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The Skeptic Way: Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism
The Outlines of Pyrrhonism by the 2nd century A.D. Greek physician Sextus Empiricus was immensely influential in the history of Western philosophy. The rediscovery and publication of this work in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries led directly to the skepticism of Montaigne, Gassendi, Bayle, Descartes, Berkeley, Hume, and others, and eventually to the preoccupation of modern philosophy with attempts to refute or otherwise combat philosophical skepticism. In recent years, however, it has become apparent that Pyrrhonism--the form of skepticism professed by Sextus--is in several important respects quite different from the modern forms of skepticism to which the writings of Sextus have given rise. Some of these differences are of particular philosophic interest because they seem to render the ancient form immune to many of the standard responses to skepticism that are made today.
In this book, which incorporates a new translation of the Outlines in their entirety, Benson Mates presents Pyrrhonism not as a mere historical curiosity, as has often been done, but as a philosophical position eminently worthy of serious philosophical consideration here and now. His thorough introduction sets the stage by explaining what Pyrrhonism is and what it is not, and by contrasting it in the relevant respects with modern skepticism. He gives particular attention to explicating a number of quasi-technical terms that occur frequently in the Outlines and have decisive bearing on the philosophical content. By rendering these terms more accurately and uniformly in his translation, he seeks to make the essential feautres of Sextus's Pyrrhonism more evident to the reader.
The latter part of the book consists of a detailed Commentary, which endeavors to discuss and explain the work, section by section, from a philosophical (as contrasted with a philological) point of view.
In this book, which incorporates a new translation of the Outlines in their entirety, Benson Mates presents Pyrrhonism not as a mere historical curiosity, as has often been done, but as a philosophical position eminently worthy of serious philosophical consideration here and now. His thorough introduction sets the stage by explaining what Pyrrhonism is and what it is not, and by contrasting it in the relevant respects with modern skepticism. He gives particular attention to explicating a number of quasi-technical terms that occur frequently in the Outlines and have decisive bearing on the philosophical content. By rendering these terms more accurately and uniformly in his translation, he seeks to make the essential feautres of Sextus's Pyrrhonism more evident to the reader.
The latter part of the book consists of a detailed Commentary, which endeavors to discuss and explain the work, section by section, from a philosophical (as contrasted with a philological) point of view.
352 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 200
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About the author
Sextus Empiricus
93 books91 followersAncient Mediterranean physician and philosopher. His philosophical work is the most complete surviving account of ancient Greek and Roman skepticism.
In his medical work, tradition maintains that he belonged to the "empiric school", as reflected by his name. However, at least twice in his writings, Sextus seems to place himself closer to the "methodic school", as his philosophical views imply.
In his medical work, tradition maintains that he belonged to the "empiric school", as reflected by his name. However, at least twice in his writings, Sextus seems to place himself closer to the "methodic school", as his philosophical views imply.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 69 reviews
May 2, 2025
I am skeptical that I fully understood this book, but I love the way writers of the past just said what they thought...like it or leave it. I did not get what I should have out of this book due to my lack of understanding this particular philosophical perspective - a lesson in and of itself - not to mention how humbling admitting this to myself is.
March 1, 2024
In this extremely unlovely book, Sextus Empiricus (c. 200 CE) summarizes the main points of skeptical philosophy following the tradition of the semi-legendary philosopher Pyrrho (c. 300 BCE). Pyrrhic skepticism directs us to question dogmatic or uncertain statements, as one would tend to think of skepticism in the time of Descartes. But it was also an explicitly therapeutic discipline aimed at generating a sense of detachment or equipoise in which the mind would stand in a state of suspension or non-commitment to beliefs. This was said to relieve the practitioner from unnecessary suffering. This work by Sextus Empiricus provides a terse and extremely dry collection of typical arguments the school would employ in bringing about that state of uncertainty.
If this sounds similar to the Yogasutra of Patanjali or the Buddhist philosophers of India, this is not a coincidence. According to Diogenes Laertius, Pyrrho traveled to India in order to study with the Gymnosophists, the Greek word he used to describe various yogic schools. The philosophical and rhetorical agreements between the Madhyamaka school of Nagarjuna and Pyrrhic skepticism are countless, ranging from the stated goals of the tradition to using extremely similar examples, such as both traditions using the case of phenomena appearing yellow to a person suffering from jaundice as a stock example for why the senses are unreliable.
The views of the skeptical schools of Pyrrho and Timon were summarized by a certain Aristocles in this manner:
"[W]e should not trust [sense perceptions, as they are unreliable], but should be without opinions and without inclinations and without wavering, saying about each single thing that it no more is than is not, or both is and is not, or neither is nor is not. Timon says that the result for those who are so disposed will be first speechlessness [perhaps resembling the "noble silence" that fell upon the Buddha after his final illumination], but then freedom from worry; and Aenesidemus says pleasure."
We are first struck by the similarity to the Madhyamaka ideal of "freedom from views," and then by the rejection of four possible modalities of being: is, is not, both, and neither. This fourfold negation is referred to by Buddhist scholars as the tetralemma, and is universally acknowledged to be the definitive position associated with the Buddhist Madhymaka school. I have never myself seen it formulated in a non-Indian tradition from the ancient world.
Here is a short excerpt from Outlines of Skepticism:
"If a thing moves, it moves either in the place where it is or in that where it is not. but it does not move in the place where it is, for if it is in it, it remains in it; nor yet does it move in the place where it is not; for where a thing is not, there it can neither effect nor suffer anything. Therefore nothing moves."
Compare to this argument from Nagarjuna's Mulamadhymakakarika:
Now, where one has gone one does not go.
Where one has not yet gone one does not go.
Apart from where one has gone and where one has not gone,
That over which one goes cannot be conceived.
This work is therefore of extraordinary interest to the comparativist, and I think one would have to be obtuse to fail to recognize the obvious connection here between Indian and Greek philosophy. What form it took, we cannot say. According to our tentative dating, Pyrrho was centuries earlier than Nagarjuna, but then Nagarjuna is often held to have compiled existing ideas in his Fundamental Wisdom.
The arguments of Sextus Empiricus also exerted a deep influence on modern philosophy, notably on Kant and Hegel, both of whom are known to have been enthusiastic readers of Pyrrhic skepticism. Kant taught Sextus Empricus for thirty years as part of his course on logic, and the basic structure of his use of antimonies of pure reason reflects its obvious influence. Hegel's criticism of dogmatic philosophy, as has been pointed out by his biographer Klaus Vieweg, owes a great deal to his enthusiastic use of Sextus Empiricus's so-called "five modes," which are presented as a general set of arguments for refuting any position.
The five modes are often reduced to a subset of three, which are referred to as the Trilemma of Agrippa. In this form, the argument runs as follows:
If I assert a proposition P, for which I provide some number of reasons or arguments, then there are either a finite number of reasons, or an infinite number of reasons; in the latter case, the argument may be eliminated by reductio ad infinitum.
If there are a finite number of reasons for the argument (P because of Q, Q because of R, and so forth), either the successive justifications eventually lead back to the original argument, or they do not; in the former case, it is a circular reasoning. And in the remaining case, in which a finite number of arguments terminates on a proposition not identical to the initial proposition, that final proposition must itself be unestablished, and thus dogmatic.
All arguments therefore ultimately resolve through chains of reasoning either back to themselves, or to an article of faith, or they do not resolve at all.
Vieweg persuasively links this argument to Hegel's critique of Schelling in the Differenzschrift as containing covert dogmatic premises, which are themselves undemonstrated.
Again, I have to emphasize that Outlines is not a beautiful book. It is not readable like a Platonic dialog, but it may be mined for extremely valuable material.
If this sounds similar to the Yogasutra of Patanjali or the Buddhist philosophers of India, this is not a coincidence. According to Diogenes Laertius, Pyrrho traveled to India in order to study with the Gymnosophists, the Greek word he used to describe various yogic schools. The philosophical and rhetorical agreements between the Madhyamaka school of Nagarjuna and Pyrrhic skepticism are countless, ranging from the stated goals of the tradition to using extremely similar examples, such as both traditions using the case of phenomena appearing yellow to a person suffering from jaundice as a stock example for why the senses are unreliable.
The views of the skeptical schools of Pyrrho and Timon were summarized by a certain Aristocles in this manner:
"[W]e should not trust [sense perceptions, as they are unreliable], but should be without opinions and without inclinations and without wavering, saying about each single thing that it no more is than is not, or both is and is not, or neither is nor is not. Timon says that the result for those who are so disposed will be first speechlessness [perhaps resembling the "noble silence" that fell upon the Buddha after his final illumination], but then freedom from worry; and Aenesidemus says pleasure."
We are first struck by the similarity to the Madhyamaka ideal of "freedom from views," and then by the rejection of four possible modalities of being: is, is not, both, and neither. This fourfold negation is referred to by Buddhist scholars as the tetralemma, and is universally acknowledged to be the definitive position associated with the Buddhist Madhymaka school. I have never myself seen it formulated in a non-Indian tradition from the ancient world.
Here is a short excerpt from Outlines of Skepticism:
"If a thing moves, it moves either in the place where it is or in that where it is not. but it does not move in the place where it is, for if it is in it, it remains in it; nor yet does it move in the place where it is not; for where a thing is not, there it can neither effect nor suffer anything. Therefore nothing moves."
Compare to this argument from Nagarjuna's Mulamadhymakakarika:
Now, where one has gone one does not go.
Where one has not yet gone one does not go.
Apart from where one has gone and where one has not gone,
That over which one goes cannot be conceived.
This work is therefore of extraordinary interest to the comparativist, and I think one would have to be obtuse to fail to recognize the obvious connection here between Indian and Greek philosophy. What form it took, we cannot say. According to our tentative dating, Pyrrho was centuries earlier than Nagarjuna, but then Nagarjuna is often held to have compiled existing ideas in his Fundamental Wisdom.
The arguments of Sextus Empiricus also exerted a deep influence on modern philosophy, notably on Kant and Hegel, both of whom are known to have been enthusiastic readers of Pyrrhic skepticism. Kant taught Sextus Empricus for thirty years as part of his course on logic, and the basic structure of his use of antimonies of pure reason reflects its obvious influence. Hegel's criticism of dogmatic philosophy, as has been pointed out by his biographer Klaus Vieweg, owes a great deal to his enthusiastic use of Sextus Empiricus's so-called "five modes," which are presented as a general set of arguments for refuting any position.
The five modes are often reduced to a subset of three, which are referred to as the Trilemma of Agrippa. In this form, the argument runs as follows:
If I assert a proposition P, for which I provide some number of reasons or arguments, then there are either a finite number of reasons, or an infinite number of reasons; in the latter case, the argument may be eliminated by reductio ad infinitum.
If there are a finite number of reasons for the argument (P because of Q, Q because of R, and so forth), either the successive justifications eventually lead back to the original argument, or they do not; in the former case, it is a circular reasoning. And in the remaining case, in which a finite number of arguments terminates on a proposition not identical to the initial proposition, that final proposition must itself be unestablished, and thus dogmatic.
All arguments therefore ultimately resolve through chains of reasoning either back to themselves, or to an article of faith, or they do not resolve at all.
Vieweg persuasively links this argument to Hegel's critique of Schelling in the Differenzschrift as containing covert dogmatic premises, which are themselves undemonstrated.
Again, I have to emphasize that Outlines is not a beautiful book. It is not readable like a Platonic dialog, but it may be mined for extremely valuable material.
May 17, 2017
Getting through this book was a bit of a trial. I can say, though, that now having finished it, this philosophy impressed me even less than Epicureanism did, which doesn't say much for either, but says even less for Pyrrhonism.
Pyrrhonism can rightly be called the earliest school of philosophy devoted to skepticism. Now, before atheists wet themselves with glee, Pyrrhonism would have even denied the certitude of the empirical method that today's atheists adore. It really starts with the position that almost nothing is certain; so absolute non-committal is the desired outcome to all inquiry--if inquiry is to be considered beneficial at all, that is.
I couldn't help but think of the later philosophy of Descartes and the inane method of Cartesian doubt. It isn't surprising that one of Pascal's labels for Cartesians was Pyrrhonists. Descartes and the Pyrrhonists started with the denial of self-evident truth and believed that that denial was a pretext for a genuine philosophy of first principles. Of course, skepticism has had adherents in others, sometimes it is used constructively and sometimes not; but, as I said in my review of Descartes, a system of skepticism, or doubt, is a contradiction in terms. It is often pointless to even entertain it for any length of time. Basically, though, Pyrrhonism is guilty of the same errors as Cartesianism.
Sextus Empiricus was probably the most notable of the Pyrrhonists. With this book he laid out the methods and principles they appeal to when refuting the so-called dogmatists, which include Platonists, Stoics, Peripatetics, Cynics, Epicureans, etc. Pyrrhonism is really a one-trick pony. If you know a few of their methods, you pretty much know how a Pyrrhonist will handle any other philosophy. It is, if nothing else, predictable. I am personally glad it didn't hold much sway in the history of philosophy. Almost no effort would have been made towards understanding the world if it had. One can be glad that many others saw it as intellectually bankrupt.
One method of refutation that Sextus Empiricus appeals to regularly is the perpetual aggregate of evidence; namely, that all evidence used to support a claim must also require evidence, and that requires further evidence, and that further evidence… ad infinitum. Since accumulating infinite evidence is absurd (to Empiricus) all evidence used by dogmatists must be rejected. Another of his go-to methods is the lack of agreement between dogmatists. He regularly uses that to show that no dogmatic philosophy is compelling because different schools may claim different and contradictory things. He also denies the state of transition between states, e.g. stasis/motion, learning/teaching, cause/effect, etc, are seen as doubtful because there is no clear state of transition between them.
He isn't afraid to use the dogmatists methods as well. With no amount of irony, Sextus Empiricus will even use syllogism to prove syllogism is erroneous. While one might think that Empiricus should either adhere to intelligible or empirical evidence to refute all competing philosophies, he must consistently show both to be doubtful, while at the same time appealing to both! You have to compliment him on his ability to use the methods he claims are dubious. It's almost a kind of philosophical chicanery. The only thing that Empiricus apparently thinks is incontrovertible is the certitude of non-contradiction and the absurdity of perpetual aggregation of evidence. He doesn't explain why in these instances alone we can be certain. If he were consistent, he would not only have to reject those, but also all appeals to syllogistic argument as well. Of course, if he did that, there would be no book and his philosophy would be exposed as the pedantic foolery it is.
I will admit to not caring for skeptical philosophy, so I am probably too biased to review this book fairly. I give the book between 2 and 2 and-a-half stars. Some arguments are mildly interesting, but I would say they are few and far between.
Pyrrhonism can rightly be called the earliest school of philosophy devoted to skepticism. Now, before atheists wet themselves with glee, Pyrrhonism would have even denied the certitude of the empirical method that today's atheists adore. It really starts with the position that almost nothing is certain; so absolute non-committal is the desired outcome to all inquiry--if inquiry is to be considered beneficial at all, that is.
I couldn't help but think of the later philosophy of Descartes and the inane method of Cartesian doubt. It isn't surprising that one of Pascal's labels for Cartesians was Pyrrhonists. Descartes and the Pyrrhonists started with the denial of self-evident truth and believed that that denial was a pretext for a genuine philosophy of first principles. Of course, skepticism has had adherents in others, sometimes it is used constructively and sometimes not; but, as I said in my review of Descartes, a system of skepticism, or doubt, is a contradiction in terms. It is often pointless to even entertain it for any length of time. Basically, though, Pyrrhonism is guilty of the same errors as Cartesianism.
Sextus Empiricus was probably the most notable of the Pyrrhonists. With this book he laid out the methods and principles they appeal to when refuting the so-called dogmatists, which include Platonists, Stoics, Peripatetics, Cynics, Epicureans, etc. Pyrrhonism is really a one-trick pony. If you know a few of their methods, you pretty much know how a Pyrrhonist will handle any other philosophy. It is, if nothing else, predictable. I am personally glad it didn't hold much sway in the history of philosophy. Almost no effort would have been made towards understanding the world if it had. One can be glad that many others saw it as intellectually bankrupt.
One method of refutation that Sextus Empiricus appeals to regularly is the perpetual aggregate of evidence; namely, that all evidence used to support a claim must also require evidence, and that requires further evidence, and that further evidence… ad infinitum. Since accumulating infinite evidence is absurd (to Empiricus) all evidence used by dogmatists must be rejected. Another of his go-to methods is the lack of agreement between dogmatists. He regularly uses that to show that no dogmatic philosophy is compelling because different schools may claim different and contradictory things. He also denies the state of transition between states, e.g. stasis/motion, learning/teaching, cause/effect, etc, are seen as doubtful because there is no clear state of transition between them.
He isn't afraid to use the dogmatists methods as well. With no amount of irony, Sextus Empiricus will even use syllogism to prove syllogism is erroneous. While one might think that Empiricus should either adhere to intelligible or empirical evidence to refute all competing philosophies, he must consistently show both to be doubtful, while at the same time appealing to both! You have to compliment him on his ability to use the methods he claims are dubious. It's almost a kind of philosophical chicanery. The only thing that Empiricus apparently thinks is incontrovertible is the certitude of non-contradiction and the absurdity of perpetual aggregation of evidence. He doesn't explain why in these instances alone we can be certain. If he were consistent, he would not only have to reject those, but also all appeals to syllogistic argument as well. Of course, if he did that, there would be no book and his philosophy would be exposed as the pedantic foolery it is.
I will admit to not caring for skeptical philosophy, so I am probably too biased to review this book fairly. I give the book between 2 and 2 and-a-half stars. Some arguments are mildly interesting, but I would say they are few and far between.
April 7, 2025
The object of Pyrrhonian skepticism is ultimately aesthetic, “a standstill of the intellect, owing to which we neither reject nor posit anything. Tranquility [ataraxia—from taratein, to trouble] is freedom from disturbance or calmness of soul” (5). The ‘aim’ of the skeptic here is “tranquility in matters of opinion and moderation of feeling in matters forced upon us” (11)—which should remind us of Epictetus and the stoics. Important in the effort is the recognition of the ‘standard,’ or ‘criterion’ of judgment (9), by which evidence might be evaluated, and which turns out to be the main problem.
To get to the point of ataraxia, the skeptic adopts the discipline of “modes of suspension of judgment” (4), in which an ‘aporetic’ accounting is developed (id.)—regarding "equipollence in the opposed objects and accounts” (id.), such that “the chief constitutive principle of skepticism is the claim that to every account an equal account is opposed” (6). We might regard this principle as lacking suspension of judgment, of course (insofar as it assumes without rigor or warrant the existence and salience of equality of accounts), and we might furthermore regard it as toothing upon an argumentum ad populum. The skeptics do have a fairly kickass manner of handling seemingly unanswerable arguments:
So, slick in the way of weaseling out of the responsibility for adjudication of claims. Ultimately, it is revealed that intellectual dissension is anepikritos--‘undecidable’ (24), which extends a key agambenian concern across all knowledge claims (recall the etymology: from Latin decidere 'to decide, determine,' literally 'to cut off,' from de 'off' + caedere 'to cut'). Particular claims will be undecidable because the decision is taken by a person, and the person is in a context: “one will not be an unbiased judge of external existing objects because one will have been contaminated by the conditions he is in” (30)—basic ideology theory, really (Mannheim's paradox, maybe). (Of course this principle of undecidability does not appear to be consistent with epoche, i.e., suspension.) Sextus contends that
An important point, the identity of the authorized decision-maker--skepticism seems to defer to the status quo at times. But someone like Agamben might use undecidabilities as the basis of argument—bringing two apparently opposed theses to the point of coinciding without remainder means that there is no dissension in fact. The skeptics do this when they become adherents to the status quo; Diogenes declined to die because life and death are undecidable, so why take the effort to change? It is an aesthetic end, after all. The skeptic might rely upon “guidance by nature, necessitation by feelings, handing down of laws and customs, and teaching of kinds of expertise” (63) for pragmatic concerns of everyday life—so, not a radical doctrine at all.
Pyrrhonians are permitted to speak about things without necessarily adopting any positions (6), which means also that “they say what is apparent to themselves and report their own feelings without holding opinions, affirming nothing about external objects”(7)—so, an internal/external split in the epistemology here. The operation is “when we investigate whether existing things are as they appear, we grant that they appear, and what we investigate is not what is apparent but what is said about what is apparent” (8).
They have several overlapping methods to hold adjudication in suspension: the Ten Modes (12 ff), the Five Modes (40 ff), and the Two Modes (43 ff) (I know, right)—these are different sorts of rhetorical objections to various genres of claims. Some of these things are useful, and some not so much. Some of the modes are contingent upon a linguistic metaphor: “some existing things are clear, others unclear, as they themselves say, and what is apparent is a signifier while what is unclear is signified by something apparent” (36). The Ten Modes are very precise and accordingly have limited utility, whereas the Five Modes are bit more generic: undecidable dissension, infinite regress, relativity, hypotheticals, reciprocation of premise and conclusion.
At times it seems like a Sith/Jedi dispute, when Sextus worries about “being seduced by the Dogmatists into abandoning” aporetic investigation (52).
The remainder of the text (Books II and III) are skeptical arguments against specific ideas of the Stoics, the Epicureans, the Aristotelians, the Platonists, and so on. The comments are interesting for a number of reasons, but often the local arguments are bad. The general techniques make the point effectively enough—there seems to be quite simply an insuperable obstacle to achieving a reliable certitude. Arguments to the contrary fail to persuade.
Toward the end (205 ff), he is interested in whether there can be an “expertise in living,’ which is plainly a consideration of the eidos zoe. Sextus will disavow it, of course:
Perhaps a bit uncharitable here, in assuming that everyone just naturally desires ataraxic quiescence; some of us by contrast may want the solicitation.
Fairly obviously required reading.
To get to the point of ataraxia, the skeptic adopts the discipline of “modes of suspension of judgment” (4), in which an ‘aporetic’ accounting is developed (id.)—regarding "equipollence in the opposed objects and accounts” (id.), such that “the chief constitutive principle of skepticism is the claim that to every account an equal account is opposed” (6). We might regard this principle as lacking suspension of judgment, of course (insofar as it assumes without rigor or warrant the existence and salience of equality of accounts), and we might furthermore regard it as toothing upon an argumentum ad populum. The skeptics do have a fairly kickass manner of handling seemingly unanswerable arguments:
Before the founder of the school to which you adhere was born, the argument of the school, which is no doubt sound, was not yet apparent, although it was really there in nature. In the same way, it is possible that the argument opposing the one you have just propounded is really there in nature but is not yet apparent to us; so we should not yet assent to what is now thought to be a powerful argument. (12)
So, slick in the way of weaseling out of the responsibility for adjudication of claims. Ultimately, it is revealed that intellectual dissension is anepikritos--‘undecidable’ (24), which extends a key agambenian concern across all knowledge claims (recall the etymology: from Latin decidere 'to decide, determine,' literally 'to cut off,' from de 'off' + caedere 'to cut'). Particular claims will be undecidable because the decision is taken by a person, and the person is in a context: “one will not be an unbiased judge of external existing objects because one will have been contaminated by the conditions he is in” (30)—basic ideology theory, really (Mannheim's paradox, maybe). (Of course this principle of undecidability does not appear to be consistent with epoche, i.e., suspension.) Sextus contends that
If undecidable, we have it that we must suspend judgment; for it is not possible to make assertions about what is subject to undecidable dispute. But if decidable, we shall ask where the decision is to come from. (42)
An important point, the identity of the authorized decision-maker--skepticism seems to defer to the status quo at times. But someone like Agamben might use undecidabilities as the basis of argument—bringing two apparently opposed theses to the point of coinciding without remainder means that there is no dissension in fact. The skeptics do this when they become adherents to the status quo; Diogenes declined to die because life and death are undecidable, so why take the effort to change? It is an aesthetic end, after all. The skeptic might rely upon “guidance by nature, necessitation by feelings, handing down of laws and customs, and teaching of kinds of expertise” (63) for pragmatic concerns of everyday life—so, not a radical doctrine at all.
Pyrrhonians are permitted to speak about things without necessarily adopting any positions (6), which means also that “they say what is apparent to themselves and report their own feelings without holding opinions, affirming nothing about external objects”(7)—so, an internal/external split in the epistemology here. The operation is “when we investigate whether existing things are as they appear, we grant that they appear, and what we investigate is not what is apparent but what is said about what is apparent” (8).
They have several overlapping methods to hold adjudication in suspension: the Ten Modes (12 ff), the Five Modes (40 ff), and the Two Modes (43 ff) (I know, right)—these are different sorts of rhetorical objections to various genres of claims. Some of these things are useful, and some not so much. Some of the modes are contingent upon a linguistic metaphor: “some existing things are clear, others unclear, as they themselves say, and what is apparent is a signifier while what is unclear is signified by something apparent” (36). The Ten Modes are very precise and accordingly have limited utility, whereas the Five Modes are bit more generic: undecidable dissension, infinite regress, relativity, hypotheticals, reciprocation of premise and conclusion.
At times it seems like a Sith/Jedi dispute, when Sextus worries about “being seduced by the Dogmatists into abandoning” aporetic investigation (52).
The remainder of the text (Books II and III) are skeptical arguments against specific ideas of the Stoics, the Epicureans, the Aristotelians, the Platonists, and so on. The comments are interesting for a number of reasons, but often the local arguments are bad. The general techniques make the point effectively enough—there seems to be quite simply an insuperable obstacle to achieving a reliable certitude. Arguments to the contrary fail to persuade.
Toward the end (205 ff), he is interested in whether there can be an “expertise in living,’ which is plainly a consideration of the eidos zoe. Sextus will disavow it, of course:
We should say, then, that if it is not agreed that things good, bad, and indifferent subsist, and if expertise in living perhaps does not subsist and—if we grant its subsistence as a hypothesis—brings no benefit to its possessors but on the contrary instills in them the greatest of troubles [i.e., not ataraxia but rather a solicitation?], then in vain do the Dogmatists preen themselves in the so-called ethical part of what they call philosophy. (216)
Perhaps a bit uncharitable here, in assuming that everyone just naturally desires ataraxic quiescence; some of us by contrast may want the solicitation.
Fairly obviously required reading.
September 3, 2013
Lorsque la philosophie sceptique parait en Grèce avec Pyrrhon d’Elis, au début du troisième siècle avant notre ère, la plupart des autres grandes écoles philosophiques existent déjà : Académie de Platon, Lycée d’Aristote, Portique de Zénon, Jardin d’Épicure. On peut laisser de côté les cyniques qui ne se sont intéressé qu’à l’éthique. La philosophie était diversement appréciée : le commun relayait des plaisanteries sans nombre sur les rêveries de ces intellectuels qui confondaient les mots et les choses, et on retrouve des traces de cette méfiance déjà dans les Nuées d’Aristophane. On retrouve cet esprit dans les écrits de Cicéron, dans sa Nature des Dieux, sa Divination ou ses Académiques, quoiqu’ils soient aussi beaucoup teintés d’Académisme. Plus tard, Lucien fera plusieurs pamphlets contre ces théories nombreuses et contradictoires, qui servent surtout à plonger les disciples des écoles dans la perplexité. L’Hermotimos est sans doute le plus beau de ces textes, celui qui m’a le plus touché. Les pères de l’Église ne dédaigneront pas non plus, dans certains de leurs apologies, les arguments de sceptiques pour attaquer le paganisme ou la philosophie. Pendant la contre-réforme, les jésuites utiliseront à leur tour les démonstrations des sceptiques pour convaincre les réformés qu’ils ne peuvent prétendre se fonder sur leurs propres lumières pour interpréter l’écriture, et qu’ils feraient mieux de retourner dans le giron de l’Église de Rome. Parmi les modernes, on trouvera chez Montaigne le premier des sceptiques, et chez David Hume, le plus accompli. On remarquera que Kant, va emprunter énormément au vocabulaire sceptique, même si lui-même va dogmatiser dans une certaine mesure, avec son esthétique transcendantale, et son impératif catégorique. La maxime de Bonaparte,"Il faut se réserver le droit de rire le lendemain de ses idées de la veille" , est tout à fait sceptique.
Le présent texte est l’un des plus complet qui nous soit parvenu sur cette école philosophique, qui se distingue des autres par sa volonté de ne pas construire de système, et de faire preuve d’une prudence et d’une rigueur intellectuelle au dessus de celle des autres écoles, en mettant un point d’honneur à ne pas admettre pour vrai ce qui est douteux ou sujet de controverses indécidables. L’auteur, Sextus Empiricus, est un grec, philosophe, astronome et médecin de la fin du deuxième siècle, donc postérieur à Plutarque : il expose une philosophie dont la paternité revient à Pyrrhon d’Elis, et il va en préciser la spécificité par rapport à toutes les autres écoles, dont il met en évidence les écarts par rapport au scepticisme, c’est-à-dire cela en quoi elles sont dogmatiques. Dans nos langues modernes, le mot « dogme » est associé aux règles fondamentales de la religion, mais pour les grecs, un « dogme » est une opinion, laquelle peut être ou vraie ou fausse, et donc les sceptiques appellent « dogmatiques » les philosophes qui adoptent des systèmes leur faisant accepter pour vraies de simples opinions pour lesquelles il est impossible d’être certain du fait qu’elles soient vraies ou fausses. Évidemment, une telle position les rend ennemis de tous les autres : ils sont ainsi caricaturés avec force comme des extravagants qui doutent de tout, même des choses les plus évidentes comme le simple fait d’avoir faim ou soif, et qu’ils périraient bientôt comme l’âne de Buridan si la sollicitude de leurs amis ne prévenaient les suites fâcheuses de leur fanatisme. Toutes ces imputations sont évidemment mensongères, car les sceptiques ne refusent de donner leur assentiment qu’aux opinions seules qui sont obscures, comme les questions métaphysiques sur la nature des choses, l’âme, les dieux, le temps, la vertu, etc… Pour le reste, ils adoptent les opinions communes, et se rendent aux évidences, comme celles des impressions faites par les sens.
Quoique cette réputation d’impudents un peu fous va leur coller à la peau, on ne manque pas de constater que toutes les autres écoles de philosophies, dans les controverses qui les opposent dans les questions disputées, vont toutes reprendre les arguments des sceptiques pour abattre les opinions de leurs adversaires. Les arguments des sceptiques s’appuient sur un certain nombre de faits : la grande diversité des mœurs des humains, la variété avec laquelle les humains sont affectés par les sens, la variété avec laquelle nous somme affectés par les mêmes choses en fonction des circonstances, et aussi en fonction de la fréquence avec laquelle nous rencontrons les faits, qui nous encourage plus ou moins à inférer. Tous ces éléments travaillent à considérer les questions débattues par les écoles avec prudence, et à vérifier s’il n’y a pas dans les démonstrations des dogmatiques quelque vice de raisonnement comme la pétition de principe (diallèle), ou quelque ruse sophistique plus ou moins élaborée, que la sagacité des sceptique se plaît à traquer. Cette méthode est assez féconde, ils vont même jusqu’à refuser la validité des raisonnements et démonstrations comme le syllogismes, dont les dogmatiques sont si fiers. Ces raisonnements ne sont que des coquilles vides, car les mots qui sont employés contiennent déjà les définitions de ce que l’on admet. Ainsi, le fameux « Socrate est un homme, or les hommes sont mortels, donc Socrate est mortel », ne prouve rien car un homme est par définition mortel, donc il suffit de dire que Socrate est un homme sans que la prétendue démonstration suivante n’apporte aucune information. Pour employer la manière de parler de Kant, il n’y a des jugements qu’analytiques, et non synthétiques.
Une autre imputation faite à la philosophie sceptique est de n’être finalement que destructrice, négative, et d’entraîner à la paresse intellectuelle ou à la bêtise. Les sceptiques se contenteraient de hausser les épaules à tout ce que l’on leur soumet, ne construiraient rien, et seraient tout à fait inutiles. Évidemment, rien n’est plus faux que ces imputations calomnieuses: c’est même tout le contraire. Sceptique, en grec, vient d’une racine qui signifie examiner avec attention. D’abord, ils reconnaissent la validité des impressions des sens. Ensuite, le sceptique se doit d’examiner avec la rigueur la plus sévère toutes les opinions qui lui sont soumises avant de décider de suspendre sont assentiment. Quant à l’accusation d’être infécond, il faut quand même préciser que le scepticisme est né avec la médecine, avec la méthode empirique, laquelle remportait plus de succès que la médecine traditionnelle qui se fondait sur des principes purement rationnels. Pour l’éthique, elle consiste à prendre en compte les circonstances, la raison et les traditions. On ne saurait trouver plus prudent et plus judicieux. Ainsi, loin d’être ennemi de la philosophie, le scepticisme apparaît en être plutôt le cœur et l’essence : toutes les écoles philosophiques lui empruntent peu ou prou, et on aurait du mal à ranger celle qui en serait totalement débarrassé au rang de philosophie, si elle était tout à fait débarrassée de prudence et de rigueur. La fin que se propose le scepticisme est une sorte de calme, non pas un calme paresseux et imbécile, mais un calme propice à l’examen dépassionné des sujets philosophiques, et plus propre à nous détourner des querelles stériles pour nous tourner vers les activités utiles.
Le présent texte est donc très complet, et la traduction bilingue de Pierre Pélégrin est de grande qualité : toutes les difficultés du textes sont indiqués dans un appareil critique maniable et concis. Cette édition l’emporte sur les Belles Lettres en lisibilité. L’introduction est passionnante, et un index des mots grecs étant des notions philosophiques permet d’avoir une meilleure intelligence du texte, qu’une simple introduction ne permet pas toujours. Le texte en lui-même est clair, structuré, mais parfois un peu aride, étant sans fioritures ni fantaisies. Mais tout respire un esprit de probité lumineux et véritablement enrichissant. En particulier, le panorama de l’histoire de la philosophie grecque, et de toutes les opinions dogmatiques de chacune des écoles est extrêmement intéressant : s’ils s’écartent d’Épicure, d’Aristote et de Zénon, c’est de la moyenne académie qu’ils s’estiment les plus proches, du moins de son enseignement exotérique, car ils accusent les enseignements acromatiques, réservés aux initiés qui payaient et étaient souvent destinés à des carrières politiques, de contenir les dogmes de Platon. Ce dernier point me semble en accord avec l’usage que les prêtres égyptiens faisaient de leurs mythes pour impressionner d’abord Pharaon, ensuite les puissants, afin de les contraindre à respecter une certaine éthique.
Le présent texte est l’un des plus complet qui nous soit parvenu sur cette école philosophique, qui se distingue des autres par sa volonté de ne pas construire de système, et de faire preuve d’une prudence et d’une rigueur intellectuelle au dessus de celle des autres écoles, en mettant un point d’honneur à ne pas admettre pour vrai ce qui est douteux ou sujet de controverses indécidables. L’auteur, Sextus Empiricus, est un grec, philosophe, astronome et médecin de la fin du deuxième siècle, donc postérieur à Plutarque : il expose une philosophie dont la paternité revient à Pyrrhon d’Elis, et il va en préciser la spécificité par rapport à toutes les autres écoles, dont il met en évidence les écarts par rapport au scepticisme, c’est-à-dire cela en quoi elles sont dogmatiques. Dans nos langues modernes, le mot « dogme » est associé aux règles fondamentales de la religion, mais pour les grecs, un « dogme » est une opinion, laquelle peut être ou vraie ou fausse, et donc les sceptiques appellent « dogmatiques » les philosophes qui adoptent des systèmes leur faisant accepter pour vraies de simples opinions pour lesquelles il est impossible d’être certain du fait qu’elles soient vraies ou fausses. Évidemment, une telle position les rend ennemis de tous les autres : ils sont ainsi caricaturés avec force comme des extravagants qui doutent de tout, même des choses les plus évidentes comme le simple fait d’avoir faim ou soif, et qu’ils périraient bientôt comme l’âne de Buridan si la sollicitude de leurs amis ne prévenaient les suites fâcheuses de leur fanatisme. Toutes ces imputations sont évidemment mensongères, car les sceptiques ne refusent de donner leur assentiment qu’aux opinions seules qui sont obscures, comme les questions métaphysiques sur la nature des choses, l’âme, les dieux, le temps, la vertu, etc… Pour le reste, ils adoptent les opinions communes, et se rendent aux évidences, comme celles des impressions faites par les sens.
Quoique cette réputation d’impudents un peu fous va leur coller à la peau, on ne manque pas de constater que toutes les autres écoles de philosophies, dans les controverses qui les opposent dans les questions disputées, vont toutes reprendre les arguments des sceptiques pour abattre les opinions de leurs adversaires. Les arguments des sceptiques s’appuient sur un certain nombre de faits : la grande diversité des mœurs des humains, la variété avec laquelle les humains sont affectés par les sens, la variété avec laquelle nous somme affectés par les mêmes choses en fonction des circonstances, et aussi en fonction de la fréquence avec laquelle nous rencontrons les faits, qui nous encourage plus ou moins à inférer. Tous ces éléments travaillent à considérer les questions débattues par les écoles avec prudence, et à vérifier s’il n’y a pas dans les démonstrations des dogmatiques quelque vice de raisonnement comme la pétition de principe (diallèle), ou quelque ruse sophistique plus ou moins élaborée, que la sagacité des sceptique se plaît à traquer. Cette méthode est assez féconde, ils vont même jusqu’à refuser la validité des raisonnements et démonstrations comme le syllogismes, dont les dogmatiques sont si fiers. Ces raisonnements ne sont que des coquilles vides, car les mots qui sont employés contiennent déjà les définitions de ce que l’on admet. Ainsi, le fameux « Socrate est un homme, or les hommes sont mortels, donc Socrate est mortel », ne prouve rien car un homme est par définition mortel, donc il suffit de dire que Socrate est un homme sans que la prétendue démonstration suivante n’apporte aucune information. Pour employer la manière de parler de Kant, il n’y a des jugements qu’analytiques, et non synthétiques.
Une autre imputation faite à la philosophie sceptique est de n’être finalement que destructrice, négative, et d’entraîner à la paresse intellectuelle ou à la bêtise. Les sceptiques se contenteraient de hausser les épaules à tout ce que l’on leur soumet, ne construiraient rien, et seraient tout à fait inutiles. Évidemment, rien n’est plus faux que ces imputations calomnieuses: c’est même tout le contraire. Sceptique, en grec, vient d’une racine qui signifie examiner avec attention. D’abord, ils reconnaissent la validité des impressions des sens. Ensuite, le sceptique se doit d’examiner avec la rigueur la plus sévère toutes les opinions qui lui sont soumises avant de décider de suspendre sont assentiment. Quant à l’accusation d’être infécond, il faut quand même préciser que le scepticisme est né avec la médecine, avec la méthode empirique, laquelle remportait plus de succès que la médecine traditionnelle qui se fondait sur des principes purement rationnels. Pour l’éthique, elle consiste à prendre en compte les circonstances, la raison et les traditions. On ne saurait trouver plus prudent et plus judicieux. Ainsi, loin d’être ennemi de la philosophie, le scepticisme apparaît en être plutôt le cœur et l’essence : toutes les écoles philosophiques lui empruntent peu ou prou, et on aurait du mal à ranger celle qui en serait totalement débarrassé au rang de philosophie, si elle était tout à fait débarrassée de prudence et de rigueur. La fin que se propose le scepticisme est une sorte de calme, non pas un calme paresseux et imbécile, mais un calme propice à l’examen dépassionné des sujets philosophiques, et plus propre à nous détourner des querelles stériles pour nous tourner vers les activités utiles.
Le présent texte est donc très complet, et la traduction bilingue de Pierre Pélégrin est de grande qualité : toutes les difficultés du textes sont indiqués dans un appareil critique maniable et concis. Cette édition l’emporte sur les Belles Lettres en lisibilité. L’introduction est passionnante, et un index des mots grecs étant des notions philosophiques permet d’avoir une meilleure intelligence du texte, qu’une simple introduction ne permet pas toujours. Le texte en lui-même est clair, structuré, mais parfois un peu aride, étant sans fioritures ni fantaisies. Mais tout respire un esprit de probité lumineux et véritablement enrichissant. En particulier, le panorama de l’histoire de la philosophie grecque, et de toutes les opinions dogmatiques de chacune des écoles est extrêmement intéressant : s’ils s’écartent d’Épicure, d’Aristote et de Zénon, c’est de la moyenne académie qu’ils s’estiment les plus proches, du moins de son enseignement exotérique, car ils accusent les enseignements acromatiques, réservés aux initiés qui payaient et étaient souvent destinés à des carrières politiques, de contenir les dogmes de Platon. Ce dernier point me semble en accord avec l’usage que les prêtres égyptiens faisaient de leurs mythes pour impressionner d’abord Pharaon, ensuite les puissants, afin de les contraindre à respecter une certaine éthique.
August 7, 2020
الكتاب مع يزيد
When you take some honey, it tastes good to you, there is no denying in that. But, is honey truly in its essence sweet? Some are disgusted by the taste of honey and they can argue the opposite (that honey is not sweet) so why bother arguing in the first place when it comes to true nature of external objects! Not bothering to argue and being convinced that we can't come to a conclusion leads to happiness (and a relaxed mind I guess), Skeptics argue.
Now there are two methods, Ten Modes, and Five Modes. The first is older and not as structured and logical as the second one in my opinion. Nonetheless Sextus suggest that Skeptics didn't come up with Five Modes to reject the Ten Modes but to provide various ways to refute Dogmatics whom Skeptics are doing their best to convince us (and them) that they do not hold the truth. In first book these modes (tools, methods) are outlined, in second and last book these modes are used to attack Dogmatics beliefs on Logic, Natural Sciences and Ethics.
Reading the book I learned that Skepticism is not as dumb as it's portrayed in other resources. Skepticism is not self-refuting, they do not say "everything is wrong" which logically leads to Skepticism itself to be wrong. Sextus is saying that if you ask me whether we are in Athens or not I'll boldly answer we are in Athens but for external objects appearances that we experience through our senses, that is highly arguable (I find honey to be sweet and I do enjoy it but I can't say honey in itself sweet or else all humans should feel the same, a nice weather is a better example, old people will say it's too cold. Marrying your sister is wrong? That is culture related not by itself is wrong). Skeptics don't say everything is inapprehensible, they say we just can't make a conclusion on the things we looked at so far, namely Dogmatics beliefs. This book is very comprehensive and dense as if it was a "textbook" for Skepticism. My critique however is that Skepticism was a reaction to Dogmatics (who for sake of discussion claim they have the ultimate truth) and Skeptics are showing us we can't hold ultimate truth so why try? We can agree on not being able to but for sake of practicality we should do our best (empirically) to reach the truth. We can't fine the truth solution to cancer but nonetheless we should come up with treatments that are good enough. Here comes Fallibility which is "taken for granted" in Natural Sciences. Fallibility can be considered an offshoot of Skepticism, they both agree on not holding the truth but the Fallibilists are at least trying.
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Ten Modes are of 3 types: concerning Subjects that are perceiving, concerning Objects that are being perceived, and the mixture of both.
1st mode of the ten is Animals (Subject), some things taste good to animals but taste bad for humans thus we can't say whether the thing in essence tastes bad or good.
2nd is Humans (Subject), some humans find pizza to taste good but others bad. When it comes to pizza I'm DOGMATIC SO F#@K YOU PIZZA IS AWESOME.
3rd is Senses (Subject), perfume smells good but tastes bad.
4th is Circumstances (Subject), some whether feels cold to old people but cool to youngsters, and when you're in love your ugly girlfriend looks beautiful HE ACTUALLY USED THIS EXACT EXAMPLE LOL.
5th is Position (Mixture), a rod looks tilted when submerged in water.
6th is Admixture (Mixture), skin color is different whether air is cold or hot.
7th is Quantity (Object), a piece of marble by itself look white but in a group looks yellow, grains of sand look rough but in quantity look smooth, drinking some wine fortifies us but too much quantity makes us wasted. Same goes with eating just the right amount of food or too much. Food whether healthy or not is obviously relative to quantity thus we can't say whether it's healthy or not in its essence.
8th is Relativity (Mixture), see 7th.
9th is Rarity (Mixture), though the sun is greater than comets we get shocked seeing comets because we aren't used to them, same goes to one who first sees sea. If gold was as common as stones, would we still get enchanted by it? Therefore we can't say gold has greater appearance (external object) than stones.
10th is Customs (Object), this is relates to ethics and myths and law. It's common for Indians to have sex in public but to Athenians it's shameful. Which are correct? We can't answer that thus we shouldn't try the answer it. You can't use laws in arguments since I can use opposing laws of other people too.
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Five Modes are: Dispute (opinions, I think the weather is cool but an old man thinks it's cold), Infinitum (two proofs that rely on each other thus infinite regress), Relativity, Hypothetical (you're building in something that is assumed and needs in itself to be proved), and Reciprocal. I believe we can apply these logical Five Modes into the Ten Modes above. For example, all first 4 ones are Relative. As for 10th for example is Hypothetical.
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Proofs can't exist. When something is unclear and we need proof for it then we can't make sure this proof is really proof for the unclear thing unless the thing was clear for us to verify, but if the thing was clear then the proof is not needed on the first place. This example is from me: if we are blind and we smell smoke, we can't say this smell is the proof of fire unless we open our eyes and see it, but then we can directly see the fire and it is clear for us so no proof is needed. This theme of "A proves B but what proves A?" is recurring throughout the book but here he is saying we don't need A if B is clear.
But (a big but), since we are proving the you can't prove anything then you can't prove that "you can't prove anything" thus you might can prove something! Thus, we can't conclude (whether we can prove something or not) and we should suspend looking for the true answer.
In other words: we just proved that you can't prove anything <--- contradiction
-----
On "can we have teachers and students?", what makes one an expert in Math in order for him to teach it? One is born ignorant on Math so he starts learning some Math theorems and after a while he is an expert. So how did he become one? Was their a certain theory he needs to learn to be called an expert? If this is the case then can we call one who only knows this certain theory an expert? .. You see, the problem with Sextus is that he takes things as extremes, either black or white and none of the colors in between (as we say), either 1 or 0. He is really concerned with the ultimate truth which humanity might never reach, but that didn't stop us from getting closer to it by the day! Same thing with being a Math expert, it is not black or white, it is not expert or non-expert as he claims. It's "a bit expert in linear algebra", "more expert than me in geometry", and so on; it's relative and not ultimate expert vs non-expert.
When you take some honey, it tastes good to you, there is no denying in that. But, is honey truly in its essence sweet? Some are disgusted by the taste of honey and they can argue the opposite (that honey is not sweet) so why bother arguing in the first place when it comes to true nature of external objects! Not bothering to argue and being convinced that we can't come to a conclusion leads to happiness (and a relaxed mind I guess), Skeptics argue.
Now there are two methods, Ten Modes, and Five Modes. The first is older and not as structured and logical as the second one in my opinion. Nonetheless Sextus suggest that Skeptics didn't come up with Five Modes to reject the Ten Modes but to provide various ways to refute Dogmatics whom Skeptics are doing their best to convince us (and them) that they do not hold the truth. In first book these modes (tools, methods) are outlined, in second and last book these modes are used to attack Dogmatics beliefs on Logic, Natural Sciences and Ethics.
Reading the book I learned that Skepticism is not as dumb as it's portrayed in other resources. Skepticism is not self-refuting, they do not say "everything is wrong" which logically leads to Skepticism itself to be wrong. Sextus is saying that if you ask me whether we are in Athens or not I'll boldly answer we are in Athens but for external objects appearances that we experience through our senses, that is highly arguable (I find honey to be sweet and I do enjoy it but I can't say honey in itself sweet or else all humans should feel the same, a nice weather is a better example, old people will say it's too cold. Marrying your sister is wrong? That is culture related not by itself is wrong). Skeptics don't say everything is inapprehensible, they say we just can't make a conclusion on the things we looked at so far, namely Dogmatics beliefs. This book is very comprehensive and dense as if it was a "textbook" for Skepticism. My critique however is that Skepticism was a reaction to Dogmatics (who for sake of discussion claim they have the ultimate truth) and Skeptics are showing us we can't hold ultimate truth so why try? We can agree on not being able to but for sake of practicality we should do our best (empirically) to reach the truth. We can't fine the truth solution to cancer but nonetheless we should come up with treatments that are good enough. Here comes Fallibility which is "taken for granted" in Natural Sciences. Fallibility can be considered an offshoot of Skepticism, they both agree on not holding the truth but the Fallibilists are at least trying.
-----
Ten Modes are of 3 types: concerning Subjects that are perceiving, concerning Objects that are being perceived, and the mixture of both.
1st mode of the ten is Animals (Subject), some things taste good to animals but taste bad for humans thus we can't say whether the thing in essence tastes bad or good.
2nd is Humans (Subject), some humans find pizza to taste good but others bad. When it comes to pizza I'm DOGMATIC SO F#@K YOU PIZZA IS AWESOME.
3rd is Senses (Subject), perfume smells good but tastes bad.
4th is Circumstances (Subject), some whether feels cold to old people but cool to youngsters, and when you're in love your ugly girlfriend looks beautiful HE ACTUALLY USED THIS EXACT EXAMPLE LOL.
5th is Position (Mixture), a rod looks tilted when submerged in water.
6th is Admixture (Mixture), skin color is different whether air is cold or hot.
7th is Quantity (Object), a piece of marble by itself look white but in a group looks yellow, grains of sand look rough but in quantity look smooth, drinking some wine fortifies us but too much quantity makes us wasted. Same goes with eating just the right amount of food or too much. Food whether healthy or not is obviously relative to quantity thus we can't say whether it's healthy or not in its essence.
8th is Relativity (Mixture), see 7th.
9th is Rarity (Mixture), though the sun is greater than comets we get shocked seeing comets because we aren't used to them, same goes to one who first sees sea. If gold was as common as stones, would we still get enchanted by it? Therefore we can't say gold has greater appearance (external object) than stones.
10th is Customs (Object), this is relates to ethics and myths and law. It's common for Indians to have sex in public but to Athenians it's shameful. Which are correct? We can't answer that thus we shouldn't try the answer it. You can't use laws in arguments since I can use opposing laws of other people too.
-----
Five Modes are: Dispute (opinions, I think the weather is cool but an old man thinks it's cold), Infinitum (two proofs that rely on each other thus infinite regress), Relativity, Hypothetical (you're building in something that is assumed and needs in itself to be proved), and Reciprocal. I believe we can apply these logical Five Modes into the Ten Modes above. For example, all first 4 ones are Relative. As for 10th for example is Hypothetical.
-----
Proofs can't exist. When something is unclear and we need proof for it then we can't make sure this proof is really proof for the unclear thing unless the thing was clear for us to verify, but if the thing was clear then the proof is not needed on the first place. This example is from me: if we are blind and we smell smoke, we can't say this smell is the proof of fire unless we open our eyes and see it, but then we can directly see the fire and it is clear for us so no proof is needed. This theme of "A proves B but what proves A?" is recurring throughout the book but here he is saying we don't need A if B is clear.
But (a big but), since we are proving the you can't prove anything then you can't prove that "you can't prove anything" thus you might can prove something! Thus, we can't conclude (whether we can prove something or not) and we should suspend looking for the true answer.
In other words: we just proved that you can't prove anything <--- contradiction
-----
On "can we have teachers and students?", what makes one an expert in Math in order for him to teach it? One is born ignorant on Math so he starts learning some Math theorems and after a while he is an expert. So how did he become one? Was their a certain theory he needs to learn to be called an expert? If this is the case then can we call one who only knows this certain theory an expert? .. You see, the problem with Sextus is that he takes things as extremes, either black or white and none of the colors in between (as we say), either 1 or 0. He is really concerned with the ultimate truth which humanity might never reach, but that didn't stop us from getting closer to it by the day! Same thing with being a Math expert, it is not black or white, it is not expert or non-expert as he claims. It's "a bit expert in linear algebra", "more expert than me in geometry", and so on; it's relative and not ultimate expert vs non-expert.
July 6, 2019
Eleştiri odağına dogmatiklere alarak dogmatik görüşleri kuşkucu yöntemlerle tek tek çürütmek için uğraşan Sextus Empiricus, "Pyrrhonculuğun Esasları / Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Scepticism" adlı eserinde hiçbir şey kesin doğru veya yanlış olamayacağını örneklerle okuyucuya sunuyor. Bakış açısının ne kadar önemli olduğunu belirten kitapta bize yanlış gelen düşüncelerin farklı iklimlerde, devletlerde, insanlarda ve zamanlarda doğru kabul edilebileceğini görüyoruz. Kuşkucu yöntemlerle kendinden sonraki filozoflara ön ayak olan Empiricus’un kitabını okuduktan sonra bir bakıma bakış açısıyla hiçbir şeyde net bir karara varılamayacağını anlıyoruz. Kitabın en can alıcı kısmı ise daha sonralar Spinoza’yı da etkileyecek Tanrı kavramı ve Tanrı’nın insanların şu anki bakış açısıyla gerçek olamayacağının altının çizilmesi. Felsefe tarihinde aşırı derecede ilerlendiği takdirde çok da etkilemeyecek eseri tam olarak Platon, Aristoteles, Cicero, Marcus Aurelius ve Seneca’dan hemen sonra okumakta fayda var. Tam notum: 3,5/5.
İstanbul, Türkiye
04.07.2019
Alp Turgut
http://www.filmdoktoru.com/kitap-labo...
İstanbul, Türkiye
04.07.2019
Alp Turgut
http://www.filmdoktoru.com/kitap-labo...
July 9, 2019
In these days when nitwits are willing to get into shouting matches (or to blow people up) in the defense of their moronic and sloppily thought out dogmatic opinions, there’s something refreshing about an ancient philosophy that says, “you probably don’t know what you’re talking about, and you should withhold judgement.” The Pyrrhonic Skeptics might have taken their philosophy of doubt a bit too far, but right now I think the world could do with a healthy dose of their way of thinking. There is a kind of peace in refusing to take positions on hot button topics about which you know little or nothing.
December 16, 2023
The unreasonable manner in which almost every fundamental truth gets denied by such far-fetched theories comes over as extremely pretentious and makes it seem as if denial for the pure sake of denial is the prime goal of the skeptics. Anyways this book was one hell of a pain to read through and certainly asserted pyrrhonism as my least favorite philosophy of the hellenistic age.
May 31, 2016
one of the most important books in the history of philosophy.
June 11, 2023
I’d like anyone who opposes dogmatism, refuses to judge, & seeks tranquility. Don’t miss 2(iv) on the infinite regress of truth criteria.
January 25, 2013
Are you skeptical about things? Is your instinct to disbelieve what others tell you, however trustworthy it seems and however often I've they've been right in the past? Well, let me tell you that you've got nothing -nothing- on the ancient Greek skeptics.
We all know that the major figures of ancient philosophy are Plato, Aristotle, and a bunch of others. (Maybe also Cicero, if you were educated prior to the 1950s.) The author of Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Sextus Empiricus, is one of those "others"- and not a particularly significant other at that. As even the publisher's intro to this book admits, he is more important for preserving these ideas -already old in his own day- than he is for any original thought or great philosophy himself. With that said, this book is still utterly fascinating, if a bit long at times.
The overarching goal of Skepticism ( = "Pyrrhonism") is "ataraxia", or peace within the soul--translated variously in my edition as either "tranquility" or "quietude." This is the goal of many (most?) philosophical systems both ancient and modern: how can I understand myself, God, and the world and consequently be at peace? In pursuit of this quietude, most of the Hellenistic philosophies turned to dogmatic declarations about their three primary categories of concern: logic, physics, and ethics. That is, by making absolute claims about reason (logic), the material about which we reason (physics), and how our lives should be shaped by reason and reality accordingly (ethics), the dogmatic philosophies all promised peace within the soul if only one would endorse and live according to these doctrines.
Full review available here: http://www.coyleneal.blogspot.com/201...
We all know that the major figures of ancient philosophy are Plato, Aristotle, and a bunch of others. (Maybe also Cicero, if you were educated prior to the 1950s.) The author of Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Sextus Empiricus, is one of those "others"- and not a particularly significant other at that. As even the publisher's intro to this book admits, he is more important for preserving these ideas -already old in his own day- than he is for any original thought or great philosophy himself. With that said, this book is still utterly fascinating, if a bit long at times.
The overarching goal of Skepticism ( = "Pyrrhonism") is "ataraxia", or peace within the soul--translated variously in my edition as either "tranquility" or "quietude." This is the goal of many (most?) philosophical systems both ancient and modern: how can I understand myself, God, and the world and consequently be at peace? In pursuit of this quietude, most of the Hellenistic philosophies turned to dogmatic declarations about their three primary categories of concern: logic, physics, and ethics. That is, by making absolute claims about reason (logic), the material about which we reason (physics), and how our lives should be shaped by reason and reality accordingly (ethics), the dogmatic philosophies all promised peace within the soul if only one would endorse and live according to these doctrines.
Full review available here: http://www.coyleneal.blogspot.com/201...
May 11, 2015
The Ten Modes of Pyrrhonism seek to prove that we do not know anything in itself, as it is, but only as it impresses itself upon us, relative to our unique senses, opinions, prejudices, etc. Everything we see, think about, interact with--really, every sense-impression and idea--is mediated to us in such a way that our mind is actively constructing reality.
The Skeptics called anybody who thought they knew reality as it is "Dogmatists" and "arrogant braggarts." From Montaigne to Nietzsche, Pyrrhonism has influenced many throughout history, and Sextus Empiricus is an impressive rhetorician who presents his arguments clearly and persuasively. Basically, the Skeptics were the postmoderns back in Ancient Greece, making them impressively contemporary. Nothing is free from the critique of the skeptics, and their mark can be seen in every century since.
The Skeptics called anybody who thought they knew reality as it is "Dogmatists" and "arrogant braggarts." From Montaigne to Nietzsche, Pyrrhonism has influenced many throughout history, and Sextus Empiricus is an impressive rhetorician who presents his arguments clearly and persuasively. Basically, the Skeptics were the postmoderns back in Ancient Greece, making them impressively contemporary. Nothing is free from the critique of the skeptics, and their mark can be seen in every century since.
September 17, 2011
Very good book for learning the art of rhetoric.
June 14, 2023
Everything on trial.
September 8, 2018
I really like this book. People should talk about it more.
July 23, 2024
I was close to giving it a 1 star. This is certainly not an enjoyable read, but what saves it is that it gives an important foundation for some future developments in the history of philosophy. For those familiar, this is almost as tedious as reading Aristotle's Organon.
At the core of this work is the central premise of the Pyhrronic Skeptic school: We live in a world of apparent knowledge, true knowledge is not necessarily impossible to grasp (as the Academic philosophers claim), but it cannot be asserted easily (as many "dogmatists" attempt), thus we must live in a mode of withheld judgement for the purpose of relieving our anxiety and dealing only with "appearances". Book 1 outlines why this is the case and debunks some common protests. Book 2 and 3 are very tediously picking apart various claims by dogmatists.
The main argument that seemed important to me was the departure from Aristotle. The Pyhronnists reject what Aristotle calls "demonstrations", primitive observations that are widely accepted and necessary to form the foundations of any premises in a syllogism or chain of causality. This line of reasoning is more or less repeated for 100+ pages as he walks you through the inadequacy of proof, then of causes, then of dialectic reasoning, then of addition and subtraction, etc.
Beyond the central premise, I found the conclusions to be kind of boring. I Imagine this is part of why this tradition didn't really have a huge popularity, because it leaves one in a suspended mode of...inaction. Of course the author addresses this criticism saying that just because we can't obtain true knowledge easily doesn't mean we should give up, or refuse to live...just that we shouldn't be so confident in our assertions and realize we are largely stuck with apparent knowledge.
So why read this? It's interesting and valuable to read attacks against the titans of ancient philosophy (dogmatists according to Sextus), Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, the Epicureans, and the Presocratics. The way they are taught sometimes gives the impressions that they are infallible or use perfect reasoning. Another point is that this is a refreshing departure from Metaphysics (speculating the essence of reality), to the now more popular epistemology (What can we actually know?). I haven't read Immanuel Kant, but I understand this to be a bit foreshadowing of his idea of Phenomena (Sextus' apparent knowledge) vs noumena (beyond comprehension). Kant builds upon this by laying out an ethics to deal with our limitations. Another contemporary philosophical battle this echoes is the Pyhrronists championing the analytic school. Demanding excessive rigorous standards and proofs at the cost of few confident claims, vs the Dogmatists championing the continental worldbuilders crafting intricate self-referential systems that capture everything.
Overall, any practical mind will find this painful to read through. I'm looking forward to reading the more modern rebuttals to this line of thought (Gödel, Wittgenstein, Quine, Peirce).
At the core of this work is the central premise of the Pyhrronic Skeptic school: We live in a world of apparent knowledge, true knowledge is not necessarily impossible to grasp (as the Academic philosophers claim), but it cannot be asserted easily (as many "dogmatists" attempt), thus we must live in a mode of withheld judgement for the purpose of relieving our anxiety and dealing only with "appearances". Book 1 outlines why this is the case and debunks some common protests. Book 2 and 3 are very tediously picking apart various claims by dogmatists.
The main argument that seemed important to me was the departure from Aristotle. The Pyhronnists reject what Aristotle calls "demonstrations", primitive observations that are widely accepted and necessary to form the foundations of any premises in a syllogism or chain of causality. This line of reasoning is more or less repeated for 100+ pages as he walks you through the inadequacy of proof, then of causes, then of dialectic reasoning, then of addition and subtraction, etc.
Beyond the central premise, I found the conclusions to be kind of boring. I Imagine this is part of why this tradition didn't really have a huge popularity, because it leaves one in a suspended mode of...inaction. Of course the author addresses this criticism saying that just because we can't obtain true knowledge easily doesn't mean we should give up, or refuse to live...just that we shouldn't be so confident in our assertions and realize we are largely stuck with apparent knowledge.
So why read this? It's interesting and valuable to read attacks against the titans of ancient philosophy (dogmatists according to Sextus), Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, the Epicureans, and the Presocratics. The way they are taught sometimes gives the impressions that they are infallible or use perfect reasoning. Another point is that this is a refreshing departure from Metaphysics (speculating the essence of reality), to the now more popular epistemology (What can we actually know?). I haven't read Immanuel Kant, but I understand this to be a bit foreshadowing of his idea of Phenomena (Sextus' apparent knowledge) vs noumena (beyond comprehension). Kant builds upon this by laying out an ethics to deal with our limitations. Another contemporary philosophical battle this echoes is the Pyhrronists championing the analytic school. Demanding excessive rigorous standards and proofs at the cost of few confident claims, vs the Dogmatists championing the continental worldbuilders crafting intricate self-referential systems that capture everything.
Overall, any practical mind will find this painful to read through. I'm looking forward to reading the more modern rebuttals to this line of thought (Gödel, Wittgenstein, Quine, Peirce).
July 14, 2024
Sextus cures the rashness of the dogmatists with the purgative medicine also known as skepticism. For example, some cultures it was permissible to have sex with your mom, have sex in public, have sex with your sister, have sex with another man’s wife, or have sex with another man. The ambiguity around sex should lead us—or so he argues—to suspend judgment about whether or not any form of knowledge of good, bad—or literally anything—is in fact possible.
Jokes aside, this book was interesting for its historical context, but in my opinion doesn’t offer that much positively into the realm of epistemology, or even my daily life. In fact, if I was to accept this carte blanche, then I would continue living exactly how I am right now and nothing would change! But having suspended judgment about all forms of knowledge, I will, he argues, be in a more tranquil state of ataraxia, otherwise known as equanimity. Unfortunately, even this thought makes me anxious, so I’m not sure how peaceful I will be knowing that I will never know anything. This truly is sort of an anti-philosophy or at least an anti-metaphysic
At the end of the book, I realized that I just read 300 pages were he attempted to very persuasively argue that one should not be persuaded by anything or anyone else, including himself. So…I guess we will, never know?
I shall, therefore, suspend judgment.
-b
Jokes aside, this book was interesting for its historical context, but in my opinion doesn’t offer that much positively into the realm of epistemology, or even my daily life. In fact, if I was to accept this carte blanche, then I would continue living exactly how I am right now and nothing would change! But having suspended judgment about all forms of knowledge, I will, he argues, be in a more tranquil state of ataraxia, otherwise known as equanimity. Unfortunately, even this thought makes me anxious, so I’m not sure how peaceful I will be knowing that I will never know anything. This truly is sort of an anti-philosophy or at least an anti-metaphysic
At the end of the book, I realized that I just read 300 pages were he attempted to very persuasively argue that one should not be persuaded by anything or anyone else, including himself. So…I guess we will, never know?
I shall, therefore, suspend judgment.
-b
February 27, 2025
By the end, the only things saving Sextus from one star were my interest in suspension of judgement and the comedic value of his arguments' absurdities. Some of my favorite samples:
"If being a human is the same for Theo as for Dio, the noun 'human', when it is brought into the construction of a statement, will make the statement either true in both cases or false in both cases. But this is not observed to hold; for when Dio is sitting and Theo is walking, 'A human is walking' is true if said of one of them and false of the other. Therefore the noun 'human' is not common to both, nor the same for both, but --if anything -- peculiar to each."
"They say that nine is necessarily a part of ten; for ten is divided into one and nine. And the same goes for eight; for ten is divided into eight and two. And the same for seven... Now if all these are included in ten, and if, taken together with it, they make fifty-five, then fifty-five is included in ten, which is absurd."
"If there are signs, there are signs; and if there are not signs, there are signs (for that there are not signs is shown through a proof which in fact is a sign); but either there are signs or there are not signs: therefore there are signs."
Almost 300 hundred pages of him uttering nonsense to disprove we have any knowledge of the existence of time, numbers, animals, objects, ourselves, and much more similar idiocy.
"If being a human is the same for Theo as for Dio, the noun 'human', when it is brought into the construction of a statement, will make the statement either true in both cases or false in both cases. But this is not observed to hold; for when Dio is sitting and Theo is walking, 'A human is walking' is true if said of one of them and false of the other. Therefore the noun 'human' is not common to both, nor the same for both, but --if anything -- peculiar to each."
"They say that nine is necessarily a part of ten; for ten is divided into one and nine. And the same goes for eight; for ten is divided into eight and two. And the same for seven... Now if all these are included in ten, and if, taken together with it, they make fifty-five, then fifty-five is included in ten, which is absurd."
"If there are signs, there are signs; and if there are not signs, there are signs (for that there are not signs is shown through a proof which in fact is a sign); but either there are signs or there are not signs: therefore there are signs."
Almost 300 hundred pages of him uttering nonsense to disprove we have any knowledge of the existence of time, numbers, animals, objects, ourselves, and much more similar idiocy.
March 27, 2024
Anyone who’s serious about logic and/or making assertions about the world (or acting within it) should learn Ancient Greek Pyrrhonist skepticism. Some of the later—more specific—arguments are pretty poor, even if we are to see them as operating within the mode of the Dogmatists. But the fundamental challenges remain essential. The text can also be quite repetitive as Sextus uses the same arguments again and again to show the flaws in the Dogmatists’ “proofs.”
Mates’ additional analysis herein is truly excellent though one wishes there was a broader analysis at the end, summarising the strengths of Pyrrhonist skepticism and pointing out where it could be improved. As a big fan of phenomenology, I also wish there’d been some exploration of phenomenology and how it overcomes certain Pyrrhonist limitations whilst building on its foundations.
Mates’ additional analysis herein is truly excellent though one wishes there was a broader analysis at the end, summarising the strengths of Pyrrhonist skepticism and pointing out where it could be improved. As a big fan of phenomenology, I also wish there’d been some exploration of phenomenology and how it overcomes certain Pyrrhonist limitations whilst building on its foundations.
December 31, 2019
Dogmatik Felsefeye kafamı tutmak istiyorsunuz; Sextus Empiricus karşınızda. Bir değil iki değil üç değil, tam 10 kavanoz kuşku...
Antik felsefenin tartışılan konularına gönderme yapar ve dönemin gelenekleri hakkında bilgiler verir. Kuşkucu felsefenin temel kavramları açıklanır. Diğer felsefe anlayışları, kuşkucu felsefe anlayışı ile ele alınır.
Bu kitaptaki anlamıyla kuşkuculuk aşırıdır, elbette bazı şeyler kavranamaz, bazı konular hakkındaki kararlar ertelenir veya karar verilmez. Ama Sextus Empiricus ileri düzey muhakeme ve kanıt ile ileri sürülen düşüncelerin aynı durumlarda olduğu düşüncesindedir ki bu kuşkunun ileri noktasıdır ve gereksiz bir kuşkudur.
Çeviri gayet güzel ve okunaklıdır.
Antik felsefenin tartışılan konularına gönderme yapar ve dönemin gelenekleri hakkında bilgiler verir. Kuşkucu felsefenin temel kavramları açıklanır. Diğer felsefe anlayışları, kuşkucu felsefe anlayışı ile ele alınır.
Bu kitaptaki anlamıyla kuşkuculuk aşırıdır, elbette bazı şeyler kavranamaz, bazı konular hakkındaki kararlar ertelenir veya karar verilmez. Ama Sextus Empiricus ileri düzey muhakeme ve kanıt ile ileri sürülen düşüncelerin aynı durumlarda olduğu düşüncesindedir ki bu kuşkunun ileri noktasıdır ve gereksiz bir kuşkudur.
Çeviri gayet güzel ve okunaklıdır.
partially-read
March 2, 2023Overview
Pyrrhonism is an ancient form of skepticism that makes "I don't know" into a well thought out and defensible position. Outlines of Pyrrhonism is the name of an introductory text written by the Roman physician Sextus Empiricus in the 2nd century AD based on the ideas of the Greek philosopher Pyrrho. Rome at this time was a place crowded with many philosophies; all competing for their own vision of metaphysics, logic and ethics; each one firmly entrenched and fighting for superiority. Pyrrhonism offered a respite to those who wished to understand the world around them, but who were unconvinced by all the greatest ideas available. To me, Pyrrhonism represents a philosophy of "disappointment with philosophy".
Points of Interest
* Pyrrhonists ask questions out of curiosity or because they are dissatisfied with their own understanding. While there are answers to be found, Pyrrhonists will find the answers unsatisfying because 1) they lead to more questions, 2) different answers might conflict with one another, and 3) the answers seem to always leave gaps in our knowledge.
* The defining characteristic of a Pyrrhonist is that they choose not to overlook knowledge gaps and they allow their consequent dissatisfaction to moderate their confidence in any given answer to their question.
* With enough questioning, a Pyrrhonist can become familiar with the best available answers to their question. At this point, the persistence of knowledge gaps keeps the Pyrrhonist unconvinced and stumped.
* For Sextus, we always know what seems true, but the relationship between "seems true" and "is true" is always questionable; or, to be more precise, it seems to always be questionable. The life of a Pyrrhonist is one that tries to make do without firm beliefs, one that (thereby) fully expects problems from the natural inaccuracy of our beliefs, and one that is rich in the knowledge of other people's similarly inaccurate perspectives.
Practical Implications
The practical implications of Pyrrhonism have to do with our attitude towards our beliefs. Something like a Pyrrhonian attitude can be seen in places that depend on making predictions such as business, science or warfare. Untested predictions regularly fail because the outside world is so different from the inside world of our thoughts. Regular failure makes self-criticism and changing one’s mind a natural part of life; this is a Pyrrhonian attitude. But not all beliefs are easy to test. Many beliefs about politics, religion or philosophy are too complex or too subjective for the outside world to regulate. Left untested and unregulated, the mind is free to believe just about anything it wants to.
Pyrrhonism disturbs this comfortable situation by asking us to remain aware that each of our beliefs, no matter how important, might be incorrect. The primary obstacle to this is our dedication to the beliefs most central to our life. But dedication just takes another form under Pyrrhonism. Instead of planning to defend a belief before finding opposition, Pyrrhonism begins with inviting and seeking out all opposition and alternatives. But then, dedication means that the seeking doesn't end. Accidentally, this makes their belief stronger as it grows to accommodate new explanations for itself. The catch is, this growth can only be achieved if we open our belief to being discredited. But for a Pyrrhonist, this is not a great sacrifice because no explanation is ever finished.
Personal Impressions
Knowing the truth turns out to be totally unhelpful in the task of living with the ones who disagree. Sextus merely shifts the focus of truth-seeking to this problem and decides that none of us have the truth until all of us have the truth. In the meantime, Sextus offers a way to live without it.
I take Pyrrhonism to be a perfect explanation of my own limitations. Its attention to the tension between what we know and what we don't know is the foundation of a humble, judicious, efficient, agile, conscientious, serious pursuit of understanding.
Addendum
I expect anyone who's persnickety about Pyrrho to be confused by the absence of proper terminology. With you in mind, I wrote some further notes on my concealment of technical language in sextus. Check the addendum for this article on my website https://jeremyinquiry.github.io/jerem...
Pyrrhonism is an ancient form of skepticism that makes "I don't know" into a well thought out and defensible position. Outlines of Pyrrhonism is the name of an introductory text written by the Roman physician Sextus Empiricus in the 2nd century AD based on the ideas of the Greek philosopher Pyrrho. Rome at this time was a place crowded with many philosophies; all competing for their own vision of metaphysics, logic and ethics; each one firmly entrenched and fighting for superiority. Pyrrhonism offered a respite to those who wished to understand the world around them, but who were unconvinced by all the greatest ideas available. To me, Pyrrhonism represents a philosophy of "disappointment with philosophy".
Points of Interest
* Pyrrhonists ask questions out of curiosity or because they are dissatisfied with their own understanding. While there are answers to be found, Pyrrhonists will find the answers unsatisfying because 1) they lead to more questions, 2) different answers might conflict with one another, and 3) the answers seem to always leave gaps in our knowledge.
* The defining characteristic of a Pyrrhonist is that they choose not to overlook knowledge gaps and they allow their consequent dissatisfaction to moderate their confidence in any given answer to their question.
* With enough questioning, a Pyrrhonist can become familiar with the best available answers to their question. At this point, the persistence of knowledge gaps keeps the Pyrrhonist unconvinced and stumped.
* For Sextus, we always know what seems true, but the relationship between "seems true" and "is true" is always questionable; or, to be more precise, it seems to always be questionable. The life of a Pyrrhonist is one that tries to make do without firm beliefs, one that (thereby) fully expects problems from the natural inaccuracy of our beliefs, and one that is rich in the knowledge of other people's similarly inaccurate perspectives.
Practical Implications
The practical implications of Pyrrhonism have to do with our attitude towards our beliefs. Something like a Pyrrhonian attitude can be seen in places that depend on making predictions such as business, science or warfare. Untested predictions regularly fail because the outside world is so different from the inside world of our thoughts. Regular failure makes self-criticism and changing one’s mind a natural part of life; this is a Pyrrhonian attitude. But not all beliefs are easy to test. Many beliefs about politics, religion or philosophy are too complex or too subjective for the outside world to regulate. Left untested and unregulated, the mind is free to believe just about anything it wants to.
Pyrrhonism disturbs this comfortable situation by asking us to remain aware that each of our beliefs, no matter how important, might be incorrect. The primary obstacle to this is our dedication to the beliefs most central to our life. But dedication just takes another form under Pyrrhonism. Instead of planning to defend a belief before finding opposition, Pyrrhonism begins with inviting and seeking out all opposition and alternatives. But then, dedication means that the seeking doesn't end. Accidentally, this makes their belief stronger as it grows to accommodate new explanations for itself. The catch is, this growth can only be achieved if we open our belief to being discredited. But for a Pyrrhonist, this is not a great sacrifice because no explanation is ever finished.
Personal Impressions
Knowing the truth turns out to be totally unhelpful in the task of living with the ones who disagree. Sextus merely shifts the focus of truth-seeking to this problem and decides that none of us have the truth until all of us have the truth. In the meantime, Sextus offers a way to live without it.
I take Pyrrhonism to be a perfect explanation of my own limitations. Its attention to the tension between what we know and what we don't know is the foundation of a humble, judicious, efficient, agile, conscientious, serious pursuit of understanding.
Addendum
I expect anyone who's persnickety about Pyrrho to be confused by the absence of proper terminology. With you in mind, I wrote some further notes on my concealment of technical language in sextus. Check the addendum for this article on my website https://jeremyinquiry.github.io/jerem...
