC

[Christopher Saunders · Rating 4 out of 5]

Robert Dallek's Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power profiles the relationship between the 37th President and his mercurial National Security Adviser. Dallek, a veteran presidential historian, draws the familiar parallels between Richard Nixon's rise from a poor California background to the apex of American politics, and Henry Kissinger's rise from German-Jewish refugee to academic to head of America's foreign policy apparatus. Using memoirs, tapes and numerous other sources, Dallek shows that the two men were alternately joined-at-the-hip against the foreign policy "Establishment" and resentful of each others' power and public image; the book shows that Kissinger was less a sage diplomat than an unusually gifted courtier, eager to stoke his boss's worst instincts while portraying himself as "the reasonable one" to the press and public. Thus he endured his boss's antisemitism and backstabbing for the ability to exercise power, whether in waging war, making peace, wiretapping aids or quashing bureaucratic rivals (Secretary of State William Rogers, as usual in these accounts, comes across as a hopeless patsy to Kissinger's power plays). Nixon, meanwhile, allows political calculations, personal resentments and obsession with secrecy to cloud his policymaking, adding a cynical edge even to his positive achievements. Dallek rehearses familiar events (Cambodia, the China opening and SALT with the USSR, the Bangladesh genocide and coup in Chile) with varying, but generally critical perspectives: Dallek views Nixon and Kissinger's prolonging the Vietnam War as profoundly misguided and cynical (a position few modern writers would dispute), blames the duo for exacerbating the carnage in East Pakistan/Bangladesh by refusing to rein in Pakistan's government and shows Kissinger's strong culpability in the fall of Chile's Allende. Yet he acknowledges that their detente policies were farsighted and played a key role in de-escalating world tensions, while also spotlighting Kissinger's "shuttle diplomacy" in the Middle East which cooled tensions after the Yom Kippur War and laid the groundwork for Jimmy Carter's Camp David Accords several years later. Ultimately, Dallek's portrait of Nixon and Kissinger is of two men, both able and even brilliant, devoured by their own egos, lust for recognition and impulses to exercise power for its own sake. While Nixon and Kissinger doesn't add a great deal to the mountains of extant literature, Dallek recapitulates their reign of error in an accessible, incisive manner.

[Chin Joo · Rating 2 out of 5]

This book juxtasposes two interesting characters who were similar yet different at the same time. This is not just a biography of two close colleagues but is an attempt to show how their respective tenures weaved together, at times in harmony, giving each other support, yet some times contradicting, coming close to breaking down on some occasions.

Since the gist of the story is about how these two men worked together, the author's effort at keeping the description of the earlier parts of their lives short is greatly appreciated. The bulk of the book rightly centres on the time of the Nixon presidency, when the two men worked closely together.

The author managed to present a picture of two men working together who were at once very similar in nature to each other but ended up with very different reputations. They needed each other yet at the same time tried to outdo one another. They served the same administration yet were almost at odds with each other on a number of foreign policy issues. They were each other's best friends yet had palpable disdain for each other, with Kissinger calling Nixon the meanest of names (pg 93) while Nixon showing that he was rightly deserving of them through the perverse pleasure he took in distressing Kissinger (pg 288). Such is the skill of the author in crafting a story filled with intriguing personalities and complicated relationships. In the end one could not help wondering about the complexities of Whitehouse relationships.

Both Nixon and Kissinger didn't come out looking very well. Nixon looked like a manipulating, crude, and insecure guy who constantly needed reassurance and reaffirmation about what he was doing. Kissinger on the other hand was egoistic, narcissistic, calculating and self-serving. But both would provide what the other needed: Kissinger was always ready to help Nixon smoke his own dope, giving superlative praises in spades, while Nixon gave Kissinger the opportunities (no matter how unwillingly) to play his role as the super-star of foreign policy. And when things did not work out, they could always resort to threats which they would not carry out, Kissinger on resigning his position, and Nixon on cancelling the summits with various world leaders. Nixon however came out looking slightly worse because of his readiness to resort to "dirty tricks" (pg 186), even as early as MyLai. In the end he would be brought down by one of these and gained the inglorious reputation of being the first (and only) president in the US to resign. In the last two chapters when Watergate was catching up with Nixon, the author portrayed a guy who always seemed to be on the verge of breakdown, and that was where the paths of Nixon and Kissinger diverged. One became almost maniacal, while the other went on to the peak of his reputation as a man who brought peace to the Middle East. It was almost painful to read, but the contrast between their fates only heighten the drama near the end.

