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Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy
Bridging the gap that separates the two cultures of academia and policymaking is the central purpose of this path-breaking study. George examines six U.S. strategies toward Iraq in 1988-1991. He urges policymakers to make better use of scholarly knowledge and challenges scholars to develop the types of knowledge that can be employed effectively by policymakers.
208 pages, Paperback
First published June 1, 1993
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July 25, 2020
The essential task of foreign policy is to develop and manage relationships with other states in a way that enhances one’s own state’s interests – be that security, prosperity, or general welfare. George examines the differences in how academics and policymakers approach foreign policy in Bridging the Gap. Published in 1993, it ran six printings and is an easy and short 145-page read. Whether you are interested in foreign policy or transforming theory into practice, this is a good book to add to your repertoire.
The story begins by laying out some basic perspectives. Academics tend to conceive their ideas in a bounded reality, look for generalized applications, are abstract and conceptual, and work on a relaxed timeline. Policymakers must contend with multiple stakeholders, manage political support, act with incomplete information, look to solve specific problems, are often in crisis-mode, and use intuitive judgment. These approaches are at odds.
George examines what policymakers require to make better policies. He argues for a change in the academic approach. Instead of criticizing, academics need to supply useful and useable knowledge to inform policymakers. George's prescription is to focus academic research on policy-relevant theory.
Policy-relevant theory needs to do three things: First, it must include a list of conceptual strategies like containment, appeasement, or rational-choice theory. A conceptual framework of available strategies to influence state behavior will give policymakers a menu of options. Second, policy-relevant theory must incorporate generic knowledge. It must describe how each strategy works in practice. Historical understanding of limitations, required conditions, and uses give policymakers some idea of how strategies might work in the present. Finally, the policymaker needs actor-specific behavioral knowledge. Policymakers need an understanding of how state-actors make decisions under their unique political systems. This helps policymakers anticipate the effect of any proposed solution. Together, policy-relevant theory aids the policymaker in problem framing and policy response; it helps diagnose the condition and prescribe a solution.
Once a policy approach is formed, policymakers need to put that approach into action. How we enact the solution is just as important as the solution itself. Policymakers, therefore, must look at generic knowledge that describes how conceptual strategies are performed in practice. In the second half of the book, George uses this theoretical framework to analyze the 1990 crisis between the United States and Iraq.
My thought is that if we intend to bridge the gap, we must focus on the relationship between knowledge and action. We should build a descriptive theory of foreign policy that provides a common language; forces us to define our interests, prioritize them, and judge the acceptable risks of pursuing them; and creates a comprehensive decision system. Policymaking is about trade-offs between good enough and the optimal, political side-effects and opportunity costs, utility and risk, the conflict between short and long-term aims, deals with a complex adaptive system, and is often on a short timeline. While many published works that answer George’s plea, it was interesting to read the logic behind the question.
The story begins by laying out some basic perspectives. Academics tend to conceive their ideas in a bounded reality, look for generalized applications, are abstract and conceptual, and work on a relaxed timeline. Policymakers must contend with multiple stakeholders, manage political support, act with incomplete information, look to solve specific problems, are often in crisis-mode, and use intuitive judgment. These approaches are at odds.
George examines what policymakers require to make better policies. He argues for a change in the academic approach. Instead of criticizing, academics need to supply useful and useable knowledge to inform policymakers. George's prescription is to focus academic research on policy-relevant theory.
Policy-relevant theory needs to do three things: First, it must include a list of conceptual strategies like containment, appeasement, or rational-choice theory. A conceptual framework of available strategies to influence state behavior will give policymakers a menu of options. Second, policy-relevant theory must incorporate generic knowledge. It must describe how each strategy works in practice. Historical understanding of limitations, required conditions, and uses give policymakers some idea of how strategies might work in the present. Finally, the policymaker needs actor-specific behavioral knowledge. Policymakers need an understanding of how state-actors make decisions under their unique political systems. This helps policymakers anticipate the effect of any proposed solution. Together, policy-relevant theory aids the policymaker in problem framing and policy response; it helps diagnose the condition and prescribe a solution.
Once a policy approach is formed, policymakers need to put that approach into action. How we enact the solution is just as important as the solution itself. Policymakers, therefore, must look at generic knowledge that describes how conceptual strategies are performed in practice. In the second half of the book, George uses this theoretical framework to analyze the 1990 crisis between the United States and Iraq.
My thought is that if we intend to bridge the gap, we must focus on the relationship between knowledge and action. We should build a descriptive theory of foreign policy that provides a common language; forces us to define our interests, prioritize them, and judge the acceptable risks of pursuing them; and creates a comprehensive decision system. Policymaking is about trade-offs between good enough and the optimal, political side-effects and opportunity costs, utility and risk, the conflict between short and long-term aims, deals with a complex adaptive system, and is often on a short timeline. While many published works that answer George’s plea, it was interesting to read the logic behind the question.
Displaying 1 of 1 review