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The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy
A scientific study of the political and economic factors influencing democratic decision making
384 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1962
About the author
James M. Buchanan
133 books67 followersAmerican economist known for his work on public choice theory, for which in 1986 he received the Nobel Memorial Prize. Buchanan's work initiated research on how politicians' self-interest and non-economic forces affect government economic policy. He was a Member of the Board of Advisors of The Independent Institute, a Distinguished Senior Fellow of the Cato Institute, and professor at George Mason University.
Buchanan was the founder of a new Virginia school of political economy. He taught at the University of Virginia—where he founded the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression—UCLA, Florida State University, the University of Tennessee, and the Virginia Polytechnic Institute, where he founded the Center for the Study of Public Choice (CSPC). In 1983 a conflict with Economics Department head Daniel M. Orr came to a head and Buchanan took the CSPC to its new home at George Mason University. In 1988 Buchanan returned to Hawaii for the first time since the War and gave a series of lectures later published by the University Press. In 2001 Buchanan received an honorary doctoral degree from Universidad Francisco Marroquín, in Guatemala City, Guatemala, for his contribution to economics.
Buchanan was the founder of a new Virginia school of political economy. He taught at the University of Virginia—where he founded the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression—UCLA, Florida State University, the University of Tennessee, and the Virginia Polytechnic Institute, where he founded the Center for the Study of Public Choice (CSPC). In 1983 a conflict with Economics Department head Daniel M. Orr came to a head and Buchanan took the CSPC to its new home at George Mason University. In 1988 Buchanan returned to Hawaii for the first time since the War and gave a series of lectures later published by the University Press. In 2001 Buchanan received an honorary doctoral degree from Universidad Francisco Marroquín, in Guatemala City, Guatemala, for his contribution to economics.
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Displaying 1 - 24 of 24 reviews
November 20, 2019
Engineered to perfection like revolutionary clockwork, Buchanan & Tullock's classic text is one of the most important works of political economy in the 20st Century. On the face of it, is an economizing theory of constitutional democracy, but it is much more than that. It ingeniously synthesizes several strands in political philosophy, political science, rational choice theory, and welfare economics. Every chapter is a gold mine of tantalizing premises and simple yet suggestive models leading to counter-intuitive but compelling conclusions with the help of logically airtight arguments.
The book famously relies on rather restrictive and dubious assumptions about Homo economicus that it imports from neoclassical economics (and to a lesser extent from the "realist" school of political philosophy going back to Machiavelli and Hobbes). And, in addition, it can be accused of smuggling in cultural biases about the inherent superiority of American constitutionalism. But these limitations impose an awesome discipline on the enterprise. The authors perform such amazing feats, ranging from novel methodological innovations to constitutional revolutions, with these assumptions that the end result transcends methodological or cultural limitations.
Calculus of Consent is a bottomless wishing well of innovative research programs. A new theory of constitutional democracy? Check. A revitalization of contractarian thinking? Check. A pioneering application of the economic exchange logic into politics? Check. A tentative proof of the need to apply the same model of human behaviour across all domains of human action (the behavioural symmetry assumption)? Check. A novel rediscovery of the Wicksellian unanimity principle of decision making as the appropriate political equivalent of the Pareto criterion? Check. A groundbreaking explanation of the surprising utility of logrolling in majoritarian democratic politics? Check... This book has so much exciting and novel stuff on its 300 pages!
The writing can be extremely dry, no doubt. But if you want to read Harry Potter, there's a time and a place for that. No, you come here for the harsh and brutal scientific epiphanies. Another objection correctly argues that the deductive premises of the book rely on behavioural premises that have come under a lot of fire and criticism. As a result, the policy conclusions are only exploratory and hypothetical, as the authors confess. They need to be tested empirically for validity. But without such models, there can be no advancement in science! Such models find their scientific anchor in the solid predictions and falsifiable hypotheses that the book (rightfully) celebrates as its proudest achievements. The freedom of the spirit, the pure spirit of Science, that soars in their mathematical and logical models, is an engine of the imagination that dreams of new futurities. Abstractions, too, have the potential to revolutionize the practical organization of Western democratic politics.
This, my friends, is a Titan among books. There is no school of political science or political philosophy that can dismiss all of its theses. If you try to run away and hide from this book, it will follow you home, find you, and kill you (or your illusions). It will laugh in the face of the destruction it brings. It challenges several hundred years of established wisdom! Although the book's arguments or conclusions can be contested they cannot be ignored. Like Rawls or Nozick, Buchanan & Tullock have created a contemporary classic of the highest order. It may not immediately pull at the heartstrings of the masses or inspire the songs of youth, but its dry, Apollonian exterior masques a Dionysian interior that sparks joy, wonder, and potency.
The book famously relies on rather restrictive and dubious assumptions about Homo economicus that it imports from neoclassical economics (and to a lesser extent from the "realist" school of political philosophy going back to Machiavelli and Hobbes). And, in addition, it can be accused of smuggling in cultural biases about the inherent superiority of American constitutionalism. But these limitations impose an awesome discipline on the enterprise. The authors perform such amazing feats, ranging from novel methodological innovations to constitutional revolutions, with these assumptions that the end result transcends methodological or cultural limitations.