October 19, 2022
As a first introduction to Skepticism, this book is great. I enjoy Sextus' way of explaining the world around him and found the science the used amusing. While I don't believe skepticism is practical, I see the appeal and appreciated the way Sextus presented all his arguments.
Read
June 16, 2019Just as promised on the box, the impossibility of knowledge comes as a relief.
Read
July 4, 2020البيرونية مذهب يجيب على سؤال "هل بإمكاننا المعرفة"؟ بلا ندري؛ حسب هذا المذهب الإنسان كي يصل إلى راحة البال عليه أن لا يحكم، فيرفع حكمه على كل شيء،و هناك اختلاف بين الناس في الأمور فمثلا في عادات و تقاليد سيكستس معاشرة الإنسان لأبويه او إخوته عيب و يعاقب عليه قانونيا لكن في ذلك الوقت الفارسييون كانوا يتزوجون أمهاتهم و المصريون يتزوجون اخوتهم "في ذلك الوقت كما ذكر في الكتاب"، المرأة اذا كانت عندها اكثر من خليل كانت قليلة الأخلاق عندهم بينما في المصر المرأة التي كانت عندها اكثر العشاق كانت تعطى خلخالا كتكريم لها، و الأدلة التي تفضل او تعتبر شيء أصح من الاخر اختلف الناس فيها و هذه الأدلة متساوية في درجة الإقناع اذا لا نستطيع أن نحكم، في الكتاب سيكستس كتب ضد الدوغمائيين (الذين يحكمون و لديهم اراء يدافعون عنها) و حاول أن ينقض كل ارائهم من المنطق، الأخلاق، السببية،الدليل،الإشارات، التقسيم....، في الوقت نفسه هم لا ينفون ظواهر الأشياء، فمثلا طعم العسل يبدو حلوا وهم لا ينكرون هذا، لكن هل حقيقته هكذا؟ هم يقولون لا ندري،
و أيضا يتبعون عادات و قوانين قومهم فمثلا اذا كان اكل لحم البشر في قومك مستباحا فكله و لا تحكم.
لقلة اطلاعي على المنطق لم أفهم الكتاب كما يجب ولو أنني اخذت فكرة عن المذهب و لدي الكثير من الاسألة حولها منها:-
١) ماذا عن أن لا نحكم بعدم الحكم ؟ الا نحكم عندما نقول بعدمية الحكم؟
٢)كيف عرفنا بأن الأدلة متساوية في الإقناع حتى نستنتج بأفضلية عدم الحكم؟
٣) هل يشكون في شكوكهم؟
٤) الا يعرفون بأنهم لا يعرفون؟
و أيضا يتبعون عادات و قوانين قومهم فمثلا اذا كان اكل لحم البشر في قومك مستباحا فكله و لا تحكم.
لقلة اطلاعي على المنطق لم أفهم الكتاب كما يجب ولو أنني اخذت فكرة عن المذهب و لدي الكثير من الاسألة حولها منها:-
١) ماذا عن أن لا نحكم بعدم الحكم ؟ الا نحكم عندما نقول بعدمية الحكم؟
٢)كيف عرفنا بأن الأدلة متساوية في الإقناع حتى نستنتج بأفضلية عدم الحكم؟
٣) هل يشكون في شكوكهم؟
٤) الا يعرفون بأنهم لا يعرفون؟
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August 18, 2011Kendimden bile kuşku duymaya hazır mıyım bilmiyorum ama buna yürekle atılabilirmişim gibi hissediyorum, yanlış zamanda, yanlış bir yerde olduğumu bile bilmeden bu atılımı gerçekleştirebilirsem, işin kötüsü, hedefime ulaşıp ulaşmadığımı bile öğrenememiş olacağım. Kuşkunun doğasında bir yerde durmak var ama decretum’laşmış, başka deyişle ketumlaşmış Kuşkuculuğun böyle bir finiş çizgisi yok, alabildiğine kuşku duymayı benimseyenler bir vakitten sonra bunu yaşamsal bir nefesmiş gibi algılamaya başlıyor, bu yüzden kuşku duymayı bir noktadan sonra bırakıp kendi dogmasıyla mutlu olanlara karşı da kuşku duymak, Kuşkucunun aslî görevine dönüşüyor. Dogmatik dogmatiği çeker misali, dogma sayısı arttıkça dogmalar-arası çatışmalar da kendi içinde çetrefilleşerek artıyor, bu da alabildiğine kuşku duyan Kuşkucunun baktığı her yerde bir ya da birkaç dogmatik görmesine neden oluyor. Böylece Kuşkucu, “Kuşkucu” kalabilmek adına, dogmatiklere bağımlı hale geliyor.
Bu yüzden “Secundum dogmaticos” yani “Dogmatiklere göre” kalıbı Kuşkucunun diline yapışıyor. Dogmatik ne derse desin, dediğini nasıl temellendirirse temellendirsin, karşısında Kuşkucuyu buluyor. Kuşkucu kendisinden emin bir şekilde, çürütülemeyecek hiçbir yargının bulunmadığını “secundum dogmaticos” ölçüsüyle dile getiriyor, başka deyişle ne kadar dogma ve dogmatik, o kadar kuşku ve Kuşkucu!
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Devamı için bkz. http://jimithekewl.com/2010/10/15/sex...
Bu yüzden “Secundum dogmaticos” yani “Dogmatiklere göre” kalıbı Kuşkucunun diline yapışıyor. Dogmatik ne derse desin, dediğini nasıl temellendirirse temellendirsin, karşısında Kuşkucuyu buluyor. Kuşkucu kendisinden emin bir şekilde, çürütülemeyecek hiçbir yargının bulunmadığını “secundum dogmaticos” ölçüsüyle dile getiriyor, başka deyişle ne kadar dogma ve dogmatik, o kadar kuşku ve Kuşkucu!
...
Devamı için bkz. http://jimithekewl.com/2010/10/15/sex...
March 21, 2024
This book has some of the most challenging philosophical puzzles ever conceived. This book alone made me a skeptic about everything. There are definitely some outdated and poor arguments in here, but this is more a record of skeptical arguments so not all of them are bound to be winners. The ones that persevere though—like Agrippa’s five modes, the dialellus (the problem of the criterion), and arguments against sense reliability—are bewildering and, for me, life-altering.
I truly do not know how to answer the questions the skeptics pose. The fact that these challenges remain largely unsolved, makes epistemologists and I worried that we may not possess any knowledge. I highly encourage those interested in epistemology and skepticism to check out this book and look at the modern iterations of the puzzles posed in it.
I truly do not know how to answer the questions the skeptics pose. The fact that these challenges remain largely unsolved, makes epistemologists and I worried that we may not possess any knowledge. I highly encourage those interested in epistemology and skepticism to check out this book and look at the modern iterations of the puzzles posed in it.
December 25, 2007
Sextus is a Roman who maddeningly recapitulates the philosophy of Pyrrhus, who did not believe that one could ever truly know anything. It would be nice to cogently disagree with Sextus, but most philosophers have, to their chagrin, found it exceptionally difficult.
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June 24, 2019*my dad upon reading the introductory blurb about Sextus* - 'this guy's against everything!!!'
Despite Sextus' tendency to drill his points in beyond necessity, this is an important skeptic document, and one that I would recommend to any interested in this way of thinking.
Despite Sextus' tendency to drill his points in beyond necessity, this is an important skeptic document, and one that I would recommend to any interested in this way of thinking.
December 2, 2023
As someone interested in the different traditions of Greco-Roman philosophy in the context of philosophy as a way of life, which is to say a tool for self cultivation or social reform, inevitably I would come across the Pyrrhonian Skeptics, a school for which this is a primary source to read.
It is hard to argue with Sextus Empiricus, as he will always insist that he was never making truth claims about the way something is or isn't but merely what it may seem to be. Which rather makes reading Sextus like reading the worst of any arguing comments section on Reddit today. (Or for that matter, like reading Stanley Cavell in the field of Emerson studies, deep cut, I know.)
It is hard to not become frustrated reading this work, even the editor, an influential scholar of virtue ethics, Julia Annas, clearly struggled as well, given the way she concludes her introduction:
"[Sextus'] skepticism is offered as a recipe for happiness. After all, skepticism is an ancient [Greco-Roman] philosophy; and ancient [Greco-Roman] philosophies were, in general, offered as recipes for happiness [i.e. living a good life.] [...] [Yet.] Sextus' advertisement for skepticism is false: do not read him if you want to be happy [...] [Only read Sextus] [i]f you want to increase your knowledge and understanding of philosophy and its history[.]
Yes, in other words, even don Julia Annas dismisses this philosophical text she is introducing as inherently flawed, and only worth your time if you want more context on Greco-Roman philosophy. I can't say, that I feel too much differently in the end. I found nothing of practical here, just historical context. The general skeptical attitude of the Pyrrhonian's is a curious novelty. Their arguments, and ideas, as actual tools for living well, I too find uncompelling.
If you are interested in the history of philosophy to which this is relevant, I would recommend reading anything else that also seems relevant first, and saving this for last, or, you know, never. Frankly, it would be more relevant to read a skeptical antirationalist type like Zhuangzi: The Complete Writings instead, if you hunger for this kind of philosophy. Zhuangzi offers fun stories one can fondly recall later that express their views, whether you find them convincing or not. That makes for far more memorable reading than the thin gruel of Sextus Empiricus insincerely arguing stuff.
It is hard to argue with Sextus Empiricus, as he will always insist that he was never making truth claims about the way something is or isn't but merely what it may seem to be. Which rather makes reading Sextus like reading the worst of any arguing comments section on Reddit today. (Or for that matter, like reading Stanley Cavell in the field of Emerson studies, deep cut, I know.)
It is hard to not become frustrated reading this work, even the editor, an influential scholar of virtue ethics, Julia Annas, clearly struggled as well, given the way she concludes her introduction:
"[Sextus'] skepticism is offered as a recipe for happiness. After all, skepticism is an ancient [Greco-Roman] philosophy; and ancient [Greco-Roman] philosophies were, in general, offered as recipes for happiness [i.e. living a good life.] [...] [Yet.] Sextus' advertisement for skepticism is false: do not read him if you want to be happy [...] [Only read Sextus] [i]f you want to increase your knowledge and understanding of philosophy and its history[.]
Yes, in other words, even don Julia Annas dismisses this philosophical text she is introducing as inherently flawed, and only worth your time if you want more context on Greco-Roman philosophy. I can't say, that I feel too much differently in the end. I found nothing of practical here, just historical context. The general skeptical attitude of the Pyrrhonian's is a curious novelty. Their arguments, and ideas, as actual tools for living well, I too find uncompelling.
If you are interested in the history of philosophy to which this is relevant, I would recommend reading anything else that also seems relevant first, and saving this for last, or, you know, never. Frankly, it would be more relevant to read a skeptical antirationalist type like Zhuangzi: The Complete Writings instead, if you hunger for this kind of philosophy. Zhuangzi offers fun stories one can fondly recall later that express their views, whether you find them convincing or not. That makes for far more memorable reading than the thin gruel of Sextus Empiricus insincerely arguing stuff.
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