Paired with Why Nations Fail, one wonders if Acemoglu’s strategy for getting readers to accept his theses is to grind them into submission—the chapters are needlessly long, meandering slogs that at times venture into territory that isn’t obviously connected to the book’s central arguments.
Those arguments—that technological advancements often don’t translate to widely shared prosperity and that the direction of technology is determined by the vision of elites—I found objectionable.
I reject the notion that the long-run direction of technology is determined by the choices and whims of elites—capital owners, executives, policymakers, etc. Rather, I think the evidence points to technology evolving convergently and semi-deterministically—i.e., similar technologies develop in response to similar conditions, needs, and pressures, independent of time, place, or the visions of specific individuals. Diamond (1997) touches on this in noting the independent development of technologies related to agriculture, metallurgy, and writing in isolated temporal and geographic contexts. Mokyr (1990) notes the independent invention of spinning wheels, looms, windmills, waterwheels, plows, and irrigation. Theorists like George Basalla (1988), Brian Arthur (2009), and Kevin Kelly (2010) paint portraits of new technologies emerging nigh-inevitably when requisite conditions and precursor technologies exist. Sure, historical, cultural, and institutional variation exists, and this leaves room for substantial divergence, but I think that convergence dominates the long-run, and doubly so in a globalized world of heightened competition.
I also think the authors’ contention that technological progress is only loosely associated with social progress suffers from a glaring oversight. The authors focus their attention pretty much exclusively on how new technologies shift the distribution of national wealth and income, noting that technical advances tend to displace workers and exacerbate inequality. They don’t, however, pay much attention to how technologies improve human welfare via new products. They claim that new technologies aren’t neatly associated with inclusive prosperity because they disproportionately benefit owners of capital over labor, but they overlook how new products benefit everyone as consumers. That is, the authors focus almost exclusively on how technology impacts production, but they largely neglect how it impacts consumption, resulting in a skewed and incomplete account of how technology contributes to progress. Capital income shares and real wages are important dimensions of a complete picture, for sure, but it’s hard to deny that technology has been an overwhelming net boon when life expectancy has doubled and vaccination, electricity, running water, refrigeration, automobiles, radio, television, personal computing, mobile telecommunication, etc., etc.—all products—have gone from non-existent to ubiquity.
Ultimately, I perceived the work as techno-pessimist. My issue with this pessimism is that I don’t think technology per se should be indicted in discussions of the perennial tension between capital owners and labor or the tradeoffs between innovation and displacement. In my view, such discussions and the concerns raised by the book are more appropriately framed as matters of economic culture and institutional milieu than as a matter of the rightness or wrongness of the “direction” of technology.