Calculus of Consent is a bottomless wishing well of innovative research programs. A new theory of constitutional democracy? Check. A revitalization of contractarian thinking? Check. A pioneering application of the economic exchange logic into politics? Check. A tentative proof of the need to apply the same model of human behaviour across all domains of human action (the behavioural symmetry assumption)? Check. A novel rediscovery of the Wicksellian unanimity principle of decision making as the appropriate political equivalent of the Pareto criterion? Check. A groundbreaking explanation of the surprising utility of logrolling in majoritarian democratic politics? Check... This book has so much exciting and novel stuff on its 300 pages!
The writing can be extremely dry, no doubt. But if you want to read Harry Potter, there's a time and a place for that. No, you come here for the harsh and brutal scientific epiphanies. Another objection correctly argues that the deductive premises of the book rely on behavioural premises that have come under a lot of fire and criticism. As a result, the policy conclusions are only exploratory and hypothetical, as the authors confess. They need to be tested empirically for validity. But without such models, there can be no advancement in science! Such models find their scientific anchor in the solid predictions and falsifiable hypotheses that the book (rightfully) celebrates as its proudest achievements. The freedom of the spirit, the pure spirit of Science, that soars in their mathematical and logical models, is an engine of the imagination that dreams of new futurities. Abstractions, too, have the potential to revolutionize the practical organization of Western democratic politics.
This, my friends, is a Titan among books. There is no school of political science or political philosophy that can dismiss all of its theses. If you try to run away and hide from this book, it will follow you home, find you, and kill you (or your illusions). It will laugh in the face of the destruction it brings. It challenges several hundred years of established wisdom! Although the book's arguments or conclusions can be contested they cannot be ignored. Like Rawls or Nozick, Buchanan & Tullock have created a contemporary classic of the highest order. It may not immediately pull at the heartstrings of the masses or inspire the songs of youth, but its dry, Apollonian exterior masques a Dionysian interior that sparks joy, wonder, and potency.
January 10, 2009
The Calculus of Consent is one of the classic works in the public choice literature.
This work presents what has come to be the basic principles of public choice theory. Traditionally political scientists had defined the political process as a system in which decisions about public policy is viewed through the lens of a struggle between “public” and “private” interests. Instead, Buchanan and Tullock suggest that the “public interest” is simply an aggregation of private decision makers.
They contend that in classical political science theory, the policy that is in the “public interest” is always the correct choice and always appeals to all voters. But that theory ignores the fact that most policy choices appeal to different groups to different degrees. For example, when confronted with a proposed increase in defense spending some voters while either strongly oppose or favor it, but most will prove to be largely indifferent.
They compare this state of affairs to transactions that take place in a market setting, where the voters strongly desiring a certain policy could purchase the acceptance of the opposition and indifferent voters with concessions, resulting in an efficient allocation of resources, increasing the well-being of all parties involved. However the equivalent of this in the realm of the political process is that politicians buy the votes of other politicians (or groups of special-interests) by promising to vote for their issues.
Buchanan and Tullock are of the opinion that “pork-barrel politics” such as this is what we should expect to see as the norm, but in the traditional political science theory, it is anomalous. Which is to say, that their model presents a more accurate and complete model of political decision-making than previous models of politics.
This work presents what has come to be the basic principles of public choice theory. Traditionally political scientists had defined the political process as a system in which decisions about public policy is viewed through the lens of a struggle between “public” and “private” interests. Instead, Buchanan and Tullock suggest that the “public interest” is simply an aggregation of private decision makers.
They contend that in classical political science theory, the policy that is in the “public interest” is always the correct choice and always appeals to all voters. But that theory ignores the fact that most policy choices appeal to different groups to different degrees. For example, when confronted with a proposed increase in defense spending some voters while either strongly oppose or favor it, but most will prove to be largely indifferent.
They compare this state of affairs to transactions that take place in a market setting, where the voters strongly desiring a certain policy could purchase the acceptance of the opposition and indifferent voters with concessions, resulting in an efficient allocation of resources, increasing the well-being of all parties involved. However the equivalent of this in the realm of the political process is that politicians buy the votes of other politicians (or groups of special-interests) by promising to vote for their issues.
Buchanan and Tullock are of the opinion that “pork-barrel politics” such as this is what we should expect to see as the norm, but in the traditional political science theory, it is anomalous. Which is to say, that their model presents a more accurate and complete model of political decision-making than previous models of politics.
June 6, 2020
Wow.
An awareness of the general outline of "public choice" economics has been something I've noticed influencing my thinking more and more over the last fifteen years. Some recent research I was doing called for me to understand it better, and so I tackled this foundational work in the field.
I will begin by saying that Buchanan deserved his Nobel prize for this pioneering work, and Tullock deserves the same recognition. This is as foundational a work in describing the behavior of collective institutions such as governments as "The Wealth of Nations" in describing the behavior of markets.
It is not the easiest of books to read. Not because of the prose -- Buchanan and Tullock do a good job explaining a very complex subject with clear examples. But they are laying out a whole new approach here, and I found it necessary to pause after every chapter to think through the implications and absorb the material before going on.
But, quite simply, this is a field which one simply should regard as indispensable before having an informed opinion on government, how it should be organized, what one should expect from it (both good and bad), and what one the sphere of government action should be.
There are probably easier, more modern treatments for the material, but this is the foundational work.
An awareness of the general outline of "public choice" economics has been something I've noticed influencing my thinking more and more over the last fifteen years. Some recent research I was doing called for me to understand it better, and so I tackled this foundational work in the field.
I will begin by saying that Buchanan deserved his Nobel prize for this pioneering work, and Tullock deserves the same recognition. This is as foundational a work in describing the behavior of collective institutions such as governments as "The Wealth of Nations" in describing the behavior of markets.
It is not the easiest of books to read. Not because of the prose -- Buchanan and Tullock do a good job explaining a very complex subject with clear examples. But they are laying out a whole new approach here, and I found it necessary to pause after every chapter to think through the implications and absorb the material before going on.
But, quite simply, this is a field which one simply should regard as indispensable before having an informed opinion on government, how it should be organized, what one should expect from it (both good and bad), and what one the sphere of government action should be.
There are probably easier, more modern treatments for the material, but this is the foundational work.
to-keep-reference
August 28, 2017En ese libro, Gordon Tullock y yo nos dimos el gusto y desplegamos nuestros talentos profesionales para derivar una base lógicamente coherente para una estructura política constitucional y democrática, una que parecía tener muchas de las características de la estructura política que imaginaran los Padres Fundadores. Presentamos una visión de las instituciones que históricamente han surgido en los Estados Unidos, una visión que difiere en aspectos fundamentales de la que reflejan las convenciones de la ciencia política moderna. El marco de análisis era en esencia
contractualista, en el sentido de que tratamos de explicar la aparición de las instituciones observadas y de aportar normas para los cambios en las reglas imperantes poniendo conceptualmente a las personas en posiciones idealizadas en las cuales cabía esperar que surgiera un acuerdo mutuo. El cálculo del consenso, al igual que otros libros míos, puede interpretarse como un intento de imponer una "visión de orden" sobre realidades institucionales y conductuales observadas.
Los límites de la libertad Pág.24
contractualista, en el sentido de que tratamos de explicar la aparición de las instituciones observadas y de aportar normas para los cambios en las reglas imperantes poniendo conceptualmente a las personas en posiciones idealizadas en las cuales cabía esperar que surgiera un acuerdo mutuo. El cálculo del consenso, al igual que otros libros míos, puede interpretarse como un intento de imponer una "visión de orden" sobre realidades institucionales y conductuales observadas.
Los límites de la libertad Pág.24
September 11, 2026
What David Ricardo's "Principles" did for the analysis of political policies, this book does for the analysis of the political processes which create policies in democracies. That is, it calls for the use of diagrams, principles, and simple numerical examples to reason about human behavior in a consistent, reliable, testable, and otherwise standardized manner.
On that reputation, I began to read-- and was immediately surprised by the weakness of the mathematics. There are trivial errors: page 179* contains a sign error in equation (8). The graph on page 180 is far too low-dimensional to represent what the text is discussing. The accompanying text is not much better: equation (4) on page 176 has three fundamental errors: it tries to establish equality between vectors of different lengths, it asserts equality when an equivalence relation is not established, and it mismatches dimensions instead of comparing entry-by-entry (i.e. it should read x_i <= V_i(I_n)). I know this because I followed the footnote citation to my copy of Luce and Raiffa. On page 257 Buchanan and Tullock try to add a count to a percent, resulting in a meaningless value.** Almost all of these issues can be explained from a lack of familiarity with mathematical notation. I began to think that Buchanan and Tullock were merely using mathematical symbols and language to enhance the perceived quality of the argument.*** I was most annoyed when they introduced a partial derivative in Chapter 15 to analyze a constitutional choice utility function of four vaguely defined scalers: "rules for electing members," "basis of representation," "degree of representation," and "the rule through which the legislative assembly shall reach its decisions." I stopped reading the book for two years.
When I came back to it this week, I had a new point of view: the historical one. From the historical point of view, this ill-use of analysis and all the rest was a call to action by two not-quite-mathematicians for the actual mathematical work to be done. Chapter 15 was written in 1961. Buchanan died in 2013, Tullock died in 2014, and, in 2015, Ethereum launched, making smart contracts real. Chapter 15 was vindicated! Everything in this book is similarly vindicated. I was, as they say, missing the forest for the trees.
This monograph is historically important for introducing the quantitative study of political decision-making into a field which tended to focus on the moral decisions of specific leaders or a vaguely conceived notion of "general will." It is not a textbook because (1) it spends much of the text justifying its relevance rather than explaining the theory, (2) it contains a number of technical errors, (3) it does not offer a bank of testable questions, and (4) it does not include any of the wonderful subsequent theory developed and empirical work conducted in this field. Please use a standard textbook if you are teaching a class on public choice. It is also not a popularization, it would be better to read "The Myth of the Rational Voter" if you are curious about public choice economics.
*In "The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan, Vol. 3" ISBN 9780865972186
**Another example comes from page 156: the only actual payoffs are A = (10,0,0), B = (0,5,0), and C = (0,0,1) for farmers a,b, and c. Therefore farmer b can always choose between A or C. Similarly, a with B or C and c with A or B. Any two farmer coalition will therefore always control the outcome (eg. the control set of a,c is {B,C,A,B} -- we do not need to write B twice). The a,b coalition can thus create the outcome (5,5,0) through the simple pattern "BBABBA...", (5,5,0) dominates (5,2.5,0), (5,0,0.5), and (0,2.5,0.5). In this case, c could purchase a defection by offering b the agreement BBBCBBBC... however, a could easily outbid c as far as Bx30ABx30A because a is rewarded ten times what c is. Thus the ab coalition will return. I could go on and on about the errors in this book, but they don't matter.
***Buchanan and Tullock are at their best when using simple arithmetic and diagrams. Chapters 10 and 16 stand up technically and would be worth excerpting.
