This 2006 book shows through accessible argument and numerous examples how understanding moral philosophy can improve economic analysis, how moral philosophy can benefit from economists' analytical tools, and how economic analysis and moral philosophy together can inform public policy. Part I explores rationality and its connections to morality. It argues that in defending their model of rationality, mainstream economists implicitly espouse contestable moral principles. Part II concerns welfare, utilitarianism and standard welfare economics, while Part III considers important moral notions that are left out of standard welfare economics, such as freedom, rights, equality, and justice. Part III also emphasizes the variety of moral considerations that are relevant to evaluating policies. Part IV then introduces technical work in social choice theory and game theory that is guided by ethical concepts and relevant to moral theorizing. Chapters include recommended readings and the book includes a glossary of relevant terms.
We have regulations, this explains the motivating factor behind most regulations -spoiler alert I do not want to satisfy the average American’s preferences
A good book examining and explaining the importance of ethical and moral issues in economic theory, especially in welfare economics. It also tries, mostly successfully, analyzing other possible decision frameworks, often ignored or not considered by most economists, like that of liberty, freedom, equality, justice and distribution, and various intricate issues involved in crystallizing these ideas within the dominant 'scientific' economics vis a vis, the dominance framework of rational preference maximization. A good overview of up to date ideas, literature and research, though, for me, it looks that there is scope for improvement in analysis, focus and synthesis.
...proponents of economic measures tend to favor preference satisfaction accounts. In the words of Hausman and McPherson (1997): ‘‘Welfare economics identifies welfare with the satisfaction of preferences. This identification is so automatic and ubiquitous that economists seldom realize how controversial it is’’ (Hausman and McPherson 1997, 17).