Under what conditions or by virtue of what reasoning can individual liberties, such as the freedom to exercise religious beliefs or the freedom to express opinions in public discourse, be legally constrained? This type of question is asked frequently these days in relation to Covid restrictions or those who wear religious symbols or clothing. Martha Nussbaum's book explores the philosophical and legal thinking that can provide guidance on questions which are at the heart of our civil society, especially in the complex, diverse societies that most humans live in today. Nussbaum has a towering reputation as a public intellectual. She is able to bring together, in plain language, the traditions of philosophy with the fields of psychology, law, history and literature as she examines these key questions. In The New Religious Intolerance, she wrestles with the specific question of bans on women wearing face coverings in public spaces. Nussbaum starts her arguments with an examination of the emotion of fear. "Fear is the "dimming preoccupation", an intense focus on the self that casts others into darkness. However valuable and indeed essential it is in a genuinely dangerous world, it is itself one of life's greatest dangers." She goes on to apply insights from the Stoic "practical philosophers" and early modern thinkers like Mill. To be any kind of a useful guide for public policy or law, the ego centered emotion of fear needs to be tempered, or as Mill puts it "moralized" by "sympathy" or thoughts about the well being of others. I like this approach which I take to be in line with Spinoza's idea that humans typically cannot use reason to overrule their emotions; to temper a potentially destructive emotion, they must recruit a stronger emotion. Nussbaum takes care to describe how the legal traditions around individual freedoms, informed by philosophy, law and jurisprudence, evolved differently in Europe and North America in response to the different conditions between the long established nation states and colonized territories. In the tradition reaching back to English philosopher John Locke, freedoms extended certainly to the realm of thought and public speech but, if conscience required certain action, then there may be legal consequences. The North American tradition, dealing with the reality of many religious groups - Quakers, Mennonites, Jews, atheists and Mormons - tended to be more accomodationist, at least in regard to groups of European heritage. In the days of the colonies and early nationhood, Native Americans, slaves and people of colour fell outside the ambit of accomodationist thinking. Marshaling together the philosophic, legal and historical strands of thinking about individual rights, Nussbaum puts actual or proposed legal bans on the burka to the test. To analyze the issue and arrive at a concept of the good, she argues we we need three things: good principles, an emphasis on "non-narcissistic consistency" and the "inner eye" of sympathetic consideration of the point of view of others. The "good principles" include such things as holding that all humans are equal bearers of dignity and that dignity is vulnerable to the actions of others or the law. Adding these two together brings us to the view that liberty should be "ample and equal", close to John Rawls' principle that justice requires the "maximum liberty that is compatible with like liberty for all". Applying these tests to five arguments for banning the burka in certain public realms, namely, security, civic friendship, objectification of women, religious coercion and health, she finds no compelling justifications for legal restrictions. Through the clarity and force of her argument Nussbaum changed my thinking. Notwithstanding that my gender might make me inept or ineligible, I suppose I tended to be signed up for a position in the "Ministry of Feminism" that would decide which cultural practices were offensive to the rights or status of women in Canadian society. I, like many people, tend to get confused by the lines between law and custom. As Nussbaum notes, "the idea that equal respect requires us to approve of all religions equally, or even all instances of religious conduct, is just mistaken, and the participatory imagination doesn't require it either." There are many things that the law doesn't or shouldn't regulate that are not good. Unkindness, rudeness, selfishness and willing ignorance come to mind. Good manners rather than law can regulate these areas. This is a wonderful book, authored by a person of impressive intellectual powers. There are statements that strike me as compellingly beautiful such as her conclusion: "We need the Socratic (and Christian-Kantian) commitment to examine our choices to see whether they are selfish, whether they make a privileged case of ourselves, ignoring the equal claims of others. And we need, equally, the inner spirit that must animate the search for consistency, if it is not to remain a hollow shell: we need, that is, the spirit of curiosity and friendship".