On that reputation, I began to read-- and was immediately surprised by the weakness of the mathematics. There are trivial errors: page 179* contains a sign error in equation (8). The graph on page 180 is far too low-dimensional to represent what the text is discussing. The accompanying text is not much better: equation (4) on page 176 has three fundamental errors: it tries to establish equality between vectors of different lengths, it asserts equality when an equivalence relation is not established, and it mismatches dimensions instead of comparing entry-by-entry (i.e. it should read x_i <= V_i(I_n)). I know this because I followed the footnote citation to my copy of Luce and Raiffa. On page 257 Buchanan and Tullock try to add a count to a percent, resulting in a meaningless value.** Almost all of these issues can be explained from a lack of familiarity with mathematical notation. I began to think that Buchanan and Tullock were merely using mathematical symbols and language to enhance the perceived quality of the argument.*** I was most annoyed when they introduced a partial derivative in Chapter 15 to analyze a constitutional choice utility function of four vaguely defined scalers: "rules for electing members," "basis of representation," "degree of representation," and "the rule through which the legislative assembly shall reach its decisions." I stopped reading the book for two years.
When I came back to it this week, I had a new point of view: the historical one. From the historical point of view, this ill-use of analysis and all the rest was a call to action by two not-quite-mathematicians for the actual mathematical work to be done. Chapter 15 was written in 1961. Buchanan died in 2013, Tullock died in 2014, and, in 2015, Ethereum launched, making smart contracts real. Chapter 15 was vindicated! Everything in this book is similarly vindicated. I was, as they say, missing the forest for the trees.
This monograph is historically important for introducing the quantitative study of political decision-making into a field which tended to focus on the moral decisions of specific leaders or a vaguely conceived notion of "general will." It is not a textbook because (1) it spends much of the text justifying its relevance rather than explaining the theory, (2) it contains a number of technical errors, (3) it does not offer a bank of testable questions, and (4) it does not include any of the wonderful subsequent theory developed and empirical work conducted in this field. Please use a standard textbook if you are teaching a class on public choice. It is also not a popularization, it would be better to read "The Myth of the Rational Voter" if you are curious about public choice economics.
*In "The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan, Vol. 3" ISBN 9780865972186
**Another example comes from page 156: the only actual payoffs are A = (10,0,0), B = (0,5,0), and C = (0,0,1) for farmers a,b, and c. Therefore farmer b can always choose between A or C. Similarly, a with B or C and c with A or B. Any two farmer coalition will therefore always control the outcome (eg. the control set of a,c is {B,C,A,B} -- we do not need to write B twice). The a,b coalition can thus create the outcome (5,5,0) through the simple pattern "BBABBA...", (5,5,0) dominates (5,2.5,0), (5,0,0.5), and (0,2.5,0.5). In this case, c could purchase a defection by offering b the agreement BBBCBBBC... however, a could easily outbid c as far as Bx30ABx30A because a is rewarded ten times what c is. Thus the ab coalition will return. I could go on and on about the errors in this book, but they don't matter.
***Buchanan and Tullock are at their best when using simple arithmetic and diagrams. Chapters 10 and 16 stand up technically and would be worth excerpting.
November 24, 2025
Cartea celor doi politologi americani James M. Buchanan și Gordon Tullock apare în 1962 și este de referință în lumea științelor politice. Parcurgerea ei este anevoioasă pentru nespecialist, dar după strădanii insistente limbajul academic și conceptele ies la lumină.
În linii mari, teoria lor, a consimțământului sau alegerilor colective într-o democrație constituțională, este un demers al științelor politice trecută prin filtrul teoriei economice; analiza instituțională se combină cu analiza politică dând lumină unei teorii a alegerilor publice.
Combinația dintre economic și politic se vede în încercarea autorilor de a extinde presupunerile economistului asupra comportamentului individului ca participant la procesul politic. Autorii pornesc de la premisele teoriei economice care presupun că fiecare individ, pe deplin informat și rațional în alegerile sale, are ca scop maximizarea propriei utilități (beneficii). Aceste premise sunt suficiente astfel încât autorii să ofere conjecturi și explicații asupra fenomenelor din lumea reală.
Lumea reală este alcătuită din colectivități de oameni liberi ale căror decizii colective sunt similare cu piața. Organizarea oamenilor îi ajută pe fiecare în parte să aleagă opțiuni pentru a-și maximiza utilitatea. Astfel că alegerea politică depășește norma morală și devine un act pragmatic care are în vedere costurile și beneficiile pentru fiecare individ în parte.
Autorii se întreabă dacă căutarea interesului propriu al individului ar putea să fie cât mai bine utilizat atât în științele economice cât și cele politice? Dacă economia descrie ordinea pieței, iar piața descrie în cele din urmă cum oamenii își urmăresc propriile interese, atunci acest câștig individual de maximizare al bunăstării ar putea fi redirecționat spre un scop social?
În centrul principiilor lor, autorii definesc „constituția” nu din punct de vedere juridic, ci ca punct de pornire al regulilor care definesc modul în care se vor lua deciziile viitoare. Organizarea modului de a decide la nivel colectiv este fundamentul cărții și în ea se discută consecințele care decurg de aici asupra diverselor tipuri de organizare decizională.
Un punct important în viziunea autorilor unde politica converge cu economia este așa numita valoarea economică a votului. Dacă unii teoreticieni economiști găsesc că voturile nu se compară cu banii, cei doi politologi că putem privi votul politic similar cum putem privi orice tranzacție economică atâta timp cât îți expui o preferință și rezultatul acelui vot are efecte asupra bunăstării tale reflectat în venituri, taxe, proprietăți, siguranță etc. Practic, votul are efect economic, nu doar o reflexie a civismului.
Cartea a avut influență în politica mondială. Reformele fiscale ala SUA, de exemplu, Balanced Budget Amendment, privind limitarea „cheltuielilor colective” sunt inspirate de munca acestor autori. Noua Zeelandă, Suedia sau Elveția au introdus reguli de „disciplină bugetară” și consultare publică care reflectă principiul consimțământului și al costurilor politice minime. Principiul subsidiarității (deciziile trebuie luate la nivelul cel mai apropiat de cetățeni) reflectă exact raționamentul „minimizării costurilor externe” al lui Buchanan și Tullock.
Cartea tratează metode de organizare și decizie la nivel colectiv, care prin consimțământ și reguli de vot raționale au ca scop limitarea abuzului majorității, reducerea costurilor la care unii membrii sunt supuși și trebuie să le tolereze fără să fie de acord cu ele și creșterea eficienței.
În linii mari, teoria lor, a consimțământului sau alegerilor colective într-o democrație constituțională, este un demers al științelor politice trecută prin filtrul teoriei economice; analiza instituțională se combină cu analiza politică dând lumină unei teorii a alegerilor publice.
Combinația dintre economic și politic se vede în încercarea autorilor de a extinde presupunerile economistului asupra comportamentului individului ca participant la procesul politic. Autorii pornesc de la premisele teoriei economice care presupun că fiecare individ, pe deplin informat și rațional în alegerile sale, are ca scop maximizarea propriei utilități (beneficii). Aceste premise sunt suficiente astfel încât autorii să ofere conjecturi și explicații asupra fenomenelor din lumea reală.
Lumea reală este alcătuită din colectivități de oameni liberi ale căror decizii colective sunt similare cu piața. Organizarea oamenilor îi ajută pe fiecare în parte să aleagă opțiuni pentru a-și maximiza utilitatea. Astfel că alegerea politică depășește norma morală și devine un act pragmatic care are în vedere costurile și beneficiile pentru fiecare individ în parte.
Autorii se întreabă dacă căutarea interesului propriu al individului ar putea să fie cât mai bine utilizat atât în științele economice cât și cele politice? Dacă economia descrie ordinea pieței, iar piața descrie în cele din urmă cum oamenii își urmăresc propriile interese, atunci acest câștig individual de maximizare al bunăstării ar putea fi redirecționat spre un scop social?
În centrul principiilor lor, autorii definesc „constituția” nu din punct de vedere juridic, ci ca punct de pornire al regulilor care definesc modul în care se vor lua deciziile viitoare. Organizarea modului de a decide la nivel colectiv este fundamentul cărții și în ea se discută consecințele care decurg de aici asupra diverselor tipuri de organizare decizională.
Un punct important în viziunea autorilor unde politica converge cu economia este așa numita valoarea economică a votului. Dacă unii teoreticieni economiști găsesc că voturile nu se compară cu banii, cei doi politologi că putem privi votul politic similar cum putem privi orice tranzacție economică atâta timp cât îți expui o preferință și rezultatul acelui vot are efecte asupra bunăstării tale reflectat în venituri, taxe, proprietăți, siguranță etc. Practic, votul are efect economic, nu doar o reflexie a civismului.
Cartea a avut influență în politica mondială. Reformele fiscale ala SUA, de exemplu, Balanced Budget Amendment, privind limitarea „cheltuielilor colective” sunt inspirate de munca acestor autori. Noua Zeelandă, Suedia sau Elveția au introdus reguli de „disciplină bugetară” și consultare publică care reflectă principiul consimțământului și al costurilor politice minime. Principiul subsidiarității (deciziile trebuie luate la nivelul cel mai apropiat de cetățeni) reflectă exact raționamentul „minimizării costurilor externe” al lui Buchanan și Tullock.
Cartea tratează metode de organizare și decizie la nivel colectiv, care prin consimțământ și reguli de vot raționale au ca scop limitarea abuzului majorității, reducerea costurilor la care unii membrii sunt supuși și trebuie să le tolereze fără să fie de acord cu ele și creșterea eficienței.
September 27, 2026
The Calculus of Consent starts with a question: who should decide how collective decisions are made?
Buchanan and Tullock argue that the rules deserve scrutiny before we debate any particular policy.
A rule that requires broad agreement protects those who might otherwise bear the cost of a decision.
But reaching that agreement takes time and may prevent necessary action.
Simple majority voting is quicker, though it can impose substantial costs on the minority.
The sensible choice of rule therefore depends on what is at stake.
This is a powerful way to think about constitutions and the limits of majority rule.
The analysis is rigorous, if sometimes more abstract than it needs to be.
Its central insight remains persuasive: political outcomes reflect the incentives and rules under which people act.
For anyone concerned with institutions, the book is demanding but well worth reading.
Buchanan and Tullock argue that the rules deserve scrutiny before we debate any particular policy.
A rule that requires broad agreement protects those who might otherwise bear the cost of a decision.
But reaching that agreement takes time and may prevent necessary action.
Simple majority voting is quicker, though it can impose substantial costs on the minority.
The sensible choice of rule therefore depends on what is at stake.
This is a powerful way to think about constitutions and the limits of majority rule.
