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The Fight For The 'Malvinas': The Argentine Forces In The Falklands War
Discusses the Falkland Islands War from the Argentine point of view, and includes reactions of soldiers of all ranks
336 pages, Hardcover
First published August 10, 1989
63 people are currently reading
243 people want to read
About the author
Martin Middlebrook
42 books62 followersMartin Middlebrook was a British military historian and Fellow of the Royal Historical Society. Appointed Knight of the Order of the Belgian Crown in 2004.
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Displaying 1 - 25 of 25 reviews
April 13, 2020
The Argentine point of view mostly from interviews
This British author who has written about the Falklands War from the British point of view has written this book to present the Argentine side of the military operations. He has, for the most part, avoided the politics and competing claims to the islands. In a very few places he leaned a bit far to the Argentine side in his efforts to present a fair and unbiased account. But I noticed only one which I feel to be material. That is a passage which could lead the uninformed to believe that British claims to the Falklands date from only 1833 and that they were seized from Argentina.
The book is a little wordy sometimes taking a few pages to impart information which could have been done in a few paragraphs. But then, the author would not have been presenting complete interviews which in some cases he apparently felt were important in their entirety. His sources are primarily interviews with Argentine navy and army personnel, enlisted, officers and commanders. He believes that these people were truthful and in some places says that he is certain of it. The interviews and the writing were completed about five years after the war. The Argentine Air Force did not cooperate with the author so his information about air force operations came primarily from material previously written by air force personnel. Some of the interviews with soldiers and sailors also revealed information about the air force.
There are very few footnotes but much of the material is attributed to various sources in the text itself. But there are assertions made with no attribution such as, "An early post-war version, that Captain Palaver’s Skyhawk was shot down in error by Argentine anti-aircraft gunners at Goose Green, was incorrect.". Another example is, "Some books state that it was a Hercules aircraft which dropped the bombs, but this is not correct."
It seems that a major problem for the frontline Argentine troops was a lack of cold weather clothing and a lack of food. There was food but the commanders did not insure its distribution to the front. Some troops stayed nice and cozy at Stanley and other places while the troops on the front lines facing the British suffered severely from hunger and exposure. Adding to the morale problem was that some of these REMF's sold food supplies to the combat troops instead of delivering them. Some also stole packages sent to the troops from home and sold the contents to the troops. It was also widely believed that the officers had plenty and better food. Despite all of this, the Argentine commanders and others interviewed by the author contend that morale was high and that the troops expected to drive the British back.
At the end of the book there are some retrospective comments by some Argentines. There is also an appendix with the order of battle of Argentine units from all services.
Overall the book is a little dry with more detail of military movements than would be of interest to many casual readers. It is worth reading if one has an interest in a mostly successful attempt at an even-handed account of the military operations from the Argentine point of view.
This British author who has written about the Falklands War from the British point of view has written this book to present the Argentine side of the military operations. He has, for the most part, avoided the politics and competing claims to the islands. In a very few places he leaned a bit far to the Argentine side in his efforts to present a fair and unbiased account. But I noticed only one which I feel to be material. That is a passage which could lead the uninformed to believe that British claims to the Falklands date from only 1833 and that they were seized from Argentina.
The book is a little wordy sometimes taking a few pages to impart information which could have been done in a few paragraphs. But then, the author would not have been presenting complete interviews which in some cases he apparently felt were important in their entirety. His sources are primarily interviews with Argentine navy and army personnel, enlisted, officers and commanders. He believes that these people were truthful and in some places says that he is certain of it. The interviews and the writing were completed about five years after the war. The Argentine Air Force did not cooperate with the author so his information about air force operations came primarily from material previously written by air force personnel. Some of the interviews with soldiers and sailors also revealed information about the air force.
There are very few footnotes but much of the material is attributed to various sources in the text itself. But there are assertions made with no attribution such as, "An early post-war version, that Captain Palaver’s Skyhawk was shot down in error by Argentine anti-aircraft gunners at Goose Green, was incorrect.". Another example is, "Some books state that it was a Hercules aircraft which dropped the bombs, but this is not correct."
It seems that a major problem for the frontline Argentine troops was a lack of cold weather clothing and a lack of food. There was food but the commanders did not insure its distribution to the front. Some troops stayed nice and cozy at Stanley and other places while the troops on the front lines facing the British suffered severely from hunger and exposure. Adding to the morale problem was that some of these REMF's sold food supplies to the combat troops instead of delivering them. Some also stole packages sent to the troops from home and sold the contents to the troops. It was also widely believed that the officers had plenty and better food. Despite all of this, the Argentine commanders and others interviewed by the author contend that morale was high and that the troops expected to drive the British back.
At the end of the book there are some retrospective comments by some Argentines. There is also an appendix with the order of battle of Argentine units from all services.
Overall the book is a little dry with more detail of military movements than would be of interest to many casual readers. It is worth reading if one has an interest in a mostly successful attempt at an even-handed account of the military operations from the Argentine point of view.
April 2, 2020
A very readable account of the Argentine side of the Falklands War. By matching up all Argentine sources with the British Side he already knew , Middlebrook is able to tell the Argentine story really well. The political miscalculation, the military logistical failures, and the central fragility of the Argentine military as a whole are all writ large over the entire timeline. Middlebrook refrains from too many judgemental comments, letting the story tell itself. One comes away saddened by the stupidity of political hubris more than enlightened about modern warfare. Well worth the time.
January 16, 2011
I read this book out of professional interest, to understand the Falklands War from the Argentine side, and in particular to see if I could figure out what they could have done to put up a better fight. The book is superb for that purpose. It is written by an Englishman, but one who interviewed extensively in Argentina and got wide cooperation. He tells the story plainly, giving full credit where it is due but accepting no claims that cannot be backed up with evidence. He gives the Argentine justification for the war simply, not necessarily agreeing with it, but not arguing with it either.
So what could the Argentines have done better? First, let's say that at the time with the knowledge and resources they had, perhaps no-one could have done better. But with the war over, we can examine it for insights on how future wars might be waged more effectively. If I had been there at the time, I would have made the same mistakes, or more likely others even more disastrous. I want to look for lessons learned from the war, hoping they will be useful for future soldiers.
1. The Argentines should have understood the political situation. They started with no plan to defend the Falklands. They imagined that their cause was so plainly just that the UN would intervene on their side. They thought that the Brits would not attempt to retake the islands. In both they were sadly mistaken. They had a plan to seize the islands, which was sound and well-executed, with an absolute minimum of bloodshed, but no plan to defend them against a determined attack. They had to improvise once it was plain that an attack was coming.
2. The Argentine system of 12-month conscription is not suitable for modern short-duration wars. Maybe it provides a basis for deliberate mobilization, but a lot of the rank and file sent to the Falklands had only four months of training. Man for man they were no match for the professional British soldiers, and the Argentines knew it.
3. If they had waited a year or two until some weapon system acquisitions were complete, they could have made the islands just about impregnable. In particular, a good supply of Excocet missiles, including some on mobile ground launchers on the islands, would have kept the British away. The Argentines were buying them, but had only five (which sank two British ships). Also, a small fleet of modern submarines would have made the waters extremely dangerous. The Argentines had one, which had not completed working up and whose torpedo system did not work. I've read elsewhere that the British chose to land at San Carlos because the protected waters could be well-defended against subs, despite the fact that the surrounding hills provided covered avenues of approach for the air raids that caused so much damage
4. The Argentines let themselves be distracted by a seconday threat. They didn't send to the Falklands the units best prepared for conditions there, which would have been those normally stationed in the south of the country. They were afraid that Chile would make a move.
5. Their plan to count on a static defense around Stanley maybe was best, given the abilities of their troops. That's how Andrew Jackson used poorly-trained militia troops to defeat battle-hardened British regulars at New Orleans in 1815. However, I wonder if they couldn't have made a better effort to interfere with the landings at San Carlos. The islands are not that big--maybe the Argentines could have had a plan to move artillery within range of likely landing sites. As it happened, the landings were almost undisturbed except for air raids. Those were pressed home against fearful odds with a gallantry that won the admiration of the world, but the raids could only reach the defensive screen of picket ships. There they caused great damage, but the landings themselves were mostly undisturbed.
6. The Argentine navy missed their one chance to mount an air attack against the approaching British fleet. Their aircraft carrier was at sea, but it would have had to approach closer than it was when the British fleet was located, and they decided the risk of such an approach was too great. But a successful attack could have won the war right there.
7. In general, the Argentine surface navy did not acquit itself well. They laid no mines in the Falklands waters, which would have complicated things a great deal for the Brits. Astoundingly, the two destroyers escorting the General Belgrano did not notice when that cruiser was torpedoed and sunk out from under them. Maybe visibility was bad and they were under radio silence, but there were distress signals that were missed.
8. Over half the bombs put into British ships by Argentine pilots (at great cost to themselves) failed to explode. On some the fuzes failed to work, so maintenance was poor. Some were released so close to the target that the arming mechanism did not have time to work. I guess no-one had reflected that attacks on modern ships would require extremely low-altitude bomb release and hence modifications to the mechanism.
9. Once the final Exocet was used, the Brits moved their aircraft carriers closer to the islands. In retrospect, the Argentines would have done better to keep their last missile as a force in being; it would likely have made British air operations much more difficult during the final phases of the war.
10. The ground defense was too passive. There was little patrolling and few outposts, so the Brits could approach Argentine positions without being shelled and without the Argentines knowing the direction of approach. On one occasion the Brits infiltrated through a minefield and took the Argentines by surprise in the rear. There should have been covering positions to prevent this.
11. In general, the Argentines did not prepare flexibile plans. They guessed at where the Brits would attack and were unprepared when the attack came elsewhere.
12. The Argentine surface navy could have operated against the Brits' sea lines of communications, with support from shore-based recon aircraft. It would have been risky, especially since they had no defense except evasion against British nuclear submarines. But the subs can't be everywhere at once, and vigorous action might have drawn off some of the force near the Falklands. Such action was considered late in the war but rejected, probably because of a political decision not to widen a war that was already as good as lost.
13. Finally, these miserable islands were not worth the lives lost either to defend or to retake them. The nationalist passion that led to their seizure was just mad. Alas, people are prone to such fits of irrational nationalistic madness about lost territory, however useless it is and however long ago it was lost. Let us beware: just this sort of irrational passion could boil up in a moment in China over Taiwan. Anyway, I say the Argentines should have used Ghandi's method to defend the islands: fly over thousands of civilians to occupy them, refuse to fight, and make the Brits use force to move them out. Nationalist feeling was so strong that volunteers would have been ample. It would have demonstrated their commitment to regaining the islands, and would have played much better on the international stage. It might not have worked, but fighting certainly didn't work, and it cost a lot more lives.
So what could the Argentines have done better? First, let's say that at the time with the knowledge and resources they had, perhaps no-one could have done better. But with the war over, we can examine it for insights on how future wars might be waged more effectively. If I had been there at the time, I would have made the same mistakes, or more likely others even more disastrous. I want to look for lessons learned from the war, hoping they will be useful for future soldiers.
1. The Argentines should have understood the political situation. They started with no plan to defend the Falklands. They imagined that their cause was so plainly just that the UN would intervene on their side. They thought that the Brits would not attempt to retake the islands. In both they were sadly mistaken. They had a plan to seize the islands, which was sound and well-executed, with an absolute minimum of bloodshed, but no plan to defend them against a determined attack. They had to improvise once it was plain that an attack was coming.
2. The Argentine system of 12-month conscription is not suitable for modern short-duration wars. Maybe it provides a basis for deliberate mobilization, but a lot of the rank and file sent to the Falklands had only four months of training. Man for man they were no match for the professional British soldiers, and the Argentines knew it.
3. If they had waited a year or two until some weapon system acquisitions were complete, they could have made the islands just about impregnable. In particular, a good supply of Excocet missiles, including some on mobile ground launchers on the islands, would have kept the British away. The Argentines were buying them, but had only five (which sank two British ships). Also, a small fleet of modern submarines would have made the waters extremely dangerous. The Argentines had one, which had not completed working up and whose torpedo system did not work. I've read elsewhere that the British chose to land at San Carlos because the protected waters could be well-defended against subs, despite the fact that the surrounding hills provided covered avenues of approach for the air raids that caused so much damage
4. The Argentines let themselves be distracted by a seconday threat. They didn't send to the Falklands the units best prepared for conditions there, which would have been those normally stationed in the south of the country. They were afraid that Chile would make a move.
5. Their plan to count on a static defense around Stanley maybe was best, given the abilities of their troops. That's how Andrew Jackson used poorly-trained militia troops to defeat battle-hardened British regulars at New Orleans in 1815. However, I wonder if they couldn't have made a better effort to interfere with the landings at San Carlos. The islands are not that big--maybe the Argentines could have had a plan to move artillery within range of likely landing sites. As it happened, the landings were almost undisturbed except for air raids. Those were pressed home against fearful odds with a gallantry that won the admiration of the world, but the raids could only reach the defensive screen of picket ships. There they caused great damage, but the landings themselves were mostly undisturbed.
6. The Argentine navy missed their one chance to mount an air attack against the approaching British fleet. Their aircraft carrier was at sea, but it would have had to approach closer than it was when the British fleet was located, and they decided the risk of such an approach was too great. But a successful attack could have won the war right there.
7. In general, the Argentine surface navy did not acquit itself well. They laid no mines in the Falklands waters, which would have complicated things a great deal for the Brits. Astoundingly, the two destroyers escorting the General Belgrano did not notice when that cruiser was torpedoed and sunk out from under them. Maybe visibility was bad and they were under radio silence, but there were distress signals that were missed.
8. Over half the bombs put into British ships by Argentine pilots (at great cost to themselves) failed to explode. On some the fuzes failed to work, so maintenance was poor. Some were released so close to the target that the arming mechanism did not have time to work. I guess no-one had reflected that attacks on modern ships would require extremely low-altitude bomb release and hence modifications to the mechanism.
9. Once the final Exocet was used, the Brits moved their aircraft carriers closer to the islands. In retrospect, the Argentines would have done better to keep their last missile as a force in being; it would likely have made British air operations much more difficult during the final phases of the war.
10. The ground defense was too passive. There was little patrolling and few outposts, so the Brits could approach Argentine positions without being shelled and without the Argentines knowing the direction of approach. On one occasion the Brits infiltrated through a minefield and took the Argentines by surprise in the rear. There should have been covering positions to prevent this.
11. In general, the Argentines did not prepare flexibile plans. They guessed at where the Brits would attack and were unprepared when the attack came elsewhere.
12. The Argentine surface navy could have operated against the Brits' sea lines of communications, with support from shore-based recon aircraft. It would have been risky, especially since they had no defense except evasion against British nuclear submarines. But the subs can't be everywhere at once, and vigorous action might have drawn off some of the force near the Falklands. Such action was considered late in the war but rejected, probably because of a political decision not to widen a war that was already as good as lost.
13. Finally, these miserable islands were not worth the lives lost either to defend or to retake them. The nationalist passion that led to their seizure was just mad. Alas, people are prone to such fits of irrational nationalistic madness about lost territory, however useless it is and however long ago it was lost. Let us beware: just this sort of irrational passion could boil up in a moment in China over Taiwan. Anyway, I say the Argentines should have used Ghandi's method to defend the islands: fly over thousands of civilians to occupy them, refuse to fight, and make the Brits use force to move them out. Nationalist feeling was so strong that volunteers would have been ample. It would have demonstrated their commitment to regaining the islands, and would have played much better on the international stage. It might not have worked, but fighting certainly didn't work, and it cost a lot more lives.
June 19, 2018
A well researched and written account. This title may be a good choice for someone's first read on the topic. The only downside I found was how anticlimactic was the battle for Stanley.
December 24, 2012
I struggled to read this as it's not really my kind of book but it was interesting in parts and well written. I was keen to read from the Argentine perspective.
August 10, 2024
Martin Middlebrook (2003, revised from the 1988 edition). The author was generously given time and interviews by many Argentine combatants, but received no help from their air force. He relied heavily on Falklands – The Air War, a comprehensive book concerning all aircraft in the conflict.
It is enlightening to read about the conflict (April-June 1982) from the Argentine perspective.
In mid-January 1982 a Working Party met at Army HQ in the Liberatador Building, Buenos Aires.Members were Vice-Admiral Lombardo, General Osvaldo Garcia of the Army and Brigadier-General Siegfriedo Plessl of the Air Force. They expected planning to be complete by 15 September: by then HMS Endurance would be withdrawn, the training of conscripts would be well advanced and the re-equipment of the Naval Air Arm with Super Étendard aircraft and weapons would be completed.
However, events dictated otherwise. Scrap metal merchants landed on South Georgia (a Dependency of the Falkland Islands) without obtaining permission which created an international incident. As the talks between Argentina and Great Britain concerning the Falklands were not going anywhere, the Argentine junta decided to bring forward their ‘repossession’ plans to force the British Government’s hand...
Ships started loading at 8am on 28 March at Puerto Belgrano...
Troops were warned that there was to be no excesses against the enemy troops, women or private property when they ‘took back’ the islands. It was considered as a semi-religious crusade – even renaming the Operation Blue after the Virgin Mary’s robe.
Many soldiers experienced ‘an excess of joy’ to be involved – (p65).
However, a senior Argentine army officer considered the enterprise ‘a crazy expedition by demented people. It was stupid to offend a big country like Britain...’ (p17).
So, on 2 April the seaborne Argentine attack resulted in the taking of the Falkland Islands with very little loss of life.
On 3 April, a platoon of the First Marine Infantry Battalion on the frigate Guerrico set out to Grytviken (South Georgia) which was manned by about 22 Royal Marines. The marines put up a fight, but inevitably outgunned with superior numbers had to surrender.
In remarkably quick time, the British Task Force sailed, a response the Argentines had not expected. A British Exclusion Zone was set up...
On 12 April, the EEC embargo on trade and help came into effect: French technicians linked to the Super Étendards were due but were cancelled. The Argentines had only five aircraft and five Exocet aircraft-missiles.
Of the criticism of the sinking of the Belgrano on 2 May, Middlebrook considers it ‘humbug’ – and Captain Bonzo of that ill-fated ship agrees: ‘By no means do I have any feelings of anger’ (p116). In effect, once Argentine aircraft attacked RN ships on 1 May, war had begun and the 200-mile exclusion zone no longer applied, and the Belgrano was carrying 400 troops (a quarter died).
After the sinking, the Argentine fleet stayed off Argentina’s shore and did not engage the British.
The Argentine aircraft were up against the phenomenal Harriers as well as ship-born missiles and guns. ‘The whole world would come to admire the gallantry shown by the Argentine pilots’ (p150).
Damage to the RN ships would have been greater save that many bombs that hit the vessels did not explode. The Argentine Skyhawks and Daggers released their bombs when flying too low, not giving the bomb fuses time to arm themselves (p154).
Towards the end, as the Harriers gained air-superiority, the Argentine soldiers on the Falklands felt abandoned: the air force and the navy stood by on the mainland and did little for them, save brave bold re-supply flights into Stanley.
The end was inevitable, perhaps, but many of the Argentine soldiers put up a good fight, even though by then they were mostly demoralised.
Middlebrook obtained many pertinent quotations; here is a sample:
The Argentine padre told the men ‘God would forgive us. We must kill as many British as possible... By then I knew we were being told lies...’ (p274).
‘The junta and people at other levels all lied to the country’ (p290).
‘I have always admired the British, and it made me very sad that the only war I ever fought in was against the British’ (p290)
Many soldiers came to resent their officers more than the British (p275).
A worthy addition to any Falklands War book collection.
It is enlightening to read about the conflict (April-June 1982) from the Argentine perspective.
In mid-January 1982 a Working Party met at Army HQ in the Liberatador Building, Buenos Aires.Members were Vice-Admiral Lombardo, General Osvaldo Garcia of the Army and Brigadier-General Siegfriedo Plessl of the Air Force. They expected planning to be complete by 15 September: by then HMS Endurance would be withdrawn, the training of conscripts would be well advanced and the re-equipment of the Naval Air Arm with Super Étendard aircraft and weapons would be completed.
However, events dictated otherwise. Scrap metal merchants landed on South Georgia (a Dependency of the Falkland Islands) without obtaining permission which created an international incident. As the talks between Argentina and Great Britain concerning the Falklands were not going anywhere, the Argentine junta decided to bring forward their ‘repossession’ plans to force the British Government’s hand...
Ships started loading at 8am on 28 March at Puerto Belgrano...
Troops were warned that there was to be no excesses against the enemy troops, women or private property when they ‘took back’ the islands. It was considered as a semi-religious crusade – even renaming the Operation Blue after the Virgin Mary’s robe.
Many soldiers experienced ‘an excess of joy’ to be involved – (p65).
However, a senior Argentine army officer considered the enterprise ‘a crazy expedition by demented people. It was stupid to offend a big country like Britain...’ (p17).
So, on 2 April the seaborne Argentine attack resulted in the taking of the Falkland Islands with very little loss of life.
On 3 April, a platoon of the First Marine Infantry Battalion on the frigate Guerrico set out to Grytviken (South Georgia) which was manned by about 22 Royal Marines. The marines put up a fight, but inevitably outgunned with superior numbers had to surrender.
In remarkably quick time, the British Task Force sailed, a response the Argentines had not expected. A British Exclusion Zone was set up...
On 12 April, the EEC embargo on trade and help came into effect: French technicians linked to the Super Étendards were due but were cancelled. The Argentines had only five aircraft and five Exocet aircraft-missiles.
Of the criticism of the sinking of the Belgrano on 2 May, Middlebrook considers it ‘humbug’ – and Captain Bonzo of that ill-fated ship agrees: ‘By no means do I have any feelings of anger’ (p116). In effect, once Argentine aircraft attacked RN ships on 1 May, war had begun and the 200-mile exclusion zone no longer applied, and the Belgrano was carrying 400 troops (a quarter died).
After the sinking, the Argentine fleet stayed off Argentina’s shore and did not engage the British.
The Argentine aircraft were up against the phenomenal Harriers as well as ship-born missiles and guns. ‘The whole world would come to admire the gallantry shown by the Argentine pilots’ (p150).
Damage to the RN ships would have been greater save that many bombs that hit the vessels did not explode. The Argentine Skyhawks and Daggers released their bombs when flying too low, not giving the bomb fuses time to arm themselves (p154).
Towards the end, as the Harriers gained air-superiority, the Argentine soldiers on the Falklands felt abandoned: the air force and the navy stood by on the mainland and did little for them, save brave bold re-supply flights into Stanley.
The end was inevitable, perhaps, but many of the Argentine soldiers put up a good fight, even though by then they were mostly demoralised.
Middlebrook obtained many pertinent quotations; here is a sample:
The Argentine padre told the men ‘God would forgive us. We must kill as many British as possible... By then I knew we were being told lies...’ (p274).
‘The junta and people at other levels all lied to the country’ (p290).
‘I have always admired the British, and it made me very sad that the only war I ever fought in was against the British’ (p290)
Many soldiers came to resent their officers more than the British (p275).
A worthy addition to any Falklands War book collection.
March 14, 2022
I really enjoyed this as it is done from interviews with the Argentine who were there,
It is always good to hear both sides of a story and this is certainly one of them, i really liked how the perception of different events is recorded in this, and it does certainly clear some of 'the fog of war'.
If you are interested in the conflict in the Falklands/ Malvinas in 1982 then this is a must read.
It is always good to hear both sides of a story and this is certainly one of them, i really liked how the perception of different events is recorded in this, and it does certainly clear some of 'the fog of war'.
If you are interested in the conflict in the Falklands/ Malvinas in 1982 then this is a must read.
October 18, 2023
Excellent account of a little distant short war
The account of this little war was very good, the explanation of the air battles and the land campaign, very detail. The impact on both sides, well detailed, at least political in the case of Argentina it was a good catalyst to move themselves from military rule to a civilian rule.the aftermath of the Argentinian soldier, a sad event. Great research on the subject.
The account of this little war was very good, the explanation of the air battles and the land campaign, very detail. The impact on both sides, well detailed, at least political in the case of Argentina it was a good catalyst to move themselves from military rule to a civilian rule.the aftermath of the Argentinian soldier, a sad event. Great research on the subject.
July 3, 2024
Falklands war veteran's opinion
As a Falklands veteran myself who sail South on HMS FEARLESS, I found this book a excellent source as to what happened on the other side of the battle, be it at sea, in the air or land. Martin Middlebrook takes the middle ground in presenting the primary evidence and narratives of the Argentine Falkands war veterans which makes it a comfortable and greatly enlightening read. Bravo Zulu (Well Done).
As a Falklands veteran myself who sail South on HMS FEARLESS, I found this book a excellent source as to what happened on the other side of the battle, be it at sea, in the air or land. Martin Middlebrook takes the middle ground in presenting the primary evidence and narratives of the Argentine Falkands war veterans which makes it a comfortable and greatly enlightening read. Bravo Zulu (Well Done).
January 10, 2020
A great book that complements other books from British points of view. The author empathised very well with the Argentine armed services who passionately and proudly served during a historic few months. I found myself sympathising with the witnesses who found themselves doing their best but let down by a few.
February 7, 2020
Well written, an Argentine perspective
Many years ago, I had played a board game based on the battle, I remembered it was interesting. I bought both books by this author and decided to read the Argentine perspective first. The bottom line is that this was a politically popular war, but ill throughout
Many years ago, I had played a board game based on the battle, I remembered it was interesting. I bought both books by this author and decided to read the Argentine perspective first. The bottom line is that this was a politically popular war, but ill throughout
August 6, 2021
Middlebrook at his best
I have been a fan of Martin's book since First Day on the Somme. The research is always excellent and you get the realities of the story from all perspectives. In this one we see the Falklands from the Argentinian perspective a very good read that will add to the understanding of the campaign
I have been a fan of Martin's book since First Day on the Somme. The research is always excellent and you get the realities of the story from all perspectives. In this one we see the Falklands from the Argentinian perspective a very good read that will add to the understanding of the campaign
May 21, 2022
A Different Perspective
It was interesting to get a different view of the war and what it meant to Argentinians. The book is well researched and written, and doesn't seek to senationalise events in any way.
It was interesting to get a different view of the war and what it meant to Argentinians. The book is well researched and written, and doesn't seek to senationalise events in any way.
Read
July 21, 2024An excellent book that I highly recommend if you wanna expand your knowledge of this conflict. Lots of quotes form servicemen who were there and the insights they all provide leave you wanting more. 10/10
May 29, 2020
Livro escrito por um historiador militar inglês, porém mostrando o ponto de vista argentino sobre o conflito.
May 19, 2021
Accurate AC ount
Very good account from the Argentine side. I would certainly recommend it, particularly if you use Kindle Unlimited as I do
Very good account from the Argentine side. I would certainly recommend it, particularly if you use Kindle Unlimited as I do
December 30, 2024
A complete yawner
December 11, 2013
This book looks at the Falklands war from the Argentinian perspective. Martin Middlebrook is an excellent author of military history and this account of the Falklands conflict is fascinating. He was granted access to interview many participants and is able to present the story from the perspectives of the commanders, pilots, sailors, soldiers and conscripts that fought there.
The story he tells is most interesting; both thrilling and tragic. Luck played its part for both sides, opportunities lost and gambles won. Certainly the Argentinian forces could have done better had they been better equipped and organised. As the author notes: to win a modern war one needs modern weapons.
The bravery of the Argentinian air force pilots is already legend, suffering horrendous losses to toss unguided bombs into British ships that generally did not function.
I wonder how intimidated were the Argentinian conscripts after four months training, waiting for weeks in a harsh and inhospitable environment for the arrival of elite British troops such as Paratroops, Marines, commandos and special forces. I am glad I was not in their shoes.
The book has considerable detail of this short war as it progressed through the naval and air stages to the ground campaign. The commentary is interspersed with stories, anecdotes and accounts from the Argentinian perspective.
Very readable and certainly recommended.
The story he tells is most interesting; both thrilling and tragic. Luck played its part for both sides, opportunities lost and gambles won. Certainly the Argentinian forces could have done better had they been better equipped and organised. As the author notes: to win a modern war one needs modern weapons.
The bravery of the Argentinian air force pilots is already legend, suffering horrendous losses to toss unguided bombs into British ships that generally did not function.
I wonder how intimidated were the Argentinian conscripts after four months training, waiting for weeks in a harsh and inhospitable environment for the arrival of elite British troops such as Paratroops, Marines, commandos and special forces. I am glad I was not in their shoes.
The book has considerable detail of this short war as it progressed through the naval and air stages to the ground campaign. The commentary is interspersed with stories, anecdotes and accounts from the Argentinian perspective.
Very readable and certainly recommended.
April 2, 2023
Whoa! A non-fiction book very much worth reading. A rare rendition from the perspective of a losing side in a conflict. What makes this so good is the heroic effort of the author to preclude speculation, supposition, politics (which of course all too often is just fabrication to impose a single point of view on the audience) and the assignation of blame. This type of writing tends to allow the reader to think for themselves and draw their own conclusion regarding the course of events. Something that appears to be totally missing from the internet and journalistic reporting today (2021). Would certainly recommend book highly to current and aspiring journalists and historians as a fine example of how history and events should be recounted.
December 29, 2008
This was something different. I was in grade school in when the Falklands War took place and knew a little bit about the conflict, primarily the role of the Harrier and the sinking of the HMS Sheffield by an Exocet missiles This book is by a British author, but from the Argentine perspective of the war. The author conducted numerous interviews just a couple years after the conflight with former soldiers of all ranks. Many of the battles are described by the soldiers that were there. I had a hard time putting this one down.
November 25, 2015
Good book. Opens a view on the argentinian perspective of the falklands war. It mainly focusses on the operational and the tactical level, although the general strategic perspective is also reviewed. The main question stays - in my opinion - the question: did the argentinians loose this campagne due to their stupidity (of their junta) or the cleverness (or bravery and professionalism and good fortune) of the British. This book doesn't answer that question, but is an interesting and valuable contribution to the ongoing historical debate.
June 20, 2011
An interesting look at the Argentine side of the Falklands War.
It's definitely a military-history book, though. I'd really like to read something more civilian, sometime. I'm not sure how many of the Spanish-language books (like the one by military governor Mario Menéndez) have been translated into English.
It's definitely a military-history book, though. I'd really like to read something more civilian, sometime. I'm not sure how many of the Spanish-language books (like the one by military governor Mario Menéndez) have been translated into English.
November 8, 2012
What it was like to be on the losing side of the Falklands War.
December 21, 2014
Completes Martin Middlebrook's Falklands War research. Very interesting to see this conflict from the Argentine perspective. It's not just about England was wrong (from their perspective).
October 26, 2016
completes my Falklands reading, clear example of the difference between professional and conscript militaries
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