Unlike Gen. Ulysses S. Grant and Gen. William T. Sherman, whose controversial Civil War-era reputations persist today, Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan has been largely untouched by controversy. In Little Phil , historian Eric J. Wittenberg reassesses the war record of a man long considered one of the Union Army’s greatest generals. From his earliest days at West Point, Phil Sheridan refused to play by the rules. He was fortunate to receive merely a suspension, rather than expulsion, when as a cadet he charged a superior officer with a bayonet. Although he achieved fame as a cavalryman late in the Civil War, Sheridan actually began the conflict as an infantry commander and initially knew little of the mounted service. In his first effort as a cavalry commander with the Army of the Potomac in the spring of 1864, he gave a performance that Wittenberg argues has long been overrated. Later that year in the Shenandoah Valley, where Sheridan secured his legendary reputation, he benefited greatly from the tactical ability of his subordinates and from his huge manpower advantage against the beleaguered Confederate troops of Lt. Gen. Jubal Early. Sheridan was ultimately rewarded for numerous acts of insubordination against his superiors throughout the war, while he punished similar traits in his own officers. Further, in his combat reports and postwar writings, he often manipulated facts to show himself in the best possible light, ensuring an exalted place in history. Thus, Sheridan successfully foisted his own version of history on the American public. This controversial new study challenges the existing literature on Phil Sheridan and adds valuable insight to our understanding of this famous, but altogether fallible, warrior.
Eric J. Wittenberg is an American Civil War historian, author, lecturer, tour guide and battlefield preservationist. He is a practicing attorney in downtown Columbus, Ohio. His published works have focused especially on the Civil War cavalryman and the cavalry battles of the Civil War, with emphasis on the Army of the Potomac's Cavalry Corps
Eric Wittenberg has gone against the grain of current Civil War scholarship to look at the facts underneath Phil Sheridan's sterling reputation. Such revisionism is extremely welcome. Sheridan had a very mixed military career, but his protectors, such as Ulysses S. Grant, and friendly biographers covered up the flaws in his personality and the blunders in his generalship.
Wittenberg's focus is narrow: Sheridan in 1864 and 1865. In showings Sheridan's personal weaknesses, the book is spot on. He was arrogant, impulsive, spiteful, and as ambitious as Lucifer. In 1864 he was given command of the cavalry despite limited experience and he mostly failed in this capacity. However, Sheridan did show ability in combined arms tactics and as Wittenberg admits, he was the man responsible for the victory at Appomattox. He was an officer who needed to fail a little before he could succeed.
All in all, this is a solid iconoclastic work. Yet, Sheridan's good points are given little notice. He was popular with the men and fought hard as evidenced by Stones River and Chickamauga. Also, although Sheridan ruined some reputations, he was no Grant toady. He had a life-long affection for Rosecrans and Thomas. Lastly, he served in a wide variety of theaters and positions, from staff work in Missouri to infantry division command in the Army of the Cumberland. He is in my estimation one of the most flexible commanders of the war, a solid combat leader, but also hurt by some glaring character flaws.
Author did a deep study of diaries and after action reports of Generals under Gen. Phillip Sheridan's command. Did he deserve to be such a noted Civil War Hero . Sherman and Grant thought so, other well know\n Union Generals, "well maybe not" . Best the reader decide, and study the Reassessment of General Sheridan. From the early chapters, Sheridan was quick to take credit for victories that took place by the commands of lessor Generals.
A very well researched reassessment of Phil Sheridan’s role as cavalry chief and army commander in the east. Sheridan loved Sheridan and Wittenberg points out the many faults of the general. It is worth the read.
This is a bit of an odd book. The title is a little misleading since it focuses on Sheridan in 1864-65, only skimming over his service in the Western Theater. It is not a true biography of Sheridan, not even of those years. It is almost in the style of an essay compilation (especially since it is not all chronological), except that there is more flow between chapters. The author suggests you should draw your own conclusions, but his opinion is fairly clear.
The first three chapters are in a fairly linear structure: Sheridan's service through 1863, Sheridan's actions as cavalry corps commander during the Overland Campaign, and his army command in the Shenandoah. The book then delves into a narrower focus on Sheridan's flaws: his insubordination, his damaged relationship with Crook and his relieving Averell and Warren of their commands, and his lying for personal gain. Wittenberg wraps up with praise for Sheridan's performance during the Appomattox Campaign and a conclusion summarizing his criticisms of Sheridan.
Wittenberg clear isn't a fan of Sheridan, but as someone who is arguably the modern authority on Union cavalry in Virginia during the Civil War he is certainly qualified to hold a strong opinion on such matters. While I think the author is making many valid points of criticism it seems like he blames Little Phil for a little too much. For example, how much of Sheridan's caution in the Valley was due to guerillas like Mosby? This isn't really addressed in this book, but it factors in to some of Sheridan's actions. Likewise, the relief of Averell and Warren doesn't seem completely unreasonable as both had some skills but were arguably cautious to a fault; the real issue seems to be the timing of their relief and the hypocrisy involved (Sheridan's failure to relieve other subordinates like Torbert).
The book raises some questions in my mind that were perhaps mostly beyond the scope of the work. Grant's arguably undeserved favoritism toward Sheridan reminded me of recent criticism I have read of James McPherson. Sheridan's elevation to major cavalry command with minimal previous cavalry experience has always struck me as unusual and a comparison of other generals who received similiar promotions probably has some merit. I also wondered how Sheridan's post-war leadership compares to what he did during the war, and how the war affected his post-war service.
This is a book that is probably worth reading because it provides an interesting perspective on Phil Sheridan, but it also feels a little incomplete and doesn't seem like Wittenberg's best writing.
I have never been a fan of Phil Sheridan, so I wanted to read this book even before it was written. Finally, an author who questions his undeserved fame and fictional achievements. Unfortunately, the book isn't very well written, but small discrepancies and redundancies are not too distracting. Anyone interested in Civil War should read this.
More of an expose' than the biography I was expecting. It seems like Wittenberg expanded upon his graduate school thesis, and it reads very much like one. That said, it does make you think twice about how/why Sheridan reached the level he did in the Union army. Only recommended for those who are REALLY into Sheridan.