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A Duel of Giants: Bismarck, Napoleon III, and the Origins of the Franco-Prussian War
Combining impeccable scholarship and literary elegance, David Wetzel depicts the drama of machinations and passions that exploded in a war that forever changed the face of European history.
264 pages, Hardcover
First published October 1, 2001
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Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews
November 9, 2018
I found this narrative a bit dry and academic and way too sort (less than 200 pgs of text).
It's also a bit revisionist. The auhor looks at the events of 1868-1870, starting with the Spanish rebelling against the Queen Isabella II and removing her from the throne. This set off another "Who will sit on the Spanish Thorne" crisis. Of course the French and Prussians back different candidates The author puts most of the blame for the war on the French esp the Premier (Ollivier) and the Foreign Minister. Napoleon III really didn't want the war, but was too sick to control them. The author also takes the position that neither Bismarck or the Prussian King, Wilhelm I, wanted a war with France. What Prussia really wanted was a Hohenzollern on the Spanish Throne. In June of '70 the Prussian eventually back down and their candidate with draws his name from consideration. This still does not satisfy the French and when Wilhelm I eventually declines to give them some very outrageous guarantee's, the French Declare War. This is where the narrative ends and the author does not discuss the war at all.
The revisionist take is that Bismarck is portrayed as mainly reacting to events rather than driving them.
The author also looks at the Prussian/Bismarck's desire for a united Germany (under Prussian control of course) and the States south of the Main River (mainly Bavaria and Wurttemberg) reluctance to be assimilated in a Greater German Reich under Prussian leadership.
All in all a 3 star book.
It's also a bit revisionist. The auhor looks at the events of 1868-1870, starting with the Spanish rebelling against the Queen Isabella II and removing her from the throne. This set off another "Who will sit on the Spanish Thorne" crisis. Of course the French and Prussians back different candidates The author puts most of the blame for the war on the French esp the Premier (Ollivier) and the Foreign Minister. Napoleon III really didn't want the war, but was too sick to control them. The author also takes the position that neither Bismarck or the Prussian King, Wilhelm I, wanted a war with France. What Prussia really wanted was a Hohenzollern on the Spanish Throne. In June of '70 the Prussian eventually back down and their candidate with draws his name from consideration. This still does not satisfy the French and when Wilhelm I eventually declines to give them some very outrageous guarantee's, the French Declare War. This is where the narrative ends and the author does not discuss the war at all.
The revisionist take is that Bismarck is portrayed as mainly reacting to events rather than driving them.
The author also looks at the Prussian/Bismarck's desire for a united Germany (under Prussian control of course) and the States south of the Main River (mainly Bavaria and Wurttemberg) reluctance to be assimilated in a Greater German Reich under Prussian leadership.
All in all a 3 star book.
October 20, 2016
In 1860 Prussia was arguably the weakest of the great powers of Europe, a Europe that hadn't changed all that much since Napoleon's downfall in 1815. Merely a decade later Prussia had humiliated first Austria and then France in two short wars and united Germany into a the most powerful state on the continent.
The version that I knew of this story basically boiled down to "Bismarck played rope-a-dope with everyone and got them to fight stupid wars over stupid crap that gave Prussia an excuse to unify Germany." The truth is more complicated, unfortunately so much more complicated that if anyone asks for the short version I'm sticking with the rope-a-dope line. And this is a good time to confess that listening on audio book to this was a mistake. Even with rewinds I struggled with a lot.
The book itself covers 1868 or so to 1870, so the run-up to the second war I mentioned, the Franco-Prussian war. (It doesn't give much of a run down of what happened earlier, and though I knew the outlines I would have appreciated far more.) The nominal cause for the war was a soap opera around the Spanish throne I won't even try to summarize. The French government--in which some factions wanted a war and some didn't--managed to whip the nation into a frenzy over wounded honor and disrespect, at which point they didn't think they could walk away with a diplomatic victory that didn't involve the Prussians abasing themselves. So they started a war that saw Paris occupied ended their Second Empire.
The "starting the war on purpose" story from Bismarck is at best half true, and to the extent it became a meme it's because Bismarck pushed it. Which was one historical lesson from the book--it was still an age when people were proud of starting wars. But Wetzel argues pretty convincingly that Bismarck didn't want war at first--he wanted a Prussian prince in Spain. The crisis blew up unintentionally, and it was only then (and at least in part to save his own position) that Bismarck started throwing fuel on the fire. He did this skillfully; Wetzel isn't trying to diminish Bismarck.
Wetzel also argues that the war was unnecessary to unify Germany and a bad idea. The basic gist is that Germany was heading towards unification anyway, so a German victory didn't gain them much except an enemy, while a French victory would have prevented unification ever. While Wetzel clearly knows more than me I'm less convinced by this, basically because a lot of the narrative does show the leaders of the minor German states hoping to avoid unification and being swept along in the nationalist anti-French struggle.
I'd give this a pretty tepid recommendation. Nothing against the writing or the scholarship. If I were trying to get a reading list around mid-19th century continental European politics I'd probably include it, but on its own I felt I was missing maybe a half-dozen other books of prep work to fully appreciate this one.