The analysis is rigorous, if sometimes more abstract than it needs to be.
Its central insight remains persuasive: political outcomes reflect the incentives and rules under which people act.
For anyone concerned with institutions, the book is demanding but well worth reading.
September 1, 2020
WELL, I have to begin by saying that I hate math (let alone calculus) and this book did not shy away from it. I also want to take this moment to voice my uncertainty with writing book reviews. Because although I don't think this was a badly WRITTEN book (on the contrary, it was very very thoroughly though out), the technicalities went over my head (and I can't say I enjoy that too much.) That being said, the ideas presented in regards to voting, economics, and our political system and various others, were very important and thought-provoking in a way I hadn't considered (and don't get me wrong, I like a book that goes a bit over my head every now and then. I think that's important.)
December 21, 2013
Interesting Quotes:
"[I]t is especially surprising that the discussion about externality in the literature of welfare economics has been centered on the external costs expected to result from *private* action of individuals or firms. To our knowledge littler or nothing has been said about the *external* costs imposed on the individual by *collective* action. Yet the existence of such external costs is inherent in the operation of any collective decision-making rule other than that of unanimity. Indeed, the essence of the collective-choice making process under majority voting rules is the fact that the minority of voters are forced to accede to actions which they cannot prevent and for which they cannot claim compensation for damages resulting. Note that this is precisely the definition previously given for externality."
-James Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent
"Much political discussion seems to have proceeded as follows: 'If the interests of two or more individuals conflict, unanimity is impossible. Some interests must prevail over others if action is not to be wholly stifled.' This line of reasoning seems quite plausible until one confronts ordinary economic exchange. Note that in such an exchange the interests of the two contracting parties clearly conflict. Yet unanimity is reached. Contracts are made; bargains are struck without the introduction of explicit or implicit coercion. In this case, no interest prevails over the other; both interests are furthered. Our continued repetition of this simple analogy stems from our conviction that, at base, it is the failure to grasp fully the significance of this point that has retarded progress in political theory."
-James Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, the Calculus of Consent
"When economic or market activity is observed to result in the imposition of costs on parties outside the exchange relationship, economists have tended to call attention to the 'inefficiency' in over-all resource usage that this organizational arrangement generates. They seem rarely to have brought into question the morality or ethics of the individuals participating in such activity. Individuals are assumed to seek to maximize their own utility within the limits of the effective constraints imposed on their action. Not bringing the underlying motivational assumptions into question, the economist tends, therefore, more or less automatically to think in terms of modifying the set of constraints on individual action (the redefining of property rights, the changes in the legal structure, etc.) with a view toward eliminating the inefficiencies, if possible.
"By contrast, the student of political processes, observing what is essentially the same phenomenon in another form (that is, the imposition of external costs on third parties), has not considered the inefficiency aspects seriously. Instead he has - through his emphasis on moral restraints on self-interest, his concept of the 'public interest,' etc. - sought to accomplish reform through a regeneration of individual motives. Ethical and not structural reforms tend to be emphasized. Breakdowns and failures in teh operation of the system are attributed to 'bad' men, not to the rules that constrain them."
-James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, the Calculus of Consent
"The activities and the importance of special-interest groups in the political process are not independent of either the over-all size or the composition of the governmental budget. A hypothesis explaining the increasing importance of the pressure group over the last half century need not rest on the presumption of a decline in the public morality. A far simpler and much more acceptable hypothesis is that interest-group activity, measured in terms of organizational costs, is a direct function of the 'profits' expected from the political process by functional groups. In an era when the whole of governmental activity was sharply limited and when the activities that were collectivized exerted a general impact over substantially all individuals and groups, the relative absence of organized special interests is readily explainable. However, as the importance of the public sector has increased relative to the private sector, and as this expansion has taken the form of an increasingly differential or discriminatory impact on the separate and identifiable groups of the population, the increased investment in organization aimed at securing differential gains by political means is a
predictable result.
"This relationship is not, however, one-sided. While the profitability of investment in organization is a direct function of the size of the total public sector and an inverse function of the “generality” of the government budget, both the size and the composition of the budget depend, in turn, on the amount of investment in political organization. The organized pressure group thus arises because differential advantages are expected to be secured through the political process, and, in turn, differential advantages for particular groups are produced because of the existence of organized activity. A spiral effect comes into play here, the results of which may be observed in the federal income-tax structure, federal tariff legislation, federal resource-development projects, and many other important areas of economic legislation in particular."
-James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, the Caluclus of Consent
"[I]t is especially surprising that the discussion about externality in the literature of welfare economics has been centered on the external costs expected to result from *private* action of individuals or firms. To our knowledge littler or nothing has been said about the *external* costs imposed on the individual by *collective* action. Yet the existence of such external costs is inherent in the operation of any collective decision-making rule other than that of unanimity. Indeed, the essence of the collective-choice making process under majority voting rules is the fact that the minority of voters are forced to accede to actions which they cannot prevent and for which they cannot claim compensation for damages resulting. Note that this is precisely the definition previously given for externality."
-James Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent
"Much political discussion seems to have proceeded as follows: 'If the interests of two or more individuals conflict, unanimity is impossible. Some interests must prevail over others if action is not to be wholly stifled.' This line of reasoning seems quite plausible until one confronts ordinary economic exchange. Note that in such an exchange the interests of the two contracting parties clearly conflict. Yet unanimity is reached. Contracts are made; bargains are struck without the introduction of explicit or implicit coercion. In this case, no interest prevails over the other; both interests are furthered. Our continued repetition of this simple analogy stems from our conviction that, at base, it is the failure to grasp fully the significance of this point that has retarded progress in political theory."
-James Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, the Calculus of Consent
"When economic or market activity is observed to result in the imposition of costs on parties outside the exchange relationship, economists have tended to call attention to the 'inefficiency' in over-all resource usage that this organizational arrangement generates. They seem rarely to have brought into question the morality or ethics of the individuals participating in such activity. Individuals are assumed to seek to maximize their own utility within the limits of the effective constraints imposed on their action. Not bringing the underlying motivational assumptions into question, the economist tends, therefore, more or less automatically to think in terms of modifying the set of constraints on individual action (the redefining of property rights, the changes in the legal structure, etc.) with a view toward eliminating the inefficiencies, if possible.
"By contrast, the student of political processes, observing what is essentially the same phenomenon in another form (that is, the imposition of external costs on third parties), has not considered the inefficiency aspects seriously. Instead he has - through his emphasis on moral restraints on self-interest, his concept of the 'public interest,' etc. - sought to accomplish reform through a regeneration of individual motives. Ethical and not structural reforms tend to be emphasized. Breakdowns and failures in teh operation of the system are attributed to 'bad' men, not to the rules that constrain them."
-James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, the Calculus of Consent
"The activities and the importance of special-interest groups in the political process are not independent of either the over-all size or the composition of the governmental budget. A hypothesis explaining the increasing importance of the pressure group over the last half century need not rest on the presumption of a decline in the public morality. A far simpler and much more acceptable hypothesis is that interest-group activity, measured in terms of organizational costs, is a direct function of the 'profits' expected from the political process by functional groups. In an era when the whole of governmental activity was sharply limited and when the activities that were collectivized exerted a general impact over substantially all individuals and groups, the relative absence of organized special interests is readily explainable. However, as the importance of the public sector has increased relative to the private sector, and as this expansion has taken the form of an increasingly differential or discriminatory impact on the separate and identifiable groups of the population, the increased investment in organization aimed at securing differential gains by political means is a
predictable result.
"This relationship is not, however, one-sided. While the profitability of investment in organization is a direct function of the size of the total public sector and an inverse function of the “generality” of the government budget, both the size and the composition of the budget depend, in turn, on the amount of investment in political organization. The organized pressure group thus arises because differential advantages are expected to be secured through the political process, and, in turn, differential advantages for particular groups are produced because of the existence of organized activity. A spiral effect comes into play here, the results of which may be observed in the federal income-tax structure, federal tariff legislation, federal resource-development projects, and many other important areas of economic legislation in particular."
-James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, the Caluclus of Consent
January 16, 2024
Unscientific, and the logical foundations are extremely silly. It's none other than a mathematical formulation of Rawls's veil of ignorance applied to constitutions. This formulation is practically explicitly spiritual, imagine a higher world of souls shapes the lower reality. I look for a natural "voting rule" which would determine the results of the imagined "first vote". This book does not do that; the authors should have read more sociobiology.
March 1, 2022
This book has to be one of the most thoroughly refuted books of any Nobel Prize winner ever, no?
January 19, 2026
2026年1月20日阅读完毕
June 18, 2026
Quite steep analysis on bicameralism.
August 27, 2024
THE FOUNDATIONAL TEXT OF "PUBLIC CHOICE" ECONOMICS
James Buchanan (1919-2013) was an American economist associated with the Cato Institute; he received the 1986 Nobel Prize in Economics. He has also written books such as 'Economics from the Outside In,' 'Limits of Liberty,' 'Cost and Choice,' etc. Gordon Tullock (1922-2014) was an economist and retired Professor of Law and Economics at the George Mason University School of Law. He has also written books such as 'The Economics of Wealth and Poverty,' etc.
They wrote in the Preface to this 1962 book, "This is a book about the POLITICAL organization of a society of free men. Its methodology, its conceptual apparatus, and its analytics are derived, essentially, from the discipline that has as its subject the ECONOMIC organization of such a society... Our main purpose is not that of exploring this choice process in detailed application to all of the many constitutional issues that may be presented. We examine the process extensively only with reference to the problem of decision-making rules."
They note that "In analyzing the behavior of the individual in the political process, there is an important element of uncertainty present"; "collective choice is a continuous process, with each unique decision representing only one link in a long-time chain of social action" (pg. 37) Individuals may be expected to be "somewhat less rational in collective than in private thought" because the responsibility for a private decision rests with the chooser, whereas in collective choice "neither his own share in the benefits nor his own share in the costs can be so readily estimated." (Pg. 38)
They argue that, "At best, majority rule should be viewed as one among many practical expedients made necessary by the costs of securing widespread agreement on political issues when individual and group interests diverge." (Pg. 96) Furthermore, "vote-trading" can also diminish the importance of "simple majority rule" assumptions. (Pg. 128) Majority voting will also tend to result in an "overinvestment in the public sector when the investment projects provide differential benefits or are financed from differential taxation." (Pg. 169)
They suggest "changing the rule which compels the minority to accept the decisions of the majority without compensation," which causes the individual voter to incur external costs as a result of public or collective action. (Pg. 145) They spend considerable time presenting various models of "majority rule" (e.g., where "A minority of 26 percent is empowered to block action desired by 74 per cent"; pg. 258).
Perhaps their key argument is that "Each interest group will, of course, turn every effort toward improving its own position, within the limits of the prevailing rules; but if, in fact, all interests come to recognize that the external costs involved in this continuous struggle of interests are excessive, all might agree on some changes." But pessimistically, they conclude that "as more and more groups organize to secure political support, and as more and more discriminatory action does come to characterize separate political decisions, reaction will surely set in at some point." (Pg. 290)
This is an interesting and thought-provoking work (although I fail to see how such analysis was worthy of a Nobel Prize), and should be read by all students of economics.
James Buchanan (1919-2013) was an American economist associated with the Cato Institute; he received the 1986 Nobel Prize in Economics. He has also written books such as 'Economics from the Outside In,' 'Limits of Liberty,' 'Cost and Choice,' etc. Gordon Tullock (1922-2014) was an economist and retired Professor of Law and Economics at the George Mason University School of Law. He has also written books such as 'The Economics of Wealth and Poverty,' etc.
They wrote in the Preface to this 1962 book, "This is a book about the POLITICAL organization of a society of free men. Its methodology, its conceptual apparatus, and its analytics are derived, essentially, from the discipline that has as its subject the ECONOMIC organization of such a society... Our main purpose is not that of exploring this choice process in detailed application to all of the many constitutional issues that may be presented. We examine the process extensively only with reference to the problem of decision-making rules."
They note that "In analyzing the behavior of the individual in the political process, there is an important element of uncertainty present"; "collective choice is a continuous process, with each unique decision representing only one link in a long-time chain of social action" (pg. 37) Individuals may be expected to be "somewhat less rational in collective than in private thought" because the responsibility for a private decision rests with the chooser, whereas in collective choice "neither his own share in the benefits nor his own share in the costs can be so readily estimated." (Pg. 38)
They argue that, "At best, majority rule should be viewed as one among many practical expedients made necessary by the costs of securing widespread agreement on political issues when individual and group interests diverge." (Pg. 96) Furthermore, "vote-trading" can also diminish the importance of "simple majority rule" assumptions. (Pg. 128) Majority voting will also tend to result in an "overinvestment in the public sector when the investment projects provide differential benefits or are financed from differential taxation." (Pg. 169)
They suggest "changing the rule which compels the minority to accept the decisions of the majority without compensation," which causes the individual voter to incur external costs as a result of public or collective action. (Pg. 145) They spend considerable time presenting various models of "majority rule" (e.g., where "A minority of 26 percent is empowered to block action desired by 74 per cent"; pg. 258).
Perhaps their key argument is that "Each interest group will, of course, turn every effort toward improving its own position, within the limits of the prevailing rules; but if, in fact, all interests come to recognize that the external costs involved in this continuous struggle of interests are excessive, all might agree on some changes." But pessimistically, they conclude that "as more and more groups organize to secure political support, and as more and more discriminatory action does come to characterize separate political decisions, reaction will surely set in at some point." (Pg. 290)
This is an interesting and thought-provoking work (although I fail to see how such analysis was worthy of a Nobel Prize), and should be read by all students of economics.
May 12, 2022
A classic and a must read for any political analysist, economist and public choice theorist. Buchanan is an intellectual giant, much too underrated, even though He won the Nobel in the 1980s.
February 12, 2012
I really enjoyed Buchanan and Tullock's original (at the time) insight on public choice theory. They were among the founders of the theory and introduced the concept of government failure (as opposed to market failure). I tend to agree with their methodological individualism approach and their rejection of an organic, benevolent State (the idea that a benevolent government exists in and of itself in the pursuit of a "common good"). I agree with their assumption that governments are composed of individuals who are self-interested, utility maximizers. Of course, Buchanan and Tullock's work is subjected to the same criticisms levied against public choice as a whole, namely that it does not explain all of human behavior. Nonetheless, their work is significant for the amount of research and scholarly activity it spawned. And, their argument for a more cautious approach when relying on government to fix market failures is compelling.
January 11, 2013
I didn't pick a lot out of this book, but that's largely because I've read so many others that use this book as a foundation that there wasn't much new for me to pick. The basic assumptions made about how people act are sound, though; I would recommend understanding the methodology more than anything else out of this book. It leads to some counter intuitive conclusions, like the necessity of log rolling in political societies.
Can imagine a lot of people who could gain from this. Maybe if I had more time to go through it deeper, I could gain more, but I just don't have said time.
Can imagine a lot of people who could gain from this. Maybe if I had more time to go through it deeper, I could gain more, but I just don't have said time.
January 9, 2011
Probably more a three and a half. The concept and the underlying theory of public choice are excellent. It's incredibly common-sensical and really frames the way you look at constitutional structures. However, in terms of presentation, it was a mix of the mathematical/economical and the philosophical, which sometimes made it less than clear. Overall, a good book, particularly for those interested in individual choice and the structure of government.
January 16, 2015
A very difficult read. Once they get through the introduction, the theory presented becomes very dense and hard to take in all at once. Read in small doses so that you have time to understand what is being said.
February 12, 2009
An excellent piece by Gordon Tullock explaining how public choice is skewed by adverse incentives.
September 24, 2009
an interesting economics approach to the same problems that Rawls faced in "A Theory of Justice."
Read
September 23, 2010The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Ann Arbor Paperbacks) by James M. Buchanan (1962)
August 30, 2014
The content is great. Very dry, but you don't read books like this for the prose.
May 22, 2016
They didn't take their conclusions 100% of the way to the very end, but the analysis of different constitutional scenarios is second to none.
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