Previously unpublished documents and personal interviews reveal the Pentatagon's attempt to establish a "mini-CIA" after the doomed 1980 Iran hostage rescue attempt and the role it played in the Iran-Contra affair
Excellent historical overview of the birth-pains of today's formidable US special ops/shadow commands. After a debacle that was Iran hostage rescue military was rather angry at both itself (inability to promptly field units to execute action, inadequate technology (planes, choppers, ships) and inadequate training) and existing intelligence apparatus (CIA) that they decided to create their own deep-cover-black-ops command(s) to execute this type of operations in the future. And Reagan's government was more than willing to support them in any way possible.
And thus organizations like ISA, Seaspray, Special Operations Division and JSOC were born.
Please keep in mind that this book is not action story - author aims at showing what it takes to create new command (especially unconventional one), provide it with manpower, training and support and keep it under tight wraps so that no-one can find about them at all in order to let them do highly sensitive work in a best possible way for which they are adequately equipped and trained.
Work of the new commands is shown very well, from ability to perform ELINT missions to troops on the ground conducting direct action and intelligence missions. Were they always successful? Of course not, at time they drew ire from the highest Army ranks and even State Department (evaluation of premises in Lebanon before the terrorist strikes in 1980's) but they proved their worth when required.
But what happens when you have highly capable force deep-undercover, under no supervision, actin on high-level of self-initiative and with seemingly unlimited funds?
Very soon other agencies start to play on patriotic card and willingness of force to prove itself (and I mean if you are a spy any contact from CIA must be like being contacted by a celebrity). It is uncanny how CIA worked on subverting the force to bring it (and it's unlimited access to funds) under its own control.
Also rather lax control from the top allowed for personnel working in commands to abuse their position and start siphoning money to their own whims.
Coup de grace was Iran-Contra affair started by over-zealous politicians in Reagan's government and CIA that sucked in covert Special Operations Division and finally [in attempt to cover their own tracks] pushed it to media front-line to be beaten up and finally dismantled in disgrace. In my opinion this was most humiliating time for US military spec ops community. But they handled it with dignity, cleaned up the ranks and pushed on to finally grow and develop what is today known as US SOCOM and JSOC.
Excellent book on early days of today's premiere special operations forces.
Recommended to all fans of military, black ops and special ops in general.
A fascinating account of the establishment and early history of what some have called the Pentagon's "mini CIA", an assortment of special units tasked with carrying out some of the most sensitive and dangerous missions around the globe. A good and, in more than a few places, eyebrow-raising read. Recommended.
Based on the subtitle, "Inside the Covert Military Operations of the Reagan Era," and after reading the Prologue, I expected something like a Tom Clancy novel, with exciting stories of heroic behind-the-scenes operations. Instead, the book is mostly a detailing of departmental in-fighting, failures to cooperate or share intelligence, and preparations for operations that never happened. Some "covert" dealings where large sums of money were thrown around without any accountability are discussed in mind-numbing detail. And what is the point of discussing in such detail the preparations for hostage rescues in Iran or Beirut or elsewhere when in the end they never happened? It's pretty discouraging to read through all that only to find out that the mission was cancelled for various reasons such as equipment failures (apparently the military didn't take care of it's equipment). In fact, according to the author, the few operational successes the Special Operations Divisions seemed to have came as a result of Israeli intelligence or West Germans apprehending a terrorist in their airport. And it seems to have practically nothing to do with Reagan himself except his directives, many times which were very broadly interpreted by those in Special Ops. I hate to unfairly judge the book based upon what must have been my overly optimistic expectations, but frankly, this ended up being a pretty dull read. Skip it and go straight to a Tom Clancy book.
This was a very interesting read. The book was published in 1988 and covers a lot of the early and mid eighties in relation to the USA and it's various intelligence agencies and their involvement with the military, the secret wars and botched operations. The book is very well researched but doesn't read like a text book. It is a fairly independant viewpoint as well more or less presenting facts. In other words it isn't just a pro-USA book. The author is quite prepared to point of the failings and corruption as well. I wished there had been more on the Iran/contra Affair but the book made up for it by including 'secret wars' and 'hostage rescue attempts" I had not previously know about. Good Read
If you are interested in an excellent historical overview of the creation of most of the special mission units (smu) that exist today, this is a must read. Emerson does a great job of illuminating the bureaucratic nightmare involved in creating extra special operations forces. Can't say enough good things about this book.
I resisted reading this, and it sat on my shelf for years. Finally, I gave it a try, and it exceeded my expectations. I enjoyed it and consider it an excellent book on covert ops during the Reagan era.
Must read for anyone in the national security or intelligence communities. Great study of hubris and what happens when folks with "special" in their organization title take that to mean the rules don't apply them. Also a cautionary tale for today's military and intelligence community.
The office I worked in while assigned to the Pentagon is mentioned in this book (Technology Management Office). It was in Room 1C460, which was destroyed by Flight 77 on 9/11.