The version that I knew of this story basically boiled down to "Bismarck played rope-a-dope with everyone and got them to fight stupid wars over stupid crap that gave Prussia an excuse to unify Germany." The truth is more complicated, unfortunately so much more complicated that if anyone asks for the short version I'm sticking with the rope-a-dope line. And this is a good time to confess that listening on audio book to this was a mistake. Even with rewinds I struggled with a lot.
The book itself covers 1868 or so to 1870, so the run-up to the second war I mentioned, the Franco-Prussian war. (It doesn't give much of a run down of what happened earlier, and though I knew the outlines I would have appreciated far more.) The nominal cause for the war was a soap opera around the Spanish throne I won't even try to summarize. The French government--in which some factions wanted a war and some didn't--managed to whip the nation into a frenzy over wounded honor and disrespect, at which point they didn't think they could walk away with a diplomatic victory that didn't involve the Prussians abasing themselves. So they started a war that saw Paris occupied ended their Second Empire.
The "starting the war on purpose" story from Bismarck is at best half true, and to the extent it became a meme it's because Bismarck pushed it. Which was one historical lesson from the book--it was still an age when people were proud of starting wars. But Wetzel argues pretty convincingly that Bismarck didn't want war at first--he wanted a Prussian prince in Spain. The crisis blew up unintentionally, and it was only then (and at least in part to save his own position) that Bismarck started throwing fuel on the fire. He did this skillfully; Wetzel isn't trying to diminish Bismarck.
Wetzel also argues that the war was unnecessary to unify Germany and a bad idea. The basic gist is that Germany was heading towards unification anyway, so a German victory didn't gain them much except an enemy, while a French victory would have prevented unification ever. While Wetzel clearly knows more than me I'm less convinced by this, basically because a lot of the narrative does show the leaders of the minor German states hoping to avoid unification and being swept along in the nationalist anti-French struggle.
I'd give this a pretty tepid recommendation. Nothing against the writing or the scholarship. If I were trying to get a reading list around mid-19th century continental European politics I'd probably include it, but on its own I felt I was missing maybe a half-dozen other books of prep work to fully appreciate this one.
February 14, 2013
Bismarck and Nappy 3 went head-to-head in this 1870 dick-swinging throwdown. At least, that's the impression you might get from Wetzel's snappy title. It was a little more complex that that. Most of this book focuses on the 1868 Spanish Rev and the succession dispute which France wanted settled in her favor. "Deine Mutter schwitzt beim Kacken," snaps back the wily Prussians. Hohenzollern succession, etc., etc. Wetzel tries to paint the French as the baddies and its clear that he falls into the Historians-Rimming-Bismarck category. That's forgivable since he offers up a little more nuance then expected. He brings in Ollivier, Gramont, and the French need for blood and glory to show how this was a major Franco-fuckup. Definitely more about the personalities with a little politicking thrown in.
February 23, 2022
A really interesting topic. Basically, Bismarck wanted to unify the German kingdoms under Prussian rule so, to stir-up support, coerced France under Napoleon III to declare war on Prussia and the German states by sponsoring a German from the Hohenzollern dynasty to succeed the Spanish throne during the 1868 Spanish Revolution. Simultaneously, Bismarck had worked out multiple intricate treaties to pull other nations into the conflict with France in the Franco-Prussian war, leading to a Prussian victory. Bismarck also passed more social reforms, notably pension, to the people of his kingdom to increase support. The reforms combined with the soaring nationalism from defeating their rivals in France led to the creation of the German empire. It is one of the most interesting world history pieces to me, but man, was this writing dull. Lacking passion and life for the subject, the author makes 180 pages feel like 540.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
May 15, 2021
I have always been interested in the history of Germany. Within that, the life of the great conservative statesman Bismarck is a particular area of interest for me. That is how I got started on this book. Its a history of the path to the third and bloodiest war that helped Bismarck consolidate Germany. Oddly though, it was the french cabinet: Duc de Gramont and Ollivier who played a more active role in the days leading upto war than Bismarck himself. On the Prussian side, matters were handled by The King and one can say the trio had already redirected the tide before Bismarck returned from his estate and stepped in more actively.
Its impossible to simplify the political situation in Europe in the days leading upto war. The question of Spanish succession, the Prussian and Italian attempts to forward their candidates for the Spanish throne and the peculiar Government of France where the ministers had no collective responsibility and were individually responsible to no one in particular has to be read to be fully appreciated.
On the structure of the book. The first chapter on personalities is fascinating and worthy of a slow read. The second chapter on the Spanish question is tedious for its complexity and requires two reads. After that the writing gathers speed and the book becomes impossible to put down with events and reactions following one another in quick succession. David Wentzel's argumentation is very nuanced with backing evidence. Even if you don't agree with his conclusions, you would have enough material to draw your own.
This book is a must read to get an idea of how the situation evolved to make France declare war. The message is clear. If you wish to avoid war, and we are not sure some actually did, stop becoming a captive of history. Highly recommended.
Its impossible to simplify the political situation in Europe in the days leading upto war. The question of Spanish succession, the Prussian and Italian attempts to forward their candidates for the Spanish throne and the peculiar Government of France where the ministers had no collective responsibility and were individually responsible to no one in particular has to be read to be fully appreciated.