This is the second book of Dallek's that I've read, and both I did not enjoy. It was not that he was a bad writer, but I just didn't take to his style. There was no occasion where I found the author's grammar wanting, I think it has more to do with his rather dry style that does not help the story to flow. Also, in this book he quoted Ambrose a lot, giving one the impression that it was the only source that he consulted, but what grated me more was his habit of quoting conversations wholesale, something that he also did in the earlier book that I read. Too much of this makes me feel that he has not analysed his subjects enough.

One also wonders about the approach taken by the author in terms of portraying the characters. Does trying to be fair and impartial equate to ensuring that the subjects are seen in a poor light? We all know what happened with Nixon, but I could hardly find anything in the book that spoke well of him. I am not much of a Nixon fan, but I do not think that he has almost no redeeming features. Kissinger looked better in comparison, but only slightly, and that was because he was put in contrast to Nixon in the last days of the presidency. I think I would not judge this book a fair account of either man, just as one praising the subjects is not necessarily biased.

Finally I would like to talk about a couple of points that I reflected upon as I read the book. Firstly, the elections in the US has a huge impact on policy decision-making. Although I believe this to be true in other democratic countries, what was unfortunate in this case was its impact on the decisions relating to the Vietnam War. Some decisions were purposely delayed because of the election in order to achieve some political optics. These delays caused many American and Vietnamese lives to be lost. While it is easy to put the blame on the politicians, we the electorate should perhaps ask if our way of looking at politicians' behaviours and our inability to comprehend complex issues have led to them needing to 'manipulate' us by presenting the best possible facade.

Secondly, no matter what relationship one has with his/her boss, one should never try to look better than the boss. No bosses like to look less able than their subordinates. Being a deputy is therefore much more challenging than being the boss in some sense; you do not want to look stupid, yet you cannot look smarter than your boss. On occasions Kissinger let his narcissism get the better of him, inccuring Nixon's wrath.

I am no Nixon/Kissinger specialist and do not intent to be one. For a superficial understanding of these two men and their relationship, this book suffices. I suspect that it is positioned as one to fill the gap in the literature of these two men by exploring the complex constructive and yet amazingly self-serving relationship between two of the most important men during the cold war era. For that reason, this is one book that may be of interest to those wanting to know more about how these two men have worked together during their time.

[Erik Graff · Rating 3 out of 5]

Having lived through the events of Nixon's political career, I find reading retrospective studies interesting, both as a reminders and as corrective supplements to more contemporary accounts. Having read a great deal about the Nixon presidency and Watergate, however, there was little new here. Hersch's 'Price of Power' is a more thorough study of Kissinger and there are any number of biographies of Nixon which go into much more detail. What's special about this book is simply that it focuses on the relationship between the two men from 1968 until 1974.

[Karl Skov · Rating 4 out of 5]

Spændende bog om Nixon. Dybdegående afsnit om Vietnamkrigen og Nixons besøg i Kina. Jeg savnede dog fokus på Nixons reformer på miljøområdet samt hans “war on cancer”.

[Robert · Rating 4 out of 5]

I have been reading fat books about American politics and policy lately to strengthen my forearms. Seems to have worked. This whopper is another look back at a critical period when I was wondering if I would end up in Canada as opposed to Vietnam. My number was 211, so I was "safe."

I already knew about 80% of this study's story, but the remaining 20% made a difference. The first two years of the Nixon presidency were torture for him and his national security advisory, Henry Kissinger. They could not (and did not ever) reach a point where they had positioned the South Vietnamese to be able to defend themselves under a so-called peace treaty without US military presence. Many have lamented that the final deal could have been negotiated at the outset of Nixon's presidency since it overlooked South Vietnam's vulnerability. I wonder about that, but what was done was done. We'll never know. US involvement in Vietnam was so badly conceived and executed that withdrawal never would have been easy or ended up with a South Vietnam as a sovereign state.

Nixon and Kissinger were determined to get out of Vietnam, open relations with China, and reboot relations with the USSR. They didn't really want to deal with the Middle East, India and Pakistan, or Chile, but they did. As Nixon fell, Kissinger rose. Nixon managed Kissinger fairly well in opening relations with China. That's his accomplishment. The two of them were a team in detente with the USSR. By Dallek's account, Kissinger presided over the needless destruction of Allende in Chile, and by all accounts, Kissinger pushed the Middle East toward peace after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.

Dallek does an excellent and troubling job in exploring Nixon's tortured personality and Kissinger's relentless ambition. Nixon was much less stable before the Watergate fiasco than I had known. He was no good with whiskey but resorted to it often. He abused Kissinger a fair amount out of jealousy. Kissinger put up with it for the sake of the power Nixon gave him. By the final year of the Nixon presidency, Nixon was flailing and not competent to be president. Kissinger, Haig and others kept this as quiet as they could, but "Washington" knew. Dallek details Nixon's demise vividly. There was a heavy toll on Kissinger as well, but again, he rose as Nixon crashed.

For me as a former diplomat, I found Dallek's account of diplomacy's grueling costs realistic and persuasive. You spend a lot of time on long flights, eat bad food, can't get your body clock on schedule and know that you are being lied to and resisted up to the last moments of agreement...and sometimes beyond. Washington follows you everywhere. Mischief makers inside and outside any administration abound. Preserving the basic concepts of your positions and conveying those concepts to the media and public is tricky. In some senses Nixon and Kissinger were superhuman with superhuman strengths and flaws. Dallek's book is an excellent exploration of what that meant in terms of U.S. interests around the world.

[Jdb · Rating 2 out of 5]

2.5 Stars
This 2007 book is a history of the relationship between Nixon and Kissinger during Nixon’s Presidency. It focuses primarily on foreign policy actions/decisions as Kissinger was National Security Advisor & then Secretary of State under Nixon.

After reading Dallek’s bio of JFK I looked forward to reading this. Oops, what a mistake. This is a muddled mess.

This book suffers from a tedious, excruciating amount of detail, nearly an hour by hour account that obfuscates the general context of events. Combined with a hopscotch-like chronology, the narrative often left me dizzy.

Dallek presents a most damning indictment of Nixon, with no positive comments except for his opening of relations with China. Kissinger is not treated much better as the author condemns him for sucking up to Nixon but does give him high praise for his Middle East negotiations which laid the groundwork for Carter’s Camp David Accords.

To be sure, Nixon ain’t our most admirable President & his Watergate coverup was one of the worst actions a President ever took (until Trump tried to overturn the 2020 election). According to Dallek, every action & statement by Nixon was motivated by his desire to take the credit, to enhance his re-election chances or to reframe his administration in a positive light.This is a veritable hit piece.

What President since WW II hasn’t put positive spin on what they do and considered the political impact of actions on re-election?

Interesting Quotes:

Kissinger-“ If I had to choose between justice & disorder or injustice & order, I would choose the latter”

Khrushchev-“ Politicians are the same all over-they promise to build a bridge even when there is no river”

Dallek-“ For Nixon & Kissinger, harsh life experiences had made both men cynical about people’s motives and encouraged convictions that outdoing opponents required a relaxed view of scruples “

Kissinger on difference between Chinese and Russians-“If you drop loose change, when you go to pick it up Russians will step on your finger & Chinese won’t “

Nixon-“ I am not a crook”

Read this book if you must but put on your boots cause you’re going to trudge through a lot of literary sludge.

[Kevin · Rating 3 out of 5]

A pedestrian view of an important diplomatic relationship without many critiques. Very good for the general history of the relationship between Nixon & Kissinger, but not a great biography of either.

[Jerome Otte · Rating 4 out of 5]

A great, insightful history of an interesting partnership, although it’s more a history of Nixon’s foreign policy and Kissinger’s role (rather than a joint biography). Dallek’s style is evenhanded and all of his criticisms are solidly backed up, and he does a great job describing how dependent they were on each other despite their huge differences.

Dallek describes all of their major accomplishments: the opening to China (“a demonstration of how pragmatic [Nixon] could be to achieve something he believed would establish him as a great president”), detente with the Soviets, arms control and ending the Vietnam War, as well all of the blunders, like (again) Vietnam (primarily influenced by domestic politics and the termination of which ultimately did less to discredit the US globally than they feared), Chile (which undercut US claims about American respect for the right of national self-determination), the tilt toward Pakistan (which involved the US in a regional dispute that had little relevance to US, Soviet, or even Chinese interests), and Watergate (where Nixon’s presidency became the victim of its own methods and all of his accomplishments were somewhat eclipsed)

Dallek does a great job describing how much Nixon and Kissinger had in common: distrust in others (and each other) a desire for power and prestige, and a propensity for delusion. Both could be petty and vengeful, and neither seemed to have much interest in domestic affairs. While they were always collaborating on something during Nixon’s presidency, it does not seem like they were personally close, with Nixon recommending to his aides that Kissinger get psychiatric therapy and dubbing him “Sir Henry,” a “dictator” a “crybaby,” and “psychopathic” and complaining that Kissinger had NSC discussions about “every goddamn little shit-ass thing that happens...he has too many meetings. They go on and on and on and on about crap” or Kissinger blasting Nixon as “our drunken friend” or a “madman.” Although loyal to the president (even through Watergate) Kissinger often had doubts about Nixon’s ability, and it does seem like Kissinger was the more brilliant of the two, while Nixon’s mood swings, caginess and paranoia was always a problem (Dallek still concludes that Kissinger’s blind loyalty to Nixon was a “disservice to the country”) Kissinger was also able to adopt a persona that allowed him to come off as charming: Nixon, on the other hand, was a paranoid control freak and generally did not seem to like people very much, and people responded accordingly. Both genuinely seemed to regard their own image and legacy as a priority, and each used the other for political gain.

Dallek’s writing can be a bit dull, with some clunky writing here and there (like China agreeing on a rapprochement with the US “after a sharp internal policy conflict”) and Dallek’s provision of background and context can seem inconsistent at times. Dalleck does not cover some of the other influences on Nixon’s foreign policy in detail (the anti-war movement, Congress, other officials, NSC, or even Nixon and Kissinger’s own worldviews) There is also little on the “madman” theory, Mao’s diplomacy, or even the “Nixon Doctrine.” The book often reads like a somewhat disjointed collection of anecdotes, and much of the “analysis” seems more like shallow observations aided by hindsight, although they do seem sound. And for some reason there’s next to nothing on the SALT negotiations, and relatively little on NATO-related issues, Chile or Watergate. Dallek’s habit of calling Kissinger “Henry” is a little irritating. At one point Dallek writes that Le Duc Tho suggested the date for a negotiated settlement, even though it was Kissinger. There is ultimately little background on how the international world changed during their era. And for some reason Dallek asserts that a successful negotiation of the 1968 Vietnam peace talks would be unlikely to have much effect on the 1968 election (really?)

Still, a readable and well-researched history.

[Martin Zook · Rating 5 out of 5]

It was worse than we thought.

Dallek's insights into Nixon are scarier than Stanley Kubrick's Dr. Strangelove. Where the movie was a satirical fiction to shine a light on truth, Dallek's recounting of Nixon's "tactic" of presenting himself as an unbalanced man with his finger on the button is downright scary on two accounts: 1) it was nonfictional; 2) people tend to become roles that initially are pretend.

That's not the only alarming revelation of this history focusing on Nixon's and Kissinger's execution of foreign policy. Dalleck carefully details how the two were obsessed with secrecy that precluded balancing influences in the conduct of the war in S.E. Asia (such as the decision to expand the war into Cambodia), and in Chile, where the US was up to its elbows in overthrowing the elected administration of Allende.

Dallek makes clear that the dynamic of Nixon's paranoia feeding Kissinger's paranoia, feeding Nixon's paranoia feeding Kissinger's paranoia skewed their perceptions to the point where the two thought the history of the free world teetered on events that were just not that pivotal.

Dallek does an outstanding job of explaining how international events not only influenced each other, but also swayed domestic policy. Vietnam, which is an historical enemy of China, depended largely on aid from the Soviet, with whom N&K were desperately seeking a nuclear nonproliferation agreement, which the mainland Chinese feared tipped the balance of power against them. Success in negotiating agreements with all these players was pivotal to Nixon's re-election, or so it was thought in the White House, despite a 36 percentage point lead over the Democrat's candidate George McGovern late in the campaign.

Petty? Nixon was so obsessed with receiving credit for any and all advancements that his paranoia consumed energies that would have been better expended on substantive issues. At times, this concern bordered on madness, especially as Nixon's emotional and psychological health deteriorated.

In at least one instance, a meeting of defense officials had to be terminated early because the president was raving madness, making it impossible to address items on the agenda. As pressure built for Nixon's resignation, Kissinger conducted foreign policy, but rushed back to Washington to prop up the president during public pronouncements.

Ironically enough, despite Nixon's obsession with occupying center stage, it was Kissinger who was publicly recognized on magazine covers and in public adulation.

[Ryan · Rating 2 out of 5]

My main draw to this book was to gain insight about Kissinger, since this book is a dual biography. (It was this or Walter Isaacson's bio of HK, which is longer though is also older. I thought it might be a richer book since more documents, tapes, etc., have been released since the Isaacson publication.) This book primarily focuses on the administration's foreign policy achievements and blunders, going into further detail compared to other books about relations with the Middle East (Golda Meir, Sadat, etc.) and the tensions it caused with detente. The book coasts over a lot of Watergate detail, but does highlight how Nixon's staff and cabinet (e.g., SecDef James Schlesinger) lost confidence in the president.

(On a side note, for those interested in reading about Nixon, you won't find compare to Stephen Ambrose's inexplicably out of print three-volume series. The first volume on Nixon's rise and tenure in Congress and as Eisenhower's VP is spectacular. That book gives insight to Nixon's character as well as making him all the more a tragic figure - living in the shadow of Eisenhower, wrestling with the demons of his upbringing, etc.)

It took me months to read this book. I was reading chapters between other books. Dallek's book on JFK is decent; based on his previous work, I expected a more impartial account here. I finished this book more or less out of spite and to not completely squander the time investment. It's one of the more ridiculous history books I've read. I'm not sure I'd say it was a complete waste of time so much as I didn't gain much out of it. It's a book more for Nixon-haters looking to reinforce a negative image than it is for readers, like myself, looking to get a fuller picture of his life and his presidency.

I laughed out loud reading its last pages. With resignation imminent, Kissinger reiterated that history would be favorable to Nixon's foreign policy. Comically, Dallek writes "...ever convinced that political bias trumped historical reality or that anyone could ever be objective about a president's actions, Nixon predicted that it would depend on who wrote the histories" (p. 609).

Nixon was no angel, but to write a giant book so seething with hatred, full of snide asides, 20/20 hindsight and constant assumptions about the subject's psychological state is not a faithful attempt to provide historical comment. I cannot believe this book was a Pulitzer Prize finalist.

[John Bene · Rating 2 out of 5]

American society - and the global balance of power - would be different had Richard Nixon's 1964 prediction that we wouldn't "have Dick Nixon to kick around anymore" had come true. These two men were so influential, especially on geopolitical affairs, it is nearly impossible to estimate the world without them. But we know it would not be an unambiguously sweeter place, like Bedford Falls without George Bailey.


For non-Watergate junkies, this is a comprehensive recitation of the Nixon presidency. For those who know the story as nauseum, it is a lot of tilling already-tilled soil, much of which, one suspects, was leaked by Kissinger or his henchmen to protect Kissinger's image. Yes there is new material but most of the truly interesting tidbits are already well known. One also gets the sense that there is so much more between the lines than in them.


Given everything we already know, this doesn't provide anything new an insightful, which is equally amazing and disappointing. These men were both brilliant, driven, self-made, paranoid, scheming, duplicitous and meglomanical, and obsessed with their public images. There has to be a fascinating story to tell about how these two personalities melded that remade our world. But this book just doesn't do it.


As if in an effort to make up for the lack of real insight, the author self-consciously pokes in and out of the narrative of events trying to find something important to say. But without insight or a unifying theme, the commentary seems artificial and distracting. Rarely was it even interesting.


For those who don't know much about the Nixon presidency, especially it's historic work in foreign affairs, this is an excellent book. For the rest, I hate to say, it doesn't offer enough insight to be worth the time.

[Hobbes · Rating 2 out of 5]

The major problem with this book was the author's continual intrusion into the material. However, there is no question that his self assurance when it came to knowledge of his subject. Extensive research and insight into the personal lives of these two American giants are what formed the basis of a very informative book.

Unfortunately it was incredibly difficult to tell where thorough research left off and speculation began. There is brief biographical information for both Kissinger and Nixon (though mostly Nixon) but this book is about the years in power they spent together, and specifically the foreign relations. A large to-do is made over their internal motives as related to diplomatic action. Domestic policy, approval ratings, and feelings of inadequacy as a child. It's easy to see why many of the conclusions were not the result of detailed research.

But there's no question detailed research was done. And though there's no great love between the author and either of his two main characters, the typical presentation of Nixon and Kissinger as one-dimensional bad guys is laid aside in search of something deeper and more meaningful. Nixon's greatest legacy was his foreign affairs record and this provides a wonderful window in which to view both the man and the monster. Kissinger's role (both acceptance of Nixon's darker actions and point man for his greater triumphs) is shown clearly through declassified tapes and documents. Quotes and stories from those who were present help solidify actual events if not backing the rampant postulating the author feels the need to engage in.

[Will Byrnes · Rating 3 out of 5]

Dallek is a gifted writer and this is both a very entertaining and informative read. It is the personalities of the two men that defined so much of what they did and Dallek pays particular attention to that. And these are definitely two characters with lots of personality, whatever one may think of their politics. I have one quibble. I felt at times that I was being buried in detail and that the book could have been a lot easier to invest time in had it not had over 600 pages of actual text. That said, it was a worthwhile journey and makes it even clearer how our nation’s policies can be so determined by political needs and personality flaws. How much effort was expended, and how much opportunity might have been lost had Kissinger not been such a preening Prima Dona, ever involved in keeping our actual Secretary of State on the sidelines. How much could the experience of the 60’s and 70’s changed had Nixon not been such a paranoiac? In pointing out the impact of their ego issues on world affairs, Dallek reminds us that the insanity that is the Bush administration stands on the shoulders of other crazy people.

[F. · Rating 5 out of 5]

This was one of the most engaging and compelling non-fiction books that I have read. While Dallek was a bit more on the critical side when discussing the Nixon administration, he also provided some of Nixon's strengths as well as vulnerabilities which allowed the reader to see another side to him. It was nice to see an even and yet seamless description of Kissinger's personality as well as his interactions with the president.

Dallek also has an eye for detail with thorough referencing and examples and the selection of quotes were both insightful and entertaining to read. As someone who does not read much non-fiction I was engaged from start to end, witnessing all the drama of Watergate unfold like a movie from these pages.

For those who would like to know more about American politics, particularly in regards to President Nixon, this book is a must-read. This is also a good book for those who may have negative assumptions about Nixon, for there are explanations of why he did things that were frowned upon by the public. But don't take my word for it! Read it for yourself.

[Ron · Rating 4 out of 5]

A well-researched (thanks to recently released transcripts of Dr. Kissinger's phone records and notes) study of the complex, conflicting, and often competitive relationship between Kissinger and Nixon as they pursued the boldest foreign policy steps of the Cold War. From the successes of detente with the Soviets and the 'open door' to China, to the failures of Vietnamization and the Chilean coup of Pinochet, to the mixed bag of Middle East peace negotiations, Dallek's book explores how Nixon and Kissinger mixed foreign policy ambition with domestic policy realities, often, as the Watergate scandal grew larger in scope, at cross purposes.

[Bryan Craig · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a well-written study of two men who had considerable success and miscues in American foreign policy. The biggest impression I got was the huge clash of egos. Nixon and Kissinger were out for credit and did not want to "out-do" one another. It is a fascinating read and worth the time. Dallek uses sources well and his style doesn't bog you down.

[Quinn · Rating 4 out of 5]

I thought I knew a lot about Nixon, but this book really shows the relationship between two people who at their time were the most powerful men in the world.

[Shubes · Rating 5 out of 5]

Overall, this was a fascinating book...but it was not an easy read. This is the first book by Robert Dallek that I've read (I have a couple other biographical books by him) and it might just be the content of this particular book that made it hard to get through. Although the subject matter was, indeed, fascinating I found the writing style very plodding and almost overloaded with minutiae. In his defense, I understand that Dallek used tons of notes, conversations, memos, etc to draw from and that could be why it was difficult for me to get through. Again, the subject matter - and the book overall - was truly a fascinating read about Nixon and Kissinger and their on-again/off-again working relationship. The majority of the book, however, seemed to be written in a "Here's what Nixon said, and Kissinger replied..." manner; it was almost as if the author were transcribing the taped conversations between the two men and putting those conversations into book form. Rather than a general all-encompassing history of the two men, this particular book seemed focused primarily on their interactions with each other on various subjects: Vietnam, the Middle East, China, the Soviet Union. And of course Watergate happened during the midst of all this, causing the ultimate "fall from grace" of Richard Nixon. Fascinating, absolutely...and also somewhat saddening to see the pains that some men will go to to ensure they remain in power for as long as possible. One could almost feel sorry for Nixon because of his insecurities...almost. Although it was certainly not the easiest - or most enjoyable - political history that I've read, I have ZERO regrets about reading it...and possibly will read it again, knowing what to expect from this particular author/book. For fans of political history or even those who just want to know a bit more about what exactly happened to cause Richard Nixon to resign as President of the United States, I highly recommend this. It might not be the easiest to get through (and maybe it's just my particular taste in writing style) but it's certainly guaranteed to hold your attention.

[Jo · Rating 5 out of 5]

I found Robert Dallek's detailed account of one of the most important foreign policy partnerships in US history utterly compelling. When Nixon's distrust of eastern-seaboard intellectuals collided with Kissinger's conviction that he was always the smartest person in the room, the result could not be anything other than a volatile working relationship between the two men, each determined to make his mark on the world.

As well as taking the reader through some of the most momentous events in recent history - negotiations to end the war in Vietnam; SALT talks with the Soviet Union; the overthrow of the Allende government in Chile; the Yom Kippur War; the thawing of relations with China; and the creation of Bangladesh - Dallek analyzes power and manipulation within the White House and provides insight into Nixon's belief that foreign policy successes would save him from impeachment.

Nixon was jealous of Kissinger's high public profile. Kissinger considered Nixon his intellectual inferior. They both wanted to receive the lion's share of credit for successful foreign policy outcomes. Despite the contempt each man sometimes displayed for the other, theirs was a mutually dependent relationship. Kissinger needed Nixon in order to pursue his own ambition to be a world statesman and Nixon needed Kissinger's intellect and diplomatic skills.

Dallek occasionally editorializes, a habit I found distracting and unnecessary. The wealth of well-researched material underpinning his remarkable study of power and influence during the Nixon-Kissinger years speaks for itself.

[Ryan Johnson · Rating 4 out of 5]

Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power

Book 25/2023.

I’ve had this on the shelf a long while. But given that it’s Hank’s 100th, it seems apropos. While a lot of ink has been spilled on the awful things he’s done in a century, it’s worth remembering that in the mid 70’s he was one of the most admired men in America. The result of this collaboration is a mixed bag, of course: for the benefit that detente with the USSR and opening of relations with the PRC brought, thousands of additional American dead in Vietnam and a flawed policy towards Chile provide plenty of instructive moments on how not to conduct a superpower’s foreign policy.

This is a thorough double biography of the unlikely partnership that had wide ranging repercussions we are feeling today, especially with regards to China policy (a mixed bag at best).

Kissinger’s ego likely gets more ink than any single foreign policy issue covered here. Rightly so. I was surprised at how sharp tongued he could be to colleagues and friends. And at how emotionally destroyed Nixon was at the end of Watergate.

The writing is magnificent, like getting caught up in a stream. Snippets of quotes that are bridged by judgements and interpretations that fall far from an objective view of the subject. And no folksy McCullough homespun bits here. It’s a noisy freight train of prose barreling down on the reader.

[Matthew Warchal · Rating 3 out of 5]

Dry, but generally good. It's hard to be objective when covering an ideological opponent or a figure like Nixon and generally, Dallek chooses the easy, biased approach. Most of the positive aspects of their lives are brushed over or explained in a workman-like way without giving context to explain "why" people might have favored for example, Nixon's Vietnam departure policy and re-electing him. Usually this is explained as deception or manipulation by Nixon, which he engaged in plenty of, rather than a public positively responding to his policy and he reciprocating. It's Dallek's blindspot and even with signature triumphs like detente, Dallek devotes much time to the back and forth negotiations without providing a greater context or barely acknowledging their positive focus. His descriptions of the easy negatives are devastating, especially Nixon's major personality flaws or Kissinger's vanity. Flaws are clearly what he would choose to focus on. There is a lot of good history in here, but tainted with the writing style of a biased journalist.

[Jonathan Brown · Rating 2 out of 5]

If you are looking for a joint biography on Nixon/Kissinger, I am not sure this is exactly the one to choose. While there is some biography in the beginning, the book quickly moved into hundreds of pages about the minutiae of the decisions of Nixon and Kissinger throughout Nixon's presidency. The author clearly had a beef with the decisions they made, from Vietnam to Chile to Russia to China and ultimately, to Watergate. Some events were left without context (this wouldn't be a read for an amateur history reader), and I am not sure I learned much about these two characters, except that they were "delusional maniacs". The author should have left his conclusions to the end of the book (which he did in a nice summary that I probably just could have read rather than the 600+ page book). I think the truth is much more nuanced in the end. I wouldn't recommend this book unless you want to hate Nixon/Kissinger more, though it certainly was well-researched.