What do you think?
Rate this book
Darwinian Reductionism: Or, How to Stop Worrying and Love Molecular Biology
After the discovery of the structure of DNA in 1953, scientists working in molecular biology embraced reductionism—the theory that all complex systems can be understood in terms of their components. Reductionism, however, has been widely resisted by both nonmolecular biologists and scientists working outside the field of biology. Many of these antireductionists, nevertheless, embrace the notion of physicalism—the idea that all biological processes are physical in nature. How, Alexander Rosenberg asks, can these self-proclaimed physicalists also be antireductionists?
With clarity and wit, Darwinian Reductionism navigates this difficult and seemingly intractable dualism with convincing analysis and timely evidence. In the spirit of the few distinguished biologists who accept reductionism—E. O. Wilson, Francis Crick, Jacques Monod, James Watson, and Richard Dawkins—Rosenberg provides a philosophically sophisticated defense of reductionism and applies it to molecular developmental biology and the theory of natural selection, ultimately proving that the physicalist must also be a reductionist.
With clarity and wit, Darwinian Reductionism navigates this difficult and seemingly intractable dualism with convincing analysis and timely evidence. In the spirit of the few distinguished biologists who accept reductionism—E. O. Wilson, Francis Crick, Jacques Monod, James Watson, and Richard Dawkins—Rosenberg provides a philosophically sophisticated defense of reductionism and applies it to molecular developmental biology and the theory of natural selection, ultimately proving that the physicalist must also be a reductionist.
263 pages, Hardcover
First published September 15, 2006
71 people want to read
About the author
Alex Rosenberg
45 books111 followersAlex Rosenberg's first novel, "The Girl From Krakow," is a thriller that explores how a young woman and her lover navigate the dangerous thirties, the firestorm of war in Europe, and how they make sense of their survival. Alex's second novel, "Autumn in Oxford" is a murder mystery set in Britain in the late 1950s. It takes the reader back to the second world war in the American south and England before D-day, France during the Liberation and New York in the late '40s. It will be published by Lake Union in August.
Before he became a novelist Alex wrote a large number of books about the philosophy of science, especially about economics and biology. These books were mainly addressed to other academics. But in 2011 Alex published a book that explores the answers that science gives to the big questions of philosophy that thinking people ask themselves--questions about the nature of reality, the meaning of life, moral values, free will, the relationship of the mind to the brain, and our human future. That book, "The Atheist's Guide to Reality," was widely reviewed and was quite controversial.
When he's not writing historical novels, Alex Rosenberg is a professor of philosophy at Duke University.
Before he became a novelist Alex wrote a large number of books about the philosophy of science, especially about economics and biology. These books were mainly addressed to other academics. But in 2011 Alex published a book that explores the answers that science gives to the big questions of philosophy that thinking people ask themselves--questions about the nature of reality, the meaning of life, moral values, free will, the relationship of the mind to the brain, and our human future. That book, "The Atheist's Guide to Reality," was widely reviewed and was quite controversial.
When he's not writing historical novels, Alex Rosenberg is a professor of philosophy at Duke University.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
June 14, 2019
(...)
I will not get into the nuts and bolts of every argument. Aside from a general appraisal of the book, I’ll elaborate a bit on two small – yet fundamental – elements of critique, and end with a list of nuggets of wisdom I found while reading – a list that is probably of interest to those readers not interested in the general content of this book, yet who do have a healthy interest in science.
(...)
While I don’t claim to be a specialist nor a philosopher, there’s two issues I want to bring up.
1. While I agree words matter, a part chapter 8 (the final chapter) actually revolves around semantics: there is a difference between ‘causation’ and ‘determinism’, but it is crystal clear that PKU (an inherited metabolic disease) is caused by some combination of genes. The fact that one can alter the environment to deal with this disease (change one’s diet) does make these genes less (or not fully) determining in one sense. True, genes don’t necessarily cause the disease as one can change one’s diet, but in that case, the genes do cause the need for dietary changes. In that respect, there still is determination.
Similarly, the fact that not merely one gene or group of genes causes this or that effect, but that often different genetic pathways also lead to a similar outcome, doesn’t make the overall statement that genes determine less true. It only refutes a very narrow approach to genetic determinism. A part of Rosenberg’s refutation of genetic determinism boils down to ‘it’s too complex to describe’; but that’s obviously not a valid argument.
All things considered, it seems that Rosenberg is fighting a specific, very narrow definition of genetic determinism. It’s obvious that genes are not the full story, but they – and all the molecular structures related to them – irrefutably do their part in materialistically determining biological outcome.
2. I missed Rosenberg’s stand on free will. It is the elephant in the room that isn’t addressed at all in this book. In chapter 8, on human behavior, Rosenberg only talks about genetic determinism, while in much of the rest of the book, he often talks about the more general macromolecular reductionism. Why not go the full mile, and write a chapter about the consequences of general material determinism?
I think he didn’t go there out of fear for controversy – but that’s kind of strange in the light of the rest of the book, which was/is also controversial: a large part of biologists apparently are physicalists yet anti-reductionist – something I can’t wrap my head around.
(...)
Full review on Weighing A Pig Doesn't Fatten It
I will not get into the nuts and bolts of every argument. Aside from a general appraisal of the book, I’ll elaborate a bit on two small – yet fundamental – elements of critique, and end with a list of nuggets of wisdom I found while reading – a list that is probably of interest to those readers not interested in the general content of this book, yet who do have a healthy interest in science.
(...)
While I don’t claim to be a specialist nor a philosopher, there’s two issues I want to bring up.
1. While I agree words matter, a part chapter 8 (the final chapter) actually revolves around semantics: there is a difference between ‘causation’ and ‘determinism’, but it is crystal clear that PKU (an inherited metabolic disease) is caused by some combination of genes. The fact that one can alter the environment to deal with this disease (change one’s diet) does make these genes less (or not fully) determining in one sense. True, genes don’t necessarily cause the disease as one can change one’s diet, but in that case, the genes do cause the need for dietary changes. In that respect, there still is determination.
Similarly, the fact that not merely one gene or group of genes causes this or that effect, but that often different genetic pathways also lead to a similar outcome, doesn’t make the overall statement that genes determine less true. It only refutes a very narrow approach to genetic determinism. A part of Rosenberg’s refutation of genetic determinism boils down to ‘it’s too complex to describe’; but that’s obviously not a valid argument.
All things considered, it seems that Rosenberg is fighting a specific, very narrow definition of genetic determinism. It’s obvious that genes are not the full story, but they – and all the molecular structures related to them – irrefutably do their part in materialistically determining biological outcome.
2. I missed Rosenberg’s stand on free will. It is the elephant in the room that isn’t addressed at all in this book. In chapter 8, on human behavior, Rosenberg only talks about genetic determinism, while in much of the rest of the book, he often talks about the more general macromolecular reductionism. Why not go the full mile, and write a chapter about the consequences of general material determinism?
I think he didn’t go there out of fear for controversy – but that’s kind of strange in the light of the rest of the book, which was/is also controversial: a large part of biologists apparently are physicalists yet anti-reductionist – something I can’t wrap my head around.
(...)
Full review on Weighing A Pig Doesn't Fatten It
July 12, 2008
An excellent vindication of reductionism in biology, while at the same time debunking the idea of genetic determinism.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews