Bill Sloan’s The Ultimate Battle: Okinawa 1945 differs from the “classic” descriptions of the Battle for Okinawa in at least one important way. The classics, like E.B. Sledge’s With the Old Breed at Peleilu and Okinawa, William Manchester’s Goodbye, Darkness, and R. V. Burgin’s more recent Islands of the Damned were first-person accounts of things directly seen and experienced. The view is through a narrow-angle lens, and one has enormous respect for those like Sledge, Manchester, and Burgin who experienced such traumatic events and wrote about them so well.
Sloan’s contribution is a journalistic third-person account based on official records, interviews of participants, and from the classics themselves. It is a wide-angle view of the Okinawa campaign with information on the initial planning, the final execution, and the multiple Army, Navy, and Marine units involved. Still, its value-added is limited. We learn that until mid-1944 the Japanese defenses on the island were sparse, but after Saipan was lost the Japanese realized that Okinawa would be high priority for the U.S. forces. In the last half of 1944 and first quarter of 1945 an intricate system of interlocking caves was dug throughout the island, some containing large artillery pieces, some containing hospitals, others containing barracks. These caves were interconnected so that troops could be redirected from one area to another. In short, once Allied intentions became clear—that Japan would be attacked from the Marianas in the south—Okinawa was turned into the Corregidor of the East China Sea. Regrettably, it was a far stronger defensive platform than Corregidor.
In the earlier planning phase, Formosa had been the U. S. objective, but attention turned to Okinawa because it was closer to Japan and on a direct route to Japan’s Main Islands, making it a better staging base for the ultimate invasion of Japan. The Okinawa invasion plan—Operation Iceberg—required over 1,500 ships and created the Tenth Army, consisting of four Army divisions and three Marine divisions, with total manpower exceeding 540,000; one of the Army divisions that gained notoriety was the 27th Division hastily organized from less-well trained National Guard units. Over time Operation Iceberg’s manpower increased to about 800,000. Of those about thirteen percent would be casualties—killed, wounded, missing in action, and psychiatric—during the eleven weeks of active battle.
While Army and Marine forces faced these formidable defensive fortifications, the Navy had its own problems. The 1,500 ships used in the invasion were harassed by kamikazes, Japanese planes sent on suicide missions to sink ships. This was the heyday of the Kamikaze, the Divine Wind, named after the typhoon that saved Japan from Mongol invasion centuries earlier. The XXI Bomber Command of the XX Air Force, located in the Marianas Islands, blunted the Divine Wind in March of 1945 when Curtis LeMay diverted B-29s from fire raids on Japanese cities and bombing of Japanese military facilities to attacks on the Kamikaze airfields of Japan’s Kyushu Island: as many as 500 Kamikaze aircraft were destroyed on the ground.
The Okinawa landing on April 1, 1945 was predicted to have 80 percent casualties. Instead, there was no initial Japanese resistance. General Ushijima had radically changed Japan’s defensive strategy: gone was the defensive strategy at earlier island invasions—fierce resistance on the beaches and at the airfields, and repeated nighttime banzai attacks. Replacing these was a strategy of attrition of U. S. forces and morale by deeply entrenched Japanese forces—the U. S. Army and Marines would simply batter themselves into defeat by attacks on an unseen and highly mobile enemy.
There were three Japanese defensive lines on Okinawa, all in the southernmost ten miles of the seventy-mile long island south of the landing beaches. The First Defensive Line was the Maeda Escarpment, also called (among other names) Hacksaw Ridge. Located a few miles south of the landing beaches, the Escarpment was a high cliff to a southern plateau held by the Japanese. The First Line followed the Escarpment along Kakazu ridge and across the island. The Second Defensive Line—the Shuri Line—was south of the First Line, cutting across the island passing through the ancient Shuri Castle, under which the Japanese command center was located. The Final Defensive Line was south of the Second Line, at the southern tip of Okinawa, where the densest concentration of Japanese troops would be found.
From the beaches the Army and Marine units searched both northward and southward for the enemy, but significant contact didn’t come until they reached the First Defensive Line on April 5, 1945, four days after the landing. As U. S. troops proceeded southward there was a steady escalation of fighting as Japanese force density increased and the complex cave systems came into play. General Ushijima soon realized that there would be no Japanese victory, but the defense of the island was aggressively followed as a matter of military and national pride, and in the hope of encouraging a negotiated peace by showing the total commitment of Japan to protecting its home islands. Ironically, perhaps one could attribute use of the atomic bomb to the intense Japanese resistance on Okinawa, which clearly demonstrated the excessive losses that would come with an invasion of the Japanese mainland.
Much of Sloan's book contains vignettes of the experiences of individual soldiers and Marines. Many of those are taken from secondary sources and add little to our understanding of the Battle of Okinawa. Rather, they reinforce the horror of that battle, and the total committment of both sides to destroying the other.
Four Stars.