This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1901 ... have a kind of vaguely localised diagram in my mind, with the various fractional objects of the thought disposed at particular points thereof; and the oscillations of my attention from one of them to another are most distinctly felt as alternations of direction in movements occurring inside the head." The student should read also the next two paragraphs of p. 301, and the remarks on pp. 435 f. The passage quoted is a fine piece of introspection, marred only by the pictorial reference to the 'lines of direction' shooting across the brain. Kohn op. cit., 48) "If we consider the proofs that James adduces for the presence of these feelings, we find that they speak not for such presence at all, but simply for the possibility of discovering these feelings by the direction of attention upon them." "If the feelings were present while the attention is directed upon some other object, there would be no need at all of the 'turning round' or the 'introspective glance.' We should be conscious of them without this." To which the obvious reply is, that we are conscious of them 'without this'; otherwise there would be no cue for introspection. We do not attempt to introspect the non-existent. But, when we are giving a psychological account of any contents, we examine it in the state of attention. The strain-sensations are present in the margin of consciousness while we are attending to something else; when we set to work to describe these sensations for psychology, we attend to them. As to the part played in attention by these strains and tensions, we must distinguish between the strains themselves and the sensations arising from them. Pilzecker (pp. cit., 40) is probably right when he "We must regard these motor phenomena not ...