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Aquinas to Whitehead: Seven Centuries of Metaphysics of Religion
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First published January 1, 1976
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February 20, 2026
Reading this rather short polemical text which promoted an understanding of the evolving pretensions held for the grasp of philosophy as it has evolved over the past seven centuries caused me to raise the following questions, which I solved partially through the means of artificial intelligence. First off, how did Aquinas show that the influence of Greek philosophy on theology was bad or good?
Thomas Aquinas argued that the influence of Greek philosophy—specifically Aristotelianism—was good when used as a tool to clarify and defend theology, but bad when it contradicted divine revelation. He held that reason and faith are complementary, famously stating that if philosophy contradicts faith, it is a misuse of philosophy.
How Aquinas Showed the Influence Was Good:
Rational Framework for Faith: Aquinas used Aristotle's logic, metaphysics, and ethics to structure theology, arguing that natural reason could prove God's existence and support theological truths.
Validation of Material Reality: Contrary to strict Platonism, Aquinas adopted Aristotle’s view that humans are a soul-matter composite. This, he argued, supported the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation and resurrection of the body.
Understanding Morality: He adapted Aristotelian ethics (virtue theory) into a Christian context, viewing moral life as a way to achieve fulfillment ("eudaimonism") in God.
How Aquinas Showed the Influence Was Bad (Abuse of Philosophy):
Contradiction of Revelation: Aquinas rejected Aristotle’s belief that the universe is eternal, arguing that it contradicted the theological doctrine of creation ex nihilo (out of nothing).
Limits of Reason: He maintained that while reason is powerful, it cannot grasp mysteries like the Trinity or Incarnation, which require faith.
Rejection of Faulty Logic: If a philosophical conclusion contradicted a revealed truth, Aquinas identified it as a "failure of reason" rather than a truth.
Ultimately, Aquinas believed that using Greek philosophy properly was essential for building a robust, intellectually sound theology, provided it was kept subordinate to divine revelation.
Does postmodern philosophy grow out of the need to question the foundations of Western thinking represented by the medieval synthesis that Aquinas laid down?
Postmodern philosophy is often understood as a radical critique of the foundations of Western thought, but it generally grows out of a reaction against modernism—specifically the Enlightenment’s reliance on reason, science, and universal "metanarratives"—rather than a direct, immediate reaction to the medieval synthesis of Thomas Aquinas.
However, because modernism itself was built on the dismantling of the medieval worldview, postmodernism can be seen as the ultimate extension of this critique, targeting the very foundations (objectivity, universality, truth) that were established in the medieval era and continued through the modern period.
Here is a breakdown of the relationship between postmodernism, the medieval synthesis, and the foundations of Western thinking:
1. The Medieval Synthesis (Aquinas) as the Target
The "medieval synthesis" refers to the reconciliation of Christian faith with Greek rationalism (specifically Aristotle), a project masterfully executed by Thomas Aquinas.
The Foundation: This synthesis established that faith and reason are compatible, holding that there is an objective, ordered, and understandable reality—a "metanarrative" or grand story about the world's meaning and purpose.
The Shift to Modernity: Modern philosophy (starting with Descartes) departed from this by discarding the reliance on religious authority, opting instead for human reason as the primary tool.
2. Postmodernism as a Reaction to Modernity
Postmodernism arose in the mid-20th century primarily as a skeptical response to the promises of the modern era (17th–19th centuries).
The Critique of Reason: While modernism relied on reason to uncover truth, postmodernism argues that reason and logic are not objective, but rather tools of power and social construction.
The Rejection of Meta-narratives: Lyotard defined postmodernism as an "incredulity towards metanarratives," meaning it rejects all-encompassing stories (like Christianity or Enlightenment progress) that attempt to explain all of history or human experience.
3. The Indirect Connection to Aquinas
While postmodernists rarely target Aquinas directly, they reject the core assumption of the medieval (and early modern) world: that there is a single, objective reality or, as they term it, the "univocity of being".
Subverting Structure: Postmodernists seek to dismantle the "hierarchical, dogmatic structures" that they believe originate in pre-modern and modern thought.
The "Premodern-Postmodern" Loop: Some thinkers note that by rejecting the modern, secular, and scientific worldview, postmodernism sometimes shares a "skepticism of structural legitimation" similar to pre-modern perspectives, making it, in some ways, a paradoxical return to a pre-modern, non-rationalist perspective.
In summary: Postmodern philosophy does not directly emerge from a need to question Aquinas, but rather from a need to question the rationalist, scientific, and humanist paradigm of the modern era. However, since the modern era was itself a departure from the medieval synthesis, postmodernism is, at its core, a complete dismantling of the foundational, universalizing, and ordered worldview established in the Middle Ages.
How did Hegel take up that image of the World Soul that Aristotle abandoned?
Hegel took up the concept of the World Soul—which he interpreted as the immanent, self-organizing "soul-principle" or inner entelechy of nature—by transforming it from a static, cosmological entity into a dialectical, developmental process of Spirit (Geist). Rather than abandoning the idea as Aristotle largely did, Hegel reappropriated it by blending Aristotelian hylomorphism (form-matter unity) with Kantian inner teleology (organic life as its own end), positioning the soul as the active, mediating link between inorganic matter and conscious spirit.
Hegel's reinterpretation of the World Soul involved the following key approaches:
Reinterpreting "Soul" as Self-Producing Process: Hegel argued against viewing the soul as a separate, immaterial thing. Instead, he took up the Aristotelian idea of soul as entelechy (the realized end of a natural organism) and defined it as the "universal immateriality of nature". It is the inner purpose that organizes matter into a living form.
Merging Aristotle with Kantian Teleology: Hegel took the Aristotelian "soul-principle" (inner purpose) and fused it with Kant's notion of an organism being its own end (Selbstzweck). For Hegel, this means the living organism is not produced by external forces but is self-producing—synchronically through its own metabolism and diachronically through reproduction.
A Three-Fold Hierarchy of Souls: Following Aristotle’s distinction, Hegel structured his "Philosophy of Nature" based on a hierarchy of soul-principles: vegetative (plant), animal, and human. These are not merely different types of beings, but steps in the liberation of the soul, where the lower form is implicitly contained within the higher.
The Soul as Mediator to Spirit (Geist): Hegel transformed the World Soul into a developmental story. The soul starts as the "sleep" of mind—unconscious in nature (the "World Soul")—and develops into a conscious human subjective spirit. In his Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, the soul is the intermediary "bond" that connects the physical body to consciousness.
From "World Soul" to "World Spirit" (Weltgeist): The ultimate transformation of the "World Soul" in Hegel is its elevation into the "World Spirit," where the self-organizing principle of nature becomes aware of itself through human history and culture.
In essence, Hegel took up the idea of the World Soul by arguing that nature is not dead matter but "petrified spirit," whose inner, purposive activity is a living, developing soul.
How does process philosophy react to the statement that relations between God and the world are dynamic and subject to alteration for the world but not for Godhood?
Process philosophy, particularly via Alfred North Whitehead, rejects the notion that God remains unaffected by the world. It argues that while God has a static "primordial nature" (possibilities), God possesses a "consequent nature" that is actively shaped, changed, and enriched by the temporal world. God is viewed as the "fellow sufferer who understands," experiencing change alongside creation.
Key reactions from process thought to this statement include:
Divine Passibility/Relationality: Process theology asserts that divine love necessitates being affected by the beloved. God is not a detached, static substance but is constantly becoming, growing, and experiencing the world.
Two Natures of God: Whitehead proposed that God has two aspects:
The Primordial Nature: Unchanging, eternal, and full of possibilities.
The Consequent Nature: Changing, temporal, and incomplete, as it incorporates the experiences and events of the world into the divine life.
Reciprocity: Relations are not one-way. While God influences the world through "lures" (persuasion), the world affects God.
Divine Vulnerability: God is not omnipotent in a coercive sense but rather vulnerable to the world, suffering with it and preserving its achievements.
Therefore, process philosophy would argue that if God were totally unaffected, God would not be truly loving or intimately related to the cosmos.
How does Whitehead's process philosophy justify the medieval invasion of God's cognitive knowledge as compared with Hume and Spinoza?
Whitehead’s process philosophy justifies the "invasion" of God's cognitive knowledge into the world by redefining God not as a static, omnipotent substance (as in medieval thought), but as a dipolar, relational entity that is both the source of, and affected by, temporal reality. Whitehead resolves the tension between God and the world by proposing a Consequent Nature, where God experientially knows and treasures every "actual occasion" in the unfolding universe.
This differs from Spinoza by rejecting a pantheistic, deterministic, and static divine, and from Hume by replacing skepticism about necessary connections with a metaphysics of direct, relational, and, therefore, cognitive prehension.
Whitehead’s Justification: The Two Natures of God
Whitehead restores a form of "divine omniscience," but reconfigures it to fit a creative, evolving universe.
The Primordial Nature (Ground of Possibility): God is the "principle of concretion," providing the initial aim and potential for every new occasion. This is God’s mental, eternal, and non-temporal knowledge.
The Consequent Nature (Knowledge of Actuality): Contrary to static, medieval notions, Whitehead’s God is "passible," meaning God is affected by the world. The Consequent Nature is the "actual world" as it is, perfectly understood, synthesized, and remembered within the divine experience.
"Invasion" as Lure and Reception: God "knows" the world by "prehending" (feeling/taking in) the completed actual occasions of the past. God is "in unison of becoming with every other creative act," meaning God’s knowledge is immediate and experiential, not distant or detached.
Comparison with Spinoza
Spinoza’s God (Deus sive Natura) is the one infinite substance, and everything is a mode of God.
Spinoza’s Knowledge: In Spinoza, everything is logically necessitated. God's knowledge is a static, eternal understanding of the necessary, geometric structure of reality.
Whitehead’s Difference: Whitehead rejects this determinism. For Whitehead, the future is not determined. God knows the world not as a static, necessary unfolding, but as a "creative advance" where God and the world are co-creators. Whitehead’s God is "dipolar" (mental and physical poles), while Spinoza’s is a substance with infinite attributes but no "becoming".
Comparison with Hume
Hume’s empiricism challenged the very existence of a rational, knowable, and designing God.
The Whitehead Encyclopedia +3
Hume’s Skepticism: Hume argued that we cannot know "causes" or necessary connections; we only see "constant conjunction". Therefore, he viewed the "designed" world as a poor analogy for a divine mind, and "God" as an unjustifiable inference.
Whitehead’s Difference: Whitehead argues that Hume’s empiricism is not "radical enough". Whitehead contends that if we look at experience in its full "concreteness," we directly feel the "causal efficacy" of the past acting on the present. God, in Whitehead's view, is the ultimate "subject" who feels and binds these connections, providing the "order" that makes the universe intelligible.
Does the project of process philosophy stand for the universal creativity which represents the modern metaphysics of the forms of forms?
Yes, the project of process philosophy, particularly in the tradition of Alfred North Whitehead, is fundamentally built on the concept of universal creativity, which functions as the modern metaphysical "form of forms". It posits that reality is not a collection of static substances, but rather a dynamic process of becoming, where creativity is the ultimate, universal principle.
Key Aspects of this Philosophical Stance:
Creativity as "Universal of Universals": In Whitehead’s metaphysics, creativity is the ultimate, non-actualizable principle that allows for the creation of new actual entities. It is the "many" (past actualities) becoming "one" (a new actual occasion), which then becomes a new datum for future creativity.
The "Forms of Forms": While process philosophy rejects static Platonism, it retains a "neo-classical" approach by organizing "eternal objects" (Platonic forms) within a dynamic framework. Creativity is the ultimate, non-actualized principle that gives rise to these forms, making it the "form of forms".
Rejection of Substance Metaphysics: Process philosophy replaces the traditional focus on static substances with "actual entities" or "occasions of experience". These are momentary events of experience rather than enduring, unchanging, material substances.
The Creative Advance of Nature: Process philosophy describes the world as a "creative advance into novelty". It focuses on how newness is constantly emerging, rather than just rearranging existing, static materials.
Universal Agency: Because creativity is universal, process philosophy argues that all actual entities possess some degree of self-determination.
Modern Metaphysics and Beyond:
Constructive Postmodernism: Process philosophy is often called "constructive postmodernism" because it seeks to overcome the limitations of modern mechanistic, materialist, and subjectivist worldviews by revising rather than abandoning metaphysics.
God and Creativity: In this system, God is not an omnipotent creator outside the process, but the supreme creative power and the "principle of limitation" that organizes eternal objects (forms) into a coherent, though never finished, universe. In essence, process philosophy stands for a world where every entity is a "creature" of this universal, evolving creativity.
Thank you for leading me on to pose these questions today, Robin. I feel there is definitely something in the nature of higher truth that lies hidden in these answers to the questions I posed on Google's Gemini A.I. feature..
Regards, Andrew B. Noselli
Thomas Aquinas argued that the influence of Greek philosophy—specifically Aristotelianism—was good when used as a tool to clarify and defend theology, but bad when it contradicted divine revelation. He held that reason and faith are complementary, famously stating that if philosophy contradicts faith, it is a misuse of philosophy.
How Aquinas Showed the Influence Was Good:
Rational Framework for Faith: Aquinas used Aristotle's logic, metaphysics, and ethics to structure theology, arguing that natural reason could prove God's existence and support theological truths.
Validation of Material Reality: Contrary to strict Platonism, Aquinas adopted Aristotle’s view that humans are a soul-matter composite. This, he argued, supported the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation and resurrection of the body.
Understanding Morality: He adapted Aristotelian ethics (virtue theory) into a Christian context, viewing moral life as a way to achieve fulfillment ("eudaimonism") in God.
How Aquinas Showed the Influence Was Bad (Abuse of Philosophy):
Contradiction of Revelation: Aquinas rejected Aristotle’s belief that the universe is eternal, arguing that it contradicted the theological doctrine of creation ex nihilo (out of nothing).
Limits of Reason: He maintained that while reason is powerful, it cannot grasp mysteries like the Trinity or Incarnation, which require faith.
Rejection of Faulty Logic: If a philosophical conclusion contradicted a revealed truth, Aquinas identified it as a "failure of reason" rather than a truth.
Ultimately, Aquinas believed that using Greek philosophy properly was essential for building a robust, intellectually sound theology, provided it was kept subordinate to divine revelation.
Does postmodern philosophy grow out of the need to question the foundations of Western thinking represented by the medieval synthesis that Aquinas laid down?
Postmodern philosophy is often understood as a radical critique of the foundations of Western thought, but it generally grows out of a reaction against modernism—specifically the Enlightenment’s reliance on reason, science, and universal "metanarratives"—rather than a direct, immediate reaction to the medieval synthesis of Thomas Aquinas.
However, because modernism itself was built on the dismantling of the medieval worldview, postmodernism can be seen as the ultimate extension of this critique, targeting the very foundations (objectivity, universality, truth) that were established in the medieval era and continued through the modern period.
Here is a breakdown of the relationship between postmodernism, the medieval synthesis, and the foundations of Western thinking:
1. The Medieval Synthesis (Aquinas) as the Target
The "medieval synthesis" refers to the reconciliation of Christian faith with Greek rationalism (specifically Aristotle), a project masterfully executed by Thomas Aquinas.
The Foundation: This synthesis established that faith and reason are compatible, holding that there is an objective, ordered, and understandable reality—a "metanarrative" or grand story about the world's meaning and purpose.
The Shift to Modernity: Modern philosophy (starting with Descartes) departed from this by discarding the reliance on religious authority, opting instead for human reason as the primary tool.
2. Postmodernism as a Reaction to Modernity
Postmodernism arose in the mid-20th century primarily as a skeptical response to the promises of the modern era (17th–19th centuries).
The Critique of Reason: While modernism relied on reason to uncover truth, postmodernism argues that reason and logic are not objective, but rather tools of power and social construction.
The Rejection of Meta-narratives: Lyotard defined postmodernism as an "incredulity towards metanarratives," meaning it rejects all-encompassing stories (like Christianity or Enlightenment progress) that attempt to explain all of history or human experience.
3. The Indirect Connection to Aquinas
While postmodernists rarely target Aquinas directly, they reject the core assumption of the medieval (and early modern) world: that there is a single, objective reality or, as they term it, the "univocity of being".
Subverting Structure: Postmodernists seek to dismantle the "hierarchical, dogmatic structures" that they believe originate in pre-modern and modern thought.
The "Premodern-Postmodern" Loop: Some thinkers note that by rejecting the modern, secular, and scientific worldview, postmodernism sometimes shares a "skepticism of structural legitimation" similar to pre-modern perspectives, making it, in some ways, a paradoxical return to a pre-modern, non-rationalist perspective.
In summary: Postmodern philosophy does not directly emerge from a need to question Aquinas, but rather from a need to question the rationalist, scientific, and humanist paradigm of the modern era. However, since the modern era was itself a departure from the medieval synthesis, postmodernism is, at its core, a complete dismantling of the foundational, universalizing, and ordered worldview established in the Middle Ages.
How did Hegel take up that image of the World Soul that Aristotle abandoned?
Hegel took up the concept of the World Soul—which he interpreted as the immanent, self-organizing "soul-principle" or inner entelechy of nature—by transforming it from a static, cosmological entity into a dialectical, developmental process of Spirit (Geist). Rather than abandoning the idea as Aristotle largely did, Hegel reappropriated it by blending Aristotelian hylomorphism (form-matter unity) with Kantian inner teleology (organic life as its own end), positioning the soul as the active, mediating link between inorganic matter and conscious spirit.
Hegel's reinterpretation of the World Soul involved the following key approaches:
Reinterpreting "Soul" as Self-Producing Process: Hegel argued against viewing the soul as a separate, immaterial thing. Instead, he took up the Aristotelian idea of soul as entelechy (the realized end of a natural organism) and defined it as the "universal immateriality of nature". It is the inner purpose that organizes matter into a living form.
Merging Aristotle with Kantian Teleology: Hegel took the Aristotelian "soul-principle" (inner purpose) and fused it with Kant's notion of an organism being its own end (Selbstzweck). For Hegel, this means the living organism is not produced by external forces but is self-producing—synchronically through its own metabolism and diachronically through reproduction.
A Three-Fold Hierarchy of Souls: Following Aristotle’s distinction, Hegel structured his "Philosophy of Nature" based on a hierarchy of soul-principles: vegetative (plant), animal, and human. These are not merely different types of beings, but steps in the liberation of the soul, where the lower form is implicitly contained within the higher.
The Soul as Mediator to Spirit (Geist): Hegel transformed the World Soul into a developmental story. The soul starts as the "sleep" of mind—unconscious in nature (the "World Soul")—and develops into a conscious human subjective spirit. In his Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, the soul is the intermediary "bond" that connects the physical body to consciousness.
From "World Soul" to "World Spirit" (Weltgeist): The ultimate transformation of the "World Soul" in Hegel is its elevation into the "World Spirit," where the self-organizing principle of nature becomes aware of itself through human history and culture.
In essence, Hegel took up the idea of the World Soul by arguing that nature is not dead matter but "petrified spirit," whose inner, purposive activity is a living, developing soul.
How does process philosophy react to the statement that relations between God and the world are dynamic and subject to alteration for the world but not for Godhood?
Process philosophy, particularly via Alfred North Whitehead, rejects the notion that God remains unaffected by the world. It argues that while God has a static "primordial nature" (possibilities), God possesses a "consequent nature" that is actively shaped, changed, and enriched by the temporal world. God is viewed as the "fellow sufferer who understands," experiencing change alongside creation.
Key reactions from process thought to this statement include:
Divine Passibility/Relationality: Process theology asserts that divine love necessitates being affected by the beloved. God is not a detached, static substance but is constantly becoming, growing, and experiencing the world.
Two Natures of God: Whitehead proposed that God has two aspects:
The Primordial Nature: Unchanging, eternal, and full of possibilities.
The Consequent Nature: Changing, temporal, and incomplete, as it incorporates the experiences and events of the world into the divine life.
Reciprocity: Relations are not one-way. While God influences the world through "lures" (persuasion), the world affects God.
Divine Vulnerability: God is not omnipotent in a coercive sense but rather vulnerable to the world, suffering with it and preserving its achievements.
Therefore, process philosophy would argue that if God were totally unaffected, God would not be truly loving or intimately related to the cosmos.
How does Whitehead's process philosophy justify the medieval invasion of God's cognitive knowledge as compared with Hume and Spinoza?
Whitehead’s process philosophy justifies the "invasion" of God's cognitive knowledge into the world by redefining God not as a static, omnipotent substance (as in medieval thought), but as a dipolar, relational entity that is both the source of, and affected by, temporal reality. Whitehead resolves the tension between God and the world by proposing a Consequent Nature, where God experientially knows and treasures every "actual occasion" in the unfolding universe.
This differs from Spinoza by rejecting a pantheistic, deterministic, and static divine, and from Hume by replacing skepticism about necessary connections with a metaphysics of direct, relational, and, therefore, cognitive prehension.
Whitehead’s Justification: The Two Natures of God
Whitehead restores a form of "divine omniscience," but reconfigures it to fit a creative, evolving universe.
The Primordial Nature (Ground of Possibility): God is the "principle of concretion," providing the initial aim and potential for every new occasion. This is God’s mental, eternal, and non-temporal knowledge.
The Consequent Nature (Knowledge of Actuality): Contrary to static, medieval notions, Whitehead’s God is "passible," meaning God is affected by the world. The Consequent Nature is the "actual world" as it is, perfectly understood, synthesized, and remembered within the divine experience.
"Invasion" as Lure and Reception: God "knows" the world by "prehending" (feeling/taking in) the completed actual occasions of the past. God is "in unison of becoming with every other creative act," meaning God’s knowledge is immediate and experiential, not distant or detached.
Comparison with Spinoza
Spinoza’s God (Deus sive Natura) is the one infinite substance, and everything is a mode of God.
Spinoza’s Knowledge: In Spinoza, everything is logically necessitated. God's knowledge is a static, eternal understanding of the necessary, geometric structure of reality.
Whitehead’s Difference: Whitehead rejects this determinism. For Whitehead, the future is not determined. God knows the world not as a static, necessary unfolding, but as a "creative advance" where God and the world are co-creators. Whitehead’s God is "dipolar" (mental and physical poles), while Spinoza’s is a substance with infinite attributes but no "becoming".
Comparison with Hume
Hume’s empiricism challenged the very existence of a rational, knowable, and designing God.
The Whitehead Encyclopedia +3
Hume’s Skepticism: Hume argued that we cannot know "causes" or necessary connections; we only see "constant conjunction". Therefore, he viewed the "designed" world as a poor analogy for a divine mind, and "God" as an unjustifiable inference.
Whitehead’s Difference: Whitehead argues that Hume’s empiricism is not "radical enough". Whitehead contends that if we look at experience in its full "concreteness," we directly feel the "causal efficacy" of the past acting on the present. God, in Whitehead's view, is the ultimate "subject" who feels and binds these connections, providing the "order" that makes the universe intelligible.
Does the project of process philosophy stand for the universal creativity which represents the modern metaphysics of the forms of forms?
Yes, the project of process philosophy, particularly in the tradition of Alfred North Whitehead, is fundamentally built on the concept of universal creativity, which functions as the modern metaphysical "form of forms". It posits that reality is not a collection of static substances, but rather a dynamic process of becoming, where creativity is the ultimate, universal principle.
Key Aspects of this Philosophical Stance:
Creativity as "Universal of Universals": In Whitehead’s metaphysics, creativity is the ultimate, non-actualizable principle that allows for the creation of new actual entities. It is the "many" (past actualities) becoming "one" (a new actual occasion), which then becomes a new datum for future creativity.
The "Forms of Forms": While process philosophy rejects static Platonism, it retains a "neo-classical" approach by organizing "eternal objects" (Platonic forms) within a dynamic framework. Creativity is the ultimate, non-actualized principle that gives rise to these forms, making it the "form of forms".
Rejection of Substance Metaphysics: Process philosophy replaces the traditional focus on static substances with "actual entities" or "occasions of experience". These are momentary events of experience rather than enduring, unchanging, material substances.
The Creative Advance of Nature: Process philosophy describes the world as a "creative advance into novelty". It focuses on how newness is constantly emerging, rather than just rearranging existing, static materials.
Universal Agency: Because creativity is universal, process philosophy argues that all actual entities possess some degree of self-determination.
Modern Metaphysics and Beyond:
Constructive Postmodernism: Process philosophy is often called "constructive postmodernism" because it seeks to overcome the limitations of modern mechanistic, materialist, and subjectivist worldviews by revising rather than abandoning metaphysics.
God and Creativity: In this system, God is not an omnipotent creator outside the process, but the supreme creative power and the "principle of limitation" that organizes eternal objects (forms) into a coherent, though never finished, universe. In essence, process philosophy stands for a world where every entity is a "creature" of this universal, evolving creativity.
Thank you for leading me on to pose these questions today, Robin. I feel there is definitely something in the nature of higher truth that lies hidden in these answers to the questions I posed on Google's Gemini A.I. feature..
Regards, Andrew B. Noselli
April 26, 2022
The clash between Thomist and Process thinkers is still raging on, and this lecture gives great and respectful insight into that debate. Hartshorne is one of those incredible thinkers that can weave years of complex theories and thought into a brilliant and approachable summary. This book is yet another example that demonstrates Hartshorne at his best. Necessary for those who want to understand Whitehead through Hartshorne more while getting a leg up on Thomists.
July 13, 2016
A very good book for getting a feel for Charles Hartshorne. In their classic "Process Theology" Cobb & Griffin say that Hartshorne's small book "A Natural Theology for Our Time" is a great summary of his work. That is true, but this book is not even half the size of NTOT and also summarizes CH well.
February 20, 2026
Charles Hartshorne And Process Theology In Milwaukee
The philosophy department of Marquette University, Milwaukee, presents an annual lecture, the Aquinas Lecture, delivered by a distinguished philosopher. The annual lectures are published in small, uniformly bound volumes. Fifty years ago, on February 22, 1976, the 40th in the series of Aquinas Lectures was delivered by Charles Hartshorne, on the subject "Aquinas to Whitehead: Seven Centuries of Metaphysics of Religion." At the time of the lecture, Hartshorne (1897 -- 2000) was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas. He had earned his PhD at Harvard in 1923 and had also studied at the University of Freiburg and the University of Marburg in Germany. He was greatly influenced by the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce and, together with the philosopher Paul Weiss, had prepared a six volume edition of Peirce's papers. Hartshorne had studied at Harvard with Alfred North Whitehead and wrote extensively developing his own version of Whitehead's process philosophy and theology. As stated in the Preferatory material to his lecture, "Professor Hartshorne's study has followed two major interests, human knowledge and God". Hartshorne was a systematic metaphysician at a time when this was distinctly out of fashion in American philosophy.
Process theology was also not the sort of philosophy practiced by the namesake of the lectures, Thomas Aquinas. Inviting Hartshorne to speak in itself, as Hartshorne acknowledged, showed the breadth and openness to ideas of the Aquinas Lectures. Hartshorne's lecture covers about 50 pages in this pocket-sized book,but it is vast in scope. The lecture is in part historical. It begins with Plato and Aristotle and then proceeds to Aquinas with considerations of many other thinkers including Spinoza, Leibniz, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Fechner, Peirce, William James, John Dewey and many others thgough Whitehead and beyond. Hartshorne uses this history to place process philosophy in its context. He tries to show how process philosophy and process theology offer a better path to understanidng God and reality than do its substantialist predecessors. The book covers a great deal in its short scope. It is difficult to follow as a book and must have been even more difficult to follow delivered as a lecture. Still, it offers a brief overview and argument in support of process theology.
The book opens with a discussion of Aristotle and of the influence of Aristotle on the Abrahamic traditions. God was viewed as omnipotent, omniscient, and unchanging. This understanding of God, Hartshorne argues, made it difficult to explain God's relationship to and knowledge of a finite, changing world and also lead to the problem of evil. Hartshorne wanted to develop a different understanding of God. God was the greatest being but did not have the qualities of Aristotle's God, adopted in the Western tradition. God changed and developed with time and responded to chance in the development of the physical world. There was interplay and creativity in the relationship between God and the world, on both sides. Hartshorne thought about time. The future followed upon and developed the past, but remained indeterminate. Hartshorne wanted to change the focus of thinking about God and about reality from static, unchanging Being to becoming and change.
Hartshorne sets out this position in roughly the first half of his Aquinas Lecture and develops it in the second part of the Lecture which considers philosophers such as the early Socinians, Fechner, and Jules Lequier, none of whom are well-known. Late in the lecture, he draws parallels with the thought of Leibniz. Among Hartshorne's contemporaries, he discusses Whitehead and also, William E. Hocking, E.S. Brightman, and W.S. Montague, among others. He develops a position called dual transcendence under which God is viewed as "in uniquely excellent ways, both necessary and contingent, both infinite and finite, independent and dependent, eternal and temporal." In what he describes as his "express trip through history" Hartshorne also discusses the nature of matter and rejects substantialist accounts in favore of an account emphasizing change, time, and becoming.
Hartshore belives that metaphysics and God are vital to human life. In his view, process theology gives a new meaning to the old saying, "the end of existence is the glory of God." Hartshore revises this saying to state "very literally, we exist to enhance, not simply to admire or enjoy, the divine glory. Ultimately we are contributors to the ever-growing divine treasury of values. We serve God. God is not finally means to our ends. Our final and inclusive end is to contribute to the divine life."
It is difficult to do process theology justice in a short lecture. It has become an important theological movement with adherents in both Christianity and Judaism and outside of organized religion. If emphsizes change and human activism.
It was valuable to struggle with this lecture and to think about process thought. I was gratified to read Hartshorne expounding his views fifty years ago in a lecture in Milwaukee, the city where I grew up and first became aware of the mysteries and difficulties of philosophical thinking.
Robin Friedman
The philosophy department of Marquette University, Milwaukee, presents an annual lecture, the Aquinas Lecture, delivered by a distinguished philosopher. The annual lectures are published in small, uniformly bound volumes. Fifty years ago, on February 22, 1976, the 40th in the series of Aquinas Lectures was delivered by Charles Hartshorne, on the subject "Aquinas to Whitehead: Seven Centuries of Metaphysics of Religion." At the time of the lecture, Hartshorne (1897 -- 2000) was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas. He had earned his PhD at Harvard in 1923 and had also studied at the University of Freiburg and the University of Marburg in Germany. He was greatly influenced by the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce and, together with the philosopher Paul Weiss, had prepared a six volume edition of Peirce's papers. Hartshorne had studied at Harvard with Alfred North Whitehead and wrote extensively developing his own version of Whitehead's process philosophy and theology. As stated in the Preferatory material to his lecture, "Professor Hartshorne's study has followed two major interests, human knowledge and God". Hartshorne was a systematic metaphysician at a time when this was distinctly out of fashion in American philosophy.
Process theology was also not the sort of philosophy practiced by the namesake of the lectures, Thomas Aquinas. Inviting Hartshorne to speak in itself, as Hartshorne acknowledged, showed the breadth and openness to ideas of the Aquinas Lectures. Hartshorne's lecture covers about 50 pages in this pocket-sized book,but it is vast in scope. The lecture is in part historical. It begins with Plato and Aristotle and then proceeds to Aquinas with considerations of many other thinkers including Spinoza, Leibniz, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Fechner, Peirce, William James, John Dewey and many others thgough Whitehead and beyond. Hartshorne uses this history to place process philosophy in its context. He tries to show how process philosophy and process theology offer a better path to understanidng God and reality than do its substantialist predecessors. The book covers a great deal in its short scope. It is difficult to follow as a book and must have been even more difficult to follow delivered as a lecture. Still, it offers a brief overview and argument in support of process theology.
The book opens with a discussion of Aristotle and of the influence of Aristotle on the Abrahamic traditions. God was viewed as omnipotent, omniscient, and unchanging. This understanding of God, Hartshorne argues, made it difficult to explain God's relationship to and knowledge of a finite, changing world and also lead to the problem of evil. Hartshorne wanted to develop a different understanding of God. God was the greatest being but did not have the qualities of Aristotle's God, adopted in the Western tradition. God changed and developed with time and responded to chance in the development of the physical world. There was interplay and creativity in the relationship between God and the world, on both sides. Hartshorne thought about time. The future followed upon and developed the past, but remained indeterminate. Hartshorne wanted to change the focus of thinking about God and about reality from static, unchanging Being to becoming and change.
Hartshorne sets out this position in roughly the first half of his Aquinas Lecture and develops it in the second part of the Lecture which considers philosophers such as the early Socinians, Fechner, and Jules Lequier, none of whom are well-known. Late in the lecture, he draws parallels with the thought of Leibniz. Among Hartshorne's contemporaries, he discusses Whitehead and also, William E. Hocking, E.S. Brightman, and W.S. Montague, among others. He develops a position called dual transcendence under which God is viewed as "in uniquely excellent ways, both necessary and contingent, both infinite and finite, independent and dependent, eternal and temporal." In what he describes as his "express trip through history" Hartshorne also discusses the nature of matter and rejects substantialist accounts in favore of an account emphasizing change, time, and becoming.
Hartshore belives that metaphysics and God are vital to human life. In his view, process theology gives a new meaning to the old saying, "the end of existence is the glory of God." Hartshore revises this saying to state "very literally, we exist to enhance, not simply to admire or enjoy, the divine glory. Ultimately we are contributors to the ever-growing divine treasury of values. We serve God. God is not finally means to our ends. Our final and inclusive end is to contribute to the divine life."
It is difficult to do process theology justice in a short lecture. It has become an important theological movement with adherents in both Christianity and Judaism and outside of organized religion. If emphsizes change and human activism.
It was valuable to struggle with this lecture and to think about process thought. I was gratified to read Hartshorne expounding his views fifty years ago in a lecture in Milwaukee, the city where I grew up and first became aware of the mysteries and difficulties of philosophical thinking.
Robin Friedman
January 1, 2016
What a great little book.
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