On the structure of the book. The first chapter on personalities is fascinating and worthy of a slow read. The second chapter on the Spanish question is tedious for its complexity and requires two reads. After that the writing gathers speed and the book becomes impossible to put down with events and reactions following one another in quick succession. David Wentzel's argumentation is very nuanced with backing evidence. Even if you don't agree with his conclusions, you would have enough material to draw your own.
This book is a must read to get an idea of how the situation evolved to make France declare war. The message is clear. If you wish to avoid war, and we are not sure some actually did, stop becoming a captive of history. Highly recommended.
March 10, 2024
Not so much a duel between Giants really more so some backdoor dealings and gossip. This whole war was apparently caused because the Prussian king refused to admit his plotting to put a member of the Prussian Royal family on the Spanish throne. That’s it. The French were so mad about this they mobilized their ENTIRE army against Prussia. Couldn’t believe the pettiness of 19th century European politics. The Prussian Chancellor, Wetzel reports, so wracked with disdain “had often lain awake whole nights, hating”. That legit made me laugh out loud. Like buddy relax just get some sleep! Book was alright- there were definitely some cool insights on the diplomacy and geopolitical climate that I hadn’t considered previously. I think getting out of the minutiae of diplomatic correspondence and focusing more on the macro factors motivating the conflict would’ve been more enjoyable but that wasn’t really Wetzel’s aim. 3.5 stars.
May 19, 2020
Very dense, filled to the brim with names and dates. Definitely not something for the casual reader, but if you know the history well already and want something to go more in depth this is perfect. Very well researched.
September 10, 2025
An excellent analysis of the origins of the Franco-Prussian War. So thorough and detailed that the reader becomes an observer of these dramatic, entertaining events. One can comprehend the fluid, chaotic situation on the French side that led to the fatal choice for war over the Spanish succession crisis of 1868-1870.
It seems reckless, even absurd that Napoleon III would view a German prince as the King of Spain as a threat to French security. That was the sort of issue that started a few major 18th century European wars; but dynastic power politics, especially over a weak power like 19th century Spain, should've looked less dangerous than in the previous century.
The author lays out very well the conflicts and dilemmas Napoleon III faced with his government and particularly with his advisors. It seemed that there was no right thing to do. Given the pluses and minuses of all the candidates for the Spanish throne, it was like playing a game with unscrupulous opponents without recognizable rules.
It is difficult to see why Leopold was such a poor candidate from the French perspective. Sure he was of the ruling family of Prussia; but, he was also a South German and a Catholic--both attributes from the French view. But appearances became everything in this crisis, and prestige mattered more than logic.
Still, as is well-documented here, Napoleon got the renunciation of Leopold's candidacy that he wanted. Had Gramont backed off just a bit, the whole crisis might well have ended in a complete French diplomatic victory. And no war.
Obviously, Napoleon was in no shape to effectively lead, as, his decision-making was greatly compromised by his declining health, and exacerbated by poor advice.
On the other hand, Bismarck played his cards well, and was a bit lucky besides. One wonders how German unification --Bismarck's main goal--would've been put off without the succession crisis and the subsequent war.
The entire history of this crisis leads me to believe that the only giant referred to in the title is Bismarck. Napoleon III more aptly fits the role as the one slain by the giant.
This is great history, and a wonderful read. Highly recommended.
It seems reckless, even absurd that Napoleon III would view a German prince as the King of Spain as a threat to French security. That was the sort of issue that started a few major 18th century European wars; but dynastic power politics, especially over a weak power like 19th century Spain, should've looked less dangerous than in the previous century.
The author lays out very well the conflicts and dilemmas Napoleon III faced with his government and particularly with his advisors. It seemed that there was no right thing to do. Given the pluses and minuses of all the candidates for the Spanish throne, it was like playing a game with unscrupulous opponents without recognizable rules.
It is difficult to see why Leopold was such a poor candidate from the French perspective. Sure he was of the ruling family of Prussia; but, he was also a South German and a Catholic--both attributes from the French view. But appearances became everything in this crisis, and prestige mattered more than logic.
Still, as is well-documented here, Napoleon got the renunciation of Leopold's candidacy that he wanted. Had Gramont backed off just a bit, the whole crisis might well have ended in a complete French diplomatic victory. And no war.
Obviously, Napoleon was in no shape to effectively lead, as, his decision-making was greatly compromised by his declining health, and exacerbated by poor advice.
On the other hand, Bismarck played his cards well, and was a bit lucky besides. One wonders how German unification --Bismarck's main goal--would've been put off without the succession crisis and the subsequent war.
The entire history of this crisis leads me to believe that the only giant referred to in the title is Bismarck. Napoleon III more aptly fits the role as the one slain by the giant.
This is great history, and a wonderful read. Highly recommended.
July 29, 2023
A very micro-level read into the diplomatic history preceding the war. The details and the flavor of the times are fascinating but the mass of details sometimes obscures or contradicts the author's rather opinionated theses.
March 19, 2025
Somehow too long and short at the same time?
Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews