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Napoleon's Invasion of Russia
“An impressive source book on the conflict, high on information and data.”— Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research
September 7, 1812, is by itself one of the most cataclysmic days in the history of 74,000 casualties at the Battle of Borodino. And this was well before the invention of weaspons of mass destruction like machine guns or breech-loading rifles.
In this detailed study of one of the most fascinating military campaigns in history, George Nazfiger includes a clear exposition on the power structure in Europe at the time leading up to Napoleon’s fateful decision to attempt what turned out to be the conquest of Russia. Also featured are complete orders of battle and detailed descriptions of the opposing forces.
September 7, 1812, is by itself one of the most cataclysmic days in the history of 74,000 casualties at the Battle of Borodino. And this was well before the invention of weaspons of mass destruction like machine guns or breech-loading rifles.
In this detailed study of one of the most fascinating military campaigns in history, George Nazfiger includes a clear exposition on the power structure in Europe at the time leading up to Napoleon’s fateful decision to attempt what turned out to be the conquest of Russia. Also featured are complete orders of battle and detailed descriptions of the opposing forces.
704 pages, Paperback
First published June 1, 1988
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103 people want to read
About the author
George F. Nafziger
113 books12 followersGeorge F. Nafziger is an American writer and editor. He runs the Nafziger Collection, a publishing house specializing in military history.
Nafziger earned his BA and MBA at Miami University, Oxford, Ohio, and his PhD From the Union Institute, Cincinnati, Ohio. He has served as Director of the Napoleonic Society of America and the Napoleonic Alliance. Nafziger is a fellow of Le Souvenir Napoléonienne Internationale.
He served in the US Navy for four years and another two decades in the US Navy Reserves. Nafziger did two tours to Vietnam and experienced combat firsthand. In addition, he worked in the State Department's African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, where he trained African officers in peacekeeping operations from 2002 to 2012.
Nafziger earned his BA and MBA at Miami University, Oxford, Ohio, and his PhD From the Union Institute, Cincinnati, Ohio. He has served as Director of the Napoleonic Society of America and the Napoleonic Alliance. Nafziger is a fellow of Le Souvenir Napoléonienne Internationale.
He served in the US Navy for four years and another two decades in the US Navy Reserves. Nafziger did two tours to Vietnam and experienced combat firsthand. In addition, he worked in the State Department's African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, where he trained African officers in peacekeeping operations from 2002 to 2012.
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
May 8, 2018
This is easily the most exhaustive of the many studies and narratives produced on one of the greatest contests in all of military history: Napoleon's ill fated 1812 invasion of Russia.
George Nafziger scoured the archives of numerous nations who were involved to produce the most detailed account of the military operations and analysis of the strategic and concerns. However, much like David Glantz, Nafziger is a man who knows his subject matter intuitively, yet struggles to form a narrative that is palatable to those who don't specialize as quartermaster clerks.
First off, to avoid sounding like I am negatively reviewing this work, I am not. Allow me to highlight the many pros of this work.
Napoleon's invasion was not merely a French invasion. Napoleon was able to muster a united European effort with official representation from: France, Portugal, Pro-Bonapartist Spain, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Italy, nearly all of the German states, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Prussia and Poland. Of the nearly 700,000 men who marched into Russia, over half were not French.
While the popular view of the campaign is of a long scorched earth Russian retreat, followed by a counteroffensive once Napoleon began to collapse logistically at Moscow, this is significantly a warped and not entirely true narrative.
There were numerous large scale, full fledged battles in the march to Moscow. And it is in the painstaking retelling of each and every major, and minor, tactical engagement of the campaign that one comes to an appreciation of why the invasion ended as it did.
This was not the Russian Imperial Army of the Great War which was woefully outclassed (as was everyone else) by a smaller yet significantly better Imperial German Army. Nor was this the behemoth Red Army of the Second War which largely won through superior mass and firepower, absorbing several times the losses of an again smaller, yet tactically significantly superior Germanic foe. No, this was the Imperial Army of the age of muskets, the age when Russia was at the apex of her military capabilities.
From the 7 Years War against Frederick the Great (the Russians lost few battles to alte Fritz) through the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the Russians were indeed second to none in terms of their military system.
In recounting the many battles and skirmishes on the road to Moscow, Nafziger showcases the Russians at the height of their military glory. In most of these engagements they inflicted heavier losses on their Napoleonic foes, and denied everywhere he sought one, Bonaparte the decisive victory he needed.
The only significant Allied victory of the campaign was Borodino, a bloodbath of epic proportions that, while the Russians took heavier losses (44,000 to roughly 35,000 Allied losses), they again denied Napoleon a decisive victory, and greatly eroded the fighting qualities of the best of Napoleon's allies, specifically the Germans and the Austrians.
The counteroffensive which swept the Allies out of Russia (and which collapsed the European Union against Russia), was likewise a bloodsoaked affair with the Russians losing equally severely to the elements as did the Allies.
In truth, while the Allies were devastated by their disastrous invasion, the Russians were likewise devasted by their near disastrous triumph. The Russians could barely muster as many men as Napoleon once the campaign was finally over, and it would take some time to repair their logistical situation for the impending 1813 invasion of Germany considering their own purposeful devastation of their own territories during the Allied invasion. This allowed Napoleon to shock the world by rebuilding his army, and subsequently thrashing the Russians and Prussians at Lutzen, Bautzen and Dresden in 1813.
The negatives of this book are relatively few, as this was published back in the good old days when publishing houses actually afforded in house editors. The only real glaring negative is the lack of spirit or emotion in Nafziger's writing style.
Much in the same style as Col. Glantz, Nafziger inundates the reader with details of a fascinating subject while managing to suck all the life and drama out of a truly dramatic subject.
Regardless this is a must have work for any military historians library. The appendices alone, half the book, are worth the price on their own.
You will legitimately not find a more exhaustively detailed study on the 1812 invasion of Russia. For that reason, it is recommended.
George Nafziger scoured the archives of numerous nations who were involved to produce the most detailed account of the military operations and analysis of the strategic and concerns. However, much like David Glantz, Nafziger is a man who knows his subject matter intuitively, yet struggles to form a narrative that is palatable to those who don't specialize as quartermaster clerks.
First off, to avoid sounding like I am negatively reviewing this work, I am not. Allow me to highlight the many pros of this work.
Napoleon's invasion was not merely a French invasion. Napoleon was able to muster a united European effort with official representation from: France, Portugal, Pro-Bonapartist Spain, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Italy, nearly all of the German states, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Prussia and Poland. Of the nearly 700,000 men who marched into Russia, over half were not French.
While the popular view of the campaign is of a long scorched earth Russian retreat, followed by a counteroffensive once Napoleon began to collapse logistically at Moscow, this is significantly a warped and not entirely true narrative.
There were numerous large scale, full fledged battles in the march to Moscow. And it is in the painstaking retelling of each and every major, and minor, tactical engagement of the campaign that one comes to an appreciation of why the invasion ended as it did.
This was not the Russian Imperial Army of the Great War which was woefully outclassed (as was everyone else) by a smaller yet significantly better Imperial German Army. Nor was this the behemoth Red Army of the Second War which largely won through superior mass and firepower, absorbing several times the losses of an again smaller, yet tactically significantly superior Germanic foe. No, this was the Imperial Army of the age of muskets, the age when Russia was at the apex of her military capabilities.
From the 7 Years War against Frederick the Great (the Russians lost few battles to alte Fritz) through the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the Russians were indeed second to none in terms of their military system.
In recounting the many battles and skirmishes on the road to Moscow, Nafziger showcases the Russians at the height of their military glory. In most of these engagements they inflicted heavier losses on their Napoleonic foes, and denied everywhere he sought one, Bonaparte the decisive victory he needed.
The only significant Allied victory of the campaign was Borodino, a bloodbath of epic proportions that, while the Russians took heavier losses (44,000 to roughly 35,000 Allied losses), they again denied Napoleon a decisive victory, and greatly eroded the fighting qualities of the best of Napoleon's allies, specifically the Germans and the Austrians.
The counteroffensive which swept the Allies out of Russia (and which collapsed the European Union against Russia), was likewise a bloodsoaked affair with the Russians losing equally severely to the elements as did the Allies.
In truth, while the Allies were devastated by their disastrous invasion, the Russians were likewise devasted by their near disastrous triumph. The Russians could barely muster as many men as Napoleon once the campaign was finally over, and it would take some time to repair their logistical situation for the impending 1813 invasion of Germany considering their own purposeful devastation of their own territories during the Allied invasion. This allowed Napoleon to shock the world by rebuilding his army, and subsequently thrashing the Russians and Prussians at Lutzen, Bautzen and Dresden in 1813.
The negatives of this book are relatively few, as this was published back in the good old days when publishing houses actually afforded in house editors. The only real glaring negative is the lack of spirit or emotion in Nafziger's writing style.
Much in the same style as Col. Glantz, Nafziger inundates the reader with details of a fascinating subject while managing to suck all the life and drama out of a truly dramatic subject.
Regardless this is a must have work for any military historians library. The appendices alone, half the book, are worth the price on their own.
You will legitimately not find a more exhaustively detailed study on the 1812 invasion of Russia. For that reason, it is recommended.
June 8, 2025
A challenging read! Nafziger's data heavy account of 1812 is, very occasionally, exciting, but it is always exhausting in its detail.
I've wanted this particular title for my growing Russia 1812 library for some years. As long as I've known of it the cover has held a certain charm, for one thing. But usually I couldn't even find it, and then when I occasionally did it was priced around £15-20, or more, either online or at wargaming shows. So I was very chuffed when I spotted it, on a haberdashery stall, of all places, at a local 1940s themed show; they were asking... 50p!
And I'm damn glad I only paid that amount, 'cause if I'd paid £15-20, I'd have really resented it. Sure, it's a veritable almanac of data, but it's not a particularly easy or inspiring narrative. I mean no offence to George F. Nafziger, who clearly knows and loves his subject - and who's clearly also a data junkie - but this book is amongst the most densely turgid on the subject I've forced myself to wade through.
In places I did enjoy it. It is, for example, better than many accounts of this campaign in including coverage of what went on to the north and south of Napoleon's main central forces. But at other times it worked as one of the most powerful soporifics I've ever encountered. If I were a doctor, I might prescribe this to anyone with sleeping problems. In fact - and I jest not - I do suffer that way, and I have intentionally used this book to put myself out. It never fails!
Of the more than 700 pages, only the first 300 or so, i.e. less than fifty percent, comprise the narrative! The remainder of the book is made up of maps, OOBs, and numerous other forms of pertinent data. I'm building miniature armies and planning to wargame several key events from the 1812 campaign in Russia, and I suppose I may refer to some of this other material when I really get stuck into that.
But, for the time being, I have to confess that it was with great relief that I 'finished', i.e. reached the end of the narrative segment, of this factually informative but rather leaden account of what is, as David Chandler says in his intro, an endlessly fascinating campaign.
I still love the cover. And I suppose I'm glad to now finally have this potentially useful resource as part of my Russia 1812 arsenal. But the density of movement, location and unit info was, speaking frankly, a real slog to get through. And the writing itself would've benefitted from more editorial intervention (to remedy occasional lack of clarity, frequent repetition, etc.).
If you were coming to this subject fresh, I'd recommend Zamoyski's exciting 1812, or Paul Britten Austin's fabulous and epic 'word-film' (available as either a trilogy of single volume). I'm only an interested amateur/dilettante myself, and I deeply admire and respect Nafziger's accomplishment in marshalling all the information, as well as sharing his passion for the subject.
But, truth be told, this really is one for the hardcore buffs only!
I've wanted this particular title for my growing Russia 1812 library for some years. As long as I've known of it the cover has held a certain charm, for one thing. But usually I couldn't even find it, and then when I occasionally did it was priced around £15-20, or more, either online or at wargaming shows. So I was very chuffed when I spotted it, on a haberdashery stall, of all places, at a local 1940s themed show; they were asking... 50p!
And I'm damn glad I only paid that amount, 'cause if I'd paid £15-20, I'd have really resented it. Sure, it's a veritable almanac of data, but it's not a particularly easy or inspiring narrative. I mean no offence to George F. Nafziger, who clearly knows and loves his subject - and who's clearly also a data junkie - but this book is amongst the most densely turgid on the subject I've forced myself to wade through.
In places I did enjoy it. It is, for example, better than many accounts of this campaign in including coverage of what went on to the north and south of Napoleon's main central forces. But at other times it worked as one of the most powerful soporifics I've ever encountered. If I were a doctor, I might prescribe this to anyone with sleeping problems. In fact - and I jest not - I do suffer that way, and I have intentionally used this book to put myself out. It never fails!
Of the more than 700 pages, only the first 300 or so, i.e. less than fifty percent, comprise the narrative! The remainder of the book is made up of maps, OOBs, and numerous other forms of pertinent data. I'm building miniature armies and planning to wargame several key events from the 1812 campaign in Russia, and I suppose I may refer to some of this other material when I really get stuck into that.
But, for the time being, I have to confess that it was with great relief that I 'finished', i.e. reached the end of the narrative segment, of this factually informative but rather leaden account of what is, as David Chandler says in his intro, an endlessly fascinating campaign.
I still love the cover. And I suppose I'm glad to now finally have this potentially useful resource as part of my Russia 1812 arsenal. But the density of movement, location and unit info was, speaking frankly, a real slog to get through. And the writing itself would've benefitted from more editorial intervention (to remedy occasional lack of clarity, frequent repetition, etc.).
If you were coming to this subject fresh, I'd recommend Zamoyski's exciting 1812, or Paul Britten Austin's fabulous and epic 'word-film' (available as either a trilogy of single volume). I'm only an interested amateur/dilettante myself, and I deeply admire and respect Nafziger's accomplishment in marshalling all the information, as well as sharing his passion for the subject.
But, truth be told, this really is one for the hardcore buffs only!
December 28, 2013
Nafziger is an awful writter, but a great historian, which is why i have a tough time complaining about him. I know he knows his stuff, just wish he would present it better.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews