"A History of the Modern Chinese Army" by Xiaobing Li is one of those books you read for the bits and details that you fit into a broader assessment. Sadly, it is written in "Commie-speak", that boring prose that bombards you with numbers devoid of context but implying great achievement. Read between those lines and some interesting details emerge as to how China assessed its national security needs in the 1950s to the present day and adjusted accordingly, or incorrectly, depending on what was happening.
Seeing the other side of a war can be an ironic eye-opener. In China's view, it "won" the Korean War by protecting North Korea from being overrun by the United States. It also "won" the Chosin Resevoir battle, though the USMC begs to differ. Like the United States, China also sent advisors to Vietnam during the French War, and the Viet Minh could be quite stubborn igoring them. During Vietnam's American War, China dispatched about 150,000 AA troops and railway workers to protect and repair the twin rail lines supplying North Vietnam, thus freeing up NVA troops to go south.
One theme that emerges is China's strategic perception that it cannot be surrounded by smaller states aligned with other powers. Security is making sure all bordering states are aligned with Beijing. So you get the "skirmish wars" with Vietnam, India and Taiwan. Sometimes they can seem absurd in their length, like the PRC's bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu lasting several decades. Border sniping with Vietnam also went on for quite a while following the brief, botched war of 1979. Sparring with the Soviets over piddling islands in the Amur River got a little hot and bloody in 1969-70, almost leading to a major war, then rapprochement with the US to check Russia. Fear of American attack was never discounted, even though the US lacked the capability to invade and hold China.
Perhaps the tightest chapter looked at the role the Chinese People's Liberation Army played during the Cultural Revolution, when it basically expanded and took over all civil government. Displaced bureaucrats then became the targets for young "Red Guards", Mao's useful puppets that rooted out all enemies, real or imaginary (well, mostly imaginary). But that move politically strengthened the Army, empowering Defense Minister (and designated successor) Lin Biao, who suffered death in a suspicious airplane crash while trying to flee the country. (Unsuccessfully trying to seize power can do that to you.)
Still, the tidbits and details provided by Li don't add up to much of a book. It has a useful place on my shelf--for now. Li's little book will no doubt be supplanted by further scholarship in the future. Let's hope it's not outdone by a thicker, duller book full of "commie speak."